WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000

RT HON ROBIN COOK MP, MR P HARE AND MR P RICKETTS

  220. Have you received any request from the US administration for a British, or more likely EU contribution to the funding of the conversion of their plutonium into mixed oxide fuel and the destruction of their highly enriched uranium stockpile?
  (Mr Cook) I am not aware of that, but I should not like to say no categorically.
  (Mr Hare) The major concerted effort on this at the moment is going on in the G8 group, G7 obviously. Although the EU is looking at a possible contribution, we are more hopeful that the framework of an international financial arrangement in which we would be involved would be agreed through the G8 mechanism. It will be discussed in great detail at Okinawa next month.

  221. Let me take you to a couple of key countries, China being the first. Is there any evidence to suggest that China is helping other countries to build nuclear warheads or delivery systems?
  (Mr Cook) I am not aware of that. On the whole China does not tend to raise concerns of proliferation.
  (Mr Hare) Proliferation concerning ...?

  222. Either nuclear warheads or delivery systems to third parties.
  (Mr Hare) We have had concerns in the past, obviously particularly in relation to the Pakistan programme where there has been cooperation. We hope that they are now introducing better export controls. There are signs of them doing that. In the last couple of years they introduced dual use controls and we are looking for further evidence that yes, indeed they have stopped the flow to Pakistan.

  223. When you say they are strengthening and toughening their arrangements does that imply they did not know what was being done, that the Chinese forces did not know or that they wanted to sell? The sense of your reply seemed to be that they were toughening up their licensing arrangements.
  (Mr Hare) In fact China only entered the NPT in the early 1990s. They are not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group yet. They have recently joined the Zangger Committee, which imposes an obligation to put export controls on nuclear materials. They would regard their cooperation programme with Pakistan as legal. They are now in a between stages process of gradually coming into these regimes and imposing better controls, but I do not think the situation is perfectly clear at the moment one way or the other.

  224. What about Iran? Any indication that they may or may not be?
  (Mr Hare) That the Chinese would be supplying Iran?

  225. Yes.
  (Mr Hare) There have been indications in the past but the concern is not as clear currently.

  226. Links with North Korea?
  (Mr Hare) Yes, as well, but of course the North Korean nuclear issue is being dealt with under the KEDO framework and there is a freeze on their nuclear programme. The Chinese involvement there is more historical than current.

  227. In Beijing last week we did have the opportunity of a fairly extended conversation with the senior Chinese official responsible for their arms control negotiations. We discussed at some length the issue of whether China might be willing, one would hope at a fairly early date, to join the missile technology control regime. I have to say we got a very dusty reply. We were told that this was a rich man's club. We were told that this was discriminatory against developing countries and so on. I do not know whether you can give us any assurance that HMG will be doing its best to try to bring about a change of view in Beijing because this is one of the few real arms control brakes on this crucial area of missile technology which spreads round the world. The implications not just merely for nuclear but chemical and biological as well are obviously very serious, as we all understand. It is vitally important that all countries understand that the widest possible participation in that regime is in everybody's interests.
  (Mr Cook) You are absolutely right to draw attention to the fact that the proliferation of delivery system technology is every bit as much a matter of concern as the weapons of mass destruction themselves. I absolutely share your concern to make sure that we have the maximum effective measures to prevent missile technology proliferation. Plainly I shall continue to do all I can to encourage China to adhere to it although I am not aware at the present time of concern we have about them sharing missile technology. I am not sure there is much I can do to meet the essential argument because in a sense it is an unavoidable consequence of an export control regime that its whole purpose is to deny it to others. One cannot quite get round that.

  228. I also recall that conversation. It began with a reference to General MacArthur and we took it from there. One thing we could do is remind the Chinese that MacArthur was actually sacked by the US administration for it. India and Pakistan are in by far the most serious possible regional nuclear arms race. What sort of diplomatic initiatives, not necessarily unilateral ones by the United Kingdom but by the collective or any other combination possible, are we able to mount to try to persuade India and Pakistan to slow down and start to proceed to disarm?
  (Mr Cook) You will recall that when the nuclear tests took place in South Asia, Britain gave a vigorous response and was very active in trying to put together an international coalition to try to maintain pressure on both India and Pakistan to renounce the nuclear option. Indeed Britain took the initiative in proposing that we should set up the Task Force in order to bring together a number of like-minded countries to both maintain dialogue with India and Pakistan on this question but also look at ways in which we might be able to help technically, for instance on confidence building between them and also in mapping out the way in which they could renounce the nuclear option. What I did when I drew together that task force, because at the time Britain was in the presidency of the G8, was deliberately to invite the countries who had renounced the nuclear option to play their part in that task force. One point I would stress is that actually if you look across the totality of the 1990s what is encouraging is the number of countries which actually turned their back on the nuclear option: Brazil and Argentina through their treaty which has provided a nuclear weapon free Latin America; Ukraine; to a lesser extent Kazakhstan who came out of the former Soviet Union and renounced the nuclear weapons, of which there were many on their soil; South Africa, which since the end of apartheid is the first country to have actually wound down and dismantled a nuclear weapons programme. We invited those countries to join us in the G8 to work together in a task force to encourage India and Pakistan to join them and renounce the nuclear option and to provide technical advice on how to go about it. The task force still meets. It is not particularly popular in South Asia but it is a means of crystallising international concern in a way that it is difficult to rebuff because here are countries who have deliberately chosen not to exercise the nuclear option. We also regularly discuss nuclear weapons matters with India and other countries of South Asia.

  229. With any result?
  (Mr Cook) There is a dialogue. I shall come onto the root problem in a moment, but we did agree in the course of my visit to India the other month that we would have a bilateral dialogue between India and Britain on nuclear weapons issues. The basic problem with the Indian sub-continent of course is not essentially one of arms control, it is essentially one of tension between the two countries and ultimately we shall continue to have difficulties making progress on arms control unless and until we make progress on what we delicately term the roots of tension between them.
  (Mr Ricketts) The non-proliferation dialogue which the Foreign Secretary launched when he was in India will be taken forward next week when there is a delegation of Indian officials coming to London for two days of full discussions on these issues. The task force is still very much alive with active participation from the non-nuclear weapons states and also Russia and China who both see very clearly that a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent is not in their interests and that the benchmarks we set out in that UN Security Council Resolution 1172 are still very much applicable. The pressure is still there.
  (Mr Cook) In terms of what progress has been made, it is worth recording that there have been no further nuclear weapon tests in South Asia. Both countries appear to have accepted a moratorium on tests. We are encouraging both countries to adhere to the comprehensive test ban treaty. If they were to do so that would be quite a significant barrier to any further development of a nuclear arms race between them.

  230. Frankly would not the most simple example to set be for us to continue rapidly to nuclear disarm on the grounds of what is our function at the moment as a nuclear power, what role do we play in the post Cold War era? If that happened in European Community nuclear powers, outside United States and Russia, would that not really set a good example to and encourage Pakistan and India to follow?
  (Mr Cook) I would not wish to overstate the extent to which India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear weapons programme in response to British or French nuclear weapons programme. I suspect any decision we take unilaterally would have no bearing on their own calculations. I would stress to the Committee that we have already taken quite remarkable unilateral steps in terms of our nuclear posture and I listed them in response to Sir Peter. Those steps are widely appreciated outside Britain. I find they do not necessarily get the attention that they merit inside Britain but in the nuclear arms control debate around the globe, what Britain has done in the last three years is widely appreciated, recognised and understood. Our commitment of course is to take further steps in the context of moves towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Personally, I think there is a case to be made for us pressing the other countries to follow the example we have already made in our transparency, our reduced alert, our reduction of nuclear arsenals and to continue to use our voice among the nuclear weapons states for further progress.

  231. We have had evidence from Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent-Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, and at that time no advocate of nuclear disarmament. He now says that the case for an independent nuclear capacity of the UK is markedly less cogent than it was during the Cold War. Do you agree with that?
  (Mr Cook) The tension and the threat is demonstrably much less than it was at the height of the Cold War. It does not mean that all threats have disappeared and indeed we spent the first half of this session reviewing new threats.

  232. What is the best intellectual argument that you can advance for the continued possession of nuclear weapons?
  (Mr Cook) From the point of view of the Foreign Office and our concern about further progress on arms control, I should be extremely reluctant to see us take a step which was not reciprocated by others. The most useful way in which we can take forward that objective is within the nuclear weapons states.

  233. So the best case is as a bargaining counter.
  (Mr Cook) I do not say best case, I am merely answering as the Foreign Secretary, not as the Defence Secretary. I am answering as Foreign Secretary in relation to the arms control requirement.

  234. The Middle East is obviously another region where it is not exactly all sweetness and light. Can I ask how hard Israel is being pressed by Britain and others to become a party to the NPT as a non nuclear weapons state? Do you view recent reports of their testing of cruise missiles as reassuring or otherwise?
  (Mr Cook) Do you mean the Israeli denial? I have no reason to disbelieve the Israeli denial of the cruise missiles and I have no evidence to suggest that the reports were accurate or that the denials are wrong. In terms of our view on this matter, we should very much wish to see Israel come into the NPT. We should very much wish to see Israel adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because, if I remember rightly, it is one of the countries which has to adhere for it to come into force. At the Review Conference we signed up enthusiastically to a commitment that all countries of the region should abandon weapons of mass destruction and enter into the international regimes. An Israeli of course would respond by saying that whilst they might be willing to do that, other countries, notably Iraq, have to do so as well.

  235. I should simply remark that Israel has a history of denying things which subsequently turn out to be true. It has consistently denied that it had any nuclear facilities. Of course the defection of Mordecai Vanunu blew that one away.
  (Mr Cook) Yes, but it is difficult to launch a cruise missile without somebody noticing, particularly in such an intensive electronic environment as the Mediterranean.

  236. People may have noticed and it not have been in their interests to say. Turning to other states within the region, what prospects do you think there are of drawing all the Arab states into the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Convention in the absence of Israel's membership of the NPT, particularly given the current asymmetry between the weapons potential of Israel and other states within the Middle East. What incentive is there for them to be the ones who move first?
  (Mr Cook) If both sides to any particular standoff like that sit and wait on the other to move first, we have a recipe for stalemate which is sadly something only too familiar in diplomacy. In the case of the Middle East my own expectation of progress would be more pinned on making progress in the Middle East process. When I visited the Middle East in autumn of last year, when there was some optimism about progress, I was very encouraged that then there were several countries enthusiastically contemplating a very different security environment which would arise in the wake of the Middle East peace process settlement. Looking at regional parallels for instance to OSCE in Europe which has provided a basis for confidence building and security arrangements and inspections within Europe, some equivalent to that in the Middle East would be revolutionary. I personally would be sceptical whether we are going to make that much progress on the question you raised without first resolving the current position in the Middle East peace process. I should be hopeful that if that were achieved we could then make more rapid progress both between the Arab nations and with Israel. One exception to this of course, and it is a very large exception, is Iraq which is likely to pursue its ambitions for weapons of mass destruction irrespective of the Middle East peace process because that is about securing regional domination, not about concerns about Israel.

  237. Indeed and indeed it is as much of a threat to Iran for example as it might be to Israel. May I just press you on this notion that the Middle East peace process should take primacy and then after that there might be discussions about weapons of mass destruction? Western nations have a significant leverage within the Middle East peace process in that they are going to have to pay for it. Might it not be sensible to couple discussions about weapons of mass destruction and the Middle East peace process slightly more nearly together, particularly given the fact that western nations will be expected to put a huge amount of money into the region after the conclusion of a peace agreement and that we might expect some quid pro quo in greater helpfulness in overall regional peace from the nations involved in return?
  (Mr Cook) First of all may I just make clear that I am not asserting a primacy of the peace process over arms control agreements as a matter of policy, I am merely making a statement of reality, that in reality if the peace process is successfully resolved we can expect better progress on some of these other questions. I am not saying that is the way it should be. I am certainly not saying that in any way reduces our calls on Israel and other states in the region to adhere to the relevant international agreements. On the question of the financial contribution we are making to the peace process, you are quite right to point out that the peace process will require very substantial international support, particularly for example on the settlement and compensation of refugees. That will primarily be funding for the Palestinian entity and for other countries in the region such as Lebanon. I am not sure that there will be that much financial leverage in relation to Israel.

  238. Except that successful financing of the agreement adds to the stability of the agreement and that certainly is to the advantage of Israel.
  (Mr Cook) I would agree with that but I really do not think you would thank me if Yassar Arafat reached agreement with the Prime Minister of Israel and I refused to fund it because I was waiting on another agreement with the Prime Minister of Israel.
  (Mr Hare) In relation to Israel we do call on them immediately to ratify the CTBT. We also see the cut-off treaty as a very realistic immediate measure to which they could come in as a negotiator alongside the other non-NPT parties, India and Pakistan. Just as with India and Pakistan, where we have a non-proliferation dialogue, we also have one with Israel. We are making those points and in our view there are immediate things they can do which would be short of adhering to the NPT but nevertheless very worthwhile.

  239. Would Israel's attitude change if all its surrounding neighbours would recognise it as a state?
  (Mr Cook) That is essentially a question for Israel. It is certainly true that its development of its programme of nuclear weapons was a reflection of a perception of itself as threatened.