INDIA AND PAKISTAN

  India and Pakistan have refused to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. In 1999, the two were involved in a serious and protracted conventional military conflict in Kashmir. There was a clear risk of escalation which could have lead, under certain circumstances, to use of nuclear weapons. Tensions between the two have again risen and are now dangerously high. We continue to urge India and Pakistan to re-open their dialogue over the issues that divide them, including Kashmir. We encourage them to implement existing confidence——and security-building measures, and to develop new ones. While recognising that neither is likely to accede to the NPT in the foreseeable future, we also continue to urge them to make rapid progress on some of the other non-proliferation steps set out in UNSCR 1172, particularly on signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and on opening negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

  India and Pakistan are both States Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, legally committing themselves not to possess or use chemical weapons. India has declared a small stockpile of mustard gas, plus associated production facilities, which has been inspected by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and is now being destroyed. Both are also States Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

ISRAEL, IRAN, SYRIA AND IRAQ

  Israel is not a party to the NPT. It has signed but not ratified the CWC and has not signed the BTWC. Iran is a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State Party to the NPT and a State Party to the CWC and the BTWC. Syria is a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State Party to the NPT and a State Party to the CWC and the BTWC. Syria is a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State Party to the NPT. It has not signed the CWC and has signed but not ratified the BTWC. Iraq is a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State Party to the NPT and a State Party to the BTWC but has not signed the CWC—none of this is particularly relevant given that it has shown itself determined to flout its Treaty commitments, requiring the imposition of special arrangements under UNSCR 687.

  There have been repeated reports that Israel possesses nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. We continue to urge Israel to join the international non-proliferation regimes, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

  Iran's public position is one of strong commitment to non-proliferation principles. Nevertheless we are aware of reports that the elements in Iran may be working against Iran's stated non-proliferation policy by seeking to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. The verification procedures of the non-proliferation treaties and the various export control regimes already described in FCO/FAC/001-00 provide some assurance. Agreement by Iran of an Additional Protocol with the IAEA would provide more. Ultimately however, we believe the best means of ensuring Iran abides by its treaty commitments lies in the continuation of the political reform and rapprochement with the West begun under President Khatami, and with the success of the Middle East Peace Process (see below). Hence our policy of engagement with Iran on non-proliferation and other issues.

  Syria is one of the countries in the Middle East causing serious concern in the context of chemical or biological weapons. We remain watchful, and urge Syria to adhere to the CWC and BTWC.

  Iraq has demonstrated all too clearly that it is ready and willing to use WMD. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons and ballistic missiles against his neighbours and his own people. He is unlikely ever to abandon his WMD ambitions.

  Before Iraq intransigence forced their withdrawal, UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors had succeeded in destroying large quantities of CBW materials and facilities, Scud-type missiles and an advanced nuclear weapons programme. But because of Saddam's policy of concealment and obstruction, not everything was found. He is undoubtedly taking advantage of the absence of inspectors to rebuild his WMD programmes. Hence the UK's strenuous efforts to get Security Council agreement to a new comprehensive resolution on Iraq (UNSCR 1284) which provides for the return of inspectors. Nevertheless, the vigilance of the international community makes it unlikely that Saddam will be able to threaten the region with WMD in the foreseeable future, even if he chooses not to cooperate with UNSCR 1284.

  Middle East states (including Israel) support the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone. But little progress has been made due to Isreal's reluctance to negotiate until there is peace in the region and until there is parallel agreement on a Middle East zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. The latter proviso reflects Israel's concerns about those Arab States which have yet to sign the CWC and the BTWC and which are suspected of possessing chemical and biological weapons. In turn, Arab States such as Syria refuses to join the CWC and BTWC while Israel remains outside the NPT. Thus the risks of WMD use in the region and the hopes of creating a WMD-free zone are both inextricably bound up in the Middle East Peace Process. We judge it unlikely, however, that any of these countries would use WMD in the current political climate.

  Missile proliferation—linked to possible use of WMD warheads—is also of great concern in the Middle East.

POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE TO FACILITIES

  All the countries referred to above have at least one nuclear facility. Both the Middle East and South Asia are regions of instability. Nuclear facilities might sustain damage either as intentional targets of military action, as was threatened during conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, or through terrorism, as has happened in France, or accidentally.

  The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decided that "attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardise nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provision of the Charter of the United Nations". Parties to the NPT are bound by this.

  The safety of nuclear facilities is a national matter. Although the IAEA inspects the nuclear facilities of NPT parties and certain nuclear facilities in India, Pakistan and Israel, the focus is on compliance with safeguards obligations, not on safety.

  Most nuclear facilities, even in the developing world, are built to high safety standards designed to withstand serious incidents, including minor earthquakes. Nuclear reactors are normally built with robust outer vessels, which protect them from most serious stresses short of direct attack. Battle damage could easily put such a plant out of action, but would be less likely to lead to widespread, lethal radioactive contamination. Smaller reactors can be less well protected but can also withstand attack without causing contamination, as was shown by the "Desert Storm" damage to the Tuwaitha nuclear research centre outside Baghdad. In addition, research or academic institutes, industrial radiography facilities, or even the radiology departments of large hospitals, might be subject to damage which could lead to radioactive contamination, but this would be unlikely to be more than very local.

  The worst possible hazards would probably result from a large-scale attack on the cooling tanks of a spent fuel storage facility resulting in permanent loss of cooling capacity.

  Damage to chemical weapons production and storage facilities could result in the release of CW agents and other chemicals (such as precursors and solvents) into the environment. Many of these other agents are also toxic, although not generally as toxic as the agents.

  Damage to civil chemical plants can also result in the release of toxic chemicals. For example, common industrial chemicals such as chlorine and phosgene were used as CW agents in World War I. They are stored in large quantities at many civil chemical sites.

  The extent of the hazard resulting from damage to such facilities depends on many factors, including the characteristics and quantity of the agent or chemical involved, how it is stored, and local meteorological conditions. In general, CW agent production facilities are built at remote sites: hence release of CW agent might pose only a small risk to population. However, even in Western countries, civil chemical plants are often built close to large population centres where leakage could mean significant risk to the health/lives of local people.

  Potentially dangerous microorganisms and toxins can be found in small amounts in hospital, public health, academic and industrial laboratories. Experimental animals infected with dangerous organisms may be held in research facilities. If such facilities were to be looted or damaged in conflict or civil disorder, there would be potential for release of infectious or toxic materials. However, since most hold dangerous materials in small quantities, the risk would be relatively localised unless an infectious, readily transmissible, organism were involved.

  Larger amounts of dangerous materials could be found in biological warfare facilities. Security is generally tight at such facilities but consistency of standards cannot be guaranteed.