INTRODUCTION
This Memorandum will focus principally on nuclear
weapons. Whilst the control and elimination of chemical and biological
weapons is of immense importance, far less progress has been made
with regard to nuclear weapons. In fact the proliferation of nuclear
weapons is threatening to become critical, ie beyond control.
CND welcomes the Foreign Affairs Committee's timely Inquiry.
The number of nuclear warheads and the number
of nuclear weapon systems have both reduced world-wide over the
last decade. However the new warheads and systems that have been
deployed are more powerful than ever even if the warhead yields
are generally smaller. This is due to increased range, increased
accuracy, independent targeting, more flexible delivery and more
sophisticated communications systems. There are still 36,000 nuclear
weapons world-wide and nuclear arsenals are still effectively
on high alert status.
Whilst the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have
either scrapped nuclear weapons or sent them back to Russia, and
South Africa has scrapped its nuclear arsenal, the proliferation
of nuclear weapons continues and is in danger of accelerating
out of control. India and Pakistan now possess nuclear weapons
although, along with Israel, they are not allowed to join the
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) "club". There are clear
indications that other states wish to develop nuclear weapons
and if, as seems very possible, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty process collapses still further states have indicated that
they could well take the nuclear route. Added to this horizontal
danger is the continuing vertical proliferation. All the states
possessing nuclear weapons are in the process of developing or
deploying new or enhanced nuclear warheads and/or systems.
There has been some apparent progress on nuclear
arms control, notably the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but the
international nuclear disarmament process is at present deadlocked
and in danger of collapse. While the NWS apparently bicker amongst
themselves they are in fact trying to maintain a policy of no
effective nuclear disarmament for themselves and no nuclear proliferation
for everyone else. As events have shown this policy is not sustainable.
However they continue to pursue it thus increasing the likelihood
of proliferation, raising nuclear tensions between themselves
and lowering the nuclear threshold.
Addressing the terms of reference of the Inquiry
clearly demonstrates that if there is to be significant progress
towards the global abolition of nuclear weapons then the NWS will
need to pursue a different policy. In particular there is an opportunity
for the UK to take a lead on this issue, to break the deadlock
in the international nuclear disarmament process and make significant
advances towards the control and elimination of nuclear weapons.
CND believes that the UK Government should cancel the Trident
nuclear weapon system programme and work vigourously for the global
abolition of nuclear weapons.
1. "THE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES, SPECIFICALLY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), THE PROPOSED FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABM)"
For a variety of reasons all the treaties and
indeed the whole non-proliferation process is under threat.
1.1 The bargain of non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament which is at the heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty NPT and which was re-emphasised at the 1995 Review Conference
has not been kept. The record of the NWS is not good. As well
as the continued modernisation of their nuclear arsenals they
retain, with the exception of China, a first-use policy and sub-strategic
policies which can be incompatible with the negative security
assurances given to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Again
with the exception of China, they remain unmoved by the opinion
of the International Court of Justice and did all in their power
to block the New Agenda Coalition resolution in the UN First Committee
and General Assembly.
1.2 While none of the NWS are fulfilling
their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty clearly the major
responsibility is on the United States of America and the Russian
Federation to move the disarmament process forward more rapidly
and effectively. The end of the Cold War provided the opportunity
for a new view of nuclear weapons and arms control and reductions,
yet negotiations between the US and Russia are deadlocked in an
outdated process based on Cold War perspectives. The blame may
well lie mostly with US and NATO actions and intentions, but whether
or not that is the case the solution to the logjam in negotiations
is for the US and Russia to pursue immediate, parallel, reciprocal
and verifiable initiatives. They should pursue not only START
II but also START III with far more vigour. None of the preceding
should be taken as letting China, France and the UK or indeed
those states possessing nuclear weapons who are not party to the
NPT, off the hook. Waiting for START II has been as much misused
by them as by the US and Russia. De-alerting and removal of warheads
from delivery systems should be carried out by all the NWS and
others possessing nuclear weapons, immediately!
1.3 The record of the NNWS has generally
been one of far greater compliance, with some working very hard
to progress the work of the Treaty, and of course some states
have renounced nuclear weapons capabilities and joined the NPT.
However Iraq and North Korea have committed violations to the
Treaty and all NATO states are in violation of the spirit of the
NPT and many questions have been raised, inside and outside the
NPT, over their compliance with the letter of the Treaty. There
would therefore be greater compliance with the Treaty if NATO
reversed its first-use policy and US tactical weapons were removed
from Europe. These actions would also have wider benefits in the
international disarmament process.
1.4 The new Russian Security Doctrine which
not only places greater emphasis on nuclear weapons and formally
confirms a first-use policy, but also lowers the threshold of
use of nuclear weapons is almost identical with the NATO Strategic
Concept. Both have at their heart the concept that nuclear weapons
are necessary for security. That being the case it is not surprising
that the NWS are accused of not being interested in the total
elimination of nuclear weapons only their control and restriction.
1.5 The indefinite extension of the NPT
and the three Preparatory Committee meetings between the five
yearly Review Conferences appears to have done little or nothing
to advance the process. Although aspects of the 1955 programme
of action have almost been fulfilled, the most crucial item: "to
pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons",
has not! Everything has been left for the 2000 Review Conference
to solve, including the Middle East resolution and the question
of Israel's nuclear arsenal.
1.6 Statistically the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) seems to be making good progress towards entry-into-force:
154 states have signed the treaty and of the 44 who need to ratify
the treaty before it can enter-into-force, 41 have signed and
26 ratified. However the US, Russia and China are amongst those
who have not ratified and India, Pakistan are amongst those who
have not signed. While they were unlikely to support the treaty
even before the US Senate decision not to ratify, that decision
makes it most improbable that the treaty will ever enter-into-force
even though the present US Administration will continue to try
to bring about ratification and there is some evidence that Russia
may ratify the treaty soon. It is also clear that the continued
use of Stockpile Stewardship activities such as sub-critical tests
and inertial confinement experiments are not only in violation
of NPT Article VI commitments they clearly undermine the spirit
if not the law of the CTBT. Therefore the NWS should give international
observers free access to facilities and programmes and they should
also announce an immediate moratorium on laboratory nuclear experiments.
1.7 The Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) not
only has identity problems it is also beset by the deadlock due
to lack of progress of other business at the Conference on Disarmament
(CD). While negotiations could begin immediately on a FMT there
is no doubt that the NNWS wish to pursue the disarmament option
by including present stocks of fissile materials but the NWS prefer
the anti-proliferation Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. As significant
is the fact that no-one is addressing the control of tritium which
is the essential ingredient in the new generation of smaller yet
more powerful nuclear weapons. The UK produces tritium at Chapelcross
in Scotland.
1.8 A number of proposals have been put
forward at the CD in order to address the question of progress
on nuclear disarmament. Many attempts have been made by NNWS,
including members of NATO, to seduce the NWS into negotiations,
or at the very least, discussions about negotiations on nuclear
disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. However the
NWS and in particular the UK and the US see a FMT as the only
valid next step to be pursued at the CD.
1.9 To this stalemate is now added the insistence
of some states, notably China, that the most important work for
the CD at present is the discussion and negotiation of the Prevention
of Arms Race in Space (PAROS). This is due mainly, if not exclusively,
to the US plans for the weaponisation of space. Deadlock seems
assured for some time yet, thus guaranteeing no progress on further
anti-proliferation measures or on steps to nuclear disarmament
or on the consideration of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. There
may need to be compromise on the part of the NNWS but the major
factor required for progress is clear commitment, demonstrated
by action not rhetoric, of the NWS to the global abolition of
nuclear weapons and supporting systems.
1.10 The threat to the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM Treaty) is greater now than it has ever been. The
US plans for a National Missile Defence (NMD) and possible Theatre
Missile Defence (TMD) systems has prompted them to try to convince
Russia that the systems are not concerned with Russian missiles
and therefore a re-negotiation of the ABM Treaty is a safe and
positive step. It is no surprise that Russia is not convinced.
In fact their stance has hardened over the last few weeks and
their new Security Doctrine demonstrates the dangers ahead if
the US pursues the NMD.
1.11 China is also alarmed. Partly by the
NMD but also because Taiwan wants, and may well get, from the
US a TMD. Many states, including NATO states, have either publicly
or privately expressed grave concerns with regard to NMD and TMD.
France has been as outspoken as any in their condemnation of this
programme which is already having negative effects on the international
nuclear disarmament process as well as creating greater tensions
between, in particular the US and Russia and the US and China.
1.12 The fact that the systems may well
be technically unfeasible and even if they work will only do so
to very limited effect does not seem to deter the US from spending
billions of dollars in pursuit of what is essentially the "son
of" President Reagan's "Star Wars". The consequences
of this programme, even if technically unsound, will be a new
nuclear arms race and a further set back to the already beleaguered
international nuclear disarmament process.
1.13 In the UK the Conservative Opposition
seems supportive of NMD while the Labour Government has distinct
reservations since they wish the ABM Treaty to be maintained.
However the UK government's criticism of the NMD programme has,
unfortunately, not been overt. They cannot maintain this position
for long since, if they give consent for the use within the NMD
programme of the bases at Menwith Hill and Fylingdales in North
Yorkshire, they will be collaborating in the non-compliance with
or the disintegration of the ABM Treaty. The UK can make a significant
contribution not only to supporting the ABM Treaty but also to
helping avert a new nuclear arms race and rescue the deadlocked
international nuclear disarmament process.
3. "THE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL REGIMES, SPECIFICALLY, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) AND THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BTWC)"
3.1 The addition to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC) of an inspection and verification regime
is to be welcomed and support for and adherence to such a regime
should be maintained.
3.2 While the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) has considerable support and the operation of its inspection
and verification regime has had considerable success this has
not been without problems. The problems for the regime are not
only obvious as in Iraq but also less obvious as in the US where
legislation has been passed which allows the President to limit
the inspections.
3.3 One further issue is worthy of note
here: that of Depleted Uranium (DU). While not a "weapon
of mass destruction" in the traditional sense DU is nevertheless
a "weapon of indiscriminate effect". It is also toxic.
If DU does not come under the CWC nor falls within the remit of
this Inquiry then it needs to be addressed at another time and
not, as in the case of tritium, ignored because it does not fit
neatly into an existing category.
4. "THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MAIN NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES' VERIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES"
4.1 Inspection and verification regimes
concerning chemical and biological weapons are clearly more difficult
to apply with success than those for nuclear weapons. It is remarkable
therefore that possible difficulties over such regimes are often
sited as reason for not pursuing a Nuclear Weapons Convention
vigorously by states which nevertheless support and successfully
apply the regimes in other areas.
The success of the inspection teams in Iraq
in tracing and dealing with the development of nuclear weapons
demonstrates the possibility of more wide ranging success. The
fact that the continued bombing of Iraq by the US and the UK and
the continuation of sanctions has created circumstances in which
the inspection teams cannot operate does not diminish their earlier
success.
4.2 Enforcement of inspection and verification
regimes must be within the conditions of the treaty under consideration
and must make the success of the regime more likely. Regimes also
need to apply equally to all parties. Limitations such as those
the US has applied to itself in relation to the CWC and sought
in relation to the CTBT should not be supported.
5. "THE UK'S ROLE IN ENCOURAGING NON-SIGNATORY STATES TO SIGN APPROPRIATE TREATIES AND IN IMPROVING THE MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS"
5.1 While on the surface it would appear
that the UK is actively supporting a number of treaties, in many
cases there is a major difference between stated support and actual
support.
5.2 The most glaring of these is undoubtedly
the NPT where the failure of the UK and the other NWS to comply
with their obligations under Article VI in no small way contributes
to the non-signatory status of India and Pakistan and could well
lead to "break-out" by states who are party to the treaty.
The continued insistence of the NWS, and indeed those who shelter
under their nuclear umbrellas, that nuclear weapons are necessary
for their security, as stated for instance in the NATO Strategic
Concept, feeds horizontal proliferation. The UK first-use policy
and the sub-strategic role of Trident also contribute to the UK's
lack of compliance with the NPT.
5.3 While the UK, it would appear, is prepared
to at least acknowledge and address the problem of Israel's nuclear
weapons the US is not. The UK could do a lot more to persuade
the US to face this problem which Israel as another non-signatory
of the NPT poses.
5.4 The UK has ratified the CTBT and has
called on all states to do likewise. However some non-signatory
and/or non-ratification states find the pronouncements somewhat
hollow when the UK talks up the CTBT while taking advantage of
data from the latest French nuclear tests and from the US sub-critical
tests in order to pursue the enhancement and possible replacement
of the Trident system. While much laboratory work is carried out
in the US, AWE Aldermaston is taking, and will continue to take,
the lead in the development and manufacture of enhanced or new
nuclear warheads for the UK.
5.5 If the UK wishes to promote nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament treaties it must do more than:
BACKGROUND SUMMARY
There are still 36,000 nuclear weapons world-wide
and nuclear arsenals are still effectively on high alert status.
All the states possessing nuclear weapons are
in the process of developing or deploying new or enhanced nuclear
warheads and/or systems.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons continues
and is in danger of accelerating out of control.
The NWS continue to pursue policies which are
increasing the likelihood of proliferation, raising nuclear tensions
between themselves and lowering the nuclear threshold.
The consequences of the NMD and TMD programmes,
even if technically unsound, will be a new nuclear arms race and
a further set back to the already beleaguered international nuclear
disarmament process.
ACTION SUMMARY
The US and Russia should pursue not only START
II but also START III with far more vigour.
De-alerting and removal of warheads from delivery
systems should be carried out by all the NWS and others possessing
nuclear weapons, immediately!
NATO should reverse its first-use policy and
US tactical weapons should be removed from Europe.
Russia should reverse its first-use policy.
The NWS should give international observers
free access to facilties and programmes and also announce an immediate
moratorium on laboratory nuclear experiments.
The NWS need to give clear commitment, demonstrated
by action not rhetoric at the CD, to the global abolition of nuclear
weapons and supporting systems so that progress can be made on
an FMT and a NWC.
The US should abandon the NMD and TMD programmes.
The tritium issue should be addressed.
The depleted uranium issue should be addressed.
Inspection and verification regimes need to
apply equally to all parties.
The NWS need to fulfil their obligations under
Article VI of the NPT.
The UK government should cancel the Trident
nuclear weapon system programme and work vigorously for the global
abolition of nuclear weapons.