The Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed to the following Report:—

1. Finding ways to minimise the threat to strategic stability posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a key component of UK foreign and defence policy. A number of international regimes have been established which seek to control the availability and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Our predecessor Committee reported on this issue on 30 March 1995 following its inquiry into UK Policy on Weapons Proliferation and Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era.[6] Given continued international concern about the proliferation of WMD in certain regional "hot spots", anxiety about the progress of arms control and the potentially destabilising impact of the USA's plans to deploy a system of National Missile Defence (NMD), we decided that now was the time to examine this issue.

2. A number of other factors make this the right time for a review:

• The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—the foundation stone for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts—came under scrutiny earlier this year during the Sixth Review Conference.[7] The NPT, which has 187 States Parties,[8] opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The international political and military climate was very different when the treaty was initiated: retaining relevance and signatories' support so that breakout from the treaty is avoided presents a significant challenge. The 2000 NPT Review Conference ended with the adoption, by consensus, of a final document which reviews the operation of the treaty over the past five years and sets out a number of steps that should be taken to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The next Review Conference is due to be held in 2005.

• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has also reached an important stage in its development. Efforts are being made to agree a verification protocol for the treaty before the Fifth Review Conference, due to take place in 2001.

• The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, is unique in being the first multi-laterally negotiated disarmament agreement which aims to ban an entire category of WMD in a verifiable manner and may, therefore, offer important lessons.

• Both the Russian Federation and the USA—central players due to the size and technological sophistication of their weaponry—will have elected a new President by the end of this year. President Putin was elected in March and the new US President will be elected in November. The policies pursued by each of these new administrations will have repercussions for many other states and will have a profound influence on the arms control climate. The UK Government enjoys strong links with the USA and the Russian Federation and must seek to influence both administrations in ways which enhance international security and stability.

• The Strategic Defence Review set out the UK Government's assessment of the risks from proliferation: "Our assessment is that there could be around 20 countries that either possess or have shown an interest in developing offensive chemical and/or biological warfare capabilities. The Government is also concerned about the nuclear programmes of some non-nuclear weapon states, as well as India and Pakistan."[9] The Government concluded that "at present, any risk to Britain from the ballistic missiles of nations of concern in terms of proliferation is many years off, but the risk to some of our NATO allies is less distant; and British forces must be able to operate in regions, such as the Gulf, where they might face these risks."[10] The risk presented by terrorist use of WMD is another important factor to take into consideration. The non-classified FCO paper "UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)" issued on 4 February 1998 stated that: "One hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people." The Government highlighted the steps it was taking to meet the threat both at home and overseas from biological and chemical weapons in the Ministry of Defence's publication last year "Defending against the threat from biological and chemical weapons."[11]

• Media interest in nuclear weapons and arms control treaties was boosted in March 2000 when Michael Douglas, UN Goodwill Ambassador, urged Members of Parliament to encourage the Prime Minister to take a leading role in preserving arms control regimes.[12] The film star's speech in Westminster Hall attracted a range of hyperbolic headlines—for example, Star begs Blair to save the world[13], Douglas warns MPs of nuclear anarchy,[14] Hollywood actor sees disarming role for Blair.[15] Despite the frivolity of the eye-catching headlines, the topics addressed in the articles are serious ones and the actor's visit certainly helped to raise the profile of an issue which, despite its vast importance, is often dismissed as off-puttingly technical and dull. Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala, of the Department for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, addressed a follow-up meeting in the Palace of Westminster on 3 July 2000.[16]

3. Continuing WMD proliferation makes arms control measures more vital than ever and some notable successes have been achieved. Since our predecessor Committee's 1995 report, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature; the indefinite extension of the NPT Review Conference has been agreed; the CWC has entered into force; the negotiation of a verification protocol to the BTWC has started and is now hopefully nearing successful conclusion; the USA and Russia have both ratified the START II Treaty that, when implemented, will result in significant reductions in the size of both countries's strategic nuclear arsenals; the UK and France have implemented unilateral reductions in the size of their nuclear arsenals; and four of the five nuclear weapon states have ceased the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

4. At the start of this inquiry, we visited the United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a visit which provided us with a useful, if somewhat depressing, introduction to the work of the Conference. We met a number of Ambassadors to the Conference, who expressed diverse but stimulating views. We later paid a useful visit to the United Nations in New York and to Washington, where we met officials from the State Department and politicians with interest and expertise in this field. A frequent topic of discussion during the latter visit was the USA's plans to deploy a system of National Missile Defence. This is a subject to which we returned during our sessions of oral evidence in London. We took evidence from academics, who had extensive expert knowledge of the three different categories of weapon and both the treaties and arms control measures designed to curtail the risk they present. Regional threats, especially those emanating from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, were also raised during the visits and the formal evidence sessions.

5. We took oral evidence on 4 April 2000 from people with expert knowledge of nuclear weapons and the related international treaties. Professor Paul Rogers of Bradford University, Professor Robert O'Neill of Oxford University and Professor John Baylis of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, made up our first panel of witnesses; and Professor William Walker of the University of St Andrews, Professor John Simpson of the University of Southampton and Ms Rebecca Johnson, Director of the Acronym Institute, the second. On 11 April 2000 we turned our attention to biological and chemical weapons and their associated conventions. Our three witnesses with expert knowledge of these fields were two academics, Professors Malcolm Dando and Graham Pearson of the University of Bradford, and Dr Tom Inch of the Royal Society of Chemistry, Chairman of the National Advisory Committee on the Chemical Weapons Act and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In the second part of this session, we turned to the verification issues surrounding the treaties governing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and took evidence from Dr Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) and Colonel Terry Taylor, Assistant Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The inquiry concluded on 28 June when the Foreign Secretary appeared before the Committee.

6. Many organisations and interested individuals submitted written evidence to the Committee. This is published with the Report.[17] We requested evidence from the FCO about small arms and landmines, two issues covered in the 1995 Report. We did not seek written evidence about these latter topics from parties other than the FCO, but we have decided to comment briefly on the FCO's memorandum in this Report as there is enormous public interest in these issues. We are grateful to all of our witnesses and to those who have submitted written evidence. We should also like to express our thanks to the two specialist advisors who have helped us enormously during the course of this inquiry—Dr Wyn Bowen of the Department of War Studies, King's College, London and Dr Stephen Pullinger, Executive Director of ISIS.

7   The Conference took place at the United Nations in New York between 24 April and 19 May 2000. Back

8   A State Party is a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force. Back

9   Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, p. 5-13. Back

10   Strategic Defence Review, Supporting Essays, p. 5-13, 5-14. Back

11   Defending Against the Threat from Biological and Chemical Weapons, Ministry of Defence, July 1999. Back

12   Text of speech available at www.acronym.org.uk/44speech.htm. Back

13   The Times, 21 March 2000. Back

14   The Guardian, 21 March 2000. Back

15   The Daily Telegraph, 21 March 2000. Back

16   Text of speech available at www.acronym.org.uk/ukdhana.htm. Back

17   See pp. 146-219. Back


Prepared 2 August 2000