1.  The task of combating WMD proliferation has become a prominent issue in international security in the post-Cold War period. The disintegration of the Soviet Union—which, in addition to its vast nuclear capabilities, was the world's main producer of CBW—and the ensuing political and economic instability in the USSR successor states have highlighted the need for a comprehensive response to possible proliferation from this region in particular. With Western, and primarily US assistance, nonproliferation arrangements were introduced in most of the countries in question in the first few post-Soviet years.

  2.  Political, social and economic upheaval in these countries—especially in Russia, which inherited the major share of Soviet WMD capabilities—has complicated both domestic and foreign policy choices relevant to non-proliferation, however. The strategic implications of NATO enlargement into former Warsaw Pact territory; the introduction of a new NATO strategic doctrine, and the Alliance's military intervention in the Kosovo conflict; the perceived widening of the military-technological gap between the Alliance and Russia; and the latter's inability to revive its military potential through defence integration in the former Soviet space and rapid domestic reform are prompting a far-reaching re-assessment of its security situation. This has had little impact hitherto on Russian adherence to international norms and security, disarmament and non-proliferation arrangements. However, the "cool peace" which arguable characterises the present state of security relations with the West may last for some time to come; its consequences are uncertain.

  3.  Authoritative Russian commentators have emphasised how fundamental differences between Russia and the US on cardinal issues of arms reductions and WMD non-proliferation have emerged as mistrust and misunderstanding has grown. The Clinton-Yeltsin relationship has not been cemented in positive mutual relations between parliaments and in public opinion, depriving relations of predictability and continuity; financial aid is seen purely as supporting what many Russians perceive as the catastrophic economic course which has led to social suffering, political humiliation and an increased sense of insecurity. The high priority given by US to problems of proliferation and terrorism is shared by the Russian security establishment, but important differences have become visible. Geopolitcal and commercial losses which would be incurred by sacrificing projects with countries such as India, the new nuclear power, and Iran, perceived in the West as a "rogue" state, are seen as unacceptable, particularly where Russia is not breaching the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime are not being breached and when double standards prevail in US support for Israel.

  4.  Influential sections of political opinion in Moscow envisage a situation where continuing cooperation on arms control could alternate with rivalry in regional issues. While it is unlikely that Russia's drive to export arms will become a major factor in the development of an anti-Western foreign policy, an arms transfer practice which one experienced defence industry analyst has characterised as "semi-informal and not fully-declared in nature" may emerge. Russia will operate as regional power with interconnected political interests and arms customers in a number of countries; depending on future political developments the effect of this may be, in contrast to hopes for common approaches to security, a degree of conflict between Russia and the West—and especially the US—in certain key regions of the world, extending to open or tacit political support for certain powers which do not go along with the Western-led consensus on non-proliferation.

  5.  The issue is complicated by continuing uncertainty also about the chemical and biological (CB) capabilities of the USSR successor states, the extent to which the Soviet Union's offensive military programmes have been dismantled or converted and the difficulties of monitoring production and verifying compliance with national export controls in these countries.

  6.  "Vertical" proliferation: with the Russian government giving official support to the CWC and trying hard to bring defence spending under control, the former Soviet chemical defence establishment has come under increasing pressure in the last few years and available evidence suggests that the extensive CW programme which existed in the late Soviet period has been discontinued. Considerable progress has been made in solving the problem of converting former CW manufacturing capacity; Russia's economic need to retain plant and find markets for civilian-related production has been recognised by the organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and is being addressed by initiatives aimed at ensuring that conversion is irreversible and subject to verification. There appears to be no current involvement on the part of the RF Defence Ministry in the affairs of former manufacturers of chemical warfare agents which might give rise to suspicion that CW programmes are continuing. Due to the government's neglect of all but the strategically vital parts of the defence sector, managers at these plants are being forced to diversify and develop civilian customers. A core defence industry receiving federal budget and extra-budgetary support to satisfy the critical procurement needs of the Russian armed forces and existing export markets is being preserved, but there is no indication that manufacturers of CW precursors form part of this core defence complex. The substantial R&D network which underpinned the Soviet CW programme also appears to have been largely reoriented either to chemical defence or to civilian-related work, although expertise in the relevant fields of chemistry—particularly in applied research—still exists.

  7.  The Yeltsin administration also signalled an end of officially-sanctioned BW programmes by opening up suspected offensive microbiological R&D facilities to inspection, introducing administrative changes to make them more accountable to civilian bodies and converting BW facilities to peaceful programmes to boost the country's performance in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. An agreement signed by Russia, the US and the UK in September 1992 introduced a set of measures to address concerns about Russia's compliance with the BTWC, including reciprocal inspection visits to BW facilities.

  8.  While there is no indication that the Russian government is currently sponsoring CW development and production for offensive military purposes—the 1993 Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine rejects WMD proliferation and calls for the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—there is still concern over the alleged existence of a Soviet/Russian binary CW capability, involving substantial industrial capacity to produce dual-use precursors which can be used in agricultural chemicals and also as binary components. The Russian government has denied the existence of such a programme and has not apparently declared any such interest—which would, of course, be a breach of the CWC—to the OPCW.

  9.  The programme undertaken by the Russian government to destroy stockpiles of existing CW constitutes a formidable administrative and technical task and represents a massive financial burden at a time when the state's economic and organisational capabilities are limited. It is certain that, without substantial overseas assistance (at a level which is unlikely to be forthcoming), existing stockpiles will not be disposed of within the period of time envisaged by the RF Federal Programme for CW Destruction and the CWC and the process may take many more years. Doubts about whether Russia can shoulder the economic burden involved could have implications for chemical disarmament in general. As one source noted: "After the August (1998) financial crash the State Duma adopted a protocol decision in which there is an instruction to carry out a juridical analysis of possible ways for Russia to leave the (CW) Convention. Today the country faces a dilemma: either to strain every nerve and spend our last penny to keep to the timescale laid down in the Convention or to leave it. It is in the West's interest to help Russia make the right choice".

  10.  Russian government assurances have also failed to allay concerns about an offensive BW programme in Russia. Statements by senior defence officials that biological warfare was not an intricate part of the Soviet defence doctrine and that BW were not part of Soviet military planning has been sharply contradicted by recent, widely-publicised disclosures by Dr Kanatyan Alibekov, the former deputy head of the Biopreparat organisation where a BW programme was based. He has described Soviet programmes to develop a strategic ballistic missile with multiple warheads containing BW agent, some of which was stockpiled, and maintains that the BW programme is continuing and has been concealed from Western inspectors. Among his claims are that smallpox stocks were transferred to the Vektor facility in Koltsovo in contravention of international agreements, and the possible existence of work on genetically-engineered viruses such as a smallpox/Ebola strain. Despite general Russian assurances that no BW work is now being done the relevant government agencies have not refuted specific allegations by Alibekov. Other reports have also raised alarm over the nature of work carried out at certain microbiological facilities. Authoritative sources have stated that there is a substantial number of individuals formerly involved in military microbiological programmes still working in the Russian biotechnology sector.

  11.  "Horizontal" proliferation: the Russian government is addressing this aspect of proliferation and measures have been introduced to conform to international practice on chemical and biological export controls. A Federal Law on export controls and a "catch-all" government resolution have recently been promulgated to back up the earlier introduction of lists of controlled chemicals, equipment and related production technologies and licensing procedures for exports of dual-use CB goods and technologies which conform with Australia Group (AG) guidelines; these are backed up by legal penalties for evasion.

  12.  The intrinsic dual-use nature and widespread availability of many key CB materials and technologies, coupled with a strong climate of opinion in favour of making them accessible to countries wishing to use them for commercial purposes, is a general proliferation problem faced by developed industrialised nations. The problem is considerable in Russia because of its size and technological capability in the sphere of chemistry and biotechnology. As well as several facilities which formerly produced CWC schedule 1 chemicals—in other words, chemical warfare agents or key final stage precursors—there are dozens of facilities producing CWC schedule 2 and 3 precursors and a hundred or more plants manufacturing discrete organic chemicals covered by the CWC. Large-scale capacity exists for pesticides, organo-phosphorus and -fluorine materials and a considerable range of other organic industrial chemicals. In addition, there are facilities in other USSR successor states of potential proliferation concern.

  13.  There is also a large number of facilities, apart from those known to have been involved in BW programmes, which might need to be monitored for illicit activities under a verifiable BTWC. One expert analysis has estimated the number of small production facilities with a fermenter at several hundred in Russia alone, and has stated that a lot of dual-use equipment used in the former Soviet biotechnology industry was produced indigenously. A substantial biotechnology industry exists in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, with other USSR successor states possessing more limited capabilities.

  14.  Political, economic and security issues peculiar to these countries are intruding into non-proliferation policy and must also be addressed. At national level financial and political pressures limit cohesion between agencies among which the tasks of constructing a comprehensive export control system are shared. The financial and administrative resources needed to provide adequate personnel, infrastructure and equipment to ensure industry outreach and compliance with non-proliferation measures is only part of the task involved. There are problems in ensuring the effective working of under-resourced customs services; some of the main customs posts are being equipped with trained staff and special detection equipment, but the situation at others is deplorable.

  15.  At industry level, the urgent need of market-orientated companies to realise their potential in terms of sales of G & T abroad may, particularly if sanctions are perceived to be avoidable and governments do not provide a strong lead, prompt them to ignore legal guidelines and act on the principle of "no questions asked" when trading in sensitive items. The tension between adherence to non-proliferation regimes and the urgent need to exploit scientific and industrial capabilities on global markets is made greater by the fact that some of the USSR successor states' traditional markets are in countries which give cause for greatest proliferation concern; industrial lobbies try to force the government to take a different view of the status of these countries.

  16.  Export controls have to be enforced by national authorities with the ultimate sanction being legal penalties imposed by the courts. The inadequacy of judicial procedures in the USSR successor states may prove to be a major problem in this regard. Underresourced and overstretched national authorities, facing an action by an aggressive and resourceful commercial concern sceptical about trade controls, may be unable to defend their action in a courtroom where judicial expertise in complex matters of commercial law is limited.

  17.  The official Russian position makes it unlikely that there will in the foreseeable future be any large-scale transfer of CB agents or technologies for obvious offensive purposes from Russia, which remains the major potential proliferation source in the region. Much more likely are small-scale cases (isolated incidents have already been alleged, but there are few hard facts to allow a firm assessment of the implications) involving the transfer of materials apparently destined for commercial use or of equipment ostensibly for the manufacture of commercial compounds. The danger of such transfers being facilitated by uncoordinated government activity, weak judicial enforcement of export control legislation and non-transparent trading practices in Russia and the other successor states still exists.

  18.  Retaining and modernising CW capabilities enjoys political support in some sections of the defence and security community. Although these are in the minority, the tradition of secrecy in the defence establishment is compounded by uncertainty as to political control over it. Democratic parliamentary control over the military in Russia is limited to control over the military budget, and establishing civilian control is likely to be a long and difficult process. The Russian defence ministry is still responsible for controlling financing and administration of the CW destruction programme (although one recent report suggests that part of its responsibilities have been transferred to the recently-created Agency for Munitions, which oversees Russia's commitments in the sphere of CBW proliferation). It is unclear whether its disposal of funding for this purpose is being properly controlled. There is also a lack of transparency as regards funding of sensitive biotechnology facilities in Russia. Concern thus still exists about the possibility of a resumption of clandestine programmes, which could also result in the creation of channels for the transfer of sensitive CB goods and technologies abroad.

  19.  Providing further assistance to Russia and enlisting its cooperation in international efforts to keep pace with technological developments in the chemical and biotechnology spheres with a view to furthering nonproliferation should be under serious consideration. There is a continuing need to study the political, legal and institutional arrangements surrounding chemical and biological demilitarisation, and the non-proliferation process in general, in Russia and the USSR successor states and for fresh initiatives to build on progress achieved in this sphere.