The UK, along with othe EU partners, is committed
to a responsible and transparent export policy on small arms.
We are also working closely with other EU, and international,
partners to combat illicit trafficking and the cumulative effect
of large numbers of small arms in affected societies. The availability
and numbers of small arms in some regions is seen as a direct
catalyst to inherent instability; such activities are presently
concentrated in Africa.
The UK promoted agreement in 1998 on the EU
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Subsequently we supported the
objective and provisions of the EU Joint Action which aims to
prevent the excessive proliferation of small arms and offers EU
assistance to affected regions.
The UK is active in a number of fora, such as
NATO, which encourage countries to act responsibly with accumulated
surplus weapons. Destruction of surplus weapons is an option the
UK MoD and police are exploring, but at present re-export should
be managed with the highest degree of responsibility. If surplus
weapons are to be retained then best practice stock pile management
should be observed, and we have funded visits from UK based experts
to troubled regions to advise on this. The UK has also been active
in the Wassenaar Arrangement in stimulating international action
to prevent destabilising accumulations of small arms.
The UK has also been supporting UN initiatives
on small arms. The Foreign Secretary attended the UN Security
Council Ministerial meeting on Small Arms in September 1999. We
are active contributors to the preparations for the UN Conference
on Small Arms trafficking scheduled for 2001. A UK representative
sat on the Panel of Experts which prepared for the Conference.
An inter-departmental committee on small arms
proliferation has been formed, chaired by the FCO, to: develop
small arms policy; promote the exchange of information and ideas;
and ensure coherence of UK action in this area. Among issues currently
being considered are international harmonisation of deactivation
standards, common marking of small arms to assist tracing, the
creation of a national database to track sales of small arms and
the dissemination of technical information.
The UK has provided assistance to areas affected
by small arms proliferation. The Department for International
Development has pledged $500,000 to support the implementation
of the ECOWAS moratorium on the import, export and manufacture
of light weapons, which was agreed in October 1998 as the result
of a Malian initiative. We have funded a series of seminars to
spread the "Mali message" more widely within the region.
The UK has supplied information more than once to the ECOWAS Secretariat
on illicit trade to the region. In October 1999 a joint FCO/DfID/DTI
team spent 10 days in Abuja on a needs assessment mission. The
resulting report is being used to generate renewed momentum and
additional assistance for the implementation of the Moratorium.
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY
The process of adapting the 1990 CFE Treaty
(paragraphs 1-3 of memorandum FCO/FAC/2/97) culminated at the
Instanbul OSCE Summit on 19 November 1999, with signature of an
Agreement to amend the Treaty. This Agreement ensures that the
CFE Treaty, which has been a cornerstone of European security
during the tumultuous post-Cold War period, can continue to play
its crucial role in ensuring military transparency and predictability.
The Agreement changes the Treaty's system of
limits from one aimed at military alliances (designed for the
Cold War) to one which caps individual states' holdings of conventional
equipment. The overall amount of equipment permitted by the Treaty
will fall. The Agreement also imposes tighter constraints on where,
in the area of application, equipment can be deployed. The Agreement
includes flexibility for when additional deployments are needed
in exceptional circumstances, so allowing for crisis management.
It increases the level of military information that each State
Party must provide to the others, and raises the proportion of
each State Party's military sites open to inspection. The Agreement
also allows European states not currently party to the Treaty
to apply to accede. The adapted Treaty, including all these elements,
will enter into force when all States Parties have ratified it.
The Foreign Secretary issued the statement below
following signature of the Agreement on Adaptation, which reflects
the concern felt over Russian deployments in the north Caucasus,
which exceed CFE limits:
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
Arms Sales Policy
The Government is committed to maintaining a
strong defence industry which is a strategic part of our industrial
base, as well as a key supplier to our own armed forces. Our defence
industry employs some 355,000 people, 130,000 of which are dependent
on exports. In 1998 the UK's defence companies achieved export
orders worth around £6 billion.
Defence exports can also contribute to international
stability by strengthening bilateral and collective defence relationships
in accordance with the right of self-defence recognised by the
UN Charter. However, defence exports must be managed responsibly,
in particular so as to avoid their use for internal repression
or international aggression.
National Criteria
On 28 July 1997, the Foreign Secretary announced
a new set of criteria against which we would judge export licence
applications. These criteria gave effect to the pledge to add
an ethical dimension to arms exports in that for the first time,
the Government made clear that it would not issue export licences
for equipment where there was a clearly identifiable risk that
it might be used for internal repression or international aggression.
Proposed exports are also carefully assessed to ensure that they
do not seriously undermine the social and economic development
of the recipient country.
The Foreign Secretary stated that the criteria
would be applied when considering applications for licences to
export goods controlled under Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export
of Goods (Control) Order 1994, also known as the UK Military List.
This covers all categories of conventional weapons and also paramilitary
and internal security equipment (e.g. water cannon and some types
of protective vehicle).
The criteria are also applied to applications
to export dual-use goods (ie those controlled under Council Regulation
(EC) 3381/94 and the Dual Use and Related Goods (Export Control)
Regulations 1996), when there are grounds to believe that the
end-user of the goods would be the armed forces or internal security
forces of the recipient country. A further application of the
criteria is to decisions on exports of military goods by the Government,
for which no licence is required.
The MoD also administers advance approvals for
promotion prior to formal application for an export licence through
the Form 680 process. Under this procedure companies can seek
official approval for the promotion of specific equipment in specified
markets (although they still need to apply to the DTI for a licence
to export the equipment).
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
In announcing the new criteria, the Foreign
Secretary committed the UK to work for a European Code of Conduct
setting high common standards for arms exports from EU Member
States. This objective was achieved under the UK's EU Presidency
when the General Affairs Council adopted the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports in June 1998. The Code sets out detailed criteria
against which Member States will assess applications to export
defence equipment, and is used in parallel with our national criteria.
The other key element of the EU Code of Conduct
is the "no undercut mechanism", whereby Member States
circulate details of licences refused. Before any Member State
grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State
or States for an essentially identical transaction, it will first
consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s).
If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides
to grant a licence, it will notify the Member State or States
issuing the denial.
The operation of the Code to date has supported
our initial assessment of it as a major step in the process of
establishing high common standards for arms exports from all Member
States. Member States recently concluded a review of the first
year's operation of the Code, in accordance with paragraph 8 of
its Operative Provisions. The consolidated report arising from
the review characterised Member States' experiences of the Code
as "positive" and stated that the Code had "increased
mutual understanding of Member States' export licensing policies
. . . both directly, through the circulation of denial notifications
and consultations, and indirectly through contributing to a culture
of greater (inter-state) transparency and openness." The
consolidated report also gives a detailed account of practical
steps taken to support the operation of the Code and priorities
for future action. A meeting of the Council of Ministers on 11
October 1999 took note of the Report and decided to publish it
in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The UK will
continue to work for the effective implementation of the Code
and the adoption of its principles by arms exporting countries
outside the EU.
Annual Report
We published the first Annual Report on Strategic
Export Controls in March 1999. It gave details by country of the
goods we licensed for export between May and December 1997 and
values of actual exports in 1997. The Report marked a new level
of transparency and is the most detailed such report published
in Europe.
The level of detail disclosed in the Report
represented a fulfilment of our commitments on transparency and
accountability. It also recognised the need to protect commercial
confidentiality and the essential security interests of importing
countries.
The 1998 Annual Report was published on 3 November
1999 and is available on the FCO Website http://www.fco.gov.uk/.
We will consider the format and content of future reports in light
of responses to the first two Annual Reports, taking into account
in particular the eventual report of the Joint Inquiry being carried
out by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade and
Industry, and International Development Committees.
White Paper on Strategic Export Controls
The Government published a White Paper on Strategic
Export Controls on 1 July 1998, setting out proposals for new
primary legislation on strategic export controls. Views on the
proposals contained in the White Paper were invited by 30 September
1998, and 54 responses were received from a variety of organisations
and individuals.
With the exception of two responses for which
confidentiality was requested, the responses were published on
30 November 1998; copies are available from the Export Control
Organisation in the DTI. The Trade and Industry Committee's Report
on Strategic Export Controls published on 10 December 1998 also
contained recommendations relating to the White Paper proposals.
The Government will announce proposals for new export control
legislation, following conclusion of the review of the White Paper
proposals in the light of responses received.
Equipment used for torture or other cruel, inhumane
or degrading treatment or punishment
On 28 July 1997 the Foreign Secretary announced
a UK ban on the export or transhipment of all types of equipment
designed primarily for torture.
Work on controlling the export from all EU Member
States of the equipment covered by the Foreign Secretary's announcement
was hindered by the resignation of the European Commission. Much
preparatory work has been done, however, and we remain committed
to working with the Commission and our EU partners for the introduction
of such a control.
WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
Since late 1997, the UK has consistently sought
to improve the effectiveness of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies, in line with the Government's policy of promoting
responsibility and transparency in this area. The UK has:
During 1999, Participating States held the first
formal assessment of the operation of the WA since it was established
in 1996. The UK used the Assessment to pursue its priorities as
outlined above. The UK Permanent Representative to the IAEA in
Vienna chaired the General Working Group considering the Assessment.
The Assessment was concluded in December 1999 at the WA's annual
Plenary. Participating States agreed to a limited expansion of
reporting requirements on their transfers of arms and military
equipment. Several other proposals for increased transparency
were not agreed at the Plenary but were reserved for further study
in 2000. These covered reporting on transfers of additional types
of military equipment including small arms, reporting of denials
of military equipment and the provision of additional information
in reports on transfers and denials of dual-use goods. Other key
conclusions were:
The agreed public statement by the 1999 Plenary
is on the WA website (www.wassenaar.org). The Government's view
of the results of the Assessment was set out in detail in written
answers by Keith Vaz MP and Baroness Scotland of Asthal on 11
January 2000.
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
The United Kingdom remains at the forefront
of the international anti-personnel mines campaign. We were among
the first to sign and ratify the Ottawa Convention, which bans
the weapons completely and which entered into force on 1 March
1999. So far, 137 countries have signed the Convention, and 90
have ratified it. In July 1998 we passed legislation enabling
us to meet our commitments under the Ottawa Convention, and in
October 1999 we completed the destruction of our operational stocks
of the weapon.
The task now is to secure the widest possible
support for a ban on anti-personnel landmines, and to remove the
millions of mines already laid across the world. Several key states,
including Russia, China, India and Pakistan, as well as the US,
have not signed the Ottawa Convention. We shall continue to press
them and all other non-signatories to sign and ratify the Convention
as soon as possible, while pressing for a wider ban in all appropriate
fora, including the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Weaponery
Convention Review Process. We shall continue to fund mine-related
humanitarian projects, focussing on the worst affected countries.
Since 1997 we have doubled the funds available for such activities
from £5 million to £10 million per year.
UN ARMS REGISTER
The Gulf conflict revealed that the huge arsenal
of weapons amassed by Iraq far exceeded the requirements of self-defence.
The UN Arms Register was established to prevent similar potentially
destabilising build-ups. With the UK playing a leading role in
its compilation, the register was set up with near unanimous support
by the UN General Assembly in resolution 46/36 of 9 December 1991.
It covers seven weapons systems (tanks, armoured combat vehicles,
large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters,
warships and missile systems) which are judged to be of key importance
for any major offensive operation. The UK's first return was made
on 29 April 1993 and one has been submitted every year since,
the latest being made in June 1999, covering transfers made in
1998. This also included details on procurement from national
production and the UK's military holdings. At present some 90
countries make returns to the register each year.
The UK is committed to strengthening the Register,
both by encouraging more countries to participate and by broadening
the range of equipment upon which information is submitted. Although
the Register is not itself an instrument to control arms transfers
the greater level of transparency it has introduced into the international
arms trade has proved an important confidence building measure,
especially in regions of tensions, and has helped to identify
at an early stage excessive accumulations of weapons.
REGIONAL PROLIFERATION
Iraq
A series of confrontations brought about by
Iraq's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) culminated
on 16 December 1998 in the withdrawal of the weapons inspectors
and the launch of operation "Desert Fox" by the US and
UK. Since then, the UK has been leading efforts in the UN Security
Council to find a new way forward on Iraq. In December 1999, the
Security Council adopted the UK-drafted resolution 1284 which,
inter alia, makes clear to Iraq that it must give up its
aspirations to have weapons of mass destruction and creates a
new body of weapons inspectors, UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission). Dr Hans Blix was appointed Executive
Chairman of UNMOVIC in January. It remains to be seen whether
Iraq will co-operate.
Iran
We remain concerned about reports of Iranian
efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. We urge the Iranians
to comply with their obligations under the NPT and to agree an
Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.
Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention
in November 1997 and has since become an active member of the
Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (it is
on the OPCW Executive Council until May 2000). Some questions
on its activities remain, however, including on details of its
declarations to the OPCW. We intend to pursue these in bilateral
contacts. Iran is also an active participant in the Geneva negotiations
on a Verification Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.
We have frequently expressed our concerns about
Iranian attempts to develop ballistic missile systems. We remain
particularly concerned by Iran's development of the Shahab-3 ballistic
missile, with a range of 1,300 kms. Such a system is capable of
reaching any of the neighbouring countries and could pose a threat
to stability in the region. Iran is not the only country in the
region to possess such technology, but whilst understanding Iran's
legitimate security concerns, we continue to urge Iran to refrain
from the further development of ballistic missiles.
We are also taking advantage of improved relations
between the UK and Iran following the election of President Khatami
to discuss proliferation issues directly with Iran, most recently
during Foreign Minister Kharrazi's visit to London in January
2000.
India & Pakistan
The UK joined international condemnation of
the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The benchmark
against which progress is now measured is UNSCR 1172, adopted
unanimously in June 1998. It condemns the tests and calls on India
and Pakistan to address their differences through dialogue and
to take key non-proliferation steps. Progress so far has been
negligible, but there are signs that India may be preparing to
sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty this year, a move
which would probably be followed by Pakistan.
The UK was instrumental in setting up the Senior
Officials Task Force, a G8 initiative, in June 1998 to co-ordinate
efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to join the international
non-proliferation regimes.
North Korea
Progress towards implementation of the US/DPRK
Framework Agreement continues. The nuclear freeze at North Korea's
suspect reactor sites remains in place; and canning of spent fuel
rods is almost complete. But IAEA inspectors continue to report
that the information and access provided has been insufficient
to allow them to draw a comprehensive picture of DPRK's nuclear
programme, so questions remain about its past nuclear activities.
In July 1997 the EU, through the European Atomic
Energy Community, became a member of the Korean Energy Development
Organisation, alongside the founder members (the US, Japan and
South Korea), in return for a contribution of 15 million ECU a
year for five years.
We strongly support US efforts to persuade the
DPRK to refrain from its missile proliferation activities. The
DPRK's launch in August 1998 of the Taepo Dong missile caused
great tension in the region.
PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
The 1996 Moscow Nuclear Summit tasked the G8
Non-Proliferation Experts Group (NPEG) to take forward international
co-operation on the safe and permanent disposal of ex-weapons
plutonium, focussing on the huge Russian and American stockpiles.
Technical experts agreed that the most promising options for disposal
were conversion into mixed-oxide fuel "MOX" (of both
plutonium and uranium) for use in civil nuclear reactors, and
vitrification (in glass or ceramic form). The UK has been actively
contributing to discussions on how to carry forward work. As President
of the G8 in 1998, we held a major conference of governmental
and industrial experts which examined options for implementing
the programme and ways of financing it.
The 1998 Clinton/Yeltsin Summit committed the
US and Russia to the disposal of 50 tonnes of plutonium each.
The US are working with the Russians to agree a programme to turn
34 of these 50 tonnes into MOX for civil energy use. The US will
fully fund its own disposal programme, which will have the capacity
to dispose of 3 tonnes of plutonium per year. The US will require
that Russia makes reciprocal progress in its disposal programme.
Work has begun in a number of areas and the
US have secured Congressional funding of $200 million. They have
agreed to fund the initial stage: the conversion of missile pits
into plutonium. The US have been working to agree detailed costings
with the Russians on the whole programme, and these are due in
March/April 2000. They have also been drawing up plans for interim
storage of the material. A trilateral German/French/Russian project
has designed and completed feasibility studies for a pilot MOX
plant. But no money is yet available to move to the construction
phase.
Nuclear Safety in the Former Soviet Union has
been included as an issue for a "Cross-cutting" expenditure
review currently being conducted by HM Treasury. The Ministerial
group will be chaired by John Battle. Plutonium disposition is
one of the areas being considered.
The UK is also continuing to explore opportunities
in the medium term for UK companies to contribute to plutonium
disposition in Russia. BNFL are preparing a summary of areas in
which they could "add value" to plutonium disposition.
The US will be looking to G7 members to make
firm commitments at the Okinawa Summit in July 2000.
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES (NWFZS)
The UK has always supported the principle of
NWFZs. We believe that they can make a valuable contribution to
nuclear non-proliferation and global and regional peace and security,
as long as they are based on arrangements freely arrived at by
all the states in the region concerned. We have signed the relevant
Protocols to the Treaties establishing NWFZs in Latin America
(Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Raratonga) and Africa (Pelindaba).
We have ratified the first two of these and are committed to ratifying
the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba before the 2000 NPT Review
Conference (the only NWS to have ratified so far is France).
The Treaty of Bangkok, covering a South East
Asian NWFZ, entered into force in 1997. None of the Nuclear Weapon
States has signed the Protocol yet because of concerns with its
wording, but there is constructive dialogue between the NWS and
ASEAN on how to proceed. In 1997 the countries of former Soviet
Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan) signed the Almaty Declaration, which stated, inter
alia, that Central Asia should be declared a NWFZ, and called
for all interested countries to support the proposal. The Central
Asians have produced a draft Treaty and protocol on which the
NWS have commented. The UN Secretariat are providing support and
advice to the Central Asians.