30. The current US Administration is considering
the deployment of a system of national missile defence (NMD),
designed to defend US territory against limited ballistic missile
attacks from "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iran
and Iraq.[57]
President Clinton has stated that he will decide whether or not
to proceed with NMD in autumn 2000, following the completion of
a series of three tests of the proposed system, the third of which
took place on 7 July 2000. The President's decision will be based
on four criteria: an evaluation of whether the threat has developed
sufficiently to warrant deployment; the technical feasibility
of NMD; its likely cost; and finally, its potential impact on
strategic stability. A decision in favour of deployment would
require Russia's agreement to amend the ABM Treaty. If such agreement
were not forthcoming, the USA would be forced to abrogate the
treaty unilaterally.[58]
31. The USA and the Soviet Union signed the bilateral
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 1972. The Treaty
and its related Protocol of 1974 impose strict limits on the number
and location of strategic interceptor missiles deployed by both
parties—each country is restricted to deploying 100 launchers
at a single site. The ABM Treaty was a product of the rough parity
that had developed between the strategic nuclear arsenals of the
superpowers by the late 1960s. This situation, where both sides
possessed the capability to retaliate in a devastating manner
if the other side struck first in a nuclear exchange, came to
be known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Preserving this
condition of mutual vulnerability was perceived as the key to
maintaining a stable deterrent relationship between the Superpowers.
Indeed, MAD was the basis for strategic nuclear arms control from
the late 1960s onwards and it was perceived as the bedrock of
strategic stability between the USA and the Soviet Union for the
remainder of the Cold War. The potential development of anti-ballistic
missile defences threatened to undermine MAD by offering either
side the capability to shoot down the other's nuclear retaliatory
forces after initiating a first strike. The ABM Treaty was designed
to ensure mutual vulnerability by preventing each side from developing
an ABM system capable of nullifying the other's strategic retaliatory
forces.[59]
Although the treaty did not prevent a strategic nuclear arms race
between the superpowers during the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted
in each side possessing the capability to destroy the other many
times over, it did help to preserve MAD by preventing the initiation
of a highly destabilising competition between defensive anti-ballistic
missile systems and offensive missile systems designed to overwhelm
them.
32. The ABM Treaty does not prohibit the deployment
of defensive missiles per se, but places limits on the
extent of the territory that can be protected. Article 1 of the
ABM Treaty forbids any national system of missile defence.[60]
The Soviet Union developed a system of ballistic missile defence
that remains in place today. The system is centred on Moscow.
The USA deployed its anti-ballistic missile defence in North Dakota
but moth-balled the system in 1976.[61]
In the 1980s, President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative
proposed the development of an impenetrable shield over the USA.
This overly-ambitious plan, popularly referred to as "star
wars" failed to materialise for a variety of political, financial
and technological reasons.
33. The issue of NMD has become caught up in the
current US Presidential election campaign[62]—both
the Democratic and Republican parties are keen to demonstrate
that they are tough on defence issues. The British American Security
Information Council asserted that "there is a steadily strengthening
view in the US against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in
national strategy. The idea that Americans must not be threatened
with any kind of missile has led the Administration to consider
deployment of [NMD] ... and many in the Republican Party to reject
the ABM Treaty out of hand."[63]
The Threat from "Rogue States"
34. The pressure in the USA to deploy a national
missile defence has increased over the last few years. There are
many complex reasons for this, but one powerful motivator is concern
within the USA about the potential threats arising from its position
as the world's sole superpower. Professor Walker observed that
"an unco-ordinated but terrifying army of 'rogue states',
'terrorists' and other actors has assembled in the public and
political minds against the American people and government."[64]
In the previous section of the report, where we discuss key regional
threats, we acknowledge the threat presented by a number of countries,
which have acquired or developed long-range missiles and which
are suspected of developing clandestine WMD programmes. Mr George
J. Tenet, US Director of Central Intelligence, made a statement
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 March 2000 in
which he set out the CIA's view of the threat to the USA presented
by ballistic missiles:
Many politicians and officials within the USA have
concluded that the deployment of NMD is the best way to respond
to this threat.
35. A great deal of scepticism has been expressed
to the Committee about the extent and credibility of the threat
posed by "rogue states". During our visit to the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva, a senior European official described
the idea of a North Korean ballistic missile attack upon the USA
as "surrealistic". Whilst accepting that North Korea
is run by an unpredictable administration, Professor Baylis believes
that the threat has been exaggerated for political ends and that
the Rumsfeld Commission[66]
in 1998 had "hyped this issue up quite considerably."[67]
Our academic witnesses viewed "pork barrel" politics
as an important driver for the project. Professor Rogers advised
us that many studies of the threat from "rogue states"
had been financially assisted by arms companies.[68]
Professor Baylis concurred, stating that NMD "has been driven
¼ by
close links between political groups and various industrial complexes
in the United States."[69]
36. By contrast with the USA, the UK Government acknowledges
the threats generated by WMD proliferation but does not appear
compelled to take defensive action. The Foreign Secretary told
us that although "we take very seriously threats of proliferation
to British interests... we are not currently anticipating another
state other than the existing nuclear weapon states having the
capacity to strike Britain by missile."[70]
The Secretary of State for Defence said in the House on 3 July
2000 that "our current assessment is that there is no significant
threat to the UK from weapons of mass destruction."[71]
The Foreign Secretary told us that:
As the Foreign Secretary intimated, it is important
to recognise that the perceptions of the threat from WMD in the
hands of rogue states are not the same in the UK and the USA:
the latter's superpower status may make it a more obvious target.
Strategic Stability
37. There is mounting international concern about
President Clinton's decision because of fears that deployment
of NMD will be destabilising in terms of its impact on strategic
arms control. Strategic stability would be undermined if Russia
and China felt obliged to respond to NMD by enhancing their offensive
nuclear capabilities. This would adversely affect the progress
of nuclear arms control which, in turn, could have serious repercussions
for the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. NMD might also
trigger an arms race, particularly in regions such as East Asia,
the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent which are already
volatile. Professor Baylis's view of the importance of the ABM
treaty and the dangers of it being compromised was representative:
38. The US administration argues that it is planning
to deploy only a limited system of NMD, designed to offer protection
against a small number of missiles. It claims that this would
not alter the balance of deterrence that currently exists between
the nuclear forces of the USA and Russia or China. In other words,
the nuclear forces of Russia and China would still be capable
of overcoming such defences. However, the public response of Russia
and China to these proposals shows that neither regime is apparently
sanguine about the USA's claim to be considering only a limited
system of NMD. During our recent visit to China, we received the
clear message from official Chinese sources that NMD was a prime
example of US hegemony and was unacceptable. Russia has also been
implacable in its public opposition to NMD. President Putin and
President Jiang Zemin held a summit meeting on 18 July 2000 following
which they issued a joint statement, expressing their mutual antipathy
to NMD. The joint statement confirmed that, in the view of the
two Presidents, "the plan by the United States to develop
a National Missile Defence System seeks unilateral military and
security advantages."[74]
The joint statement also warned that if the USA persists with
its plans to deploy NMD, this would "pose the most grave
adverse consequences not only to the national security of Russia,
China and other countries, but also to the security and international
strategic stability of the United States itself."
39. Professor Rogers explained the reasons for Russian
and Chinese anxiety about NMD:
Dr Chalmers's view of China's potential response
to the deployment of NMD was typical. He thought that China might
seek to increase its force of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
because NMD would reduce the effectiveness of its existing force.[76]
It is not clear to what extent Russia's protests are being used
as high-stake bargaining to lay the ground for future demands
for concessions elsewhere in the arms control field. However,
Russia could perceive China's expansion of its nuclear capability
in response to NMD as a potential threat.
Technological Feasibility and
Credibility of NMD
40. Whilst we recognise that threat assessments within
the UK and the USA may differ for legitimate reasons, when assessing
threat it is important to distinguish between capability and intention.
We are concerned that the USA over-emphasises the capability component
of the threat equation, when it comes to assessing the extent
of the threat it faces, and attaches too little importance to
intention. It is this which makes the threat which NMD is intended
to counter less credible. There are a number of reasons for this.
First, it is difficult to see what a "rogue state" would
gain from launching a WMD-armed ballistic missile against the
USA as it would do so in the knowledge that its action would precipitate
massive and devastating retaliation upon itself. Secondly, if
a "rogue state" did decide to inflict mass casualties
on the USA, it is unlikely to use the one method of attack—ballistic
missile—which would leave no doubt as to the identity of
the attacker. Thirdly, as we discuss in the next paragraph, other
methods of attack—such as biological or chemical weapons—can
be delivered much more easily, at a minute fraction of the cost
and with a real possibility of concealing the aggressor. Finally,
if a future US President came to believe the US was at imminent
risk of a WMD ballistic missile attack from a "rogue state",
we believe it is reasonable to assume that that President would
authorise the pre-emptive destruction of the rogue state's missile
site or sites regardless of whether NMD had by then been deployed
in the USA or not.
41. WMD do not have to be delivered by missile. Professor
O'Neill and Rebecca Johnson, Director of the Acronym Institute,
both warned that nuclear warheads could be delivered, for example,
on cargo ships, in delivery trucks that can go across borders
and in packing cases. This meant that it was impossible for the
USA to make itself invulnerable to attack and external pressure.[77]
NMD would not eliminate the threat posed by WMD. As the Sarin
nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway demonstrated, the USA,
in common with any other industrialised state, might face as great
a risk from a biological or chemical weapons which do not need
to be delivered by missile. We are concerned that a decision to
implement NMD may provide the USA with an illusion of security
whilst increasing the risks for many other countries by undermining
strategic stability.
42. We are also concerned that NMD might not in any
case offer the degree of protection sought by the US Administration.
Doubts have been raised about the technological feasibility of
NMD. The tests to date have not been impressive: the first intercept
test in October 1999 scored an ambiguous hit, the second test
in January 2000 was a miss and the third test on 7 July 2000 was
another miss. Although President Clinton is not due to make his
decision about deployment until the autumn, there has been widespread
speculation in the media that the failure of the third test will
mean that the decision is delayed until after the Presidential
election. The Union of Concerned Scientists and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Security Studies Program published a report,
by a panel of eleven independent senior physicists and engineers,
which concluded that the planned NMD system could be easily overwhelmed
by simple "countermeasures".[78]
According to Dr Scilla Elworthy of the Oxford Research Group,
"National Missile Defence systems against strategic missile
attacks are hard to rationalise. No current threat justifies them
and they are not cost effective—it would be far cheaper
for the enemy to deploy more strategic ballistic missiles with
multiple warheads than for the defenders to develop and deploy
anti-ballistic missiles to attack them."[79]
The Response of the UK Government
to US Plans for National Missile Defence
43. In Professor Simpson's view, the international
community now faces the problem that "many proliferation
decisions, many decisions on nuclear weapons, are going to be
made in domestic political contexts where the ability of the outside
world to influence state decisions is going to be very limited."[80]
Certainly, the UK Government has to be realistic about the extent
of its influence with the US Administration, but other EU partners
and allies of the USA—notably, France, Germany and Canada—have
been much more vociferous in their opposition to NMD, a system
which they believe will be destabilising. The Foreign Secretary
denied that there was a split amongst members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation. He said that he had been present at two meetings
of the North Atlantic Treaty Council when there had been a full
round-table discussion of NMD. In his view, it would be "fair
to say that there is a lot of common ground on what are the areas
of difficulty and what would be an appropriate condition for this
to proceed. It is not a question of the United States versus Europe,
nor of the United Kingdom being isolated in its views either from
the United States of from Europe."[81]
We recognise, however, that the UK is in a difficult and uneasy
position on this sensitive and highly important issue, with countervailing
pressures from its European and US allies.
44. The Government has been repeatedly asked to express
its view of the US plans for NMD, by members of this Committee
and by parliamentary colleagues, but refuses to be drawn on the
issue and seeks to avoid taking a firm position at this stage,
at least in public. The Government argues that the ABM Treaty,
as a bilateral treaty between the USA and Russia, is a matter
for these two parties alone to decide. The Government's memorandum
states that:
Whilst this is certainly true, any decision to deploy
NMD and to change the status of the ABM Treaty, especially if
done without Russia's agreement, will have a profound effect on
international relations and strategic stability. Because of this,
it is incumbent on the Government, as one of the five nuclear
weapon states and as a close ally of the USA, to make an early
public statement on its analysis of NMD's likely impact on strategic
stability and its assessment of whether this would be in the overall
security interests of this country.
45. This is all the more important due to the apparently
contradictory views emanating from the FCO and the MOD. While
the FCO has made it clear that it continues to attach importance
to the ABM Treaty and wishes it to be preserved and strengthened,[83]
the MOD is keeping open the possibility of acquiring a system
of national missile defence in the future. The Secretary of State
for Defence announced that "we will continue to consult closely
with the US and take account of the work they are doing, to help
us take an informed decision on whether to acquire such a capability
ourselves in the future."[84]
Asked why the Government was keeping the option of NMD deployment
by the UK open, the Foreign Secretary replied: "I do not
honestly see that there would be any particular interest in closing
it off, but at the present time there is no active commitment
to it."[85]
46. The UK is not simply a bystander with regards
to NMD. For implementation of the first phase of NMD to work,
facilities at RAF Fylingdales will need to be upgraded, and this
cannot happen without the UK Government's assent. This puts the
Government in a different position to many of our EU partners
and NATO allies, who will not be asked to make similar decisions.
The uniquely close nature of the US-UK relationship in the security
field exacerbates the complex and sensitive nature of the Government's
response to NMD. A UK refusal to allow the upgrading of facilities
at Fylingdales would be unprecedented and prove very testing for
the alliance.
47. When the Government is asked whether it intends
to allow the US Government to upgrade facilities at Fylingdales
if NMD were to proceed,[86]
it argues that since no such request has yet been received from
the US Government, no response has been given. The Foreign Secretary
defended this stance as "an eminently sane position for a
government to take."[87]
He argued further that "until we know both the nature of
the question and also the circumstances in which we are being
asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what
the response might be, particularly since at the moment there
is no commitment by the United States to ask the question."[88]
48. A joint memorandum from the FCO and the MOD sets
out the two most likely scenarios in which the Government might
be asked to agree to the use of Fylingdales for NMD purposes and
to its related upgrading. Under the first scenario, the USA and
Russia would agree to modifications of the ABM Treaty which would
permit the deployment of the first phase of an NMD system. Under
the second scenario, an agreement would not be reached and the
USA would have formally given notice of its withdrawal from the
treaty.[89]
The following conclusions are then drawn about each of these scenarios:
A decision by a US administration to seek permission
to upgrade Fylingdales, having given formal notice of its withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty, would present the UK Government with an acute
dilemma. Whether a "special relationship" continues
to exist between the USA and the UK is open to question, but the
relationship remains a particular and distinct one, rather different
from any shared with the USA by other member states of the EU.
A decision by the UK to refuse a US President—possibly a
newly elected President committed to implementing NMD as essential
to the security of the USA—would have profound consequences
for UK/US relations. It is relevant to point out the Prime Minister's
latest statement on NMD:[91]
We commend the Prime Minister's approach, whilst
urging the Government to impress upon the US Administration that
it cannot necessarily assume unqualified UK co-operation with
US plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral US abrogation
of the ABM Treaty.
49. We understand that the British Government, in
determining its policy towards NMD, has to be realistic. The UK
has a degree of influence but this is not definitive. For our
part, we wish to emphasise strongly that our concern about US
plans for NMD does not stem from opposition to, or even indifference
to, our closest ally's desire to protect itself: the question
is whether the additional security that NMD might offer outweighs
the negative impact of its deployment on strategic arms control.
In any event, NMD would only offer the USA limited protection
as the system would only defend the USA from WMD delivered by
ballistic missiles and would not eliminate the total threat posed
by such weapons. Other methods of meeting the threat posed by
WMD, such as diplomatic persuasion, arms control, deterrence and
other defensive measures, might also prove to be as effective
and do not generate such difficulties for strategic stability.
50. We recommend that the Government articulate
the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within
the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent
an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by
the international community. We recommend that the Government
encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threats it
perceives.
58
Some hard-line Republicans dispute the legitimacy of the ABM Treaty,
arguing that it became invalid upon the break up of the Soviet
Union. However, Russia is recognised as the successor state of
the USSR, and has inherited its international obligations. Back
59
In September 1997 the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus
signed a Memorandum of Understanding which, once it enters force,
will make all five states parties to the ABM Treaty (Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus each inherited Soviet ABM facilities on
their territory). Back
61
Ev. p. 131. Back
63
Ev. p. 194. Back
64
Ev. p. 27. Back
65
Statement by Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet,
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 March 2000
on The World Wide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of our National
Security (as prepared for delivery), available at www.cia.gov. Back
66
The Rumsfeld Commission was a bipartisan commission established
by Congress in the National Defense Authorisation Act of 1997.
The Commission was tasked with assessing the ballistic missile
threat to the USA. Back
71
HC Deb 3 July 2000, col. 2. Back
74
Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir
Putin, and Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin
on National Missile Defence, 20 July 2000. Back
76
Ev. p. 149. Back
78
Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational
Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defence System,
The Union of Concerned Scientists and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Security Studies Program, available at www.ucsusa.org. Back
79
Ev. p. 187. Back
82
Ev. p. 131. Back
83
See, for example, Ev. p. 132, HC Deb 11 April 2000, col. 185. Back
84
HC Deb 21 March 2000, col. 491w. Back
86
The Government memorandum explains that: "Present US plans
for the first phase of a National Missile Defence system envisage
the use of Fylingdales and four other existing ballistic missile
early warning radars (three of them in the United States, the
fourth at Thule in Greenland) for tracking hostile ballistic missiles
in mid-flight. These radars would each be upgraded to enhance
their usefulness to a National Missile Defence system."
Ev. p. 132. Back
89
Ev. p. 132. Back
90
Ev. p. 132. Back
91
Following the recent G8 Summit in Okinawa. HC Deb 24 July 2000:
col. 767. Back
"Over the next 15 years,
however, our cities will face ballistic missile threats from a
wide variety of actors—North Korea, probably Iran,
and possibly, Iraq. In some cases, this is because of indigenous
technological development, and in other cases, because of direct
foreign assistance. And while the missile arsenals of these countries
will be fewer in number, constrained to smaller payloads, and
less reliable than those of the Russians and Chinese, they will
still pose a lethal and less predictable threat."[65]
"I can say with some
confidence that we do not anticipate a nuclear strike from North
Korea on Britain, but I am not going to seek to second-guess the
assessment of the United States in relation to itself. I do think
that it is a matter of perplexity that North Korea developed such
a technology in the first place. Not unreasonably there are people
in the United States who ask why?"[72]
"The ABM Treaty is a
cornerstone treaty in terms of strategic stability. It is in the
interests of the United States as well as in the interests of
Britain to maintain strategic stability and not to create a situation
in which the whole fabric of arms control begins to unravel. NMD
potentially could be so serious as to unravel the whole basis
of strategic arms control."[73]
"Frankly, in Moscow
and Beijing they do not believe a word of it. They see a limited
NMD as the start of a bigger programme, and when you look at the
details already coming up from the Ballistic Missile Defence Offices
it is clear that there are a number of stages and one would end
up with an NMD system which is really quite comprehensive."[75]
"as with any other international
treaty, the interpretation of the ABM Treaty is a matter for the
Parties. It is not for non-parties, such as the United Kingdom,
to offer their own interpretations of its provisions."[82]
"In scenario (a), the
upgrading and integration of RAF Fylingdales into NMD would presumably
have been agreed by the Parties to be permitted under the terms
of a modified ABM Treaty. In scenario (b), such constraints as
the ABM Treaty currently places on the role of RAF Fylingdales
would no longer be operative. Either way, the question of any
possible breach of the treaty through the upgrading of the Fylingdales
radar or its integration into any NMD system would not appear
to arise."[90]
"We are trying to ensure
that the fear that the United States has—perfectly legitimately
and justifiably—is taken account of in a way that does not
put at risk the substantial progress that has been made on nuclear
disarmament over the past few years. It is vital, therefore, for
us to continue a dialogue on what will be one of the most important
issues that we shall have to face over the next few years."
57 Ev. p. 101. Back
Prepared 2 August 2000