TUESDAY 11 APRIL 2000

COLONEL TERRY TAYLOR AND DR TREVOR FINDLAY

  127. Colonel Terry Taylor, you are the assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dr Trevor Findlay, you are the executive director of the Verification Research, Training and information Centre. I believe you both attended the first session?

  (Colonel Taylor) I did not.

  128. I pose to you the same question as I posed in similar circumstances last week. Is there anything from your experience that you would like to add or take issue with, which you have heard in the previous session?
  (Colonel Taylor) There are a number of issues which I would like to raise with which I disagree. My major concern from what I have heard so far is, in your deliberations and analysing what the British government's policy should be, there is a danger of looking purely through the lenses of the Treaties themselves, which have clear limitations, some of which have been illustrated by the last witnesses. In particular, the weakness of the verification systems. Any global verification system will have severe limitations. The Chemical Weapons Convention probably represents the most intrusive verification system that could be agreed that will operate on a global scale and even that has serious limitations. The Biological Weapons Convention draft protocol which is being negotiated with great difficulty—and there are very good reasons why it is difficult—is a much more difficult technological area to examine. In effect, it is much easier to evade any kind of verification system that could be agreed globally. For those few countries, I would stress—we are only talking about a very small number of countries that might be minded to cheat under the Convention, either perhaps by not being members or even by being members—when one is looking at the Biological Weapons Convention, one is looking at something rather different and a much more difficult verification challenge. These Treaties deal with the supply side of the weapons systems. Her Majesty's Government's policy needs to be equally or even more focused on the demand side. The demand for weapons of mass destruction is a direct result of events in the Middle East, the failure to make progress in the peace process, events in South Asia, events on the Korean peninsula. It is an investment in trying to make progress in resolving these issues which is the key to preventing proliferation. Looking at another issue that has not been mentioned at all, the situation in Russia for example, which is a proliferation source if you like, there needs to be much more investment by the United Kingdom and its European allies in dealing with the situation in Russia. The United States invests many millions of dollars more in dismantling nuclear weapons in Russia, which is a real, substantive, practical contribution to improving international security, which in this discussion so far has not played a part and that worries me. If I were to look at a part of United Kingdom government policy that needs attention, it is that. I know there are steps being taken. I know that the United Kingdom did help with providing secure containers for dismantling nuclear weapons in Russia. I know the United Kingdom, amongst European allies, has the strongest defence diplomacy policy in relation to Russia in helping with the restructuring and reform of Russian armed forces, which is very important as part of the equation one must calculate as a balance to looking at the Treaties. Of course we must improve them; of course we must reinforce them but we have to deal with the demand side and pay equal attention, if not more, to that.

  Chairman: That is a helpful corrective. We will be asking the two of you specifically on verification, not just on biological and chemical but also in the nuclear fields.

  129. On the nuclear field, could you tell us, Colonel, whether you think that the new SSS, Strengthened Safeguard Systems, which the IAEA are introducing will greatly enhance their ability to ensure detection of non-compliance with the NPT? Secondly, how far does this go down to strengthen the position, because if one really looks in Iraq, it was only with UNSCOM, after some considerable time, were able to go much deeper than anything that the Conventions would have allowed to be certain of our ability to provide nuclear weapons. Do you now consider that even those inspections have ensured that Iraq is clean?
  (Colonel Taylor) On your first question, Sir Peter, I think the improved IAEA safeguards system provides a modest improvement, not a greatly enhanced improvement. With any global safeguard system, there is the inherent difficulty that I have referred to that a determined country, absolutely determined to pursue a weapons programme come what may, will do so even under the improved system. I think on a global scale it is very important to have this improved system because it is an excellent method of accounting for fissile material and helping with looking for areas where there might have been some diversion. I am not down grading the importance of this step, but we must be very careful in thinking about whether this is a great enhancement or a modest enhancement. It needs to go along with these other measures I have referred to, dealing with the situation in Russia, dealing with the situation on the Korean peninsula. Efforts outside the frameworks of the Treaties are equally important and require as much investment. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq did indeed, through its much more intrusive capabilities which were specially mandated for this purpose, discover pretty well the full extent of the Iraqi programme. There are still questions relating to the supplier network which I believe are still open and require attention. The Iraqi programme has been largely dismantled. The problem that remains in Iraq is that the scientists, technologists and engineers are still there, with the same regime in power, so it could be restarted. I was a member of the Commission myself as a commissioner and also as an inspector. We did not know at the time when I was with them that we had covered everything and I know we did not cover everything, but I think those programmes have been stopped for the time being.

  130. The scientists and engineers still there presumably are not sitting on their behinds doing nothing?
  (Colonel Taylor) I suspect they are certainly doing something and surveying the literature that is available, learning a great deal from the inspections carried out by the UN Special Commission about how they may hide things in the future, what routes they may follow and so on. There remains a big problem and the problem will remain as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.
  (Dr Findlay) In response to the two questions previously asked, my view is somewhat different to Colonel Taylor's in that I think the Strengthened Safeguard System is a significant improvement on what went before. Whether that is sufficient is a different question but I certainly think the new system is a significant advance, both from the point of view of what the agency itself can do in Vienna—it has much more freedom to collect the sort of information it would need to detect a non-compliance situation—but also from the point of view of the states' parties themselves, the information they have to provide and the availability of information they have to give to the agency and the openness to particular types of inspections that they now have to give. The difficulty is that states are not obliged to sign on to these new arrangements and there has been a great delay in the number of states wishing to do this. That is a real problem, so in a sense it is voluntary. The IAEA can only do so much without the cooperation of the states' parties. In the case of Iraq, I pretty much agree with what Colonel Taylor has said. Clearly, Iraq is at the extreme end of the cases we have been looking at and verification systems do find it difficult to cope with extreme cases. The point needs to be made here that verification systems by and large are geared towards catching most cases. They are there to provide confidence to states that other states' parties are cooperating. There is a mutuality about this, a mutual reinforcing confidence. They are also there to deter would be violaters. Violaters may be determined, but they may not be sure whether they will be caught or not and we would hope they would weigh up the balance between being caught and being able to achieve the proliferation of the types of weapons systems that they are actually aiming at. The system, while it would not aim at 100 per cent verification, would certainly aim at establishing a deterrent situation where states would very carefully have to weigh what their actions were going to be.

  131. Could I turn to an entirely different question but one of considerable worry? Do either of you gentlemen consider that there is anything that ought to be done or could be done further to stop or to limit or to have knowledge of the transfer of nuclear weapons or parts of nuclear weapon technology, China into Pakistan, perhaps the transfer of weapons from Russia for money because of the financial position to certain areas of the world which is rumoured, I do not know with what substance, but those are obvious worries that we must have. What the devil can we do about it?
  (Colonel Taylor) The IAEA safeguard system essentially deals with fissile material. The improved system will help but [they] are not looking at all the weapons technology that surrounds all of that because we do not have an inspection system globally that looks at that. One must also look at missile technology and transfers of the delivery systems through the non-proliferation regime, such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, which is one area when one looks at transfers of technology; the Missile Technology Control Regime is another area which needs a great deal of work, but one has to deal at source with these issues. Until there is progress in the Middle East peace process, a demand will remain for other countries in the Middle East to have some kind of weapons of mass destruction capability. Israel will retain its capabilities. As long as that remains a problem, there needs to be a great deal of effort and resources devoted to that, to try to deal with that question. The United Kingdom, along with the European Union, could do a great deal more than they are doing at the moment. The other issue is a great deal more could be done by the United Kingdom, who is the leader amongst the Europeans in dealing with the situation in Russia, in helping to deal through two mechanisms. One is the International Science and Technology Centres which exist, which the EU, Japan and the United States are the major contributors to, where weapons scientists are employed on projects which are peaceful. That makes a major contribution but it needs a lot more money; and through the Defence Diplomacy Initiative which the United Kingdom promotes in Russia, dealing with the Russian armed forces, ensuring that they are stable and that they can restructure to deal with the new environment. That effort can be even more reinforced and the United Kingdom, as the leader in Europe on this, could still do more.

  132. Can I pick you up on what you said about the EU and the United Kingdom doing more? What more could they do?
  (Colonel Taylor) One has to recognise the United States, with its military power, guaranteeing any agreements that might be made in the Middle East, for example the negotiations going on between Israel and Syria at the moment and Israel and the Palestinians. When the time comes and when we get nearer to steps towards a resolution, the European Union countries and the United Kingdom in particular must be ready and have the capabilities in order to contribute to a peace settlement in the same way as they are in the Balkans at the moment, having the capability to deploy forces. If it comes to a situation in the Middle East where the Golan Heights have to be guaranteed by a third force or something like that, the European Union should be ready to make a contribution. The modest military forces they have at the moment will make that rather difficult but it may be that, through financial contributions, the European Union and the United Kingdom in particular could contribute to that effort.

  133. Do you think that, as part of that settlement of the Middle East peace process, there should be a higher profile given to control of weapons of mass destruction? There are numerous press reports that, far from reducing the number of weapons in the area, the peace agreement will result in an increase in weapons supplies by America to Israel and even by America to Syria; that somehow, by arming and upgrading the capabilities of each of those two states, that will aid them to feel more secure and will somehow help a settlement. Do you think that is a helpful discussion or not?
  (Colonel Taylor) I do not follow that analysis. I would disagree with it completely as far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned. Any progress towards a settlement would reduce the demand and push weapons of mass destruction to the background through enhancing security. The measures you have been talking about might be to do with their conventional capabilities, particularly the areas of surveillance and target acquisition, those sort of areas where Israel has an advantage. There may be some need for some balance, but overall I do not think it would increase the demand for weapons of mass destruction.

  134. I wanted to pursue the points that Sir Peter raised on the NPT, if I may. Dr Findlay, you said that, quite rightly, few people have signed the additional protocols. My latest information is that eight have thus far ratified, which includes the Holy Sea and Monaco. I do not know what we make of that but if only eight out of 193 have actually ratified why is that?
  (Dr Findlay) Partly because the agreements themselves are technical. It is not something that foreign ministries focus on very much. It is also partly because many states' parties do not even have the basic safeguards agreement in place already, to which the additional protocol is an add on. There has been a great lack of political pressure over the years to make the states' parties fulfil their legal obligations to have a full scope safeguards agreement in the first place. The additional protocol is even one step further on than that. We have to really begin with the full scope safeguards agreements. Many countries are in breach of their obligations. It seems to me the pressure should start there and then on states to have this additional protocol as well.
  (Colonel Taylor) I agree with Dr Findlay. All treaties are a prisoner of their time. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguard regime, one must not forget, were put in place in the late sixties and early seventies. As a result of that, the only way they could get any kind of inspection system was having a system of entirely separate, individual, bilateral agreements between individual countries and the inspection organisation. When it came to the Chemical Weapons Convention which was open for signature in 1993, there was a single agreement. In other words, if a country ratifies the treaty, then they are committing themselves to all the inspection provisions. That is a major advance. There has been some improvement but it took 10 to 15 years because there was a critical mass of countries which signed up to the original safeguards agreement. I think it will be 10 or 15 years before we see a large number of countries, maybe passing the 100 mark, who will sign up to the modestly improved system that we have already. To me, this is a strong message in here that these systems bear very heavily on those states that have major industries. In other words, most of the money involved in the inspections is on the United States, on western European countries, on countries with advanced industries and those countries which we are probably most concerned about take the least amount of resources devoted to them, because in this global treaty system it is equal misery. That is why these focused programmes outside the Treaties also need to be pursued like the ones in Russia, like the framework agreement, for example, that is being pursued by the United States. Also, the EU is involved in that and Japan and South Korea. They merit a great deal of investment because they go right to the source of the problem and you get return for your pounds that you invest in that, which you do not get out of a modestly improved NPT safeguards regime.

  135. Still focusing on the additional protocols, the British government is currently in the process of ratifying something which, Colonel Taylor, you described as a modest improvement. Dr Findlay, you improved on that by saying the level of improvement was significant, but both of you indicated that there was much more that could have been achieved or should be achieved over and above what is being attempted by the additional protocols. What more do you have in mind? How could we improve those protocols?
  (Dr Findlay) One way in which the situation could have been improved was to open up the whole question of special inspections. The agency has had the right from the very outset to have special inspections. That is, where it was suspicious about a particular country's activities. The new system simply reiterates that right of the agency. It did not go into great detail about specific circumstances, what the modalities would be, of special inspections. In the case of the CWC, we have the equivalent of special inspections but that has not been duplicated in the nuclear field. The argument often goes that special inspections will be difficult to carry out anyway because it will be extremely politically sensitive to challenge a state and say, "We suspect you of non-compliance and therefore we want a special inspection." The argument goes that you would very rarely need to use this, as long as that threat is there. You do not have to do anything further. My argument would be that it is much better to pin down the circumstances, the modalities, the procedures which would strengthen the deterrent effect of having these special inspections. At the moment, it is all very vague. It is just there. They can be used. No one quite knows how one would go about it.
  (Colonel Taylor) I do not think these regimes can be improved at all in a sense which would enable them to deal in any way with a determined cheat. These modest improvements do not do a great deal. I cannot think of a way in which this protocol could be redesigned to enable inspectors on the ground to get any further than they could do now against a determined country that is going to cheat. I say that as someone who has been an inspector on the ground in Iraq and also in Russia on biological weapons. One has to recognise the limits. I am not saying we should not have these regimes; of course we should, but we need to recognise their limits and be careful about investing too much in trying to make "improvements" which will not deal with a very determined state like Iraq. All those countries that are going to comply of course will make all the right reports and maybe sometimes trip over technicalities and so on. All the major industrial countries will somehow comply in the end with all these things and it is a very good confidence building measure for that reason. It helps those states keep control of materials within their own countries. It is an important contribution to non-proliferation but tinkering with the inspection regimes any more—the Chemical Weapons Convention represents the absolute limits of what can be achieved and the Biological Weapons Convention protocol will be more limited in its effect now.

  136. I feel pessimistic about the protocols as well. The third question on this same subject is that, whilst we can lay down protocols, I do not read very much about what enforcement should follow from those who do not abide by them or those who break what they have signed up to. Can you make any suggestions on sanctions on enforcement that might help us give some teeth to some of these well meaning agreements?
  (Dr Findlay) My view is one of the great lacuna in arms control agreements. They never quite set out the consequences of non-compliance. I would advocate that in future and even in retrospect these Treaties are given compliance steps which are clear to all the states' parties who sign up. They should have more than a vague idea of what would happen in cases of non-compliance. We have these sorts of arrangements in other agreements like environmental agreements, for instance. The consequences of non-compliance are much clearer. Ultimately, these can only be done on the basis that the Security Council is the ultimate arbiter of these cases and Security Council reform is also a necessary component of this. If you are going to build in compliance systems that do have credibility, the Security Council end of it has to also be fixed and Security Council reform, as you know, is a very vexed question.

  137. It is a much wider agenda.
  (Dr Findlay) Certainly, but it has to be linked to that wider agenda in the sense that the states' parties themselves will have limited ability to cope with, as Terry calls them, the determined non-compliers. Ultimate resort would have to be made to the Security Council.
  (Colonel Taylor) I disagree with the first part of Dr Findlay's remarks because I do not think states like Iraq and Iran and so on make calculations about the procedures within the Treaties. As someone who was directly involved in the Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations as a member of the United Kingdom delegation, we studiously and I think correctly avoided specific outcomes, specific procedures, that dealt with countries that were found to be not in compliance, because we wanted to leave that open. It may be possibly that a state or group of states may need to resort to the use of military force. They did not want to be wrapped up in a procedure which would delay dealing with perhaps what might be a very urgent military situation and a very urgent threat. It was deliberately left open in order to provide a very fast route to the Security Council which it was felt could deal with it. I do not think it is a good thing to lay out what might happen in certain circumstances. You build in steps because the situation may be more urgent. One is dealing with weapons that can kill potentially hundreds of thousands of people. You cannot have delays built into the processes. These Treaties are finger pointing mechanisms to mobilise support, to do something against a particular country. We have that classic case, for example, in Iraq for that particular reason.
  (Dr Findlay) The compliance systems should be set so that the response of the international community matches the type of violation envisaged. Obviously, if it is a major outbreak from the Treaty, the Executive Council of the organisation should be able to go straight to the Security Council and that is permitted now. You are talking about what type of violation. Penalties can be built in, as in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention. States lose their trading privileges if they do not comply with certain aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the ability to trade freely in chemicals. That is the sort of incentive I have in mind. You would be more conscious of building in incentives towards compliance. In the case of the very hard cases that Terry is talking about, certainly the Executive Council could take it direct to the Security Council and urgent action would have to be taken, but it would match the circumstances.

  138. Would the addition of sanctions to the body of those Treaties deter potential signatories?
  (Dr Findlay) I think it would set out the sort of sanctions that one might have in mind. Economic is obviously something that could be within the purview of the Treaty parties themselves. Military force would obviously have to go to the Security Council. One thing that the UN and the international system have been very bad at is targeting sanctions. We have seen that in the case of Iraq. They are a very blunt instrument right now and the UN Secretary General and some Security Council members are very conscious that they need to be targeted at the perpetrators of the violation. That is, the leadership, the surrounding leaderships. I think a great deal more work needs to be done on the targeting of direct sanctions that we have had in the past.

  139. The supplementary evidence given to us by the Foreign Office on Iraq includes this sentence: "He"—referring to Saddam Hussein—"is undoubtedly taking advantage of the absence of inspectors to rebuild his WMD programmes." Based on your knowledge and evidence, what WMD programmes is he rebuilding at present? How is he doing it and in what way are sanctions therefore failing to prevent him? Are all these indigenous programmes?
  (Colonel Taylor) I am sure it would be extraordinary if they were not attempting to rebuild their programmes. I suspect it is not being done in such a way that weapons immediately ready for use are being developed, although one cannot rule that out, but certainly they will be looking at their nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities in order to break out when conditions become better. One must not forget that Iraq has been overflown largely and if there was any attempt to reconstruct weapons of mass destruction facilities or possibly to even deploy missiles, for example, this, one hopes, would be seen and maybe dealt with by military means. It is unfortunate to have to resort to that but that is the situation we are in at the moment. Saddam Hussein and his regime certainly have the scientists and the capabilities to continue their work. Sanctions and the fact that there is not an open trading system and a great deal of economic activity do limit their capabilities. Sanctions were absolutely fundamental while inspections were going on. Otherwise we, as inspectors, would have had an impossible task in trying to find these hidden programmes against a very determined concealment plan. My answer to your question is yes, I believe work on all those three areas and possibly missile programmes as well is going on but not in a form that I think would lead to immediate deployment of weapons.