Writing in 1993, Sir Michael Quinlan raised the question of whether the world still needed nuclear weapons. He concluded that it did and that Western policy on nuclear possession should continue unchanged.[34]

  Since then there has emerged a significant body of authoritative international opinion, which outspokenly favours the elimination of nuclear weapons. This includes a sizeable number of very senior retired military officers, Presidents and Prime Ministers. There are substantive reasons for this development, which suggest that it is now time to revisit the questions posed in Quinlan's article.

  An important catalyst for new thinking about this question was the view which emerged in the wake of the Gulf War that the USA's main objective should be to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[35] Elimination was one way of achieving that objective and would bring other benefits. Besides removing "all kinds of risks of catastrophic destruction" America would then "be free to enjoy two extraordinary strategic advantages: first, as the least threatened of major states, and second, as the one state with modern conventional forces of unmatched quality." This led to the conclusion that it would be very much in the interests of the USA if all nuclear weapons were "taken off the table of international affairs"—if only one knew how.[36]

  The revisionary process has meanwhile been at work on some of the assumptions underlying the Western policy of nuclear deterrence. A re-examination of decision-making by all parties involved in the Cuban Missile crisis made several of the original participants—notably Robert McNamara, then US Secretary of Defence—realise we had come much closer to a nuclear exchange than people realised at the time. This led him to conclude that the indefinite combination of nuclear weapons and human fallability would inevitably lead to a nuclear exchange. McNamara's personal conviction was reinforced by retrospective analysis of various situations and incidents in the 1960-85 period, highlighting the inherent danger of inadvertent and/or accidental war.[37]

  In other words, nuclear deterrence was not and never had been risk free. Furthermore, access to Soviet archives cast serious doubt on the core Western assumption: that Soviet policy in the Cold War years was driven by an urge to military expansion. This undermined the claim that nuclear weapons had kept the peace, leaving the central truth that it was the existence of nuclear weapons which made nuclear war possible.

  This led to the question of whether, in the post-cold-war security environment, we should adopt "the firm and serious policy goal of a nuclear-free world?"[38] In addressing that question, there emerged a new awareness that the policy-choice was not between the seemingly-stable, low-salience, nuclear world which we currently enjoyed and some future, hypothetical, nuclear-free world. We had to choose between two unfolding processes; we had to compare likely outcomes over time. Neither policy would be risk free.

  Risk is the product of the consequences of a calamity and the likelihood of its occurrence. In a nuclear world (such as we have known this half century) the worst case is a full-scale nuclear exchange. In a non-nuclear world, the risk would be nuclear breakout, leading in the very worst case to the limited use of nuclear weapons. Opinions may differ on the comparative probability of the worst case occurring under the different policies. But in terms of risk, we can be certain that any disparity would be insufficient to balance the incomparable calamity of a nuclear exchange.

  It was this kind of thinking that persuaded experienced military men like Field Marshal Lord Carver and USAF General Lee Butler to support the goal of a nuclear-free world.[39]

  There were other reasons for this re-evaluation, including the 1995 Review conference on the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. Preparation for the Conference engaged the attention of officials and politicians, raised public awareness and prompted new analyses by non-governmental groups. These included the Washington-based "Project on Eliminating Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction",[40] and the international "Canberra Commission". The latter was specifically tasked by the Australian Government to develop concrete proposals on how to achieve a nuclear-free world.

  Another spur was the growing danger of nuclear proliferation, in part a byproduct of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but also a corollary of the two-tier structure of the NPT. Added to the opinion that elimination would be in US interests and to the technical demands of the START dismantling process, this stimulated new research and increased investment in the science and technology of verification, which was still low on its learning curve. It was concluded that a nuclear-free world was within the bounds of feasibility.

  The Canberra Commission published its report in August 1996, soon after the ruling by the International Court of Justice that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons [would] generally be contrary both to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and in particular to the principles and rules of humanitarian law."[41] The Commission's report described practical measures to bring about the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and called on the five nuclear powers "to give the lead by committing themselves unequivocally" to that goal.[42] It was followed in December 1996 by a "Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals" (including 19 from the USA and 17 from Russia) supporting the principle of "continuous, complete, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons".

  In February 1998, "The State of the World Forum" released an open statement that had by then been signed by over 100 former civilian leaders and senior officials (including 52 past Presidents and Prime Ministers) from 48 states (including the major powers). Noting that "immediate and practical steps" towards a nuclear-free world had been "arrayed in a host of compelling studies", the statement called on the five nuclear powers to commence "the systematic and progressive reduction and marginalisation of nuclear weapons" and declare "unambiguously that their goal is ultimate abolition". The statement was launched with a powerful speech by General Lee Butler, in which he explained how he had come to reject the theories and doctrine he had subscribed to throughout his service career, with particular emphasis on the "treacherous axioms" of nuclear deterrence.[43]

  In June 1998, the Foreign Ministers of eight good friends of the Western nuclear powers issued a joint declaration supporting the Canberra Commission's conclusions on the danger of nuclear war and calling on all nuclear-weapons states to commit themselves "unequivocally": and "now", to the "speedy, final, and total elimination" of their nuclear weapons capability.[44]

  The need for action by the nuclear weapon states was echoed by the Tokyo Forum's report delivered to the UN Secretary General in August 1999. This study by senior international experts had been initiated in August 1998 by the then Prime Minister of Japan and was carried forward by his successor.

  These various statements differ in their details and emphases, but share the conviction that the continued existence of nuclear weapons imperils mankind. They all stress the crucial importance of the five nuclear powers making an unequivocal (rather than rhetorical) commitment to the elimination of such weapons and the need to back words with action. They consider that such a commitment would have a radical influence on the problem of proliferation. Some believe it would have a transformative effect on the international system.

  Judging by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the British Government remains unpersuaded by these arguments. It seems not to agree that nuclear weapons imperil mankind, noting merely that "the world would be a better place if such weapons were still not necessary".[45] Nor is the Government prepared to make an unequivocal commitment to the goal of a nuclear-free world,[46] which it considers can only come about when the conditions exist "in which no state judges that it needs nuclear weapons to guarantee its security".[47]

  This is a legitimate point of view, and the Government is under no obligation to present a case other than its own.[48] But it is under an obligation not to misrepresent the alternative policy, as it does when it says that "the condition for complete nuclear disarmament does not yet exist". The context implies that proponents of the alternative policy think it does exist, whereas they have always been explicit that elimination will be an evolutionary process, taking 20-30 years, or longer.

  The Government also has a responsibility not to use words that mislead the public as to the policy it is actually pursuing. Reading of its "commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons", one would assume that the Government supported the various statements referred to above. That is, unless one knew that some such form of words had been used since 1970, the year the NPT entered into force and (coincidentally) the build up of nuclear arsenals began in earnest. Past usage has ensured that in sophisticated circles, "commitment" to elimination is understood to be rhetorical, unless it is qualified by a term like "unequivocal".[49] The average reader (let alone the electorate) is not aware of that convention.

  There is a third, important point. The question of whether Britain should adopt "the firm and serious policy goal" of eliminating nuclear weapons is of a different order and in a different category to questions concerning the utility of an independent British deterrent or the number of Trident warheads. In the short-to-medium term these questions are not interdependent. A decision to adopt the goal of a nuclear-free world need have no early effect on the other category of questions.[50]

TO CONCLUDE

  Writing in 1993, Sir Michael Quinlan, recently retired as Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, posed two questions. First, did the world have to have nuclear weapons at all? Second, were there adequate reasons for not adopting the firm and serious policy goal of a nuclear-free world?[51]

  Quinlan answered both questions in the affirmative and it is reasonable to assume that this was Government policy at the time. Lip service notwithstanding, the Strategic Defence Review gives no reason to suppose that Government policy has changed in this particular area.[52]

  Since 1993, a series of international reports and declarations have reached a different conclusion and answered both questions in the negative. A common feature of these documents has been the range and calibre of the signatories and the depth, spread and relevance of their political and professional expertise.

  This does not mean they are necessarily right. But it does suggest that their conclusions deserve serious consideration, which they have not received to date. Seven years down the road, Quinlan's questions should be revisited publicly and with an open mind, bringing into the analysis the considerable body of new thinking (evidence and argument) that has accrued since 1993.

  When addressing this issue, it is important that the global question of the future of nuclear weapons be treated as quite separate to questions concerning the British deterrent, which are not directly related at this level of analysis. The global question can only be analysed by envisaging the unfolding of the alternative policies (each with its attendant consequences, good and bad), and comparing the risks over time.

35   The idea was floated initially by Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and subsequently US Secretary of Defence. Back

36   Reducing nuclear danger: the road away from the brink (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) p 5. Joint authors: McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1961-66; Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1985-89; Sidney Drell, nuclear physicist and long-time advisor to the US government. Back

37   For example: Bruce G Blair, The logic of accidental war (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1993); Scott D Sagan, The limits of safety: organisations, accidents, and nuclear weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1992). Back

38   This was Michael Quinlan's formulation. The qualifiers were needed to distinguish this course of action from rhetorical pronouncements during the previous 25 years. Back

39   As CinC Strategic Air Command (1991-92) and CinC Strategic Command (1992-94), General Butler had been responsible for all USAF and USN nuclear deterrent forces. Back

40   The Chairman of the Project's Steering Committee is General Andrew Goodpaster, currently co-Chair of the Atlantic Council and formerly SACEUR (1969-74); the 17 members include Robert McNamara (US SecDef 1961-68), Amb Paul Nitze (Arms Control Supremo 1981-89), General Charles Horner (CinC N American Aerospace Defence Command 1992-94), and General WY Smith (Dep US CinC Europe). This multi-year project was launched by the Henry L Stimson Center in 1994 and has published 10 reports to date. The most relevant to this discussion is the Steering Committee's Second Report An Evolving US Nuclear Posture (December 1995). It advocates "an up-front, serious commitment to the long-term objective of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction" combined with an "evolutionary" nuclear posture of careful phased reductions. Back

41   The Court was unable to "conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in the extreme circumstances of self-defence, in which the very survival of the state would be at stake". Back

42   The Canberra Commission also concluded: "There is no doubt that, if the peoples of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them . . ." Back

43   For extended extracts from his speech at the National Press Club, Washington on 2 February see Disarmament Diplomacy (London: Acronym Institute, No 23, Feb 1998) pp 24-30. Back

44   "A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda", Joint Declaration in Dublin by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998. This said (inter alia) "we are deeply concerned at the persistent reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to approach their Treaty obligations [under the NPT] as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons". Back

45   Quotations from the SDR come from paragraphs 3, 20, 22 of the Supporting Essay on Deterrence (etc). Back

46   In this part of the SDR, the term "unequivocal commitment" is only used in respect to Britain's obligations under the NPT, where the reference to nuclear disarmament can be construed in different ways. Back

47   China has always favoured the elimination of nuclear weapons, as (until quite recently) had India. In January 1986, genuinely concerned about what he saw as the very real and growing danger of nuclear war, Mikhail Gorbachev made a formal proposal (repeated in October that year at Reykjavik) that all nuclear weapons should be eliminated by the year 2000. Through 1992, Russia continued to advocate (unequivocally) complete nuclear disarmament. Back

48   The SDR is uninformative in this respect, but there appears to have been no significant change in the long-standing policy inherited from the Conservatives. Nuclear deterrence is needed to keep the peace unless (or until) there is a fundamental change in the nature of the international system, such that no state sees the need for nuclear weapons. Failing such a change, the Government doubts the very feasibility of a verifiable nuclear-free world and, even if it were achievable, it would not necessarily be desirable. In such a world, the possibility of conventional war between major powers would re-emerge, leading (most likely) to the reconstitution of nuclear arsenals, and (possibly) to nuclear war. In sum, stay with the devil you know, make comforting noises about nuclear disarmament, but no unequivocal commitments to a nuclear-free world. Back

49   This convention was confirmed implicitly by the careful wording of a statement by Baroness Symons in the Lords (note 50, below). Quoting the Papal representative's call "for an unequivocal commitment to the abolition of nuclear arms", she said she was "happy to repeat that the Government was committed to the global elimination of those nuclear weapons". Note the elision of "unequivocal". Back

50   One explanation for the new Government's reluctance to debate the question of eliminating nuclear weapons could be that it (wrongly) perceives nuclear matters as a single ball of string. It is loath to tamper with the ball lest the rationale for a British nuclear capability starts to unravel. Back

51   See note 32. For an up-to-date version of Quinlan's argument see Thinking about nuclear weapons, (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1997) For a rebuttal see McGwire, "The elimination of nuclear weapons" in John Baylis & Robert O'Neill eds. Alternative Nuclear Futures, (Oxford University Press, 1999). Back

52   This conclusion is supported by the carefully worded statements of Baroness Symons, when she took the "opportunity to present . . . the Government's position on nuclear disarmament". (Hansard, 17 December 1997, columns 684-89). She claimed that a speech in the UN First Committee by the Papal representative calling for the world "to move to the abolition of nuclear weapons through a universal non-discriminatory ban" was mirrored in the Government's manifesto commitment to "mutual, balanced and verifiable nuclear disarmament". The Government would "work for the global elimination of nuclear weapons" by pressing for "multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions". (See also note 47 above.) This Lords debate was noteworthy for having one Prelate (the Lord Bishop of Oxford) opposing a nuclear-free world, one Field Marshal (Lord Carver) in favour, and two Field Marshals (Lords Carver and Bramall) advocating the elimination of Britain's nuclear capability. Back