This submission is written to express concern at the current policy of nuclear deterrence, the implicit preparedness to use nuclear weapons that it involves, and the lack of compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

  As a teacher of ethics, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons, either to initiate a war, or to prosecute a hitherto conventional war by nuclear means, or as retaliation for the use of nuclear weapons by another belligerent, would be both disproportionate to any foreseeable benefit and indiscriminate between combatants and non-combatants, and therefore completely unacceptable.

  This granted, the preparedness to use nuclear weapons implicit in a policy of nuclear deterrence becomes hard to justify. While in theory a conditional willingness to use nuclear weapons could conceivably be necessary in some circumstances to avert nuclear hostilities, the risks attaching to a policy of deterrence, including those of nuclear accidents and military misperceptions, and particularly those of nuclear proliferation, strongly suggest that a policy of nuclear deterrence cannot begin to be justified.

  Further, the obligations undertaken by this country under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate nuclear de-escalation and disarmament are simply not being honoured, despite the Treaty itself, despite the strong prudential case for compliance, and despite the moral case (as expressed above) for moving away from current nuclear weapons policies.

  Efforts to negotiate the decommissioning of dangerous Russian nuclear facilities, if necessary through offers of technical assistance and/or of reductions to the British nuclear armoury, should also be undertaken, before shifts in Russian policy render such efforts hopeless.

  I submit that the Foreign Affairs Committee should press HMG for action to take the above matters much more seriously.