INTRODUCTION

  The UK attaches great importance to efforts which prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and promote their elimination. Such efforts enhance our security and reduce the threats we face. We play a leading role in the implementation of the non-proliferation treaties and conventions now in force, principally the Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We also work to promote agreement on further international steps. The UK's enforcement of strict national export controls is a further important measure against proliferation of WMD. National controls are reinforced by co-operation within the international export control regimes.

  There has been impressive progress in extending and reinforcing the regimes during the last decade. However, serious challenges—particularly missile proliferation—face them. UK action in the regimes involves close co-ordination with EU and Western Group partners.

A.  THE TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

  The UK continues to view the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. As one of the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) recognised by the NPT, the UK is committed to the Treaty's full implementation. It attaches particular importance to the terms of Article VI under which all parties commit themselves, inter alia, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament".

  At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference the NPT Parties agreed to extend its duration indefinitely. To achieve this they also agreed on a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", a Strengthened Review Process for the Treaty, and a Resolution on the Middle East.

CURRENT ISSUES

  The Treaty now has 187 States Parties (including all five NWS), over a quarter of which adhered in the 1990s. However, there are three main current issues:

—  non-parties:  there remain four States which have so far refused to adhere to the Treaty: Cuba, who argues that the Treaty does not go far enough in pressing for nuclear disarmament rather than because Cuba is unwilling to renounce nuclear weapons ambitions of its own, plus India, Israel, and Pakistan, because they have been unwilling to renounce such ambitions. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998;

—  non-compliant parties:  some States which acceded as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) have nevertheless sought to acquire nuclear weapons (Iraq), are strongly suspected of having sought to do so (North Korea), or are the subject of concerns that they might seek to do so. These issues are covered more fully in the Supplementary Memorandum in the Report on UK Policy on Weapons Proliferation and Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era;

—  good-faith parties:  many NNWS parties claim that the NWS Parties have not done enough to make progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. This has been the main bone of contention at the Conference of the Parties which have reviewed the Treaty's operation at five yearly intervals since its entry into force.

  It remains a key UK objective to promote universality of the NPT which we do in multilateral fora and in bilateral contacts with India, Pakistan and Israel. We have also demonstrated our commitment to reduce nuclear weapons. We have reduced our operationally available warheads by 50 per cent since the end of the Cold War and in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review we announced a reduction of a third in the previously planned number of warheads. We also announced that the one submarine on patrol will be at a reduced state of alert. Our nuclear holdings are now considerably lower than those of any other NWS and we are the first NWS to declare the size of our defence fissile material stocks. Substantial quantities of the UK's nuclear material have been brought into safeguards as a result of the SDR of 1998.

  The next Review Conference of the NPT will be held in New York during April-May 2000. The UK will be working hard to achieve an agreed outcome. We are active in discussions with key partners and regularly meet representatives of NGOs interested in promoting disarmament. An FCO Minister will attend the Review Conference. The three meetings of the Preparatory Committee, held in 1997, 1998 and 1999, have agreed on the procedural arrangements for the Conference but failed to agree any substantive recommendations to it. The US Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the failure to start Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations, US plans for a National Missile Defence System, and the poor state of bilateral nuclear arms control efforts between the US and Russia will inevitably make it a difficult Conference.

  Implementation of the safeguards required by the Treaty is undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (see below under verification).

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

  Three major attempts have been made to negotiate a CTBT. The first, from 1958 to 1962, ended in failure, but spawned the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which bans explosions anywhere but underground. The second attempt, from 1977 to 1980, also failed, but was preceded and followed in the mid-70s and late-80s by bilateral US/Soviet treaties to limit the size of underground explosions. The third attempt involved three years of intense negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva from 1994 to 1996. This led to the opening for signature of a CTBT in September 1996.

  During the negotiations several nuclear weapons states, were unwilling to be constrained by the Treaty unless all five nuclear-weapon States, together with India, Israel, and Pakistan, were similarly constrained. The upshot was a provision making the Treaty's entry into force dependent on its ratification by 44 named states, including these eight states. As of January 2000, 26 of the 44 have both signed and ratified (including the UK and France), another 15 have signed but not yet ratified (including the US, Russia, China, and Israel), and a further three have not yet signed (India, Pakistan and North Korea).

ENTRY INTO FORCE

  Prospects for the Treaty's entry into force received a set-back with the US Senate's rejection of the Treaty in October 1999, but President Clinton has made clear that the US will not resume testing and that his Administration continues to favour US ratification. The US is also contributing to funding the development of the CTBT's interim monitoring arrangements. Russia and China continue to say they will move towards ratification. In the wake of their May 1998 tests, both India and Pakistan made heavily qualified statements about signing the Treaty and each announced its own moratorium on future tests. We are encouraging both to sign the CTBT as a contribution to stability in the region.

  Foreseeing that its entry into force might not be straightforward, the negotiators of the Treaty provided in its Article XIV that, if it had not entered into force within three years of its opening for signature, a conference of ratifying states would be held to "consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty". This Article XIV Conference was duly held in October 1999, in Vienna. Further such Conferences will now be held periodically until such time as the Treaty enters into force.

  Although the Treaty has yet to enter into force, the only nuclear explosions conducted since it was opened for signature have been those of India and Pakistan in May 1998. China and France both tested during the negotiations, but the US, Russia, and the UK have not tested since before they began. Having ratified itself, the UK strongly urged a positive vote in the US Senate on US ratification and has encouraged non-signatories (particularly India and Pakistan) to sign. The UK acted as facilitator for the October 1999 Article XIV Conference. It also strongly supports the work of the CTBT Prepcom to establish the International Monitoring System (IMS) (see Section D below). The Treaty provides for the establishment of a Vienna-based Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) to oversee the IMS. A Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is making efforts to ensure both can be up and running when the Treaty enters into force.

  The CTBT will make a substantial contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It will represent a significant constraint (political for non-parties) on the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Those countries which have signed can be expected to comply with its provisions. None has suggested it would do otherwise.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

  A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty has been seen for many years as the next logical and practical step in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament. The essential purpose of an FMCT would be to end the production of those materials without which no nuclear weapon or other explosive device can be made to explode, essentially plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium (HEU).

  The only states which are still legally free to produce these materials for nuclear weapons are the five NWS (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) and the four non-parties to the NPT (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan). The main benefits of an FMCT to the UK would be:

—  to prevent any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons by the US, Russia, France and China and the first three, like the UK, have publicly stated that they have already ceased such production;

—  to prevent any increase in the size of existing stocks of fissile material available for nuclear weapons, and thus to establish a baseline from which efforts can be made gradually to control and/or to reduce those stocks.

—  to prevent the continuing production of fissile material for nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and possibly Israel.

  The UK has long supported the achievement of an FMCT as the next incremental step to achieving nuclear disarmament. We regularly advocate an FMCT in bilateral contacts with, inter alia, India, Pakistan and China.

  Although the idea of a cut-off has been around for decades, President Clinton gave the idea new momentum by advocating it in his address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 1993. Later that year the UNGA adopted by consensus a resolution calling for negotiations. Since then efforts have focussed on trying to get negotiations started in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva. This has so far proved impossible. While there is wide agreement on the mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate such a Treaty (the so-called "Shannon Mandate"), the NAM and China are linking the actual establishment of such a Committee to agreement on how to address other issues (Nuclear Disarmament in the case of the NAM and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in the case of China). The UK position is that, as agreed by the 1995 NPT Review) and Extension Conference, an FMCT is the next multilateral step in the process of nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate should not be held up by linkage to these other issues.

MAIN ISSUES

  When negotiations on an FMCT do begin, the two main issues will be: whether the Treaty should deal with existing stocks of fissile material as well as with ending future production; and what the arrangements for verifying such a treaty should be. On stocks, the UK agrees that these will need to be addressed as progress is made towards nuclear disarmament. However, we believe that trying to deal with them in FMCT negotiations would prevent the early achievement of a straightforward ban on future production, and that in the meantime stocks can be addressed more successfully in other ways. The UK favours focussing verification measures on those facilities that can produce fissile material (reprocessing and enrichment plants) and on any fissile material they produce after the cut-off date.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)

  The ABMT is a bilateral treaty that was signed in 1972 between the US and the Soviet Union. It restricted each party to only two ABM deployment areas (and in 1974 a Protocol restricted each side to only one such area). Its underlying purpose was to ensure the mutual vulnerability of each side to the other's strategic nuclear missiles, and thus to make it easier for agreements limiting such nuclear missiles to be reached. The first such agreement was also signed in 1972 and the ABMT has continued to underpin subsequent US/Soviet and US/Russian agreements to limit, and to reduce, their strategic nuclear forces.

  In September 1997, the US, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed a Memorandum of Understanding which, once it enters into force, will make all five states parties to the ABMT (Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus each inherited Soviet ABM facilities on their territory). These five states also concluded two Agreed Statements to clarify the demarcation between systems to counter strategic ballistic missiles (covered by the ABMT) and systems to counter theatre ballistic missiles (not covered by the ABMT). They also concluded a related Confidence Building Measures Agreement.

  The United States is now seeking to engage Russia in discussion of a possible protocol to the treaty to permit the deployment of a "National Missile Defence" system, designed to defend US territory against limited ballistic missile attacks from "rogue" states. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in Cologne in June 1999 that US/Russian discussions on the ABMT and on a possible START III treaty should be set in train. These discussions are now in progress. We strongly hope that they can be brought to a successful conclusion. Although not ourselves a party to the Treaty, we have made clear many times the importance we continue to attach to it.

B.  THE EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
  (See Annex A for membership as of January 2000 of Export Control Regimes).

Nuclear Suppliers Group

  The Nuclear Suppliers Group was created in 1974 in response to the first nuclear explosion by India. In 2000 the NSG consists of 35 nuclear supplier countries which seek through export controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The controls and the list of goods under control are contained in the NSG Guidelines Parts 1 and 2. Part 1 goods are items that have an exclusive nuclear use. Part 2 goods are dual-use items, that is goods that could be used for nuclear uses but which also have legitimate industrial applications. The Group meets several times a year including an Annual Plenary meeting. The Chair rotates; France succeeds Italy in mid-2000. The UK chaired in 1998-99.

  The effectiveness of the NSG depends on members applying the various export control regulations contained in the Guidelines. A key provision is that full scope IAEA safeguards are a condition of supply to non-nuclear weapon states. The NSG is a consensus organisation but not legally binding. We believe that members comply with their NSG obligations.

  The NSG has a well established Denial Notice system the cornerstones of which are the no-undercut and commercial confidentiality principles, ie that information exchanged about denials will not be used for commercial purposes against firms in the country supplying the information. Information on Denials is regularly exchanged between members.

  Challenges to the NSG in the 1990s have included the development of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme by Iraq and India and Pakistan nuclear tests in 1998. The NSG is responding to the changing circumstances whilst continuing its collective efforts against proliferators. Recent initiatives have included:

—  two major transparency seminars held in Vienna in 1997 and New York in 1999, in which non-members, NGOs and other interested parties were invited to a series of talks on the work of the NSG. The purpose was to counter criticism that the NSG is a cartel that hinders legitimate trade;

—  a major restructuring of the Part 2 Guidelines to make them compatible with the EC Dual Use Regulations;

—  a willingness to consider applications from countries wishing to join the Group who can fulfil the necessary membership criteria. Turkey, Belarus and Slovenia are all on the threshold of membership;

—  the setting up of a working group (Chaired by the UK) to review the institutional working arrangements of the NSG.

Zangger Committee

  The Zangger Committee is an informal group of 34 nuclear supplier countries who are states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was formed in 1971 with the purpose of agreeing on the detailed implementation of Article III.2 of the NPT. As a result, the Committee publishes and keeps updated a "Trigger List" of items that require certain safeguards and assurances as a condition of supply.

  To a large extent the work of the group is dependent on technological progress in the nuclear industry. The "Trigger List" is now well established and only needs adjusting as new technologies come in the fore or old technology becomes obsolete. Unlike the NSG, it does not maintain a dual-use list. The Austrian Chairman of the Committee works to maintain the impetus of the group (the UK acts as Secretary). Meetings are held twice yearly in Vienna. Technical issues that warrant further study are usually handled within a technology holders working group.

  The Committee continues to be an effective instrument in non-proliferation. This is due to the importance members attach to its relationship to the NPT. China joined the Zangger Committee in 1998, the first of the international export control groups to which it has adhered.

Australia Group

  In April 1984, as a result of the findings of a UN investigatory mission that chemical weapons had been used in the Iran/Iraq war, some governments placed licensing controls on the export of various chemicals which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

  The measures imposed by the governments concerned, however, were not uniform either in scope or application. This led in 1985 to the formation of the Australia Group (AG) to harmonise the measures taken individually by governments and enhance co-operation. In 1990, the AG agreed to take steps to address the problem of the spread of biological weapons.

  The AG is an informal arrangement in which 30 countries and the EU Commission participate. It is chaired by Australia and meets in Paris. Participants do not undertake any legally binding obligations: the effectiveness of the co-operation between participants depends on their national measures and their commitment to non-proliferation goals.

  All members are States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Annual meetings explore the scope for making more effective the measures already taken by individual countries, including through exchange of information, harmonisation, and consideration of the introduction of additional national measures where necessary.

  Each AG country has introduced licensing measures on the export of certain dual-use chemicals, biological agents, and chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment with a view to ensuring that exports of these items do not contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

  Denials of exports are notified to other AG participants through the AG chair. The UK consults the lists of other countries' denial notices when considering export licence applications. A "no-undercut" policy is operated ie if a country receives an export licence application for an AG-controlled item to the same end-user which has previously been denied by another member, the export cannot go ahead without consultations between the two countries. There is no obligation not to undercut but members recognise that to do so would undermine the effectiveness of the AG.

  The AG has come under increasing criticism by some NAM countries (Iran, China, India, Pakistan) who view its existence as contrary to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. These countries argue that exports should not be denied to States Parties to the Conventions. The UK believes that neither the conventions nor the AG would be wholly effective on their own but that a joint approach to stopping proliferation is the most effective. AG members are actively engaged in outreach activities to non-member countries to keep them updated on the workings of the group and to reassure them that the AG denies exports in practice in few cases and only when there are good grounds to suspect that the goods are to be used in a WMD programme. They also support the O'Sullivan statement of 1992 which accepts that the workings of the Australia Group will have to be reviewed once there is a fully operational Chemical Weapons Convention and an effectively verified Biological Weapons Convention.

Missile Technology Control Regime

  Founded in 1987 the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal non-treaty suppliers regime. It currently has 32 members and the chair for 2000 is the Netherlands. The UK chaired in 1996-97.

  The members seek to prevent the proliferation of missile systems, their components and related technology by agreeing guidelines and a list of sensitive items which are implemented through national export controls. It is the only multilateral forum dealing with missile proliferation. It is not a universal forum, nor is it universally accepted, nor does its mandate extend beyond export controls.

  MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment and Technology Annex form the basis for controlling transfers of all delivery systems, other than manned aircraft, capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. This is achieved by controlling the transfer of complete missile systems or unmanned air vehicles capable of carrying any payload over a range of at least 300km, and by controlling transfers of components and related technology that could contribute to such missile systems or to the ability to develop and produce such systems. Many items with legitimate non-missile related uses, which are known as dual use items, fall into these categories. Restraint is exercised in the consideration of transfers of such items, which are evaluated on case by case basis.

  A system of denial notifications exists for export licences that are refused. This notification contains information about the goods, destination and end-user and is relayed to all partners of the MTCR. Partners have agreed not to undercut, ie approve an export which is essentially identical to one already denied, and notified, by another partner without first consulting the issuing partner.

  The main effect of the MTCR has been to prevent or constrain ballistic missile programmes heavily dependent on imported Western technology. Its success to date stems from the common purpose and shared objectives of its partners. However, indigenous missile progammes are of increasing concern. Such programmes are active in, inter alia, India, Pakistan, Iran and DPRK. Wider international measures to prevent missile proliferation may need to be considered and these are being discussed in MTCR and other non-proliferation fora.

C.  CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons; requires the destruction of all existing chemical weapons and establishes an extensive system of declarations and inspections to verify this. It entered into force on 29 April 1997, and is the first multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreement which aims to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction in a verifiable manner.

  To date, there are 129 States Parties to the Convention, including all EU Member States (see Annex B for list as of January 2000). Other States which have ratified the Convention include the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Iran and—important in the Middle East context—Jordan. The UK aims to achieve a Treaty with universal adherence, implemented on a world-wide scale in an effective manner. In order to reach this goal, as many countries as possible must ratify (or accede to) the Treaty. Adherence by States with significant national chemical industries or in regions of tension is of particular importance.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

  Implementation of the CWC is overseen by the OPCW, located in the Hague. The OPCW has made an active start to implementing a rigorous verification and inspection regime under its Brazilian Director-General (Ambassador Bustani). All States parties to the Convention are required to submit declarations of past chemical weapons activities and regular declarations about the production, processing and consumption of certain dual-use chemicals which have possible chemical weapons applications. These declarations are verified by means of routine inspections of which over 600 have already taken place world-wide. The Convention also makes provision for clarifying concerns about compliance with the Convention including both bilaterally and through the OPCW. If necessary a State Party can request the Organisation to conduct an on-site Challenge Inspection when there are strong grounds for suspecting non-compliance. To date no challenge inspections have been proposed or carried out.

UK National Authority

  The National Authority for the UK is the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which is responsible for provision of the UK share of the funding of the OPCW. The DTI also provides the national representative on the Executive Council of the OPCW and oversees all OPCW inspections in the UK. There have so far been over 30 Inspections in the UK at both defence and industrial sites. All have passed off successfully. The UK has a permanent seat on the Council of the OPCW by virtue of the size of its chemical industry.

United States

  The United States has so far provided only a military declaration covering its CW stockpile and former CW production facilities. Destruction operations, under OPCW supervision, are well ahead of the timescale required by the CWC. Legislation facilitating the provision of US industrial declarations was however only adopted in late 1998. As a result, these declarations have been delayed and are now expected in April 2000. Industrial inspections in the US will therefore begin in the latter half of 2000. Aspects of US legislation have also given rise to concern, eg the possible Presidential veto on challenge inspections, and the restrictions on the removal from the US of samples for analysis (Condition 18). In both areas, the UK has sought to pursue pragmatic solutions which meet the essential requirements of the CWC with the US directly and in discussion with EU partners.

Russia

  Russia ratified the CWC on 5 November 1997, despite concerns over the costs (estimated at more than $6 billion) and environmental effects of destroying her large chemical weapons stocks. Russia has declared 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, of which some 30,000 tonnes is in munitions form, stored at seven sites on its territory. Russia is now obliged to destroy all stocks within 10 years, with the possibility of a five year extension. Progress has however been slow and in late 1999 Russia had to request an extension to the first deadline—destruction of 1 per cent of weapon stocks by April 2000. The UK, together with a number of States Parties, expressed concern at the setback for CWC implementation but indicated a willingness to consider the request constructively, given appropriate transparency of the Russian destruction programme.

CW Destruction assistance

  The CWC makes clear that the "possessor pays" for chemical weapons destruction. On entry into force in 1997, and without prejudice to that principle, the EU pledged up to 15 million Euros (£8.84 million) to be spent in Russia over three years on CW destruction-related projects. This has recently been supplemented by a decision to spend 6 million Euros (£3.79 million) at one CW destruction plant. The UK has been examining what additional bilateral assistance might be made available. (The US, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Italy and Sweden have offered assistance in areas related to CW destruction).

BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Biological Weapons (BW) have been banned since 1975 when the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force. A list of parties is shown at Annex C. However the Treaty has no effective provisions to verify compliance. The revelations by the UN Special Commission about Iraq's BW programme and former President Yeltsin's admission in 1992 that the Soviet Union has illegally conducted a BW programme, have underlined the pressing need for the Convention to be reinforced with measures to strengthen confidence in compliance and deter potential proliferators.

The BTWC Ad Hoc Group/UK Role

  Since 1995 an Ad Hoc Group of States Parties has been meeting in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Toth of Hungary, to consider measures to strengthen the Convention. The Group has made good progress and is now negotiating on the basis of a draft text of a Protocol to the Convention. The last two years have seen a significant increase in the tempo of the work. This intensification has been sustained in 2000, where a possible 14 weeks of negotiation are available.

  The mandate given to the Ad Hoc Group requires that the work on a Protocol be completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review Conference, scheduled for the latter half of next year. The United Kingdom is responsible for chairing meetings in the key area of compliance measures—the core of the proposed Protocol—and has played a leading role in the negotiations in our capacity as a Depositary Government for the BTWC. The UK is committed to seeing the early and successful completion of a Protocol and has offered London as the venue for the eventual signing ceremony.

BTWC Protocol

  The draft Protocol includes all the key elements which the UK considers essential to make it effective. On a number of important issues, there remain substantial differences between the negotiating parties which have yet to be resolved.

  The Protocol envisages a package of complementary measures. These include a mandatory requirement to declare sites and activities which could be misused for producing biological weapons; provisions for on-site visits; and, in the case of serious doubts, investigations (ie inspections) of suspect facilities and incidents. A small international organisation would be created to implement these measures.

Declarations

  The mandatory requirement for national declarations would identify facilities which could most easily be used for activities prohibited by the Convention, ie where expertise, equipment and materials exist, and activities conducted which could be misused by a State to develop and make biological weapons. Each relevant facility would complete a detailed questionnaire.

Visits

  There are two basic justifications for the provision of on-site visits as an integral part of the Protocol. First, to provide greater insight into and transparency of activities at declared facilities; greater openness over time will help reduce grounds for suspicion that relevant facilities might be misused. Second, to help ensure accuracy; eg a visit to clear up ambiguity in a declaration or find out whether an undeclared facility should in fact have been declared.

Investigations

  Short notice investigations will help to deter violations and deal with any alleged breaches of the Convention. These provisions need to include the right to go anywhere at anytime to see whether illegal activities are, or have been, taking place. Investigations would be carried out at facilities, test ranges, sites of alleged BW use and where there are unusual outbreaks of disease thought to be connected to illegal BW activities. Investigators would have extensive powers to interview, observe, check documents, and take and analyse samples.

Role of new International Organisation

  A small international body would have the task of implementing the Protocol. Its personnel would examine declarations; follow-up any problems; visit declared facilities and check as necessary whether other facilities which appear to meet the criteria for declaration should in fact have been declared. The organisation would also be responsible for conducting any investigations into alleged violations.

Other Issues

  It is widely recognised that the Protocol will also cover technical assistance and co-operation. The UK believes that the provisions in this area should be limited and not cut across aid activities which are conducted more effectively by other international organisations. Measures should focus rather on diagnosis, surveillance and prevention of infectious diseases. Some limited measures on transfer between states of BW agents or equipment could be included. They must not, however, interfere with national export control policies.

Non-Proliferation gains

  The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has at present no effective verification procedures. The proposed Protocol will have legally binding measures to increase openness in key biological activities, help deter proliferation and offer tools for dealing with any alleged violations of the Convention. In a wider context, the Protocol will fill the last major gap in arms control provisions covering weapons of non-proliferation regime.

D.  VERIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CONVENTIONS

NPT: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Safeguards

  The IAEA implements the safeguards required by the NPT—essentially under Article III.1 and Article III.2. DTI has lead responsibility in the UK for the IAEA and pays the UK's annual subscription. The UK has a permanent seat on the IAEA Board by virtue of the size of its nuclear industry.

  The extent to which IAEA safeguards are applied in any particular State now depends on its status in relation to the NPT:

—  NNWS parties to the NPT are each obliged by the Treaty to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material;

—  NWS parties to the NPT are not obliged by the treaty to accept IAEA safeguards on any of their nuclear material, but all of them have now voluntarily agreed to make some of their nuclear material liable to IAEA safeguards;

—  non-parties to the NPT are of course under no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material under the Treaty. All of them have nevertheless accepted IAEA safeguards on some of their material or facilities.

Strengthened Safeguards

  After the 1990-91 Gulf War it became apparent that the standard safeguards agreements with NNWS (known as INFCIRC 153) were inadequate. The IAEA had not detected Iraq's massive clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The fundamental reason for this was that the system had developed in such a way that the IAEA's focus was more on checking the correctness of the information declared to it by an NNWS than on checking that such information was comprehensive.

  In 1993 the IAEA therefore launched a two-year study into ways of strengthening INFCIRC 153 safeguards in order to remedy this deficiency. This "93+2" programme led to various additional measures being proposed. These were subsequently divided into "Part 1" measures, which could be implemented under the authority of the existing INFCIRC 153 agreements, and "Part 2" measures, which could only be implemented if an Additional Protocol was concluded between the IAEA and each NNWS. In June 1995 the IAEA's Board of Governors approved the "Part 1" measures, and they are now being implemented. In May 1997 the Board approved the model of an Additional Protocol (known as INFCIRC 540), and the negotiation, entry into force, and implementation of such agreements between individual NNWS and the IAEA is now in progress.

  In order to allay NNWS concerns about discriminatory treatment, the NWS agreed to negotiate their own Additional Protocols with a view to applying those 540 measures which they identify as contributing to the Protocol's objectives. The UK signed its Additional Protocol in September 1998. A bill to enable us to fulfil our obligations under the Additional Protocol is currently before Parliament.

Neptunium and Americium

  As a result of a separate initiative, in September 1999 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a set of measures designed to provide the international community with assurance that in the NNWS amounts of neptunium or americium in separated form do not raise proliferation concerns (neptunium and americium are fissionable materials produced during the operation of a nuclear reactor). If these materials had been left outside international oversight, there could have been a small risk of a State attempting to misuse them in seeking to acquire a nuclear explosive capability. The relatively small amounts of neptunium and americium in separated form in the UK are carefully monitored and protected, and reports on exports of the materials from the UK to NNWS are provided to the IAEA.

  Despite the experience with Iraq, the UK believes the IAEA has done and will continue to do an effective job concluding and implementing safeguards agreements in accordance with the requirements of the relevant articles of the NPT. The Additional Protocol will enhance the IAEA's ability to detect and deter clandestine activities in the NNWS. More information will have to be provided to the Agency and it will have wider inspection powers.

CTBT Verification System

  To verify compliance with the CTBT an International Monitoring System (IMS) is being established. The IMS will comprise 321 monitoring stations located in 90 countries and includes seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide sensor networks. The data from these networks are transmitted to an International Data Centre (IDC) located in Vienna. This will produce analysis of detected disturbances to allow States Parties to verify compliance with the Treaty.

  The IMS is designed to provide data to enable States Parties to detect, locate and identify nuclear explosions of at least 1 kt. The level of 1 kt is not a threshold but a level set to achieve the aims of the CTBT in a cost-effective way. We believe the IMS network ensures with a high degree of confidence detection, location and identification of explosions of at least 1 kt. It is assumed that the uncertainty of avoiding detection at a significantly lower yields will assure compliance well below the level of 1 kt. On-site inspections will also assist in verification of the nature of the source.

Verification of Chemical Weapons Convention: covered under the OPCW in Section C

Enforcement Procedures

  As regards enforcement, the IAEA's safeguards agreements with NPT Parties, the CWC, and the CTBT all contain provisions enabling the IAEA, the OPCW, and the CTBTO respectively to take certain measures if a State Party fails to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance. In addition, in certain circumstances, they require or enable these organisations to bring an issue of non-compliance to the attention of the United Nations Security Council. The BTWC, which, as yet, has no verification organisation, nevertheless provides each State Party with a right to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council if it finds any other State Party to be acting in breach of its obligations. In addition, any State Party seeking to exercise its right of withdrawal from the NPT, BTWC, CWC, or CTBT must give advance notice of such withdrawal to the United Nations Security Council.

  Once a matter had been referred to it, it would then be for the United Nations Security Council to decide on the appropriate course of action, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. On 31 January 1992 the President of the United Nations Security Council Summit (the British Prime Minister) made a Presidential Statement on behalf of the Summit which noted that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security". The United Nations Security Council subsequently took an active interest when North Korea gave advance notice in March 1993 of its withdrawal from the NPT and when the IAEA's Board of Governors reported on North Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

E.  UK EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE NON-SIGNATORY STATES TO SIGN TREATIES AND IMPROVE MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE

  In the case of the NPT, there are only four non-signatories. We discuss non-proliferation issues with India, Pakistan and Israel. We continue to urge them to join the international mainstream on nuclear non-proliferation by signing the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. This would be the only way to preserve the integrity of the NPT. We also urge India, Pakistan and Israel to sign and ratify the CTBT and join negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

  The UK has been a strong supporter of UNSCOM and IAEA efforts in Iraq to ensure Iraqi compliance with the disarmament and monitoring provisions of UNSCR 687. In December 1999, the Security Council adopted the UK-drafted resolution 1284 which makes clear that Iraq must give up its aspirations to have weapons of mass destruction and creates UNMOVIC, a new body of weapons inspectors.

  The UK has been an enthusiastic supporter of the IAEA Additional Protocol and hopes along with other EU Member States to bring its Additional Protocol into force before the NPT Review Conference.

  The UK acted as facilitator at the Article XIV Review Conference of the CTBT in October 1999 which had the objective of promoting acceleration of the ratification process to the CTBT and its early entry into force. In October 1999 the Prime Minister joined with the President of France and Chancellor of Germany in appealing to the US Senate to ratify the Treaty. The UK has also supported EU demarches to non-signatory states to promote accession. The UK and France were the first two nuclear weapon states to ratify.

  On the CWC, the UK regularly urges non-signatory countries to join the Convention and has been active in stimulating debate on compliance questions. The UK has staged mock challenge inspections in the UK to which it has invited overseas observers. It is also promoting (jointly with the OPCW) the first seminar on challenge inspections in February 2000. Challenge inspections are an important provision of the CWC and will be of a future Verification Protocol of the BTWC.