WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000

RT HON ROBIN COOK MP, MR P HARE AND MR P RICKETTS

  200. Would it be unreasonable for them to expect an authorisation, given that we are a close ally?
  (Mr Cook) As you rightly say, we are a very close ally of the United States. We have a lot of joint collaboration which works to our advantage as much as to that of the United States. We will obviously consider with great care any request from such a close ally.

  201. So they would have a reasonable expectation that if they had made this quite huge decision, probably in the next administration, probably an election issue as well, they would get approval from an ally to do this?
  (Mr Cook) I would repeat that we have not had the request. We have not taken a decision on what our answer will be to the request and it is impossible to anticipate what that answer will be unless we know the full circumstances, for instance whether an appropriate amendment has taken place to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

  202. One of our major tests would be that it would put relations under considerable strain if we had to say no in a certain situation; it would only be one. I cannot think in my parliamentary lifetime of a US/British decision of this kind. It would really put our relations under a considerable strain, would it not?
  (Mr Cook) Since we have not received the question and we have therefore not formulated our answer, it would not be helpful to any of us for me to speculate what would be the consequences of one particular form of answer as opposed to another. I am quite sure our friends in the press are even now honing down a headline in the event that I am tempted to reply to that question.

  203. I do not want to tempt you again but I think any objective person would say it would be a very considerable decision to take because it would be saying no to a major ally. I listened to your answers and one of the tests we would make on whether to say yes or no would be whether in fact the ABM Treaty was in any form of danger as a result of the US decision to go ahead. That would be one of our litmus tests as to whether to approve or not.
  (Mr Cook) Litmus test is perhaps creating a scientific certitude which I am not suggesting. Certainly the background of the ABM Treaty would be a very serious factor in our overall decision.

  204. I am just wanting clarification. We had evidence that there were two centres in Britain which were integral to NMD, one was Fylingdales and the other was Menwith Hill in Harrogate. Is that correct?
  (Mr Cook) The position with Menwith Hill is slightly different in that Menwith Hill is currently a project upgraded in the context of Space Based Infra Red Systems for early warning and indeed the authorisation for that was given under the previous government and was a technology which was being developed to upgrade early warning systems in advance of any debate on NMD with the United States. In the event of NMD proceeding, that facility would be of value, but it is continuing on its own logic and within its own terms.

  205. Would the use of that facility be essential to NMD?
  (Mr Cook) I am not sure I am technically qualified to answer that.
  (Mr Ricketts) The essential upgrading would be to Fylingdales.[2]

  206. Following on as to whether there would be any cooperation in advance of a decision taken by the US on NMD, if there were a request from the US administration for people to visit Fylingdales before a decision was taken by the United States, what would be the reaction of our government to such a request if the visit were specifically in terms of NMD?
  (Mr Cook) We would not wish to stand in the way of representatives of a close ally visiting a facility to which they already have very extensive access. I am not even sure that we would necessarily be required to condescend on whether or not they could visit. Do we know the legal position?
  (Mr Ricketts) No. It is an RAF station but I believe that US personnel have been there and there is US investment in the facility.

  207. On the general position of disarmament, what consideration has firstly the United Kingdom and secondly NATO given to the introduction of a "no first use" policy?
  (Mr Cook) The case for a "no first use" policy was argued for some time during the Cold War and indeed at that time the Soviet Union was quite interested in a "no first use" policy. With the changes in the relative balance of forces, Russia has changed its position on that and is now itself rather hostile to the context of a "no first use" policy. In those circumstances, I am not sure it would be a productive avenue to explore in terms of international negotiations. I personally would very much rest on the priorities which are set out in the memorandum which we have given to the Committee: to proceed with bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; to get underway with the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; to complete the START II process and commence on START III. These are all very important and well-established avenues for developing international arms control. I am not sure I would advise at the present time us embarking on what is at present not an actual line of inquiry which might be a diversion rather than a strength. However, I would draw the Committee's attention to what we did say in the context of the Review Conference and the NPT, which is that at present none of the nuclear weapon states has weapons targeted on any other state.

  208. Is Russian opinion of NATO and the West changing in any way now?
  (Mr Cook) At some point there will be a generation change within Russia, but at present the senior political figures and particularly the senior military figures in Russia are people who have grown up in the days when NATO was seen by Russia as a threat and it is still fair to say that NATO is not regarded with affection or with relaxation in Moscow.

  209. In paragraph 16 of your joint memorandum with the Ministry of Defence we are presented by the department with two likely scenarios. First an agreement between the US and Russia on modifications to ABMT to allow NMD to go through. We are told if that is the case Fylingdales would be incorporated into such an agreement. The alternative scenario is that the US and Russia had not reached agreement on modifications and the US formally gave notice of its withdrawal from the treaty. If that were the prospect, would we then say that is too big a price to pay and therefore we do not think we can go along with upgrading Fylingdales?
  (Mr Cook) As I said earlier, I do not think there is any profit for me to speculate about the circumstances in which we would give the precise answer. These things would obviously weigh heavily with us. Scenario (b) outlines the situation in which the ABM Treaty effectively no longer exists because it has been renounced. There are many people in the United States, never mind Britain or Europe, who would regard that as a heavy price to pay.

  The Committee suspended from 4.40 p.m. to 4.50 p.m. for a division in the House.

  210. A slightly different area, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review. Given the reduction in Trident deployment already announced in the SDR, what scope do you see for further unilateral reductions and has not already the Government improved the transparency of its nuclear weapon holdings as part of the SDR? What more promises are there that it can make and how would these be achieved if they could be?
  (Mr Cook) You are quite right and very helpful to draw attention to how far we went in this direction in the course of the Strategic Defence Review. If I take the final document of the Review Conference it identifies four specific steps to be taken by the nuclear weapon states, all of which we took in the course of the Strategic Defence Review. First of all, further efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. As you will be aware, we halved the number of planned warheads on the Trident submarines and are now operating at reduced level of warheads. Second, increase transparency. We are now the most transparent and most open of any of the nuclear weapon states about the declared number of nuclear warheads. Third, the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. I think I am right in saying that we do not have any non-strategic nuclear weapons now. Our only nuclear weapons are those on Trident. We have eliminated all others. Finally, concrete measures to reduce the operational status. We have made it clear that we have reduced the state of alert of our submarines and we are much more transparent about what that state of alert is than anybody else. We are very much in conformity already with what has been outlined in the Review Conference document. Further progress must depend on progress by other nuclear weapon states. We remain ready to consider further steps we can take but it is difficult to see, having done as much as we have in the past three years, what more we can do unilaterally. That said, I would also add that the focus of the pressure of the non-nuclear weapon states at the Review Conference was not on Britain. There was a broad recognition that we had done very well unilaterally. The pressure was very much particularly on Russia and the United States to carry forward the START process.

  211. You did however make a suggestion that a subsidiary body should be set up with a mandate to deal further with nuclear disarmament. How far has that gone? I do not think it has, has it?
  (Mr Cook) I would need advice on that.
  (Mr Hare) As a result of the NPT Review Conference?

  212. Yes.
  (Mr Hare) There will be the continuation of the strengthened review process and there will be a PrepCom procedure for the next five years. Were you talking about a body within the Conference on Disarmament, because there is a possibility of that as well?

  213. Yes, that is what I am talking about.
  (Mr Hare) It is not yet agreed. As part of the balanced work programme there is a proposal on the table which is being talked about in conjunction with the Cut-Off Treaty and other parts of a possible work programme.
  (Mr Cook) But that would require to be agreed by the Conference on Disarmament.

  214. May I move for a moment to the verification aspects of NPT? You will know of the work of the IAEA and the aspect of trying to strengthen the 93+2 process. How confident are you that this would be sufficient to deal with any unknown nuclear weapons programmes that might be developed by Iraq or somebody like that? Do you really think that this would be sufficient, that we would be able to understand that?
  (Mr Cook) We are very keen and Britain is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of strengthening the verification process. We will work hard to achieve that. You ask whether it would be satisfactory and in the real world it is very difficult to give a guarantee. On the whole the verification system of the NPT is quite credible. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a very high standing in expertise, has secured with parties to the NPT a very wide degree of access. The development of a nuclear weapons programme requires significant installations to produce the fissile material whose acquisition is one of the great bottlenecks to having nuclear weapons and also to acquire extremely sophisticated and unusual engineering facilities such as centrifuges to render it capable of weapons use. It would be difficult; I am not saying impossible but difficult for a country to develop a substantial nuclear weapons programme clandestinely.

  215. Lastly on a purely personal note, not a Committee question, I have been visiting Vienna and the IAEA now for 12 to 14 years. We have been awfully bad at keeping them up to date with funds. We do not increase even by the percentages of normal growth to that body. Would you have a look at that funding and see whether we ought not to play a greater role in trying to make certain they are financially independent?
  (Mr Cook) We have of course made a major contribution to the agency both in terms of personnel and also technology as well as our financial contributions.

  216. Of course.
  (Mr Cook) I do have to say to the Committee that this begs a much wider question which is that it is the policy of this administration, as it was the policy of the last administration, to allow for zero growth in international organisations as a means of containing the costs to the British budget. Plainly we are always willing to look at exceptions to that where a very strong case is made. It is of course a difficult and judicious judgement because every organisation advances a strong case.

  217. But they have been kept short of money.
  (Mr Cook) So has every international organisation in the past.

  Sir Peter Emery: So have I.

  218. On the question of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, what efforts are we making to get negotiations started? Given the volume of existing stocks, do you believe that the proposed treaty should address both existing stocks and future production?
  (Mr Cook) On that latter question, definitely yes.[3] Indeed it is our policy to use the negotiations on it, not simply to achieve a freeze at present level of fissile stocks but also to deal with the management and reduction of existing fissile material stocks. That is broadly agreed as the basis on which the negotiations should go. Taking them forward is a very difficult and frustrating task as you indicate, not because countries are necessarily saying that they are opposed in principle to this exercise; that would be a fundamental argument but at least one which we could cope with. A lot of the difficulties and delays have arisen over procedural points which leave one wondering quite often if those are necessarily the real points at issue. The fact of the matter is that a freeze on fissile material would be a threat to the ambitions of some states either to expand their nuclear arsenal or to develop a nuclear arsenal. Therefore there is an issue objective here which is difficult to handle. Our best prospect is to make sure that the peer pressure of the rest of the world's opinion prevents them from delaying further progress.

  219. The aspect in relation to Russia to which I want to refer is also directly related to the issue which we have just been discussing which is fissile material reductions. When the Committee was in Washington in March some of us were able to go to the Department of Energy there to be briefed by the senior American official who deals with fissile material reduction. She gave us figures which I certainly found quite staggering as to the size in metric tonnes of the Russian stockpile of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. She also gave us the American assessment of the cost of the destruction of their plutonium stockpile. She put the cost of converting their plutonium stockpile into mixed oxide fuel at US$1.5 billion. She made the point, which I think is a very reasonable one, that it is not just the United States, it is really the whole of the world, not least we in western Europe who have a huge security interest in getting this vast stockpile eliminated, certainly from the point of view of being used as fissile material in nuclear weapons. Against that background, do you not think there is a very strong case for the European Union Member States and perhaps for Britain to be taking the lead in trying to arrange a European financial contribution to this huge cost in our security interests of reducing the Russian stockpile?
  (Mr Cook) You are quite right to draw attention to the very substantial backlog in reducing Russian weapons which are now overtaken by arms control agreements and it is not just on the nuclear front, it applies very strongly also in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In some cases the problem is not simply one of finance; particularly in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention it is a question of the technological base. I certainly have never ruled out the need for Russia to receive financial and technical assistance in that. As the Committee will be aware, I have myself been very active in trying to reach agreement with Russia for Britain to fund programmes to eliminate nuclear hazards from Russia, particularly in the case of the nuclear waste at Murmansk which was largely a product of the Russian military programme. By and large what has happened between the division of responsibility in Europe and the United States is that Europe has focused its funding which is quite substantial on nuclear safety within Russia in terms of the civil reactor programme and the costs there are very substantial indeed. We are also of course examining that in relation to the Ukraine in the context of Chernobyl. The tendency has been that the United States as part of that basic sphere of influence take major responsibility for handling the disposal of fissile material from the nuclear weapons, in part of course because the nuclear weapons being dismantled are a consequence of the START programme of which the European Union is not a member. We have formidable challenges of the nuclear environment from Russia, both of the waste, of the nuclear reactor programme and of the nuclear weapons programme. It takes all of us to work on that to try to help Russia to cope with that problem. I entirely agree both the United States and Europe have a great interest in tackling both of those issues. If you take the totality of effort to assist Russia with its nuclear environment, Europe comes out rather well and what you were hearing when you were in Washington was the repeated difficulty they had on the Hill getting agreement to funding for Russia.

3   Note by Witness: The Foreign Affairs Committee received a detailed description of UK policy priorities towards the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in memorandum FCO/FAC/001-00. We strongly believe that the management and reduction of existing fissile material stock must be addressed but we believe that there are better prospects of dealing with this issue outside the negotiations of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Back