WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000

RT HON ROBIN COOK MP, MR P HARE AND MR P RICKETTS

  159. May I welcome you and your two colleagues to our inquiry into weapons of mass destruction? I welcome with you Mr Paul Hare who is Head of the Non-Proliferation Department and Mr Peter Ricketts, whom we know well, who is Director of International Security. May I say that the Committee has visited Geneva, New York and Washington? We had an excellent service from our embassy staffs there and indeed we heard many tributes to the way in which the UK was contributing constructively to the debate. On those matters, NPT and so on, we are one of many players. In the matter of the National Missile Defence (NMD), which the US is now discussing, we shall have to take key decisions on our own in respect of the US requests. What is your current understanding of the position within the US?

  (Mr Cook) To a degree it would be improper of me to speculate as to what sovereign decision the United States may take in the future. At the present time there is a degree of consensus among political quarters across the United States that is interested in National Missile Defence. There is a recognition in the administration of the importance of proceeding with this in a way which is consistent with international arms control regimes, particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Final decisions also depend on the conditions set out by President Clinton, of which, in terms of timetable, the one which prevents decision now is the need for the technology to be proven. There will be a further test in July and until then we would not anticipate any movement to a decision. Quite possibly there will be no decision under the current administration but that is for the Americans.

  160. We have noticed that the State Department have latterly dropped the use of the term "rogue state" in respect of North Korea and are now using the term "state of concern". How do you read this rebranding? Does it suggest to you that this is part of the administration's wish to push back the decision until after the presidential election?
  (Mr Cook) I think that would be over-interpreting the change of language. I must plead guilty as a politician to also frequently changing language in order to make it clear that we are talking about something which is of interest, to convey the clear message. It does not necessarily imply change of policy in this particular case.

  161. But it was clearly done deliberately to change the terms.
  (Mr Cook) It has not changed the United States' presumptions which had led it to have the National Missile Defence both while North Korea was described as a "rogue state" and whilst it is described as a "state of concern"; it is still seen as the primary reason for the impetus behind the National Missile Defence.

  162. Do you see any perceived threat from missiles either to the UK or to our forces overseas?
  (Mr Cook) We have submitted a memorandum to you and you have also had a very interesting secret briefing from DIS, which I have had the opportunity to look at. You will be aware from that that we take very seriously threats of proliferation to British interests though we are not currently anticipating another state other than the existing nuclear weapons states having the capacity to strike Britain by missile.

  163. Do you see this sort of conflict arising that in the United States there appears to be a consensus in favour of some form of National Missile Defence? Our European partners are highly sceptical of the matter, thinking it will destabilise arms discussions and so on. Do you feel that there is a real danger that the UK will be forced to choose ultimately between being seen as the tame ally of the US in terms of Menwith Hill and following an EU lead?
  (Mr Cook) You describe the two options available to us in terms which are not attractive in whichever way we answer the question. I have been present at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Council on two occasions now when we have had a full table round on this question. It is fair to say that there is a lot of common ground on what are the areas of difficulty and what would be an appropriate condition for this to proceed. It is not a question of the United States versus Europe, nor of the United Kingdom being isolated in its views either from the United States or from Europe.

  164. Do any European countries share the concerns of the US? Do any favour the US proposals for NMD?
  (Mr Cook) It is fair to say that we all recognise that North Korea is, to use the vogue term now, a "state of concern".

  165. May I press you further on Britain's attitude to the NMD? You will be well aware that there has been a whole series of written questions to the Foreign Office and to the Ministry of Defence by a variety of members attempting to find out what the British Government's attitude is. Essentially the various answers have simply said that nobody has asked us to use British facilities so we have not given any response.
  (Mr Cook) It seems to me an eminently sane position for a government to take.

  166. That is a matter of opinion. It would seem to me, I humbly suggest, that there is a debate going on about National Missile Defence, that China and Russia, for example, have made very explicit their concerns about National Missile Defence. A number of our European partners and indeed our NATO partners including Canada, have made it very clear that they have severe concerns about the possible effect of National Missile Defence on the international arms control environment, yet the British Government appears to have been saying nothing in public at all. It appears to be entirely neutral on NMD. Would that be an accurate representation of the British Government's public attitude?
  (Mr Cook) I do not think you would be entitled to conclude anything on the basis that we have not been asked for a decision. What view we took on that decision would of course depend on the circumstances surrounding that decision, for instance, the relationship to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on which the United States is in discussion with Russia. Until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what the response might be, particularly since at the moment there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question.

  167. But you have also had a number of private discussions with members of the American administration as have Defence Ministers. In those private discussions have British Ministers been entirely neutral or have they been drawing attention to some of the downsides of the American proposals?
  (Mr Cook) Private discussions necessarily are private, as you will appreciate, and I am conscious that we are not having this conversation in entirely private circumstances. You could reasonably take it that we on both sides of that discussion are open about reviewing what are the areas of most concern in terms of the threat and the areas of concern in relation to the solution to that threat. We have of course had a number of discussions about the impact on the arms control regime and the case for making sure that it is aligned with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

  168. The Foreign Minister of Denmark has said that it would not be Denmark's policy to use Thule radar station, which is the other one which needs to be used along with Menwith Hill, in a violation of international rules. Is that also the British Government's view about potential uses of Menwith Hill, notwithstanding the fact that nobody has asked us yet?
  (Mr Cook) We would find it extremely hard to agree to do anything which was a violation of international rules. One should not infer from that, that there is any settled view as to whether what we are asked is a violation of international rules. I have also had discussions with Mr Pedersen and I think it is fair to say that whilst he is absolutely right in taking the position that they would not violate international rules, he is not necessarily persuaded that what they were asked would violate it.

  169. There is a feeling that National Missile Defence may also be used by the US to proliferate theatre missile defence systems. The obvious places in the world where they would be likely to do that would be in relation to Israel, Taiwan and Japan. Would you view that proliferation as helpful to world peace or destabilising?
  (Mr Cook) If I had advice for the United States administration I would tender it to the United States administration. First of all, theatre missile defence is not constrained by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which applies to the inter-continental not the theatre ones. Secondly, I am quite sure that the United States itself will be very much alive to both the regional and the wider global consequences of any such development.

  170. President Putin said on 10 June that there is no actual missile threat from the so-called "rogue states" of the Near and Middle East or the Asian region which the USA refers to either now or in the foreseeable future. Is President Putin right or wrong?
  (Mr Cook) Let us address the issue of substance. There is no doubt that North Korea has developed a quite remarkable missile technology given the nature of North Korea's economy. It is also of wider concern in that it is an active proliferator of that missile technology and other countries have now had access to the technology developed by North Korea. It would be unwise for any of us to be complacent about the threat from North Korea or from those who benefited from its technology.

  171. So President Putin is wrong to say that.
  (Mr Cook) I am seeking to avoid such an inflammatory way of responding to the question. I am trying to deal with the substance.
  (Mr Ricketts) In the joint communiqué from the US/Russian summit on 4 June, both sides agreed "the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including missiles and missile technology."

  172. So there is some degree of commonality between America and Russia.
  (Mr Cook) Yes, they both signed that communiqué.

  173. President Putin also said that Russia would be pleased to see the representative of United Europe as the third party in this centre for missile launch control. How do you view that statement?
  (Mr Cook) I am not familiar with the statement and shall certainly have to study it with care. The immediate response to that is that Britain as a sovereign nation takes part in arms control agreements as a nation. Sometimes we confer on our position with our allies within NATO, for instance on conventional forces in Europe. In those cases which touch on our own nuclear posture, we would act independently. As far as I can recall we have never sought to collate an arms control position within the European Union, although in some cases where they touch on export controls, we would of course want to work with European partners to make sure we were applying the same effective export controls. Is that a fair summary?
  (Mr Hare) There are EU Common Positions on things like the BW protocol.
  (Mr Cook) But we do not propose to submit an EU representative to those conventions.

  174. Without being inflammatory, which I am not being, do you have any anxieties that Russia might be trying to decouple Europe from the United States as far as defence goes?
  (Mr Cook) There have been attempts to achieve that at various intervals along the past 50 years and, as you will know, it is very important for us that we maintain the strength of our transatlantic alliance.

  175. Just on the question of "rogue state", no-one on this Committee is complacent about nuclear proliferation or developments in North Korea, but it is very hard to see the ultimate logic of this "rogue state" rhetoric. The day that North Korea launched a nuclear attack on the United State North Korea itself would be dust. How far can you take this "rogue state" characterisation inasmuch as there is any realistic threat of a nuclear strike from North Korea on the United States?
  (Mr Cook) I am not seeking to take it anywhere and to be fair to the United States, as we just discussed, they have dropped the rhetoric of "rogue state". One should not understate the missile technology capacity of North Korea and whilst you may well be right in your assumption that the United States would retaliate heavily in the event of an attack, that does not quite meet the anxiety in the United States at the present time that there would be the attack in the first place.

  176. Do you think that is a realistic anxiety, that North Korea is going to launch a nuclear strike on the United States any time soon?
  (Mr Cook) I am merely trying to explain the current state of the debate.

  177. I understand that, I am asking you as Foreign Secretary whether you think that it is realistic to fear a nuclear strike on the United States from North Korea?
  (Mr Cook) I am sorry. I am Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. I can say with some confidence that we do not anticipate a nuclear strike from North Korea on Britain, but I am not going to seek to second-guess the assessment of the United States in relation to itself. I do think that it is a matter of perplexity that North Korea developed such a technology in the first place. Not unreasonably there are people in the United States who ask why?

  178. You think that it is an open question as to whether North Korean might be planning a nuclear strike on the United States.
  (Mr Cook) The judgement on the national security of the United States is one which the United States has to make itself.

  179. I wanted to get back to the question of NMD and what its effects might be on the arms race. As part of this inquiry we have taken evidence from a number of academic experts, including Professor Robert O'Neill of Balliol College, Oxford and Professor John Baylis of the University of Wales. We put to them whether NMD might not actually lead to destabilisation in relation to the arms race. Professor O'Neill says that it will completely scupper any prospect of a long-term reduction in nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia and that is going to implode the whole arms control process. Do you think there is anything in that assessment at all?
  (Mr Cook) Plainly the impact on the international arms control environment is a crucial dimension to the debate on NMD and is one which we have discussed with our opposite numbers in the United States. I would have to say that in recent months the developments, particularly in relation to Russia, have been encouraging. It is in the course of the past four months that the Russian Duma has ratified START II, has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and also the new administration in Russia has come up with much more ambitious targets than even the already high level of objective for START III negotiations. At the moment the momentum within Russia appears to be entirely favourable towards cuts in nuclear missiles and that is consistent with the comparative success of the Review Conference of the NPT. Of course, if we are to maintain that momentum, it is important that NMD does not proceed in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.