West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's submission is based on terms of reference 1, 4 and 5. This government has constantly reiterated its desire for world-wide nuclear disarmament and is well-placed to take a lead towards this end.

  1.  "The progress and effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes, specifically the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)".

  4.  "The effectiveness of the main non-proliferation regimes' verification and enforcement procedures".

  5.  "The UK's role in encouraging non-signatory states to sign appropriate treaties and in improving the monitoring of compliance with treaty obligations".

Term of reference 1

  There is no room for complacency or neglect of the issues by political leaders. The progress and effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes since the last major NPT Review Conference in 1995 has not been good. India and Pakistan, not signatories to the NPT, have both tested nuclear devices; there are strong suspicions that Iraq, Iran and North Korea aspire to become nuclear capable. US adherence to treaties is crumbling (see below), China has modernised her nuclear arsenals and Russia has tested new TOPOL missiles.

  The Guardian (14 January 2000) reports that Acting President Vladimir Putin has decreed a new national security strategy. Its more confrontational attitude to the West, saying that nuclear weapons can now be used in response to conventional attack, is sparked partly by NATO's eastwards expansion and the perceived US aim to use its military might to dominate the world. As NATO has always adopted a policy of No-First-Use, we can hardly be surprised that Russia is following our example.

  India and Pakistan are unlikely to sign the NPT, and non-nuclear NPT signatories are increasingly unlikely to abide by it, until they see some movement from the nuclear states to honour their agreements under Article 6 to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

  At the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, the Treaty was extended indefinitely, but only with agreement to a (non-binding) set of Principles and Objectives. One was that there should be an early conclusion of negotiations for a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning production of fissile materials. The UK could unblock progress towards a FMCT by agreeing to allow current stocks of plutonium to be covered by the treaty. To do otherwise is to call into question the seriousness of a desire for nuclear disarmament.

  US moves towards a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMD), money for which is likely to be confirmed in June, contravene the ABM Treaty and threaten a new arms race. The UK is encouraging the US by allowing it to expand its base at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire to provide essential communications for the BMD.

Term of reference 4

  The announcement in the Labour Party's Strategic Defence Review (1997) that the expertise of Aldermaston would be used partly to develop effective verification and monitoring regimes for treaties is to be welcomed and encouraged.

  It is to be hoped that the failure of the US to ratify the CTBT will not mean withdrawal of funds for the treaty's verification and monitoring procedures. Should this happen, the UK should be prepared to divert some of its defence budget to this end.

Term of reference 5

  The CTBT has suffered a severe blow by the refusal of the US last October to ratify it. It was good to see UK pressure on the US to ratify and it is to be hoped that this will be maintained.

  The best way to encourage states which have not signed treaties is for the UK to comply with both the spirit and the letter of treaties to which it is signatory. The choice is not between proliferation and non-proliferation but between proliferation and disarmament.