WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000

RT HON ROBIN COOK MP, MR P HARE AND MR P RICKETTS

  180. Is there a way in which the US could proceed with NMD which would not undermine the treaty?
  (Mr Cook) Yes.

  181. What might that be?
  (Mr Cook) The current discussions between the United States and Russia about an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which would enable them to proceed in a way which would be consistent with an amended treaty. Those discussions are proceeding.

  182. We have just come back from China. Wherever we went we asked our Chinese hosts what they thought of NMD. They were completely unequivocal that in their view the move forward with NMD would be to destabilise the whole process of disarmament. It is not just our European allies who are highly sceptical, the Chinese are highly sceptical. It is only Britain who seems to think it is an open question as to whether NMD would destabilise.
  (Mr Cook) With respect, you are putting Britain in a different box from our European allies with whom we discussed this closely and with whom we have a lot of common ground. In the case of China, China has a long strategic position of difference from the United States to that of Europe or the United Kingdom. One can understand that in the case of China they may take a different view of any arms development in the United States. I rather suspect if you asked them about any strategic development funded by the Pentagon you would find China flatly against it.

  183. Could you explain to us why it is the British Government's policy to keep open the option of acquiring a National Missile Defence capability ourselves in the future?
  (Mr Cook) Could you repeat that question? Are you asking me why it is we have a policy of keeping it open?

  184. Can you explain why it is the British Government's policy is to keep open the option?
  (Mr Cook) Let us not overstate our commitment. We have not made any commitment to acquiring a National Missile Defence for ourselves. The technology at the present time is not available to us. Were we to proceed to do so at our own cost it would be quite substantial. It is not a question of keeping it open, but the question has not been addressed. I do not honestly see that there would be any particular interest in closing it off, but at the present time there is no active commitment to it.

  185. I fully understand there is no active commitment but the Government's stated position is to keep open the option of acquiring a National Missile Defence capability ourselves in the future. The Government has taken that position. Could you explain to us why the Government feels it is necessary to keep that policy option open?
  (Mr Cook) It is not a question of it being necessary, but for the life of me I cannot think of a single reason of British interest which would point in the direction of closing it down for all time at the present time. That is not to say that we are actively considering it. Please tell me what is the gain for Britain of saying we will never have one?

  186. I put the question to you the other way. Will you tell us, as the Government's stated position is to keep open the option of acquiring an NMD capability, will you please tell the Committee what are the circumstances in the future in which that option might be exercised?
  (Mr Cook) No, I cannot speculate on that because we have never drawn up any commitment to it or the circumstance in which we would make that commitment. All I am saying to you now is that I cannot see what we would gain by closing the door now.

  187. It is for you to defend your policy.
  (Mr Cook) I am defending my policy. You are seeking to misrepresent the policy.

  188. No, I am not.
  (Mr Cook) You have talked about keeping the decision open but that does not imply that we have decided we will deploy it in any particular circumstances, it merely states what is a matter of fact, which is that we have not taken a decision actively to close it off.

  189. I am not misrepresenting your policy one jot or tittle. If you want it on the record, I will give it to you. The Defence Secretary in his answer on 21 March in Hansard at column 491 said, "We will continue to consult closely with the US and take account of the work they are doing, to help us take an informed decision on whether to acquire such a capability ourselves in the future". That is the Government's policy. I say to you again, as the Government keep that option open, which is a very significant policy option to keep open and you ask what the advantage is of closing it down, that the advantage of closing it down would be very significant reassurance to those who believe adherence to the existing ABM Treaty is very important. That is the clear advantage of closing it down. I must ask you the question, as the policy is to keep the option open: what are the circumstances in which the exercising of that acquisition option could be attractive to this Government?
  (Mr Cook) Mr Hoon's answer speaks for itself. We are indeed in close consultation on that aspect and a variety of other aspects of the National Missile Defence. We have taken no decision and frankly I do not think it would be helpful to the Government to discuss the conduct of the debate or for me to speculate what the conditions might be in which we would make such a decision.

  190. Obviously the object of this Committee is to move towards the limitation or the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.
  (Mr Cook) Quite.

  191. Can you explain to the Committee why, having had the successful aspect of START I, START II having been ratified by the Americans has not been entered into operation by the United States? Until it is operating we cannot proceed on START III, which obviously is a move in the direction that most of us would like to see on the limitation of warheads and sizes, etcetera? Can you explain why the Americans have not moved in that direction? Does not this incline one to believe that there is a move away from the multinational approach to disarmament of this nature to a unilateral approach whereby the Americans will decide what they will want to do for the benefit of themselves? Does that not massively reflect on their approach to NMD?
  (Mr Cook) On the question of START II, in fairness to the United States one should bear in mind that START II has only been ratified by the Russian Duma this spring after a long period of delay. My understanding is that whilst the Senate have ratified START II as a treaty they have not ratified key protocols to it. Here there is a problem which we do run into in that what may be the balance of political decision on the Hill is not necessarily consistent with the arms control policy of the administration.
  (Mr Hare) There is one particular protocol which they have not ratified which extends the time limits for destruction under the treaty. It is a slight modification of the original treaty but it is hoped they will get round to that shortly.

  192. Do you think that this therefore is or is not a reflection of the Americans moving much more to a unilateral approach on this level of disarmament in a way that they did not when Helsinki came about and Russia was the USSR and that things have massively changed since then?
  (Mr Cook) I can only speak with confidence about the position of the British Government. What I can assure the Committee is that we continue to encourage not just the administration but also the Senate and Congress to proceed with ratification of these key international agreements, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have been quite vigorous in our comments on the failure of the Senate to ratify it.

  193. The British Government would not wish to see alterations to the ABM Treaty.
  (Mr Cook) I am not sure that would accurately reflect what we are saying. What we are saying is that if the National Missile Defence is to be perceived in a way which is consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would require amendment to it. Not in itself, I have to say, such an unprecedented step because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been revised before, but it does require revision by agreement between the parties to it which does not include ourselves.

  194. We are not willing to commit ourselves on that, perhaps quite sensibly for national reasons, at this moment.
  (Mr Cook) The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States. At that time we had and still have no intent to develop an anti-ballistic missile system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the parties to it now include many of the successor states to the Soviet Union. We remain not a party to it and there is no particular obligation for us to become a party to it.[1]

  195. Is it a matter of absolute fact that in order for the NMD to become effective Fylingdales has to be upgraded?
  (Mr Cook) Yes, my understanding is that Fylingdales will require some internal change to its software particularly for the initial phase of NMD.

  196. To do that, the United States would have formally to obtain our approval and authorisation.
  (Mr Cook) Yes.

  197. Under whatever arrangements Fylingdales is.
  (Mr Cook) Yes, that is correct.

  198. In other words, to come to a decision the United States has to make assumptions at some time in the near future, or some time in the not too distant future about whether Fylingdales will be upgraded.
  (Mr Cook) I am not sure whether they would make an assumption but some time, if they wished to proceed with NMD, they would have to approach us with a formal request.

  199. That would presumably be before they come to a decision whether to go ahead with it because it is an integral part of the whole composite scheme.
  (Mr Cook) That is a matter for the United States administration to resolve for itself, but I think it is unlikely that they would approach another country with a formal request until they had formally committed themselves.