VERTIC is an independent non-governmental organization which conducts research into the verification and monitoring of international agreements. Its focus in this submission is, therefore, on the need to support and enhance the effective and efficient verification of international agreements that seek to control or abolish weapons of mass destruction.

1.  THE CURRENT STATE OF VERIFICATION

  1.1  Verification is essential to all regimes dealing with weapons of mass destruction. It helps detect non-compliance, deter potential violators and builds confidence by giving treaty parties opportunities to demonstrate their compliance. While the situation in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is currently bleak. Verification has some success stories to offer. Nuclear safeguards are being strengthened, the chemical weapons and nuclear test ban verification systems are being established and a verification regime is being negotiated for biological weapons.

  1.2  Recent advances have enabled verification to become more effective and efficient, while at the same time less burdensome to the inspected state. Such developments include a movement away from quantitative to qualitative nuclear safeguards; dramatic improvements in remote monitoring technologies; the development of "managed access" techniques for on-site inspections: and the incorporation of open source and national intelligence information into verification processes.

  1.3  Current problems in ensuring effective and efficient verification are generally not due to a lack of technical capabilities but to concerns (both legitimate and exaggerated) over national sovereignty, national security and confidentiality of commercial proprietary information; the cost and uneven burden of verification; and competing national and international priorities. It will require continued commitment from countries like the UK—even in the face of opposition in some cases from allies and partners—to maintain and strengthen verification regimes.

  1.4  of particular concern are the current policies of the United States, hitherto one of verification's strongest advocates and the single most important contributor to the science and technology of verification. Progress in a number of areas is being stymied by the apparent opposition to multilateral arms control, based in part on scepticism about verification, of much of the US Senate, combined with the reluctance of the current US Administration to provide leadership in promoting arms control and verification. Members of Parliament should consider engaging members of Congress and the US Administration in a continuing dialogue to expose them to non-American perspectives. China, India, Iran, Russia and Pakistan also often have policies inimical to effective and efficient verification, for different reasons, and also need to be engaged in dialogue.

2.  NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

2.1  The NPT Review Conference in April/May 2000 will have a decisive influence on the future of the treaty. The UK should support measures to strengthen the NPT and the organization which verifies compliance with the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

Nuclear Safeguards

  2.2  the IAEA's new Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS), developed following the discovery of clandestine nuclear weapon programmes in Iraq and North Korea, is a welcome development. Its implementation in member states has, however, been frustratingly slow, partly due to bureaucratic inertia and partly to opposition to more intrusive verification. The UK should support rapid implementation of the system in any way it can, including by expanding its safeguards support programme with the IAEA.

  2.3  As part of the SSS, states are required to negotiate an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements with the Agency. As of 17 January 2000, 45 states have done so, but only eight Additional Protocols have entered into force. The UK should encourage other countries to sign, ratify and implement their Additional Protocols as soon as possible.

  2.4  The UK has signed but not ratified its Additional Protocol. The Nuclear Safeguards Bill, which will incorporate the Protocol into domestic law and permit the UK to ratify, is currently before Parliament. Early UK ratification would put it in a strong position to encourage its European partners to conclude their ratification procedures. The Additional protocols for EU members, which are trilateral IAEA/EURATOM/state party agreements, will only enter into force when all have ratified. The legislative process should be given high priority to ensure that the UK is in a position to ratify its Protocol well before the NPT Review Conference in April 2000.

Nuclear Transparency

  2.5  As a strong supporter of non-proliferation and, not having the onerous obligations of full-scope safeguards imposed on non-nuclear weapon states, the UK could do more to promote nuclear transparency and confidence-building. To this end it should declare the number and type of nuclear weapons held in the UK arsenal. While the UK was the first nuclear weapon state to declare its holdings of fissile materials for military purposes, it remains the only NATO nuclear weapon state that has not disclosed warhead numbers. As well as being a confidence-building measure, this would encourage China and Russia to make similar declarations, all of which would be helpful in encouraging further steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Verification Research

  2.6  As required by the Strategic Defence Review, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is soon to issue a report on the UK's role in researching the verification of nuclear arms reductions. VERTIC strongly supports the initiation of such research should encompass verification of complete nuclear disarmament, the most difficult and contentious step that can be contemplated, and that AWE be required to co-operate closely with other organizations with relevant expertise, including non-governmental organizations, in its work.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

  2.7  Three years after being opened for signature, the entry into force of the CTBT seems as distant as ever. The establishment of the verification system by the Provisional Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna is nonetheless proceeding steadily but slowly. It will be a powerful tool for detecting nuclear tests whether the treaty enters into force or not. But there is a danger that progress may be obstructed by political and financial difficulties as entry into force is indefinitely delayed. In order to maintain the momentum, the UK should support the CTBTO in every possible way and increase its financial contribution if necessary, especially if the US Senate cuts US funding. The UK should, in the meantime, support the proposed 18 per cent increase in the 2001 CTBTO budget. In VERTIC's view this will be money well spent.

  2.8  The Clinton Administration recently appointed General John Shalikashvili to head a high-level Task Force on the CTBT to pave the way for reconsideration of US ratification. The UK should assist the Task Force in any possible way, including by making a submission if this is permitted. British government officials should also be made available to testify during future Congressional hearings on CTBT ratification.

  2.9  To further inform the debate on CTBT verification it would be useful for the UK to support an expert study, by a panel of internationally-renowned scientists to assess objectively the verifiability of the CTBT, both at present and once the CTBTO and its international monitoring system is fully established. VERTIC would be prepared to assist in such an endeavour.

3.  BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

  3.1  A verification protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), is currently being negotiated by an Ad Hoc Group of State Parties to the treaty, including the UK. It will increase transparency with regard to biological weapons-relevant activities and facilities, deter potential violators of the BWC and increase confidence in compliance. It will thus strengthen the BWC even if the dual-use nature of biotechnology makes it difficult to achieve the same level of verifiability of other regimes.

  3.2  The five year old negotiations have reached a crucial stage. The "rolling text" of a draft treaty has been prepared incorporating a wide range of alternative provisions.The time is ripe for an initiative by the Group Chairman or a participating state to produce a consolidated and (by necessity) compromise draft treaty. If delayed beyond the middle of this year, the negotiations may be seriously affected by the US elections.

  3.3  One issue that must be resolved is the right of the future BW verification organisation to conduct mandatory random visits to check the correctness and completeness of states' declarations about their BW-relevant capabilities. The UK and other Western states are strong proponents of such visits, while an unholy alliance of the US, Japan, India and China are opposed. The UK should continue to insist on such visits, since they would be a strong deterrent to the acquisition of biological weapons as well as building confidence that all states are complying with the Convention.

  3.4  It is important that the biotechnology industry world-wide, but particularly that in the US and Japan, accepts the need for a verification system which, while protecting sensitive commercial and security information, is effective in deterring biological weapons research and acquisition. The UK government should continue to work closely with UK industry in helping demonstrate to others the feasibility of effective BW verification.

4.  CHEMICAL WEAPONS

  4.1  Unlike the BTWC, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has a functioning international verification system in place in the Hague in the form of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). While great strides have been made in establishing the organization and beginning the process of verifying past possession of chemical weapons, ensuring the destruction of remaining stocks and production capacities, and preventing future production, the OPCW faces great challenges.

  4.2  Among the more troubling are:

—  the United States is currently in violation of the CWC by not submitting its required national declaration on its chemical weapon stocks, destruction programme and chemical weapon-capable facilities and materials

—  in its national implementation legislation the US has given the president the right to refuse challenge on-site inspections of US facilities on national security grounds and prohibited OPCW-collected chemical samples from leaving the US; both these provisions violate US obligations under the CWC

—  Russia is unable to destroy its chemical weapon stocks in time to meet the deadlines set under the CWC and will also be in breach of the treaty

—  the OPCW is having difficulty establishing its on-site inspection procedures because of the opposition of some states parties, including Israel.

  4.3  The UK should press the US Administration to rescind US legislation which impairs US compliance with the CWC and which sets such a poor example to other states. While the delay in US submission of its national declaration is the result of bureaucratic delay rather than politics, it also sets a bad example to other states parties. The US Administration needs to ensure that its declaration is completed as soon as possible.

  4.4  The UK should offer Russia as much assistance as it can in destroying its chemical weapons.

  4.5  At the OPCW the UK should seek to preserve the spirit and intent of the CWC in regard to "anytime anywhere" on-site inspections.

5.  THE UN MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (UNMOVIC)

  5.1  VERTIC commends the position taken by the UK that there be no dilution of verification standards for the new UNMOVIC, compared with those of its predecessor the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Should Iraq permit UNMOVIC to commence operations in Iraq; territory, the organization must be afforded, at the very least, the same capabilities and authority as UNSCOM.

  5.2  The UK should make certain that proper protocols are established concerning the use by UNMOVIC of national intelligence information and capabilities, so that the UNSCOM experience with US intelligence is avoided. The UK should also aim to ensure that a proper lessons-learned exercise is conducted in regard to UNSCOM and that these lessons are absorbed by the new body.

  1.  The United Kingdom should continue its leading role in promoting and supporting effective and efficient verification.

  2.  It should work closely with its ally, the United States, to ensure that US policies inimical to verification are attenuated or changed.

  3.  In the nuclear area it is essential that the UK complete its legislative process for ratifying its Additional Protocol as soon as possible, campaign for ratification of the CTBT by all necessary states and stand ready to support the CTBT Organization should non-entry-into-force continue indefinitely.

  4.  In the biological weapons area, the UK should continue to work for a strong BWC verification protocol, resisting the efforts of the US and others to neuter the on-site inspection provisions.

  5.  In the chemical weapons area, the UK should seek to reverse US policies which violate the CWC and support full implementation of the Convention.

  6.  With regard to UNMOVIC, the UK should permit no diminution of its authority and capabilities and attempt to ensure that the lessons of UNSCOM are heeded by the new organization.

  VERTIC is ready to provide the Committee with further information and explanation, either written or oral, should the Committee so desire.