WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000

RT HON ROBIN COOK MP, MR P HARE AND MR P RICKETTS

  240. We shall continue to press. Some of its immediate neighbours do recognise Israel but we shall continue to press those who do not—I am thinking particularly of Syria—to recognise Israel as a state.
  (Mr Cook) Yes, but that of course is part of the peace process. We have always said we want to see a comprehensive peace process on all its tracks; not just the Palestinian track but also the Lebanese and the Syrian track. I hope that we shall secure that. We are working hard to do so.

  241. Israel has said that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
  (Mr Cook) Since it is the only country in the Middle East which possesses nuclear weapons that is not particularly advancing the argument.

  242. You say that, but how close is Iraq to using nuclear weapons?
  (Mr Cook) Iraq is now some distance away from nuclear weapons. The threat from Iraq and the area which remains of very serious and live concern for us in relation to Iraq is its near capacity for chemical and biological weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which was the invigilating body, the inspection body under the UN resolutions, has confirmed that Iraq is some way away now from a nuclear weapon capacity.

  243. Would you agree that it is the Middle East peace process, the recognition of Israel, which needs to come first before Israel will start?
  (Mr Cook) No. As a matter of policy I would not say that: as a matter of reality I recognise that that is the most likely way forward.

  244. In what way does UNMOVIC differ from UNSCOM? When is UNMOVIC likely to commence work in Iraq?
  (Mr Cook) I take one step back and say that the difference between the two resolutions which set up these agencies lies in other parts than the inspection regime, particularly the fact that the new resolution removes any ceiling on the oil exports of Iraq. I do not think that fact has yet been adequately recognised. I still keep reading articles in the press which talk about oil sanctions on Iraq. There is no ceiling on Iraq's oil exports and they are currently at an historic all time record high, which leaves us puzzling why so many people in Iraq are starving and short of medicine.

  245. Do you think that the work of UNMOVIC is unnecessary then?
  (Mr Cook) No; no, no. I was making the point that the distinction in the resolutions lies in other parts than the inspection regime. It is our view that one cannot be confident that one is containing Saddam Hussein's well-known ambition for weapons of mass destruction unless there are inspections on the ground. There were four dossiers which were set out in the original Security Council resolution: nuclear weapons, missile technology, biological, chemical weapons. None of those has been formally closed and the latter two remain issues of very live concern. It is very difficult from aerial and external intelligence to get on top of the chemical and biological capacity.

  246. I am turning now to chemical and biological weapons and the danger of proliferation. Clearly the two conventions in this field are in themselves insufficient. What other measures, what other instruments or other means, is the UK pursuing to try to prevent the passage of these weapons to other states?
  (Mr Cook) I am not sure I would accept your contention that the Chemical Weapons Convention is itself strategically flawed. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides a very clear international regime for elimination. It does have a system of verification. There is a provision for challenge inspections where it is suspected there are chemical weapons facilities and there is a target date for 2012, by which they have to be eliminated. I am not going to pretend it is easy to implement it because by definition we are dealing with a weapons programme which can be easily mistaken for a chemical process and a manufacturing process. It would not be very easy to identify many areas where in legal drafting we could strengthen that. The Biological Weapons Convention does give us grounds for real concern because it does not have the process of verification written into it, which is why Britain is attaching high priority and putting a lot of effort into trying to get agreement on a protocol for inspection.
  (Mr Hare) The Chemical Weapons Convention is very much a landmark convention, the first universal convention applied to eliminate weapons, destroying a class of past production of weapons, 135 countries adhering, new ratifications coming through. It is an impressive achievement in three years. There is still a lot of work to do to ensure it is implemented satisfactorily, that all the provisions are properly used. We know we are contributing very directly to that. Just this week we are staging another practice challenge inspection in a military base in the UK with several foreign observers present. This is designed to show that we mean business, we mean to implement fully the Chemical Weapons Convention in all circumstances on an objective but tough basis. What the Foreign Secretary says about the Biological Weapons Convention is absolutely right. The major arms control negotiations in WMD at the moment are the biological weapons protocol negotiations. There is another major session in July where we hope further progress will be made. There is already a very substantial document there in draft form. We, the UK, have an important role as friend of the chair in the compliance portfolio which is one of the major issues to be resolved. As to your initial question, you asked what other measures we applied to supplement the work of the conventions. A big area currently is export controls. Both our international controls and our harmonisation and consultation with like-minded countries in groups like the Australia Group, where we maintain common control lists, we discuss intelligence questions and we look at patterns of proliferation. All those issues are dealt with in that context and we do not just put all our reliance on effective implementation of the conventions.

  247. Turning to the Biological Weapons Convention and the need for a verification protocol, may I say how very much I welcomed your decision to place in the public domain, I believe for the first time, early in the life of this administration some information about the horrendous nature of the release of biological weapons in a densely populated area. For example the unclassified Foreign Office paper which you placed in the House of Commons Library on 4 February 1998 contains this chilling sentence, "One hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people". I believe the Government has been right to highlight the immense dangers of these appalling weapons. Against that background, do you hold out any prospect of being able to achieve a common position amongst the P5 countries, in particular in the verification protocol for the BW treaty? Do you think you will be able to avoid the less than satisfactory position which was created in the Chemical Weapons Convention whereby the United States as the price of their ratification of it effectively have a form of presidential opt-out from a particular challenge inspection?
  (Mr Cook) As a matter of principle I should of course be opposed to countries entering an opt-out from challenge inspections. Of course in that particular case, though the administration itself has no difficulty with supporting the Convention, the Administration have in fact assisted in negotiating, that particular reservation was entered at the insistence of the Hill not of the US administration. I am not immediately up to speed on what is the position of all of us in the P5. As a broad principle I should hope that over a period of time we can secure progress on the protocol on two grounds. First of all, it is extremely difficult for any country to say that it is reserving the option to develop biological weapons, so there is a large international consensus that this is a valid negotiating objective. Secondly, a very large number of countries has already signed up to the Biological Weapons Convention. They have done so partly to have the reassurance that other countries are not developing these biological weapons and they cannot have that reassurance without some system of inspection and challenge investigations. The difficulty here of course, and there is a bona fide issue here, I am not saying we should be defeated by it or that we should accept it as a reason for giving up but there is a bona fide issue, in that the challenge inspections on chemical and biological weapons are often carrying out inspections or could be carrying out inspections of bona fide chemical or other biological factories and installations and there is a proliferation at the present time of biological technology and biological industrial production. Some countries—this was reflected in the debate in the Senate—have a legitimate concern that this would compromise their own industrial confidentiality and security. We have to find a way forward in which one can respect that industrial commercial confidentiality, but at the same time respect the very powerful strategic need to give us confidence that those who adhered to the convention are actually standing by its terms. What is the position within the P5?
  (Mr Hare) All the P5 are fully engaged and on the whole very constructively engaged in the BW Protocol negotiations. It is right to say that there are still some differences, but they are not the only differences which do exist. There are important countries in the NAM which are taking particular positions but we are working hard to resolve them. The important thing is that all the P5 and the major NAM countries are fully engaged and are addressing the key issues. The experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention will be extremely important. There have been over 500 inspections worldwide in that; a good proportion of those will have been done in the P5. The Chinese may have mentioned to you the extraordinary thoroughness with which they set up their own national authority for chemical weapons. In fact the burdens it has imposed on them in terms of the number of inspections they have received. We shall expect that to happen in the Biological Weapons Protocol as well. The answer is that of course you cannot have a realistic protocol in biological weapons without the P5 being engaged, but the signs are good that eventually they will come round. The Americans have of course only just produced their full industrial declaration in the Chemical Weapons Convention and as I understand it inspections are starting there now in industrial facilities. That will boost the numbers of inspections considerably that the US themselves are receiving.

  248. Are you concerned that the US presidential veto on challenge inspections could become a precedent for other countries to adopt that and to obstruct the implementation of the convention?
  (Mr Hare) As I understand it, it was imposed on the administration.

  249. But it is there.
  (Mr Hare) It is seen as very much a last resort in perhaps very unusual circumstances. Obviously we hope it is not a precedent. We do not see the CWC as having that sort of precedent integrated in it.

  250. Do you have any evidence that others are proposing to use it as a precedent?
  (Mr Hare) None that we have seen.[4]

  251. Back on the Chemical Weapons Convention again, we understand that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in its verification capacity has failed to investigate a number of allegations in relation to breaches of the convention. These include for example breaches in relation to India, Russia, Sudan and Turkey, allegations that they have employed chemical weapons since ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. Have we responded to these allegations in respect of those countries?

  (Mr Cook) I am advised that few of the allegations which have been made have been backed up by fact, indeed the occasions which are authenticated of the use of chemical weapons are very few, the most obvious ones being the use by Iraq during its war with Iran and also against its own population in the Kurdish area. I am not aware of an allegation in which there was evidential corroboration which has been ignored by the OPCW. You may want to take evidence on that yourselves.

  252. We have seen references to these allegations. Obviously we do not know the quality of the evidence which is available. Can I take it that HMG is not convinced of the quality of the available evidence?
  (Mr Cook) I should have to rely on advice on that?

  Mr Mackinlay: Could you clarify what evidence you are referring to?

  253. These are the four cases in our footnote. One was during the Kargil war last year in relation to Jammu and Kashmir. Another was in relation to the Russians and Chechnya. Another was in southern Sudan during July and August of last year. Finally, against various Kurdish fighters. There are clear allegations but your view is that the evidential basis is insufficient.
  (Mr Cook) In the case of the southern Sudan, soil samples were taken which provided no evidence of chemical weapons having been used. In the case of the use in the Kurdish area of Iraq, it is well known and well authenticated that Saddam Hussein did use them.

  254. The Turkish army.
  (Mr Cook) I am sorry. I am not aware of any such allegation, nor am I aware of any evidence to support it. I do not think any investigation has been carried out either in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir or in Chechnya, but I have not myself seen any evidence to support the claim that chemical weapons were used.
  (Mr Hare) What we are confident of is that the mechanism exists in the OPCW to carry out the necessary investigation. It has been shown in the Sudan case most recently that that can be done.

  255. I notice from our notes here that all our references are from The CBW Conventions Bulletin. Is that a respected source?
  (Mr Cook) I would have to defer to either of my officials who read it.
  (Mr Hare) Yes, it is.

  256. It is a respected source.
  (Mr Hare) It is.
  (Mr Cook) I cannot say that it has figured on my reading list. It has never been put in my Red Box.

  Chairman: On that basis of respectability it is appropriate to thank you and your colleagues very much.