NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

  1.  The Committee asked for a Memorandum outlining the Government's view on the outcome of the NPT Review Conference which took place in New York from 24 April 2000 to 19 May 2000. FCO Memorandum FCO/FAC/001-00 described the context of the Review Conference and the difficult issues that it would have to address.

  2.  The sixth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) took place in New York from 24 April to 19 May (the conference actually finished on 20 May but the clocks were stopped). It ended with the adoption, by consensus, of a final document which reviews the operation of the treaty over the past five years and sets out a number of steps that should be taken to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (an advance copy of Volume I, Part I of the Final Document is attached to this memorandum). The Conference also adopted, again by consensus, a Decision on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the NPT".

  3.  In order to facilitate its work, the Review Conference held discussions in three Main Committees. Subsidiary Bodies were established to two of these Committees. The broad division of the work was as follows:

MAIN COMMITTEE I

  Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

SUBSIDIARY BODY I

  Practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

MAIN COMMITTEE II

  Security Assurances, Nuclear Weapons' Free Zones, Safeguards.

SUBSIDIARY BODY II

  "Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution".

MAIN COMMITTEE III

  Peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

FINAL DOCUMENT

  4.  The conference Final Document is a compilation of reports from these committees and bodies. However, attention has inevitably focused on those elements relating to the work of Main Committee I and its Subsidiary Body. Perhaps the most significant single element, central to the success of the Conference was the:

"Unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI." (page 20, paragraph 15.6).

  In addition, the Final Document sets out a number of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty.These steps include the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. This section (page 21, paragraph 9) also sets out the following:

"Steps by all the NWS leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

—  further efforts by the NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally
—  increased transparency by the NWS with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
—  the further reduction of non strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
—  concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
—  a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
—  the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the NWS in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons."

UK DELEGATION TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

  5.  The UK Delegation was led by Mr Peter Hain, Minister of State at the FCO who delivered the UK National Statement at the opening session of the conference. A copy of this statement is attached to this memorandum together with two other formal statements made by the delegation. In addition to these statements, the UK delegation made a number of informal interventions in the course of debate and played a leading role in informal negotiating groups. Mr Hain's discussions with New Agenda Coalition leaders, particularly Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa helped to create the conditions which enabled the NWS and the New Agenda Coalition to reach agreement. The UK Delegation circulated the following papers at the Conference;

a.  an account of the UK national approach to the NPT over the review period;

b.  a "Food for thought" paper on "Systematic and Progressive Efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally";

c.  a paper outlining the efforts made by the UK to establish a capacity to verify nuclear arms reductions.

OUTCOME

  6.  This was the first NPT Review Conference since 1985 to adopt a final document. The Government considers that this document contains a balanced review of the operation of the Treaty and sets out a realistic programme for future action.

  We welcome the positive outcome which reaffirms the importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. This outcome is particularly noteworthy given the low expectations of success that existed prior to the conference. We believe that the "unequivocal undertaking" made by the Nuclear Weapons States represents their most explicit ever pledge to work for complete global nuclear disarmament. It is an important statement of intent, which we hope will provide a timely boost for wider global efforts to promote non-proliferation.

  7.  We now look forward to translating the agreements reached at the Review Conference into concrete international progress. In our view, the priority must be to get negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty underway at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force; and for the US and Russia to negotiate further deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

INTRODUCTION

  1.  The Committee asked for a memorandum on whether any possible upgrading of the early warning radar at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire, in relation to the possible deployment by the United States of a National Missile Defence (NMD) System, would constitute a breach of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT).

  2.  This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence.

THE 1972 ANTI BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABMT)

  3.  The ABMT was negotiated bilaterally between the United States and the then Soviet Union. They signed it on 26 May 1972 and it entered into force between them on 3 October 1972. On 26 September 1997, in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing that, upon the Memorandum's entry into force, they would constitute the Parties to the Treaty. The Memorandum has not yet entered into force. No other states are party to the ABMT.

  4.  As with any other international treaty, the interpretation of the ABMT is a matter for the Parties. It is not for non-parties, such as the United Kingdom, to offer their own interpretations of its provisions.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE ABMT

  5.  The ABMT made provision for the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, as a permanent forum for the discussion by the parties of issues relating to the treaty. Its mandate includes the consideration of "possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty." Since 1972, in addition to the Memorandum of Understanding referred to above, the Parties to the ABMT have also reached other agreements which have had the effect of modifying or further clarifying the Treaty's provisions.

  6.  On 3 July 1974, a Protocol was signed between the US and the Soviet Union restricting each of them to one Anti-Ballistic Missile system deployment area, rather than two. The Protocol entered into force on 24 May 1976. (The Soviet Union chose to deploy such an ABM system around Moscow. This is still in operation. The United States chose to deploy its ABM system around the ICBM fields at Grand Forks, North Dakota. This has been on inactive status—ie mothballed—since 1976.)

  7.  On 26 September 1997, after several years of difficult negotiations, the five States Party to the Memorandum of Understanding referred to in para 3 above also signed two Agreed Statements relating to the Treaty. These are concerned with clarifying the technical dividing line between ABM systems with capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles, which are controlled by the treaty, and systems with capabilities against other ballistic missiles—known generally as Theatre Missile Defence systems—which are not controlled by the treaty per se. The five States also signed another "Agreement on Confidence Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles other than Strategic Ballistic Missiles", and a "Joint Statement on the Annual Exchange of Information on the Status of Plans and Programmes with Respect to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles other than Strategic Ballistic Missiles". None of these agreements are yet in force.

CURRENT US/RUSSIAN DISCUSSIONS

  8.  The US Administration has acknowledged that, if it were to decide to proceed with the deployment of the sort of limited National Missile Defence system it currently envisages without breaching the ABMT, amendments to the present terms of the treaty would be required. It has therefore sought negotiations with Russia to that end.

  9.  Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at Cologne in June 1999 that the US and Russia should hold discussions on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as well as on further reductions in their respective strategic nuclear arsenals. A number of rounds of such discussions have since taken place.

  10.  The United States Administration has told us that, in these discussions, it has proposed to Russia modifications to the ABMT. The effect of these modifications would be to permit the deployment of the first phase of a limited NMD system, within the framework of the ABMT. Thus far, Russia has said that is is not prepared to agree modifications to the treaty to permit a limited NMD system as envisaged by the US.

  11.  The ABMT (Article XV) gives each party the right to withdraw from the treaty "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests." The treaty requires six months' notice of any such decision to withdraw, and an accompanying statement "of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests".

  12.  The US Administration have said publicly that the President would have to decide whether to withdraw from the Treaty, if the US decided to proceed with the deployment of a limited NMD system, but proved unable to persuade Russia to agree modifications to the treaty to permit this.

RAF FYLINGDALES

  13.  Fylingdales is an RAF base. It provides the UK with early warning of ballistic missile attack against the UK and Western Europe, and the US with early warning for North America. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) has existed there since 1963; in 1992 the original "Golf Balls" construction was replaced by a Phased Array Radar system. We will need it to continue to perform its early warning functions, whether or not it is also used in future in support of National Missile Defence.

  14.  Present US plans for the first phase of a National Missile Defence system envisage the use of Fylingdales and four other existing ballistic missile early warning radars (three of them in the United States, the fourth at Thule in Greenland) for tracking hostile ballistic missiles in mid-flight. These radars would each be upgraded to enhance their usefulness to a National Missile Defence system. In the case of RAF Fylingdales, this upgrading would involve changes to the present software which governs the operation of the radar, and some related information technology hardware changes.

WOULD THIS BREACH THE ABMT?

  15.  Since the US Administration has not yet decided to proceed with the deployment of an NMD system, and US/Russian discussions on this are continuing, we cannot predict with any certainty the circumstances in which the Government might be asked to agree to the use of RAF Fylingdales for NMD purposes, and to its related upgrading.

  16.  The two most likely scenarios would appear to be:

(a)  the US and Russia had agreed on modifications to the ABMT to permit the deployment of the first phase of an NMD system; or

(b)  The US and Russia had not reached agreement on modifications to the ABMT to permit the first phase of NMD, and the US had formally given notice of its withdrawal from the treaty.

  17.  In scenario (a), the upgrading and integration of RAF Fylingdales into NMD would presumably have been agreed by the Parties to be permitted under the terms of a modified ABMT. In scenario (b), such constraints as the ABMT currently places on the role of RAF Fylingdales would no longer be operative. Either way, the question of any possible breach of the treaty through the upgrading of the Fylingdales radar or its integration into any NMD system would not appear to arise.

UK POLICY

  18.  The Government has made clear, both to the United States Administration, and to the Russian Government, that it wishes to see the ABMT preserved. We are also keen to see early progress towards the further reduction of their respective nuclear arsenals. We therefore strongly hope for a successful outcome to the discussions between them on these issues. We continue to urge both sides to make every effort to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable way forward.

18 April 2000