1.  The United Nations Association has, for a very long time, been deeply concerned with the many issues relating to the three categories of weapons of mass destruction—biological, chemical and nuclear—with a special interest in the role of the United Nations in seeking their banning and their ultimate elimination from the face of the earth. We are thus very grateful to have been invited to submit this evidence to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs as it looks at the subject of weapons of mass destruction.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

  2.  A major concern of the Association in relation to biological weapons has been the relative weakness of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention's verification regime. Given that the Treaty dates from the early 1970s and is thus a product of the Cold War era, it is, in a way, a triumph that it ever came into being. At that point in time, intrusive inspection potential was non-existent and this is reflected accordingly in the treaty which was agreed.

  3.  It can be argued with considerable force that biological weapons today present the greatest danger of the three categories of weapons of mass destruction because they have the weakest verification regime.

  4.  Negotiations are continuing on the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Some quite good progress has been achieved. Nevertheless, even though 19 out of the 23 Articles are essentially complete, there remain issues to be resolved on others, including

—  Article 2 dealing with definitions on which the Russians have, ab initio, been insistent;

—  Article 3 addressing the compliance regime including the issue of non-transfers;

—  Article 7 on matters of technical co-operation.

  5.  We believe that Her Majesty's Government should continue to press for the completion of the negotiations on the Protocol during the year 2000 before next year's fifth Biological Weapons Review Conference. Having offered to host the signing ceremony of the Protocol in London, there is added interest in achieving this timetable.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

  6.  There is cause to be quite pleased with the progress made in the sphere of chemical weapons. Some years ago, we commended an initiative taken by Her Majesty's Government—when Geoffrey Howe was Foreign Secretary—to unblock an impasse over on-site inspections of chemical weapon sites. It certainly helped to strengthen the verification system of the subsequent Chemical Weapons Convention. The inspection system of the Convention appears to be working satisfactorily.

  7.  The Select Committee may wish to look into ways of enhancing the implementation of the Convention—and of the other treaties concerning biological and nuclear weapons—in rogue states like Iraq. Here, we believe, the United Nations Security Council has a key role to play, whatever the difficulties encountered. It would be in everybody's interest to see that role enhanced in a genuinely multilateral way and not left quite so much to the whims of the incumbent Administration in the United States of America.

  8.  The complicated story of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq requires careful analysis. It always depended on the support it received from UN member states, whether this was personnel, equipment or information. Nevertheless, the value of its presence on the ground and of its on-site development of contacts, continuity of process and skills has been amply demonstrated, despite all its frustrations and the capacity of the Iraqi Government to monkey with it, since it was withdrawn and the—considerably less than adequate—aerial surveillance regime was instituted. It is essential that the new inspection team is allowed to start work as quickly as possible and that the UNSCOM lessons are fully learned and previous mistakes are avoided.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  9.  There are a number of issues concerning nuclear weapons which we would urge the Foreign Affairs Committee to include in its enquiry. Among them are:

—  the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. We have always been particularly concerned at the lack of multilateral progress on the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty in which any nuclear weapon state, which is party to the Treaty, accepts to negotiate the reduction and ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons in good faith. Although the Russian Federation and the United States of America have made a number of important bilateral arrangements and although the United Kingdom has taken certain steps along that route, nevertheless there are many member states of the United Nations which feel aggrieved at the slowness of this progress. When the Treaty was extended indefinitely at the last Review Conference, there was considerable pressure to secure the more active and comprehensive implementation of Article VI. The United Nations Association fully supports those calls;

—  the current call by the United States of America to allow an amendment to be made to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty so that it can develop what has been dubbed the "son of Star Wars"—a limited missile system to protect itself against rogue states which might have long range rockets aimed against targets in the USA.

  The United Nations Association remains opposed to any such amendment being allowed. We fear lest it would set an unhealthy precedent for future amendments to other Treaties and could set off a new round of the arms race whereby potential adversaries would seek to increase their warhead and missile capacity in order to "outdo" any star wars style of defence capacity. We believe that it would be far better to intensify efforts to secure everyone's acceptance of comprehensive nuclear (and other) disarmament under the broad aegis of the United Nations.

  Basically, we oppose the inclusion of withdrawal clauses in the texts of Conventions or subsequent attempts to secure them.

  We remain highly doubtful whether the "rogue states" mentioned by the White House and the Pentagon have, or will easily develop or acquire, delivery systems to be able to launch a ballistic attack against US targets.

  We thus believe that the Select Committee should not support the proposed amendment to the ABM Treaty and should argue against the attempts being made by the US Government to incorporate its NATO allies into the search for such an amendment. We would like to see:

—  the creation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a nuclear weapons committee, which is currently being blocked by the United States of America. It is vital for genuine longer-term global security that the issue of nuclear weapons be resolved—through their elimination—and we believe that this process cannot be left exclusively to the "nuclear club". Although India and Pakistan have become members of that "club", Israel, at least officially, has not; and the position of Iran and Iraq remains clandestine. A working committee in the CD would be a practical step forward and would enable nuclear weapon issues to be openly discussed and, hopefully, agreements reached;

—  the timetabling of the final elimination of all nuclear warheads on a permanent basis. The existing nuclear weapon states are all opposed to any such structure being agreed. Nevertheless, many non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Association, believe that, without such a framework, actual reductions will take far too long to achieve and may thereby cause other potential Indias and Pakistans to develop and to declare nuclear weapon capacity. A timebound framework would also encourage nuclear weapon states to negotiate actively, in keeping with Article VI of the NPT, rather than to allow such discussions to potter along with no great sense of urgency;

—  adherence by all nuclear weapon states to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). An end to underground testing may not be as significant as it used to be, owing to the enhanced systems of computer simulation now available, but the CTBT is a significant confidence-building measure and full adherence to it would reduce the risks inherent in all nuclear tests;

—  no first-use policies. China now stands alone, we believe, in pledging no first-use of nuclear weapons. NATO'S doctrine of flexible response has never enabled the Organization to adopt a no first-use policy and Russia has reneged on its earlier position. India and Pakistan, we understand, remain equivocal on the issue. No first-use declarations are a valuable confidence-building initiative;

—  the de-alerting of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom claims to have done so, but some experts remain doubtful whether this is strictly true. This is another creative confidence-building measure which further reduces a nuclear exchange being triggered by mistake;

—  greater tolerance of the policies being proposed by the New Agenda Coalition in the UN General Assembly as they seek to promote nuclear disarmament. The issues which they raise are a vital component of the better control and final elimination of nuclear weapons; and

—  the PUGWASH study proposal to use Aldermaston for certain aspects of verification work.

  10.  Although, we imagine, outside the brief of the Foreign Affairs Committee's current study, nevertheless we believe that all nuclear policies—military and energy—will ultimately have to be considered as a comprehensive whole, since there are key areas of overlap which cannot permanently be kept separate. In the long run, nuclear energy cannot be seen as a safe energy source and materials can be manipulated to become useable militarily. The Committee might wish to engage in such a study as a follow-up to the nuclear aspects of its work on weapons of mass destruction.

  11.  That would be an initiative which we would warmly applaud.