House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE MAJOR NUCLEAR TREATIES

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

51. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) underpins all international efforts both to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to achieve their complete abolition. Essentially, the NPT is a grand "bargain" between the five States Parties—the USA, Russia, China, France and the UK—which are permitted to possess nuclear weapons (nuclear weapon states) until they can negotiate them away completely,[92] and all the other States Parties (non-nuclear weapon states) that are forbidden from possessing nuclear weapons, in return for which they are entitled to access to civil nuclear energy. Professor Michael MccGwire said that "an effective non-proliferation treaty requires that virtually all non-nuclear states believe that the regime serves their long term interests and that a large majority see the terms of the treaty as fair."[93] Since entering into force in 1970, the NPT has been subject to five-yearly review conferences. At a special Review and Extension Conference in 1995, States Parties unanimously decided to extend the treaty for an indefinite period, partly as a result of a reiteration by the five recognised nuclear weapon states of their commitment to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.

THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

52. Considerable anxiety was expressed about the likely outcome of the Sixth NPT Review Conference, both in the course of our visits to Switzerland and the USA and in the written and oral evidence. Professor Walker told us that "the whole framework of international law, particularly multilalteral arms control, has been damaged by recent events and recent trends. The notion that nuclear relations should be founded upon mutual obligation and on mutual trust... has been seriously weakened."[94] Many of the non-nuclear weapon states—especially those belonging to the New Agenda Coalition[95]—had expressed their impatience at the failure of the nuclear weapon states to make sufficient progress towards nuclear disarmament.

53. Our academic witnesses expressed scepticism about both the willingness and the ability of the nuclear powers to disarm completely. Professor O'Neill said that "we are in a logjam and there is not the slightest intent on [the part of] any of the five nuclear weapon states to even discuss going to zero."[96] Professor Simpson lamented that "one of the things that is sadly lacking at the moment... is any real vision of how one would actually get to nuclear disarmament, any agreed vision."[97] The FCO's memorandum, which had been prepared before the Conference, noted that:

The nuclear tests conducted by Indian and Pakistan in May 1998 also pose problems for the NPT regime.

54. Despite the low expectations of the Conference, the eventual outcome has been hailed as a success. A Final Document was adopted, by consensus, which reviews the operation of the treaty over the past five years and sets out a number of steps which should be taken to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Perhaps the most significant step forward was the joint statement issued by the five nuclear weapon states in which they pledged an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."[99] Mr Peter Hain, Minister of State at the FCO, announced by means of a written parliamentary answer that:

100

55. Although complete nuclear disarmament is still not a near-term prospect, the nuclear weapon states did agree a series of further practical steps down the road towards that objective in the final document, produced at the end of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A summary of these steps can be seen below. We recognise that the international climate prior to the NPT Review Conference was inauspicious and did not appear favourable for progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The achievement of a final document by consensus is a positive and welcome outcome and we commend the Government for its role in bringing this about.

The main steps towards disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

To achieve the necessary ratifications to enable early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

A moratorium on nuclear tests pending entry into force of the CTBT

The immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) with a view to their conclusion within five years

The Conference on Disarmament urged immediately to establish a body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament

The principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament to apply

An unequivocal commitment to complete nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states (see above)

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while "preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions in offensive weapons"

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative[101] between the US, Russia and the IAEA

Steps towards nuclear disarmament

      Unilateral efforts
      Increased transparency
      Reduction of non-strategic weapons
      Reduction in the operational status of nuclear weapons
      Diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies
      All the nuclear weapon states to engage in the process of disarmament as soon as appropriate

Arrangements to place all fissile material no longer needed for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to ensure it remains permanently outside military programmes

Reaffirm the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament

To provide regular reports on disarmament progress

Further development of verification capabilities relevant to assuring compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements and for achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world

56. Despite the relief of supporters of arms control that the NPT did not unravel at the Review Conference or result in states withdrawing from the treaty, it is important not to get carried away with the political rhetoric and conclude that the NPT's future is guaranteed. The review of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation", agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, shows that in many important respects, disarmament negotiations have stalled. The document from the 1995 Review Conference had announced the nuclear weapon states' political commitment to complete the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996; an agreement to commence negotiations immediately on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and to bring them to an early conclusion; and the "determined pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."[102] Each of these issues will be discussed in greater detail below, but progress has not been overwhelming. Although the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opened for signature in 1996, it has yet to enter into force; the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty have yet to begin; and the five nuclear weapon states are accused of making limited progress towards nuclear disarmament, although the UK Government has taken a number of commendable steps which are discussed further below. It is noteworthy that many of these issues were again the subject of commitments at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and that the aims of the 1995 Conference had not been achieved. The future of the NPT will continue to depend partly on how successfully the arms control and disarmament agenda identified above is now pursued and implemented.

THE PROBLEMS OF NON-PARTIES AND NON-COMPLIANCE

57. Leaving aside the Review Conference, the NPT faces two perennial difficulties: the problem of non-signatories and the problem of non-compliance by States Parties to the treaty. Four states remain outside the NPT, of which three—Israel, India and Pakistan—are de facto nuclear weapon states. The fourth state, Cuba, does not subscribe to the treaty as it argues that it does not go far enough in pressing the nuclear weapon states to disarm. Although the Government encourages India, Pakistan and Israel to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, it acknowledges that this is an unlikely proposition in the absence of a settlement to the political problems perceived by each of these states. As the Foreign Secretary put it, "the basic problem with the Indian sub-continent of course is not essentially one of arms control, it is essentially one of tension between the two countries and ultimately we shall continue to have difficulties making progress on arms control unless and until we make progress on what we delicately term the roots of the tension between them."[103] Similarly, Israel is unlikely to renounce its nuclear weapons and sign up to the NPT in the absence of a Middle East Peace Settlement.

58. Although it is impossible to prevent the determined proliferator from initiating a WMD programme, arms control treaties should seek to contain verification provisions that maximise the chances of detecting non-compliance, thereby reducing the likelihood of cheating.[104] Professor Simpson argued that events surrounding the Iraq and DPRK cases, as well as the inability of the international community to respond effectively to the underground nuclear tests in South Asia, illustrate:

105

59. We believe that evidence of non-compliance with WMD treaties, or a refusal to allow international inspectors to confirm compliance, should be met with resolute international responses. Rebecca Johnson suggested that this may require reform of the UN Security Council, to remove the possibility of the veto being used to prevent collective action against proliferators or users of WMD.[106]

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN VERIFYING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

60. The compliance monitoring provisions of the NPT are conducted on behalf of the treaty parties by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through separate bilateral agreements with each State Party to the treaty.[107] The Foreign Secretary told us that "on the whole the verification system of the NPT is quite credible."[108] As required by Article III of the NPT, the IAEA checks that nuclear materials are not diverted from civil to military programmes. It is important to recognise that the IAEA does not verify an individual state's compliance with the NPT, just with the terms of its safeguards agreement with the agency.[109]

61. Despite Iraq's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, however, the Agency failed to detect that country's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The FCO told us that:

110

As a consequence, the IAEA developed a model Additional Protocol (known as INFCIRC 540) to strengthen the standard safeguards agreement (INFCIRC 153). According to the FCO:

111

The negotiation, entry into force, and implementation of such agreements between individual non-nuclear weapon states and the IAEA is now in progress.[112] As states are not obliged to sign on to these new arrangements, and because some of them are reluctant to accept more intrusive verification, the number of states which have done so to date is small.[113] Although Colonel Taylor warned that the regimes could not be improved in a fashion "which would enable them to deal in any way with a determined cheat,"[114] improving the system of verification is important and should enhance deterrence against non-compliance.

62. The UK signed its Additional Protocol (to the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement of 1976) in September 1998 and the Bill to enable its ratification received Royal Assent in February 2000. According to Dr Findlay, as one of the few states that has negotiated and ratified the Additional Protocol, the UK is now:

115

63. We commend the Government's early ratification of the Additional Protocol which will allow it to enter into force in the UK. We recommend that the Government impress upon our European partners the need for them to ratify.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

64. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in 1996 but has yet to enter into force. During the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the treaty, certain nuclear weapon states had indicated that they would be unwilling to be constrained by such a treaty unless all five nuclear weapon states and the three de facto nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan and Israel) became parties to the treaty. The CTBT stipulated that it would not enter into force until it had been ratified by all 44 of the nuclear capable states (defined as those with civil nuclear reactors) identified in the treaty. At present only 28 have done so.[116] Of the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, the UK, France and Russia have ratified the CTBT. The US Senate's refusal to do so in 1999 was especially unfortunate, partly because of the example it set to others.[117] Moreover, whilst this refusal was heavily influenced by partisan domestic politics in Washington DC, it did serve to undermine the traditional leadership role of the USA within the international non-proliferation regime. The US Government has made clear its intention to abide by the treaty's terms nevertheless. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the CTBT and although Israel and China have signed the CTBT, they have yet to ratify it. China has undertaken to "make continued efforts to bring about universal accession to, and effective compliance with" the CTBT.[118]

65. To verify compliance with the treaty, an International Monitoring System (IMS), which will be overseen by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), is being established.[119] The IMS will consist of 321 monitoring stations located in 90 countries which will provide data allowing States Parties to detect, locate and to identify nuclear explosions of at least 1 kiloton. Dr Findlay told us that the future CTBTO was "a powerful tool for detecting nuclear tests whether the treaty enters into force or not. But there is a danger that progress may be obstructed by political and financial difficulties as entry into force is indefinitely delayed."[120] He called the Government to support the proposed budget increase of 18 per cent for the Organisation.[121]

66. By preventing any explosive nuclear testing world-wide the CTBT represents a crucial component of the non-proliferation regime because it seeks to impose qualitative constraints on nuclear weapons development. Thus its early entry into force is vital to this country's security. We urge the Government to co-operate with the US Administration and encourage the new US President to re-submit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification as an urgent priority, to encourage China and Israel to ratify the treaty and also to impress upon India and Pakistan, in particular, the importance of their becoming parties to the CTBT. Given the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation in stemming nuclear proliferation, we recommend that the Government should fully support the proposed 18 per cent increase in the CTBT Organisation's budget for 2001.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

67. It was agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference that negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should start immediately. The treaty, which would end the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, would impose quantitative constraints on nuclear weapons development, thereby complementing the qualitative constraints envisioned under the CTBT. It would establish a baseline from which efforts could be made gradually to control and/or reduce fissile materials and might succeed in preventing the continuing production of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, and possibly Israel, if these states were to become signatories.[122] Mr Paul Hare, Head of the Non-Proliferation Department at the FCO, told us that the Government saw "the cut-off treaty as a very realistic immediate measure to which [Israel] could come in as a negotiator alongside the other non-NPT parties, India and Pakistan.[123]

68. Four of the five recognised Nuclear weapon states—the USA, Russia, France and the UK—have all publicly stated that they have ceased production of fissile material.[124] Unfortunately, negotiations on the FMCT have yet to begin at the Conference on Disarmament, largely because of disagreement over the scope of any treaty (as to whether it should cover existing stocks of fissile material as well as future production), but also because a number of states are not yet ready to cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes. During our visit to Geneva, we were told that linkage negotiating is one of the reasons for the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament. China, for example, has made the establishment of a committee to negotiate a FMCT dependent on discussions about the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). China has also stated that if the US proceeds with the deployment of national missile defence, it will not be willing to agree to a cessation of fissile material production for weapons purposes as it will require more warheads to preserve the credibility of its force.[125]

69. In the written evidence we received from the FCO prior to the NPT Review Conference, the Government stated that attempting to deal with existing stocks of fissile material in the FMCT negotiations would prevent the early achievement of a straightforward ban on future production.[126] At the Review Conference the States Parties committed themselves to "the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT with a view to their conclusion within five years."

70. We recommend that the Government make renewed efforts to help to break the impasse on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations and ensure that substantive negotiations commence quickly.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations

71. Russia's ratification on April 14 this year of the second bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) with the USA will allow the implementation of an agreement aimed at reducing strategic nuclear arsenals to a maximum of 3,500 warheads each, down from 6,000 under START I. Preliminary bilateral discussions on START III indicate that the USA wants to reduce to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads, whereas Russia is now prepared to go down to as few as1,000 warheads. However, according to Minister Adamov of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Russia is likely to be unable to maintain more than 1,000 warheads by 2008 due to economic factors,[127] so Russia's motivation to reduce further the size of its nuclear arsenal is not entirely altruistic. This may well be an area where Russia would seek to bargain with the USA as part of negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of NMD.

72. Russia's ratification of START II, however, will not take effect until a number of conditions have been met, including ratification by the US Senate of the START II Protocol and, most controversially, ratification of the protocols to the ABM Treaty, signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997, stipulating strict limits on permissible defences against theatre-range ballistic missile attack.[128]

73. The Foreign Secretary was quite optimistic about the situation in Russia, stating that the "new administration in Russia has come up with much more ambitious targets than even the already high level of objective for START III negotiations" and commenting that "at the moment the momentum within Russia appears to be entirely favourable towards cuts in nuclear missiles."[129] Given the conditions attached to Russia's ratification of START II, however, future progress on START negotiations would appear to depend on US/Russian agreement on NMD and the ABM Treaty. Professor O'Neill thought that such an agreement was highly unlikely and predicted dire consequences for the START negotiations and for arms control. He warned us that NMD would "completely scupper any prospect of a long term reduction in nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia."[130] Dr Malcolm Chalmers of Bradford University detected a convergence of interests between the USA and Russia and thought that "a deal is still possible ... Russia might also use negotiations as a means of securing US financial assistance for the modernisation of its own early warning systems, currently in a state of increasing disrepair."[131]

74. As reductions in strategic nuclear weapons proceed, so theatre nuclear weapons will also need to be taken into account—building on the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and unilateral reductions by the USA and Russia agreed in 1991. Russia's increased reliance on nuclear weapons in its recently revised military doctrine, an issue we discussed during our earlier report into Relations with the Russian Federation,[132] indicates potential future difficulties and is a concern that was frequently raised in written evidence.[133]

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT

75. Arms control agreements have required Russia to dismantle hundreds of nuclear weapons. The immense scale of this problem was brought home to us during our discussions at the US Department of Energy where we were told that Russia has 600 metric tons of Highly Enriched Uranium, 700 metric tons of weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium and 165 metric tons of Plutonium. In turn, this necessitates the safe disposal of nuclear materials contained in the warheads. We heard concern about the degree of control exercised over this material and the possibility of its theft for subsequent use in other weapons.[134] This echoes the anxieties expressed by witnesses during our inquiry earlier this year into Relations with the Russian Federation.[135] There was consensus that Russian nuclear weapons and fissile material were inadequately guarded and that both the materials and technological know-how were widely available to proliferators.

76. The UK has already offered some help through the provision of secure containers for nuclear material. However, given the scale of the problem, witnesses expressed the view that the USA, the UK and its European allies should do more. Professor Rogers, Professor Baylis and Colonel Taylor all agreed that three to four times the level of current spending was needed to ensure the safe disposal of Russian nuclear materials.[136] British Nuclear Fuels told us that commercial funding initiatives were also required and advised us that it was "developing proposals to provide a system capable of dealing with all declared surplus materials in a commercially sustainable way."[137] The Foreign Secretary argued that the division of responsibility between the USA and Europe has been such that "Europe has focussed its funding which is quite substantial on nuclear safety within Russia in terms of the civil reactor programme and the costs there are very substantial indeed."[138] The USA, on the other hand, has taken major responsibility for handling the disposal of fuel from the nuclear weapons. The Foreign Secretary thought that this was justified as "the nuclear weapons being dismantled are a consequence of the START programme of which the European Union is not a member."[139] He defended the record of the EU in financing programmes, claiming that "if you take the totality of effort to assist Russia with its nuclear environment, Europe comes out rather well."[140]

77. The funding of the British Government's Cross-Departmental review of nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union was announced in the recently published Spending Review 2000, New Public Spending Plans 2001-2004.[141] Spending on existing programmes by the FCO and a number of other Government Departments totalled £8 million for 2000-01. The Government has announced that a new pooled budget will be established in within the DTI's programme with a value of £24 million for 2001-02, increasing to £27 million for 2002-03 and £33 million for 2003-04. The Government has said that this pooled budget will allow the UK to participate in a "more joined up and effective way" to international efforts to rebuild the Chernobyl shelter; improve operational safety of nuclear plant, regulatory systems and nuclear safety cultures across the former Soviet Union; de-fuel disused submarines in North West Russia; deal with surplus Russian weapons grade plutonium; retrain and generate employment opportunities for nuclear weapons scientists; and improve security, materials accountancy, and international verification arrangements at FSU nuclear sites. We welcome this increase in funding and effort to increase the effectiveness of the contribution made by the UK.

78. At the Moscow summit in June 2000 President Clinton and President Putin agreed to dispose of a further 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium by turning it into MOX (mixed oxide fuel) for civil energy use. This follows a previous undertaking in 1998 to dispose of 50 tonnes of plutonium each.[142] The Foreign Secretary told us that although the EU was looking at making a possible contribution to the funding of this agreement, the UK was "more hopeful that the framework of an international financial arrangement in which we would be involved would be agreed through the G8 mechanism."[143]

79. One specific area where greater resources would be beneficial is support of the work of the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC).[144] The ISTC was established in 1992 as a non-proliferation programme to provide peaceful research opportunities for non-military research for weapon scientists and engineers in the former Soviet Union,[145] and thereby to prevent the leakage of technical know-how onto the international black market. The EU contributed $60m between 1992-1998 (an average of $10m p.a.), but only $3.8m in 1999.

80. We are concerned that the overall level of investment in assisting Russia to dismantle and dispose of its nuclear weapons is inadequate for the scale of the problem and that EU funding for the ISTC in particular appears to be declining.

81. We recommend that the Government use its influence with both Russia and the USA to achieve the maximum negotiable reduction in nuclear warheads in START III. We further recommend that the Government use its position in both the G8 and the EU to accelerate progress in helping the Russian Government to destroy its surplus nuclear materials or convert them to civil use.

UK Nuclear Posture and Disarmament

82. The five nuclear weapon states, including the UK, have given an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total abolition of their nuclear arsenals." Mr Hain regards this as a strengthening of the Government's commitment under Article VI of the NPT.[146] Nevertheless, this commitment has no deadlines attached to it. The Secretary of State for Defence told the House that "the non-proliferation treaty agreement¼ is an aspiration; it is not likely to produce results in the short term."[147] In the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) the Government made clear that it would include the UK's nuclear weapons in strategic arms talks "when we are satisfied with progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons."[148] It was stated in the SDR that "while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security"[149] and that the UK will continue to deploy its nuclear forces at a level necessary "to deter any threat to our vital interests."[150] This position was reaffirmed by the Secretary of State for Defence who told the House that:

151

83. The UK's nuclear arsenal now comprises a single system—Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). As part of its Strategic Defence Review, the present Government made further reductions to its predecessor's deployments:

The ceiling of 96 warheads per boat was cut to an exact deployment of 48 warheads on each operationally available Trident submarine;

The total stockpile of operationally available warheads was cut to less than 200 from a ceiling of 300;

Only one submarine is now on patrol at any one time and is on a reduced state of readiness.

84. The FCO's memorandum pointed out that the UK's "nuclear holdings are now considerably lower than those of any other nuclear weapon state."[152] This point was amplified by the Foreign Secretary in his evidence. He made it clear that the Government had already made progress on all four of the specific steps which the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference committed the nuclear weapon states to take:

153

Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Secretary at the MOD, stated that the significant unilateral changes announced in the SDR has "had a wry incidental effect, in that there now remains little that could be put on the table, other than the complete abandonment of the capability, were we to be included in some wider START-type arms-reduction negotiation."[154]

85. We acknowledge and commend the positive steps taken by the Government with regard to the UK's nuclear posture. However, a number of academics submitting evidence to us commented on the lack of ideas within the international community about how to proceed to global nuclear disarmament. Some questioned whether global disarmament was being pursued seriously at all. For example, in Professor MccGwire's view, "in theory, the present government espouses the goal of a nuclear weapons free world, as did its predecessor. Lip service is paid to the commitment, but there is no evidence that the concept is taken seriously in practice and it gathers dust in the bottom drawer, along with the commitment to general and complete disarmament." [155] Professor Baylis told us that "the interesting question is¼whether we have any long term objectives in terms of trying to take the process of minimum deterrence to the next stage."[156] The Government should think creatively about how to proceed towards minimum deterrence for all nuclear weapon states and not focus its attention solely on existing arms control agreements and negotiations.

86. We accept the Government's statement that, with the reductions in nuclear capability it has made, the UK's deterrent "is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the forseeable future and smaller than those of the major nuclear powers."[157] We recommend that the Government make every endeavour to bring about reductions by all nuclear weapon states to genuinely minimum deterrent levels.

92 As they are committed to do under Article VI of the treaty. Back

93 Ev. p. 167. Back

94 Q62. Back

95 Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. Back

96 Q52. Back

97 Ev. p. 46. Back

98 Ev. p. 99. Back

99 Ev. p. 130. Back

100 HC Deb 8 June 2000, col. 306w. Back

101 The Trilateral Initiative was created in 1996 to fulfill the commitments made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin concerning IAEA verification of weapons origin fissile material. Back

102 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear non-proliferation, agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, available at: www.acronym.org.uk/a11app3.htm. Back

103 Q229. Back