INTRODUCTION
1. The Committee requested memoranda on
three issues:
THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTRE
1. The International Science and Technology
Centre (ISTC) was established by international agreement in November
1992 as a non-proliferation programme to provide peaceful research
opportunities for non-military research for weapon scientists
and engineers in countries in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The
end of the Cold War had brought concern over the defection of
scientists and engineers, with knowledge relating to WMD and their
delivery systems, from elite research institutes in the FSU to
rogue nations and terrorist groups. The proliferation of technology
and expertise on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and
the missile systems used to deliver them, presents one of the
most serious threats to peace and security today.
2. Japan, Russia, the US and the European
Union therefore established the ISTC: Norway and the Republic
of Korea have since acceded and now participate as financing members
in ISTC activities.
3. Between March 1994 and March 1999, the
ISTC funded over 650 peaceful scientific projects, employing over
24,000 scientists and engineers at nearly 300 institutes in the
FSU. These projects cover a broad range of science and technology
areas, inter alia:
4. The UK funds the ISTC through the EU.
The latest available figures show the EU contributing $60 million
from 1992-98, and / $3.80 million in 1999. A copy of the ISTC
annual report for 1998 is attached.
5. A Department of Trade and Industry-arranged
event in September will promote UK private sector involvement
in the "Partner Programme" with the ISTC. (The Management
Best Practice Directorate is leading for DTI: the Office of Science
and Technology is closely involved.)
THE US-RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM AGREEMENT
1. The 1996 Moscow Nuclear Summit tasked
the G8 Non-Proliferation Exports Group (NPEG) to take forward
international co-operation on the safe and permanent disposal
of ex-weapons plutonium, focussing on the huge Russian and American
stockpiles. Technical experts agreed that the most promising options
for disposal were conversion (of both plutonium and uranium) into
mixed-oxide fuel ("MOX") for use in civil nuclear reactors,
and vitrification (in glass or ceramic form). The UK has actively
contributed to discussion: as G8 President in 1998 we held a major
conference of governmental and industrial experts which examined
options for implementing the programme and ways of financing it.
2. At the 1998 Clinton/Yeltsin Summit the
US and Russia each undertook to dispose of 50 tonnes of plutonium.
The US are working with the Russians to agree a programme to turn
34 tonnes into MOX for civil energy use. The US will fully fund
its own disposal programme, which will have the capacity to dispose
of 3 tonnes of plutonium per year. The US will require Russia
to make reciprocal progress in its disposal programme.
3. Work has begun in a number of areas and
the US have secured Congressional funding of $200 million. They
have agreed to fund the initial stage: the conversion of missile
pits (the warhead cores) into plutonium. The US have been working
to agree detailed costings with the Russians on the whole programme,
and these are due in the next few weeks. They have also been drawing
up plans for interim storage of the material. A trilateral German/French/Russian
project has designed and completed feasibility studies for a pilot
MOX plant. But no money is yet available for the construction
phase.
4. "Nuclear Problems in the Former
Soviet Union" are the subject of a current Whitehall Cross-cutting
expenditure review chaired by John Battle. Plutonium disposal
is one of the areas being considered. The UK is also continuing
to explore medium term opportunities for UK companies in plutonium
disposal in Russia.
THE STATUS OF ANTI-TANK MINES WITH ANTI-PERSONNEL ATTACHMENTS
1. The Ottawa Convention specifically bans
the use or acquisition of anti-personnel mines. Article 2 of the
Convention (attached) covers the definitions of an "anti-personnel
mine".
2. Article 2.1 of the Ottawa Convention
states that "Mines designed to be detonated by the presence,
proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that
are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel
mines as a result of being so equipped".
3. Article 2.3 goes on to state that " `Anti-handling
device' means a device intended to protect a mine and which is
part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which
activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise
intentionally disturb the mine."
4. Anti-tank (or anti vehicle) mines with
anti-handling devices falling within the above definition (which
includes all anti-vehicle mines in use with British forces) are
therefore not subject to the Ottawa Convention. Such mines are,
however, covered by Amended Protocol II of the Convention on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which—for example,
prohibits the use of anti-vehicle mines against non-military targets;
and requires the recording of the location of minefields and the
removal of mines after the cessation of hostilities. The UK abides
scrupulously by these requirements.