House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Key Regional Threats



(1) We support the work of the Government in encouraging both India and Pakistan to demonstrate nuclear restraint by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to join the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty when they begin and to re-open dialogue on issues that divide the two countries. We recommend that the Government give priority to its dialogue with New Delhi because it is evident that Pakistan will not sign or ratify any nuclear-related treaty unless India does so first (paragraph 13).



(2) We recommend strongly that the Government contribute as fully as it can to bringing about a comprehensive and sustainable Middle East Peace settlement as the absence of such a settlement provides a major spur to the proliferation of WMD in the region (paragraph 15).



(3) We concur with the FCO's view that continued political reform in Iran, Tehran's rapprochement with the West, which included the upgrading of UK/Iranian bilateral links to Ambassadorial level in May 1999, and the success of the Middle East Peace Process are the best means of ensuring that Iran abides by its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (paragraph 18).



(4) We support the Government in its diplomatic efforts within the UN Security Council to ensure that UNMOVIC and the IAEA are given the maximum opportunity to complete the process of disarmament in Iraq in line with relevant UN resolutions. We wish to see UNMOVIC start its work in Iraq at the earliest opportunity. It is important that UNSCOM's successor, UNMOVIC, commands a mandate of equal strength to that of its predecessor to enable it to conduct further inspections of Iraq's WMD activity effectively. We urge the Government strongly to resist any attempt to dilute the international inspectors' powers of inspection or to compromise with Iraq on the composition of the Commission. We agree with the Government that "for so long as Iraq denies UNMOVIC access there can be no progress towards the suspension and eventual lifting of sanctions" (paragraph 23).



(5) We urge the UK Government to give maximum support to the current dialogue between the leaderships of North and South Korea, with the aim of reaching a settlement between the two parties (paragraph 27).



National Missile Defence and the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty



(6) We commend the Prime Minister's approach, whilst urging the Government to impress upon the US Administration that it cannot necessarily assume unqualified UK co-operation with US plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral US abrogation of the ABM Treaty (paragraph 48).



(7) We recommend that the Government articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community. We recommend that the Government encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threats it perceives (paragraph 50).



The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)



(8) We recognise that the international climate prior to the NPT Review Conference was inauspicious and did not appear favourable for progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The achievement of a final document by consensus is a positive and welcome outcome and we commend the Government for its role in bringing this about (paragraph 55).



(9) We commend the Government's early ratification of the Additional Protocol (which strengthens the IAEA's safeguards agreements with States Parties to the NPT) which will allow it to enter into force in the UK. We recommend that the Government impress upon our European partners the need for them to ratify (paragraph 63).



Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)



(10) We urge the Government to co-operate with the US Administration and encourage the new US President to re-submit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification as an urgent priority, to encourage China and Israel to ratify the treaty and also to impress upon India and Pakistan, in particular, the importance of their becoming parties to the CTBT. Given the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation in stemming nuclear proliferation, we recommend that the Government should fully support the proposed 18 per cent increase in the CTBT Organisation's budget for 2001 (paragraph 66).



Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty



(11) We recommend that the Government make renewed efforts to help to break the impasse on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations and ensure that substantive negotiations commence quickly (paragraph 70).



The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations



(12) We recommend that the Government use its influence with both Russia and the USA to achieve the maximum negotiable reduction in nuclear warheads in START III. We further recommend that the Government use its position in both the G8 and the EU to accelerate progress in helping the Russian Government to destroy its surplus nuclear materials or convert them to civil use (paragraph 81).



UK Nuclear Posture and Disarmament



(13) We accept the Government's statement in the Strategic Defence Review that, with the reductions in nuclear capability it has made, the UK's deterrent "is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the forseeable future and smaller than those of the major nuclear powers." We recommend that the Government make every endeavour to bring about reductions by all nuclear weapon states to genuinely minimum deterrent levels (paragraph 86).



Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)



(14) We recommend that the Government exert maximum bilateral and international pressure on those countries who have not yet become States Parties to the Convention to do so (paragraph 88).



(15) We recommend that the Government urge the USA to rescind its power of Presidential veto over challenge inspections, bringing the USA in line with the rest of the States Parties in time for the 2002 review conference (paragraph 94).



(16) It is in the interests of the UK and the international community that Russia is able to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We repeat our request for regular updates on the progress of the projects the UK is funding and recommend that the Government and its European partners provide higher levels of aid in assisting Russia to dispose of its chemical weapons arsenal (paragraph 95).



Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)



(17) We recommend that the Government use the UK's position as a close ally of the USA to convince it that a strong verification procedure for biological and toxin weapons which does not affect commercial confidentiality is a viable and achievable goal. We further recommend that the Government exert maximum bilateral and international pressure on those countries who have not yet become States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to do so (paragraph 100).



(18) The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is an integral part of the web of deterrence against states developing and stockpiling WMD. For it to be effective, it has to have an equally stringent verification regime to that of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We endorse the Government's view that an effective BTWC Protocol requires a package of complementary measures—declarations, visits and investigations. Whilst recognising the need to take account of legitimate concerns about protecting commercial proprietary information, we believe that national security requirements demand that the BTWC contains the strongest verification regime that can be agreed. The Government has played a positive role in arguing for such a regime. We recommend that the Government reiterate this position and push for an early conclusion to the negotiations (paragraph 104).



Role and effectiveness of Export Control Regimes



(19) We recommend that the Government encourage and assist Belarus, Turkey and Slovenia, which are about to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other future candidates for membership to implement, at the earliest possible opportunity, effective nuclear export control legislation and mechanisms. Moreover, in light of the IAEA Additional Protocol, introduced to strengthen verification procedures following the discovery of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, we recommend that the Government lobby for acceptance by the other Nuclear Suppliers Group members of this Protocol as an extra condition of civil nuclear supply in the future (paragraph 106).



(20) We recommend that the Government play an active role in exploring new and enhanced measures to constrain the development of WMD-capable ballistic and cruise missiles in countries of proliferation concern. These measures should be multilateral and bilateral in nature and should target non-western suppliers (China, Russia, North Korea) of missile technology and assistance, as well as the countries developing the missiles themselves (paragraph 111).



Small Arms



(21) We welcome the efforts that the Government has been making to reduce the deadly impact of small arms and urge it to continue to play an active role in international efforts to curb the proliferation of these weapons (paragraph 116).



Landmines



(22) We applaud the Government on the prominent role it took in bringing the Ottawa Convention into force and we urge the Government to continue in its efforts to persuade non-signatories to sign and ratify the Convention (paragraph 121).



Conclusion



(23) As we have detailed in this Report, there has been some encouraging progress on arms control in recent years. At the same time, there are some highly disturbing features of the Weapons of Mass Destruction situation world-wide. Despite all the effort on non-proliferation, the number of known nuclear weapon states is slowly enlarging. Whilst the overwhelming majority of responsible countries have renounced possession of both chemical and biological weapons, a small minority of regimes have acquired these weapons or are believed to be in the process of acquiring them covertly. The possibility that a terrorist organisation might obtain possession of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon is a matter of the utmost concern. This has horrific potential. As we stated earlier in the Report, one hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people (paragraph 123).



(24) Britain as a nuclear weapon state, a permanent member of the Security Council, a leading member of NATO, and a member of the G8 and the EU has a key role and a key responsibility in trying to put all Weapons of Mass Destruction under international arms control regimes and in making progress towards their complete elimination. This must surely be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the Government (paragraph 124).

Prepared 2 August 2000

Key Regional Threats

(1)	We support the work of the Government in encouraging both India and Pakistan to demonstrate nuclear restraint by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to join the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty when they begin and to re-open dialogue on issues that divide the two countries. We recommend that the Government give priority to its dialogue with New Delhi because it is evident that Pakistan will not sign or ratify any nuclear-related treaty unless India does so first (paragraph 13).

(2)	We recommend strongly that the Government contribute as fully as it can to bringing about a comprehensive and sustainable Middle East Peace settlement as the absence of such a settlement provides a major spur to the proliferation of WMD in the region (paragraph 15).

(3)	We concur with the FCO's view that continued political reform in Iran, Tehran's rapprochement with the West, which included the upgrading of UK/Iranian bilateral links to Ambassadorial level in May 1999, and the success of the Middle East Peace Process are the best means of ensuring that Iran abides by its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (paragraph 18).

(4)	We support the Government in its diplomatic efforts within the UN Security Council to ensure that UNMOVIC and the IAEA are given the maximum opportunity to complete the process of disarmament in Iraq in line with relevant UN resolutions. We wish to see UNMOVIC start its work in Iraq at the earliest opportunity. It is important that UNSCOM's successor, UNMOVIC, commands a mandate of equal strength to that of its predecessor to enable it to conduct further inspections of Iraq's WMD activity effectively. We urge the Government strongly to resist any attempt to dilute the international inspectors' powers of inspection or to compromise with Iraq on the composition of the Commission. We agree with the Government that "for so long as Iraq denies UNMOVIC access there can be no progress towards the suspension and eventual lifting of sanctions" (paragraph 23).

(5)	We urge the UK Government to give maximum support to the current dialogue between the leaderships of North and South Korea, with the aim of reaching a settlement between the two parties (paragraph 27).

National Missile Defence and the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty

(6)	We commend the Prime Minister's approach, whilst urging the Government to impress upon the US Administration that it cannot necessarily assume unqualified UK co-operation with US plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral US abrogation of the ABM Treaty (paragraph 48).

(7)	We recommend that the Government articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community. We recommend that the Government encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threats it perceives (paragraph 50).

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

(8)	We recognise that the international climate prior to the NPT Review Conference was inauspicious and did not appear favourable for progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The achievement of a final document by consensus is a positive and welcome outcome and we commend the Government for its role in bringing this about (paragraph 55).

(9)	We commend the Government's early ratification of the Additional Protocol (which strengthens the IAEA's safeguards agreements with States Parties to the NPT) which will allow it to enter into force in the UK. We recommend that the Government impress upon our European partners the need for them to ratify (paragraph 63).

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

(10)	We urge the Government to co-operate with the US Administration and encourage the new US President to re-submit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification as an urgent priority, to encourage China and Israel to ratify the treaty and also to impress upon India and Pakistan, in particular, the importance of their becoming parties to the CTBT. Given the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation in stemming nuclear proliferation, we recommend that the Government should fully support the proposed 18 per cent increase in the CTBT Organisation's budget for 2001 (paragraph 66).

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

(11)	We recommend that the Government make renewed efforts to help to break the impasse on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations and ensure that substantive negotiations commence quickly (paragraph 70).

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations

(12)	We recommend that the Government use its influence with both Russia and the USA to achieve the maximum negotiable reduction in nuclear warheads in START III. We further recommend that the Government use its position in both the G8 and the EU to accelerate progress in helping the Russian Government to destroy its surplus nuclear materials or convert them to civil use (paragraph 81).

UK Nuclear Posture and Disarmament

(13)	We accept the Government's statement in the Strategic Defence Review that, with the reductions in nuclear capability it has made, the UK's deterrent "is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the forseeable future and smaller than those of the major nuclear powers." We recommend that the Government make every endeavour to bring about reductions by all nuclear weapon states to genuinely minimum deterrent levels (paragraph 86).

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

(14)	We recommend that the Government exert maximum bilateral and international pressure on those countries who have not yet become States Parties to the Convention to do so (paragraph 88).

(15)	We recommend that the Government urge the USA to rescind its power of Presidential veto over challenge inspections, bringing the USA in line with the rest of the States Parties in time for the 2002 review conference (paragraph 94).

(16)	It is in the interests of the UK and the international community that Russia is able to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We repeat our request for regular updates on the progress of the projects the UK is funding and recommend that the Government and its European partners provide higher levels of aid in assisting Russia to dispose of its chemical weapons arsenal (paragraph 95).

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

(17)	We recommend that the Government use the UK's position as a close ally of the USA to convince it that a strong verification procedure for biological and toxin weapons which does not affect commercial confidentiality is a viable and achievable goal. We further recommend that the Government exert maximum bilateral and international pressure on those countries who have not yet become States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to do so (paragraph 100).

(18)	The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is an integral part of the web of deterrence against states developing and stockpiling WMD. For it to be effective, it has to have an equally stringent verification regime to that of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We endorse the Government's view that an effective BTWC Protocol requires a package of complementary measures—declarations, visits and investigations. Whilst recognising the need to take account of legitimate concerns about protecting commercial proprietary information, we believe that national security requirements demand that the BTWC contains the strongest verification regime that can be agreed. The Government has played a positive role in arguing for such a regime. We recommend that the Government reiterate this position and push for an early conclusion to the negotiations (paragraph 104).

Role and effectiveness of Export Control Regimes

(19)	We recommend that the Government encourage and assist Belarus, Turkey and Slovenia, which are about to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other future candidates for membership to implement, at the earliest possible opportunity, effective nuclear export control legislation and mechanisms. Moreover, in light of the IAEA Additional Protocol, introduced to strengthen verification procedures following the discovery of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, we recommend that the Government lobby for acceptance by the other Nuclear Suppliers Group members of this Protocol as an extra condition of civil nuclear supply in the future (paragraph 106).

(20)	We recommend that the Government play an active role in exploring new and enhanced measures to constrain the development of WMD-capable ballistic and cruise missiles in countries of proliferation concern. These measures should be multilateral and bilateral in nature and should target non-western suppliers (China, Russia, North Korea) of missile technology and assistance, as well as the countries developing the missiles themselves (paragraph 111).

Small Arms

(21)	We welcome the efforts that the Government has been making to reduce the deadly impact of small arms and urge it to continue to play an active role in international efforts to curb the proliferation of these weapons (paragraph 116).

Landmines

(22)	We applaud the Government on the prominent role it took in bringing the Ottawa Convention into force and we urge the Government to continue in its efforts to persuade non-signatories to sign and ratify the Convention (paragraph 121).

Conclusion

(23)	As we have detailed in this Report, there has been some encouraging progress on arms control in recent years. At the same time, there are some highly disturbing features of the Weapons of Mass Destruction situation world-wide. Despite all the effort on non-proliferation, the number of known nuclear weapon states is slowly enlarging. Whilst the overwhelming majority of responsible countries have renounced possession of both chemical and biological weapons, a small minority of regimes have acquired these weapons or are believed to be in the process of acquiring them covertly. The possibility that a terrorist organisation might obtain possession of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon is a matter of the utmost concern. This has horrific potential. As we stated earlier in the Report, one hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people (paragraph 123).

(24)	Britain as a nuclear weapon state, a permanent member of the Security Council, a leading member of NATO, and a member of the G8 and the EU has a key role and a key responsibility in trying to put all Weapons of Mass Destruction under international arms control regimes and in making progress towards their complete elimination. This must surely be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the Government (paragraph 124).