Brief introduction and report
on progress to date
96. Biological weapons are prohibited under the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force
in 1975. The Convention prohibits the development, stockpiling
and acquisition of biological agents or toxins of types and in
quantities that have no justification for protective or other
peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment and means of
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes
or in armed conflict.[185]
Although the Convention is wide ranging, it did not incorporate
a verification process, and this has severely undermined its credibility.
This failing was highlighted in our predecessor Committee's report
where the then Government was urged to "take a leading role
in the development of effective verification measures for the
Biological Weapons Convention at the 1996 Review Conference."[186]
In the intervening period, progress on a verification protocol
has been steady but slow. The UK Government is at the forefront
of negotiating the protocol which the FCO argues will "fill
the last major gap in arms control provisions covering weapons
of mass destruction and thereby strengthen the global non-proliferation
regime."[187]
At the beginning of its administration, the Government signalled
its positive intent by placing in the public domain papers highlighting
the immense potential dangers of these weapons.[188]
Whilst these papers made disturbing reading, we applaud the Government
for its openness and willingness to inform the public.
Progress on proposals for the
additional protocol on verification measures
97. The FCO explained that since 1995 an Ad Hoc Group
of States Parties has been meeting in Geneva, under the Chairmanship
of Ambassador Toth, to consider measures to strengthen the BTWC.[189]
The Group's mandate was to complete work on a Protocol as soon
as possible before the 5th Review Conference, which is scheduled
for the latter part of 2001. It is envisaged that this draft protocol
will incorporate verification procedures similar to those of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. This would include mandatory declarations
of biological facility sites and activities, provisions for on-site
visits, and in the case of serious doubts, challenge investigations.[190]
The UK Government is working on the basis that the protocol will
consist of a package of complementary measures which should include:
98. Unfortunately, the UK view on what the protocol
should contain is not the consensus view within the Ad Hoc Group.
Dr Findlay explained that, while the UK and its European partners
strongly support powers as stringent as those under the Chemical
Weapons Convention, "an unholy alliance of the United States,
Japan, India and China are opposed."[192]
The USA, consistent with its position on the Chemical Weapons
Convention, argues that it has to reserve the right to refuse
intrusive inspections on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.[193]
It has also resisted the need for visits. Colonel Taylor outlined
the position of the USA:
99. Certainly, if the verification regime is intrusive,
the Ad Hoc Group will have to be able to convince countries such
as the USA that the protocol will protect its industry's intellectual
property rights. However, the question the States Parties need
to resolve is to what extent these concerns should dilute the
verification process. Dr Findlay also acknowledged the concerns
of the US biotechnology industry but argued that it was "quite
unwise to let such commercial concerns determine national negotiation
stances...[and that] biological weapons proliferation is too important
a matter of national security and international governmental and
public concern to be left to the narrow interests of industry."[195]
The validity of the competing arguments was not lost on the Foreign
Secretary, who said that
Commercial considerations will certainly have to
be taken into account, but this does not necessarily mean compromising
the strength of verification. Drawing on the experience of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, Dr Inch noted that "when you
talk to the people, the scientists and technical people dealing
with it, they do not see the same problems as some people in state
departments of one country or another who seem to be more sensitive
to political considerations."[197]
100. A related area of dispute is the 'trigger' for
challenge investigations. There are two possible procedures to
be adopted for initiating challenge inspections, the 'Red Light'
procedure and the 'Green Light' procedure. Professor Pearson explained
how the two procedures worked:
Because it is easier to initiate inspections under
the 'Red Light' procedure, the USA is concerned that this could
lead to frivolous challenges. However, Professor Pearson told
us that safeguards would be established to deter states from mounting
abusive or frivolous challenges.[199]
We recommend that the Government use the UK's position as a close
ally of the USA to convince it that a strong verification procedure
for biological and toxin weapons which does not affect commercial
confidentiality is a viable and achievable goal. We further recommend
that the Government exert maximum bilateral and international
pressure on those countries who have not yet become States Parties
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to do so.[200]
Lessons to be learned from the
operation of the CWC's verification regime
101. There is consensus that the verification regime
for the Chemical Weapons Convention regime is highly relevant
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention protocol regime.
Indeed, there is some overlap between the two regimes in that
both cover toxins.[201]
The Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime offers a good
framework for the BTWC protocol and is considered as the most
stringent that can be politically acceptable.[202]
However, Colonel Taylor argued against over-optimism about verification
and warned that "the effectiveness of any enforcement procedure
was questionable."[203]
That said, if the protocol is to be credible, it must be at least
as stringent as the verification regime for the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
102. A further concern, raised in relation to the
Chemical Weapons Convention, was the quality of the national implementation
legislation, which, in some countries, was not as good as it could
have been.[204]
This meant that enforcement in individual countries was varied.
Professor Dando argued that greater assistance should be provided
to states in drafting national implementation legislation for
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Protocol. This would
have the additional advantage of providing a greater deterrence
to terrorism, as the tighter the legislation, the harder it would
be for sub-state or non-state actors to acquire the necessary
elements.[205]
103. However, of all the problems being posed on
both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, the most important to solve appears to be
political rather than scientific. Our witnesses all commented
that success will rely on the political will of the States concerned.
The UK has played a positive role in CWC and BTWC negotiations.
Dr Julian Perry Robinson of Sussex University praised the work
of the UK Government on its "track record of constructive
and expert participation in the affairs of the OPCW"[206]
while Professor Dando acknowledged that the UK was one of the
most active states in the negotiation of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention.[207]
The UK also holds an important mediating position as the Friend-of-the-Chair
in the BTWC protocol negotiations.[208]
However, not all countries have a similar will, and the conclusion
of the March session of negotiations highlighted the work still
to be done. Ambassador Toth said that progress had been modest
and that there was a need to review the situation at a high political
level. The fact that he urged delegates to use the time before
the July session to rethink their positions reinforces this view.[209]
104. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) is an integral part of the web of deterrence against states
developing and stockpiling WMD. For it to be effective, it has
to have an equally stringent verification regime to that of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. We endorse the Government's view
that an effective BTWC Protocol requires a package of complementary
measures—declarations, visits and investigations. Whilst
recognising the need to take account of legitimate concerns about
protecting commercial proprietary information, we believe that
national security requirements demand that the BTWC contains the
strongest verification regime that can be agreed. The Government
has played a positive role in arguing for such a regime. We recommend
that the Government reiterate this position and push for an early
conclusion to the negotiations.
186
HC 34, para. 83. Back
187
Ev. p. 105. Back
188
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), 4 February 1998. Back
189
Ev. p. 104. Back
190
Ev. p. 104. Back
191
Ev. pp. 104-105. Back
192
Ev. p. 83. Back
195
Ev. p. 93. Back
200
See Annex IV for a list of States Parties to the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention. Back
201
Ev. p. 55. Back
206
Ev. p. 205, para. 10. Back
209
Disarmament Diplomacy: April 2000. Back
(a) Declarations:
These would be mandatory and would identify facilities which could
most easily be used for activities prohibited by the Convention.
They would cover expertise, equipment, materials and activities
which could be misused by a State to develop such weapons. Each
facility declared would have to complete a detailed questionnaire.
(b) Visits: On-site
visits are seen by the UK Government as integral to the protocol.
Visits will provide greater insight into and transparency of activities
at declared facilities, which should lead to greater confidence
in the protocol. Visits will also help ensure accuracy. A visit
might be used to clear up ambiguity in a declaration or find out
whether an undeclared facility should in fact have been declared.
(c) Investigations:
These would be short notice investigations, with investigators
having extensive powers to interview, observe, check documents
and remove and analyse samples. The UK argues that these investigators
should also have the right "to go anywhere, anytime."[191]
"One has to remember
that the US and the United Kingdom are the leaders in the biotechnology
industry... [a therapeutic drug] costs something between $300
million and $500 million, an enormous investment, and there is
a great deal of correct concern about protecting that proprietary
information. These concerns of the United States are not surprising
at all to me. We should listen to them most carefully because
they have the biggest industry and have the biggest amount to
lose."[194]
"Some countries have
a legitimate concern that this would compromise their own industrial
confidentiality and security. We have to find a way forward in
which one can respect that industrial commercial confidentiality,
but at the same time respect the very powerful strategic need
to give us confidence that those who adhered to the convention
are actually standing by its terms."[196]
"The Chemical Weapons
Convention has what is called a Red Light procedure; you have
to vote to stop it. The European Union and the United Kingdom
are firmly of the view that the Biological Weapons Convention
should have the same; it will happen unless the executive council
votes to stop it. The United States wants a much weaker position,
the so-called Green Light, where [the executive council] have
to vote to approve an investigation."[198]
185 Ev. p. 59. Back
Prepared 2 August 2000