105. The UK participates in several informal but
well established "supplier groups". These are designed
to harmonise the national export controls of the member states
with the goal of denying countries, deemed to be potential proliferators,
access to the technology and expertise required for the development
and manufacture of WMD and their means of delivery. These groups
include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee
in the nuclear field, the Australia Group in the biological and
chemical sphere, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Each
of these groups maintains a list of sensitive items, including
'dual-use' goods in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the
Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. If
such items are to be exported to non-member states, certain conditions
must be met, such as good non-proliferation credentials on the
part of the recipient and its provision of end-use guarantees.
Dr Hopkinson indicated argued that "as technologies become
more widespread the difficulties of control, especially when as
in Russia and China central authorities may only have imperfect
knowledge of what is going on, and where there are major financial
incentives, become greater. The [export control] regimes have
been very useful but need to be supplemented by good intelligence
activity."[210]
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the
Zangger Committee
106. The Nuclear Suppliers Group currently consists
of 35 nuclear (almost all civil nuclear) supplier countries[211]
and Belarus, Turkey and Slovenia are set to join in the near future.[212]
The member states seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons through export controls. We recommend that the Government
encourage and assist Belarus, Turkey and Slovenia, which are about
to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other future candidates
for membership to implement, at the earliest possible opportunity,
effective nuclear export control legislation and mechanisms. Moreover,
in light of the IAEA Additional Protocol, introduced to strengthen
verification procedures following the discovery of a nuclear weapons
programme in Iraq, we recommend that the Government lobby for
acceptance by the other Nuclear Suppliers Group members of this
Protocol as an extra condition of civil nuclear supply in the
future.[213]
107. The Zangger Committee currently consists of
34 nuclear supplier countries that are States Parties to the NPT.[214]
The Committee publishes and updates a "Trigger List"
of items that require certain safeguards and assurances as a condition
of supply. Unlike the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Committee does
not maintain a dual-use list, but the FCO believes that the Committee
"continues to be an effective instrument in non-proliferation."[215]
Australia Group
108. Thirty countries and the EU Commission currently
participate in the Australia Group[216]
and all members are States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).[217]
Each country within the Australia Group has introduced licensing
measures on the export of certain dual-use chemicals, biological
agents, and chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and
equipment. These measures have been introduced with a view to
preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The
Australia Group has been criticised by China, India, Iran and
Pakistan, which view its existence as contrary to the CWC and
BTWC. They argue that the Australia Group should not deny exports
to States Parties to these conventions because they have made
legally binding commitments not to acquire these weapon types.
According to the FCO, "neither the conventions nor the Australia
Group would be wholly effective on their own but a joint approach
to stopping proliferation is the most effective." However,
the Australia Group members have accepted that the workings of
the group would need to be reviewed once the CWC becomes fully
operational and the BTWC has in place an effective verification
mechanism.[218]
Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR)
109. Ballistic missiles are the delivery vehicles
of choice for most states which possess or are seeking to develop
some form of WMD capability. This preference stems from the ballistic
missile's unique characteristics as a delivery vehicle, including
its ability to deliver ordnance over long ranges in relatively
short periods of time, and its almost assured penetration of defences
because of this high speed of delivery. In the view of Dr Chalmers:
The Foreign Secretary acknowledged that "the
proliferation of delivery system technology is every bit as much
a matter of concern as the weapons of mass destruction themselves."[220]
110. The Missile Technology Control Regime is the
only multilateral means of constraining the horizontal proliferation
of WMD-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. This is achieved
by controlling the transfer of complete missile systems and unmanned
air vehicles capable of carrying any payload over a range of at
least 300km, as well as transfers of components and related technology
that could contribute to such systems or the ability to develop
and produce them.[221]
The Missile Technology Control Regime is the only supplier group
that does not relate to a corresponding multilateral treaty.[222]
111. According to the FCO, the major accomplishment
of the Missile Technology Control Regime to date has been to "prevent
or constrain ballistic missile programmes heavily dependent on
imported Western technology." However, the FCO notes that
indigenous missile programmes in India, Pakistan, Iran and North
Korea are a cause of growing international concern.[223]
Indeed, long-range missile programmes in these countries have
made significant progress in recent years. In 1998 alone, Pakistan
tested the Ghauri missile, Iran tested the Shahab-3 and North
Korea tested the Taepo Dong. This progress has been made possible
through infusions of technology and expertise from non-Western
sources. Though China is not a member of the MTCR we welcome the
Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committee that "I shall
continue to do all I can to encourage China to adhere to it."[224]
We recommend that the Government play an active role in exploring
new and enhanced measures to constrain the development of WMD-capable
ballistic and cruise missiles in countries of proliferation concern.
These measures should be multilateral and bilateral in nature
and should target non-western suppliers (China, Russia, North
Korea) of missile technology and assistance, as well as the countries
developing the missiles themselves.
211
See Annex V for membership. Back
212
Ev. p. 101. Back
213
Ev. p. 13. Back
214
See Annex V for membership. Back
215
Ev. p. 101. Back
216
See Annex V for membership. Back
217
Ev. p. 102. Back
218
Ev. p. 102. Back
219
Ev. p. 146. Back
221
Ev. p. 102. Back
222
See Annex V for membership. Back
223
Ev. pp. 102-103. Back
"Concerns over WMD proliferation
have been reinforced by concerns over the proliferation of ballistic
missile technology. Primarily because of the large-scale export
of Scud missiles during the Cold War, as many as thirty-eight
countries may now possess operational ballistic missiles with
ranges over 100km. The main focus of NATO concern, however, is
the possibility that several potentially hostile states may soon
acquire ballistic missiles with much longer ranges."[219]
210 Ev. p. 186. Back