House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

KEY REGIONAL THREATS

7. Several "hot spots" stand out in terms of the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD: the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent and East Asia. Proliferation in these regions is a major cause for concern because it occurs in the context of enduring antagonism and hostility amongst former, current and potential adversaries. These conditions can often trigger arms races and increase the likelihood of WMD being used in anger or, because of the lack of trust, in error with the consequent impact on regional security and stability.

8. An additional cause for concern, from a UK perspective, is the potential vulnerability to WMD attack of British armed forces deployed in these regions. WMD offer regional aggressors the ability to inflict, or to threaten to inflict, damage totally disproportionate to their conventional military capabilities. From a broader Western perspective, then, WMD could potentially form the basis of 'asymmetric strategies' which would allow regional WMD aggressors to attempt to counter Western conventional war-fighting superiority. At the strategic level, for example, it is suggested that aggressors could use WMD threats in an attempt to deter Western intervention by exploiting our sensitivity to casualties and convincing us that the costs and risks of involvement are too high in relation to our strategic interests. Moreover, in the event of Western involvement in a regional conflict, the use of WMD can seriously undermine the effective conduct of military operations by contaminating key equipment and facilities (e.g. ports and airfields). Even the threat of WMD, by forcing troops to wear protective clothing, can reduce their effectiveness as was seen in the Gulf.

India and Pakistan

9. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 prompted international concern because of the long history of conflict between these countries. This was demonstrated most recently in 1999 when again India and Pakistan became embroiled in a conventional military conflict in Kashmir. The presence of nuclear weapons in the context of such an antagonistic relationship increases the risk that any future conflict between these two countries could cross the nuclear threshold.[18]

10. India and Pakistan are not signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their demonstration of nuclear capabilities poses the questions for the international community of how to encourage them to demonstrate nuclear restraint and of how to assimilate them into the non-proliferation regime. The challenge is to avoid being seen to treat India and Pakistan as de facto nuclear weapon states (a category not recognised under the NPT) which would undermine the NPT by rewarding them for remaining outside the treaty and developing nuclear weapons, whilst at the same time helping to defuse the conflict between India and Pakistan in order to avoid accelerating the nuclear arms race in this region.[19]

11. In June 1998, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1172, which condemned the previous month's tests and called on both countries to address their differences through dialogue and to take key non-proliferation steps.[20] It is evident that the international community will not permit India and Pakistan to join the NPT unless they renounce their nuclear capabilities and sign up as non-nuclear weapon states. India and Pakistan are highly unlikely to give up these capabilities in the short-to-medium term because of their mutual suspicion. As a consequence, both countries have been encouraged to participate in the non-proliferation regime by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and joining the negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) once they start. Despite making highly qualified statements about signing the CTBT since May 1998, and announcing moratoriums on nuclear testing, both India and Pakistan have yet to sign the CTBT. Moreover, both countries remain legally free to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes because they are not Parties to the NPT.[21] It is believed that India and Pakistan are both continuing to produce fissile material for such weapons.[22]

12. The UK Government has pursued a number of diplomatic initiatives in an attempt to resolve some of these difficulties. The Foreign Secretary said that, following the nuclear tests, "Britain gave a vigorous response and was very active in trying to put together an international coalition to try to maintain pressure on both India and Pakistan to renounce the nuclear option."[23] The UK, which held the presidency of the G8 at that time, drew together a task force, whose membership included countries such as Brazil, Argentina and South Africa which had turned their backs on the nuclear option, to encourage India and Pakistan to renounce their weapons and to offer technological expertise. The task force, which is "not particularly popular in South Asia," continues to meet.[24] The Foreign Secretary told us that it was agreed "in the course of [his] visit to India the other month that we would have a bilateral dialogue between India and Britain on nuclear weapons issues."[25]

13. We support the work of the Government in encouraging both India and Pakistan to demonstrate nuclear restraint by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to join the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty when they begin and to re-open dialogue on issues that divide the two countries. We recommend that the Government give priority to its dialogue with New Delhi because it is evident that Pakistan will not sign or ratify any nuclear-related treaty unless India does so first.

Middle East

14. Proliferation in the Middle East is primarily the product of long-term Arab-Israeli antagonism and conflict as well as Iraqi-Iranian conflict. Several countries in the region possess one or more types of WMD, such as biological and chemical weapons or gas, and many have some form of ballistic missile capability, although Israel is the only country in the Middle East which possesses nuclear weapons.[26] Whilst most countries in the region in theory support the concept of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, the FCO told us that "little progress has been made [to achieve this] due to Israel's reluctance to negotiate until there is peace in the region and until there is a parallel agreement on a Middle East zone free from all weapons of mass destruction."[27] Israel is concerned about those Arab states that have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[28] and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)[29] and which are suspected of possessing chemical and biological weapons. For example, the FCO recognises that Syria is a serious cause of concern in the context of chemical and biological weapons.[30] For its part, Syria refuses to join the CWC and the BTWC while Israel remains outside the NPT and retains a sizeable nuclear arsenal. As a result, the risk of the use of WMD in the region and the prospects of creating a WMD-free zone appear to be "inextricably bound up in the Middle East Peace Process."[31] The Foreign Secretary reported that "during my visit to the Middle East in the autumn of last year, when there was some optimism about progress, I was very encouraged that then there were several countries enthusiastically contemplating a very different security environment which would arise in the wake of the Middle East peace process settlement."[32] However, the Foreign Secretary also told us that there were some steps Israel could take now. He said that he would "wish to see Israel adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because...it is one of the countries which has to adhere for it to come into force."[33]

15. We recommend strongly that the Government contribute as fully as it can to bringing about a comprehensive and sustainable Middle East Peace settlement as the absence of such a settlement provides a major spur to the proliferation of WMD in the region.

IRAN

16. Iran is a non-nuclear weapon State Party to the NPT, and it has signed and ratified both the CWC and the BTWC. However, there have been reports that Iran may be working to develop nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities.[34] The Government told us that doubts have been expressed about the accuracy of Iran's declarations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an issue the FCO intends to pursue in bilateral contacts.[35] Moreover, Iran is currently developing the Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which has a designed range of 1,300km. Such a delivery system would be capable of targeting all countries in the region, including Israel whose own Jericho 2 missiles can already reach Iran. Dr Hopkinson of the Royal Institute of International Affairs suggested that Iran's efforts to acquire WMD stem from its fear of attacks from other countries in the region and advised us that "with the threat from Iraq, there is a real security need."[36] Although the Government understands Iran's "legitimate security concerns", the continued development and eventual deployment of this missile could significantly undermine regional stability and the UK continues to "urge Iran to refrain from the development of ballistic missiles."[37] We learned during our visit to Washington that US intelligence estimates suggest that Iran is developing delivery systems that could strike the USA in under 15 years and this is often cited by proponents of NMD.

17. The UK remains concerned about reports of Iranian efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.[38] Despite assurances that its help is limited to civil nuclear applications and subject to IAEA safeguards, the UK Government said that Russia's assistance with the development of the Bushehr nuclear facility in Iran is being watched closely.[39] Mr Peter Hain, Minister of State at the FCO, stated that "a number of Russian companies and institutions may have exported missile-related goods and technology to Iran." Concerns have been expressed to the Russian Federation, both bilaterally and in multilateral fora that this would not be consistent with Russia's commitments under the terms of the conventions and export control regimes of which it is a member.[40]

18. We concur with the FCO's view that continued political reform in Iran, Tehran's rapprochement with the West, which included the upgrading of UK/Iranian bilateral links to Ambassadorial level in May 1999, and the success of the Middle East Peace Process are the best means of ensuring that Iran abides by its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

IRAQ

19. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War, UN Security Council Resolution 687 obliged Iraq to destroy its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and its ballistic missiles with a range over 150km, and to undertake not to develop these weapons in future. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were charged with ensuring Iraq's compliance. In December 1998, however, Iraq's refusal to co-operate with UNSCOM and the IAEA resulted in the withdrawal of weapons inspectors and the launch by the USA and the UK of Operation Desert Fox.[41]

20. In December 1999, the Security Council adopted a UK-drafted resolution (1284) that "makes clear that Iraq must give up its aspirations to have WMD" and also creates the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM as the body responsible for disarming Iraq of its nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities.[42] If Baghdad fully co-operates with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, Resolution 1284 provides for the suspension of sanctions on Iraq, but controls would remain in place on prohibited items.[43] The resolution did not have the unanimous backing of the fifteen member Security Council: there were eleven votes in favour and four abstentions from France, Russia, China and Malaysia, which had a non-permanent seat on the Council at that time. Reports have suggested that the resolution was weaker than it might have been due to Russian and Chinese opposition to sanctions and France's unwillingness to jeopardise its commercial and diplomatic relations with Iraq. The resolution did not contain an earlier provision which had called for the inclusion of UNSCOM inspectors in the new monitoring organisation. There was concern that without institutional memory to augment the archives that UNMOVIC will inherit, the new Commission will be unnecessarily disadvantaged in terms of fulfilling its disarmament mandate.[44]

21. Dr Hans Blix, whom we visited in New York in March, took up his appointment as the first Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC on 1 March 2000. Under the terms of SCR 1284, he had forty-five days in which to produce an organisational plan for UNMOVIC. This plan was presented to, and unanimously endorsed by, the Security Council on 13 April 2000. The FCO informed us that "a successful first meeting of the new UNMOVIC Commissioners was held on 23-24 May, during which Dr Blix described progress on setting up the organisation ... and said that UNMOVIC will be ready to start work in Iraq by the end of August 2000."[45]

22. Prior to December 1998, UNSCOM and the IAEA succeeded in destroying large quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials and facilities as well as Scud-type missiles. A nuclear weapons programme was also uncovered. However, the Iraqi regime's systematic concealment of proscribed items and obstruction of weapons inspectors means that not everything has been uncovered. It is more than likely, therefore, that Iraq has taken advantage of the absence of inspectors to rebuild its WMD and missile programmes and capabilities.[46] There have been reports claiming that Iraq has conducted tests of the Al Samoud missile since the withdrawal of the inspectors.[47] The FCO advised us that the Al Samoud has a declared design range of less than 150 kilometres which means that it does not contravene SCR 687. However, the absence of inspectors in Iraq means that the international community has not been able to ensure that the tests were compliant with SCR 687.[48]

23. We support the Government in its diplomatic efforts within the UN Security Council to ensure that UNMOVIC and the IAEA are given the maximum opportunity to complete the process of disarmament in Iraq in line with relevant UN resolutions. We wish to see UNMOVIC start its work in Iraq at the earliest opportunity. It is important that UNSCOM's successor, UNMOVIC, commands a mandate of equal strength to that of its predecessor to enable it to conduct further inspections of Iraq's WMD activity effectively. We urge the Government strongly to resist any attempt to dilute the international inspectors' powers of inspection or to compromise with Iraq on the composition of the Commission. We agree with the Government that "for so long as Iraq denies UNMOVIC access there can be no progress towards the suspension and eventual lifting of sanctions."[49]

North Korea/Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

24. Suspicions about North Korea's nuclear activities, together with its indigenous ballistic missile development programme and history of exporting missile technology to other states including Iran and Pakistan, makes the DPRK a state of considerable proliferation concern.[50] Until the recent summit between the two Korean Presidents, North Korea was labelled a "rogue state" by US policy makers. Shortly after the meeting, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that North Korea was no longer a "rogue", merely a "state of concern". The Foreign Secretary told us that:

25. In 1994, under the USA/DPRK Framework Agreement, the USA persuaded North Korea to freeze its nuclear programme in return for humanitarian aid, energy supplies and a multi-billion dollar project to build two light-water reactors. The Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) was set up by the USA, South Korea and Japan to implement relevant aspects of the agreement; the European Union became a member of KEDO in July 1997.[52]

26. The freeze of North Korea's nuclear programme remains in place and the process of canning spent fuel rods is reported to be nearly complete. However, IAEA inspectors report that the information and access provided by Pyongyang so far have been insufficient to build a complete picture of the North Korean programme. Consequently, questions remain to be answered about Pyongyang's past nuclear activities.[53]

27. In the missile field, North Korea test-launched the Taepo Dong ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998, causing great anxiety in the region because of the missile's relatively long range in the East Asian context.[54] The development of this missile heightened concern in the USA about North Korea's ultimate intentions and it is often cited to justify plans to deploy a system of national missile defence. The USA is currently negotiating with North Korea in the hope of reining in this missile programme, as well as Pyongyang's transfers of missile technology and assistance to countries such as Iran and Pakistan. One public result of these discussions thus far has been North Korea's declaration of a moratorium on ballistic missile tests, although a recent report from the US National Intelligence Council argues that "most analysts believe that North Korea will probably test a Taepo Dong-2 this year, unless delayed for political reasons. A two-stage Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States".[55] In view of such forecasts, the recent summit between the Presidents of North Korea and South Korea is an important development. The summit meeting between the Russian and North Korean Presidents, in which North Korea offered to abandon its missile programme in exchange for help with "peaceful space research," is also encouraging, although it is not clear why such research is viewed as a priority in DPRK. President Putin discussed the offer at the G8 summit in Okinawa and Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, is to hold talks shortly with the Foreign Minister of North Korea. Clearly, the more North Korea is drawn positively into the international community, the more the case in the USA for a limited NMD will be weakened. We urge the UK Government to give maximum support to the current dialogue between the leaderships of North and South Korea, with the aim of reaching a settlement between the two parties.

The threat from terrorists and other non-state parties

28. The WMD threat also encompasses the potential acquisition and use of these weapons by terrorists and other non-state parties. The frightening potential of WMD terrorism was brought home graphically in 1995 when the Japanese sect, Aum Shinrikyo, mounted a Sarin nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway, killing 13 people and injuring approximately 3,000. While traditional politically-motivated terrorist groups are unlikely to be interested in acquiring such weapons because of the risk of jeopardising their political support base, there is a general perception that individuals or groups driven by extreme religious, apocalyptic or other fanatical beliefs could view WMD as a means by which to cause mass destruction. In part, this view is based on a fear that emerging terrorist groups are becoming more indiscriminate and lethal, and more willing to target civilian populations. The bombings of two US Embassies in Africa in August 1998 appear to support this view. This is linked to the debate on asymmetric warfare on which we received helpful evidence from the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.[56]

29. Although it is difficult to assess the level of threat in this area, the potential challenges posed by terrorists and non-state actors using WMD are enormous. Dealing effectively with those challenges will require a variety of policy instruments, co-ordinated across government departments. For instance, the most stringent and effective civil defence measures are likely to challenge traditional civil liberties, for example, the right to privacy and the freedom from arbitrary search and seizure. Moreover, it is difficult to deter terrorists willing to use WMD if they are unknown to the police and other agencies. In some instances, individuals or terrorist groups might not want to take credit for launching such an attack. Consequently, the key to countering the potential for WMD terrorism is the acquisition and collation of accurate and timely intelligence on the individuals and organisations thought to present the greatest cause for concern, and international co-operation in meeting the threat.

18 Ev. p. 124. Back

19 Ev. p. 34. Back

20 Ev. p. 122. Back

21 Ev. pp. 99-100. Back

22 See for example, Pakistan Now Producing Enough Plutonium for One Bomb Per Year, McGraw-Hill's NuclearFuel Newsletter, available at http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/000612/dc_mcgraw_.html; Washington Times, 9 June 2000. Back

23 Q228. Back

24 Q228. Back

25 Q229. Back

26 Q241. Back

27 Ev. p. 125. Back

28 See Annex III for a list of states that have ratified or signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Back

29 See Annex IV for a list of states that have ratified or signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Back