TUESDAY 11 APRIL 2000

PROFESSOR MALCOLM DANDO, PROFESSOR GRAHAM S. PEARSON AND DR TOM INCH

  100. On my original question, what action can the British Government take to secure worldwide removal of these awful weapons?
  (Professor Pearson) Three years down the road, I feel that the Chemical Weapons Convention has been more successful than we expected. A couple of states have declared chemical weapons stocks which were not known about beforehand.

  101. Can you tell us which states?
  (Professor Pearson) One is Iran. The other state is not disclosed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. That is part of what Dr Inch referred to, that the mechanism in the Hague is very much political, very much driven by the need to try to find a consensus. Going back to the main thrust of your question, that makes it very difficult for the United Kingdom in isolation to do something totally different from the other states. On the value of the treaty I want to come back to a statement made by President Clinton on 16 March this year, when he said: "It would be foolish to rely on treaties alone to protect our security. But it would also be foolish to throw away the tools that sound treaties do offer: a more predictable security environment monitoring inspections, the ability to throw light on threatening behaviour and mobilise the entire world against it'. So this year we will work to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. That statement from the White House encapsulates what Malcolm Dando said about verification not being perfect, but it provides a mechanism for gathering information and building much greater confidence than before. About a year ago the Deputy Director General of the OPCW, John Gee, in an interview with Arms Control Today, made the point that all states can obtain copies of the declarations of other states if they ask for them and that gives them far more information about what is happening in states than they had before. I believe that it is a much better situation from the point of view of achieving one's goal of eliminating chemical weapons around the world and ensuring their destruction. Once stocks are declared, they are monitored and inspected by the OPCW to ensure that they are not diverted. I think we are better off than we were before.

  102. Dr Inch, you rightly highlighted that one of the really critical provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the right of challenge inspection, has not so far been tested. My question is a bald one, but I want to ask you about this, particularly in relation to what Professor Pearson said about the political operation or the political nexus in the Hague. Is the reason why the challenge inspection provision has not yet been tested for real because the US legislation provides a right of the President of the United States to veto any such challenge inspection as applied to the US? Is there a political anxiety that if the challenge regime were tested, Russia and others would insist that it were tested in relation to the United States, but that might trigger the US presidential veto and therefore everybody is shying off testing it because of possible American political and industrial reaction?
  (Dr Inch) I am sure that it is right to make that kind of inference. At the same time there are quite a number of lower level practical considerations on challenge inspections and the mechanism for them. All states have been concerned about commercial confidentiality and all states have been concerned that challenge inspections may be used as an excuse to find out commercial secrets. There are quite a lot of problems in trying to decide exactly what are the conditions and the ground rules of challenge inspections. The same problems exist in relation to routine inspections. That makes for a degree of nervousness about the whole business. That is why I believe that to make it work there has to be greater political will than there is at present.

  103. Dr Inch, I have a couple of points of clarification. In your responses earlier to Sir John you mentioned a couple of things. The first is the refusal of the Americans to sign up to this particular agreement because they refuse to allow samples to leave American territory. What justification have they given for that, if any? Most importantly, in a throw-away remark you said that if you wanted to build a chemical weapons plant you would not build it in a chemical plant. The received wisdom that we have acquired in our investigation is precisely the reverse of that. One of the big problems of verification of a chemical weapons plant is that it is not easy to distinguish from a normal commercial operation. The Sudan pharmaceutical plant that was bombed is a case that is often quoted to us as an example of how things can go wrong. Perhaps you could elaborate on why you would take another option and why America says that it cannot allow samples to leave its hallowed soil.
  (Dr Inch) The reason concerns commercial confidentiality. Once you start using the most up-to-date analytical methods to analyse any sample, who knows what you will learn from it? That is the kind of issue that worries people and it is a worry from the point of view of the inspection. In terms of saying that I would not take such an operation into a commercial site, I had in mind that as we develop technologies, and as we go for new types of processes, catalytic or otherwise, where the use of solvents is reduced, the energy requirements are relaxed and the design is more specific, it will become increasingly easier to build a plant that does not look like a chemical plant.

  104. Are you also saying that they will be very small compared with what we see traditionally?
  (Dr Inch) And very small. If you want to look at a large chemical plant you could go to the Glaxo-Wellcome site at Ulvrston. There they produce 500 tonnes of pharmaceutical product a year. They circulate many thousands of litres of solvent a day, so it looks like an enormous petro-chemical complex, but the actual chemistry is very limited. I think we shall see many of the solvents disappear and more specific technology being introduced.
  (Professor Pearson) I actually disagree with Tom Inch on where I would do this. Over the past few years we have seen the US produce the binary programme that took two less toxic materials and mixed them in flight. Saddam Hussein went through a much more crude binary process, of mixing them before starting to fire them. Malcolm and I have been in the Hague over the past weekend at a Pugwash meeting at which we discussed the chemical weapon convention. There the point, with which I agree, was made that there are many toxic chemicals that you could create by mixing perfectly innocuous chemicals. That was seen as the real threat. Somebody could select perfectly legitimate chemicals that would come together only at a filling plant. Another lesson that came out of the Gulf War was that Saddam Hussein made his agent when he needed it, unlike the UK and the US, where the agents were put on a shelf for a couple of years[40]. Saddam Hussein did not care about agent stability. He just mixed it—it would still be nasty enough—and threw it. I would take materials that had legitimate uses, but which had a dual purpose, out of the chemical industry and mix them somewhere else.

  105. Would it be fair to say that both options are open?
  (Dr Inch) Yes.
  (Professor Pearson) Yes.

  106. Professor Dando, would you like to comment?
  (Professor Dando) The last two answers throw up some important central points. The first is that the Chemical Weapons Convention and the strengthened Biological Weapons Convention are absolutely dependent on the idea of a general purpose criteria which bans all misuse. The CWC has, and if we get the verification protocol it will have an international agreement to monitor certain agreed examples of the general purpose criteria. It is very important that both things have that kind of architecture. The second thing that we have to understand is that the aim of both conventions is to persuade a potential proliferator that it is not sensible to go down that road. The architecture that we want is what is called a three-pilar architecture. We want mandatory declarations of the materials that have been agreed as examples, and we want a mechanism of visits or routine inspections and clarification processes that ensure that those declarations are accurate. That forces a potential proliferator to say, "It's not worth me trying to proliferate using these declared facilities because I am very likely to get caught, and therefore as a proliferator I am forced to move to some other facility, and not only do I have to keep the operation secret but I also have to keep the whole facility secret because potentially that may be subject to a challenge inspection". I do not think any of us expect challenge inspections to be a regular thing in either case, but they have to be in there in order to say to the potential proliferator, "It's not a good idea to try to go down the road of a completely secret facility". That argument really forces the proliferator to say, "It's not worth it".

  107. Professor Dando, is there anything in your judgment that the British Government have failed to do that they should do?
  (Professor Dando) The one thing that keeps coming back to me in this regard—more in relation to the Biological Weapons Convention than the Chemical Weapons Convention—is that there is a terrible ignorance of the importance of this issue in scientific, medical and educational communities, not only in this country, but also around the world. As the UK has taken such an important role and pressed so hard to agree the Chemical Weapons Convention and to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, one thing that should be put forward is some kind of initiative dramatically to raise the consciousness and the information available to those communities so that they understand the importance of the issue and so that they support the strengthening of the two conventions over a protracted period of time. Without that, one fears that we may get some kind of agreement but not a follow-through over a protracted period of time.
  (Professor Pearson) On what the British Government might do—from the point of view of the biological weapons protocol—there is a big argument taking place in respect of the equivalent of challenge inspections. The Chemical Weapons Convention has what is called a red light procedure; you have to vote to stop it. The European Union and the United Kingdom are firmly of the view that the Biological Weapons Convention should have the same; it will happen unless the executive council votes to stop it. The United States wants a much weaker position, the so-called green light, where you have to vote to approve an investigation. Given the experience that we have had with the CWC and those two conditions about vetoing and no samples, I believe that the UK needs to stand firm and must try to persuade the United States to see the benefits of the presumption that under the protocol an investigation will take place. Let us not forget that in order for an investigation to take place, the state requesting it will have to provide persuasive evidence to show why it should take place. There are strong provisions in the event of abuse, so that the state can be punished if it mounts a frivolous or abusive challenge. My worry is that very often the UK tries to build a bridge between Europe and the United States, which is good, but I do not want to see the UK slipping down into a situation in which the biological weapons protocol—where the dual use problem I would say is greater—has a weaker challenge inspection, one in which the presumption was that it would not go ahead because of the need to prove something. One needs to go for the same strong initiation procedure and presumption, both in the CWC and in the biological weapons protocol, that the challenge, when it comes, will happen.

  108. In regard to the Middle East, Egypt, Libya and Syria have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, as I understand it, and Libya and Syria have not signed the Biological Weapons Convention. In your view are those positions being maintained as a response to Israel's nuclear weapons programme or for some other reason? Is the Middle East peace process taking sufficient account of these sorts of issues? In our previous session, when talking about nuclear weapons, we were told that it was pointless to engage Israel in controlling its nuclear facilities until after a Middle East peace agreement had been made. Is there a danger in putting those issues to one side and hoping that some agreement will be concluded?
  (Professor Pearson) On the Middle East, I do not have in my head precisely which states have ratified. One of the pluses is that Iran has ratified and declared a chemical weapons capability. I think that was something that no one expected. In January I was in the Hague when I heard an Iranian of ambassador level correct a presentation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that said, "Two other states", and he said, "You can put Iran up there". I thought that was quite something. What worries me in the Middle East, particularly on the biological side, is Israel's failure even to sign the Biological Weapons Convention. When a state signs a convention, it undertakes to do nothing contrary to the purpose of the convention. Quite often I have said to Israelis, "Why do you not sign the Biological Weapons Convention as that would send the message that you do not want to keep that option open". That is one thing that worries me. They always answer, "It is because of the Middle East and one does not give something up without getting something in return". In the Middle East there is a security dynamic. However, I worry about Israel and the fact that it has not even signed the Biological Weapons Convention.
  (Professor Dando) I do not want to comment on the politics, but I want to underline something that arises from what Dr Inch said earlier. There are obvious technical possibilities for new kinds of chemical agents. There are obvious new means by which different kinds of biological weapons could come about. There is the biotechnology revolution and genomics will obviously have a range of new possibilities for different kinds of biological and chemical weapons systems. It seems to me that this process is likely to go ahead very quickly. These possibilities will arise rapidly and the argument that there are political reasons why we cannot do something to begin to move towards a more secure legal system does not hold water for me, given the kinds of technical possibilities that arise.

  109. Dr Inch, do you have anything to add?
  (Dr Inch) I have nothing to add.

  110. On the genomics point, can you explain how genomics could be used? How can one use genomics to make more dangerous chemical weapons? Given that no one has demonstrated that there is a place in the world where the genetic make-up of the population is so different, how could you use that to target weapons? In my understanding of the genetics of the population of the Middle East, it is not feasible to design a weapon that will attack one population and not the other, not unless you write-off the oriental Jews as well.
  (Professor Dando) The idea of ethnic specific weapons is an example rather than the general problem. I can illustrate the general problem with another example. The growing understanding of genomics has obviously impacted over the past ten years on our understanding of receptor systems in the nervous system. Obviously that opens up the possibility of the use of different kinds of chemical peptides, peptide mimics as a form of agent. An example is endothelin, or substance P. Turning to the example that you mentioned of ethnic specific weapons, the UK's background scientific paper to the last review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention said that that could not be ruled out as a possibility. It did not say that it could be ruled in; it said that it could not be ruled out. The work that I did to try to follow that argument—I have written it up in some detail—brought me to the same conclusion that for a variety of reasons, which are probably too detailed to go into here, you could not rule out the possibility that ethnic specific weapons could arise.

  111. On the information that you have about the alleged actual use of chemical weapons since the war, Dr Julian Perry Robinson stated in evidence that four states parties have been alleged to have used chemical weapons: India, Russia, Sudan and Turkey. From your knowledge and experience, can you advise us on the alleged actual use of chemical weapons?
  (Professor Pearson) You refer to him talking about four states parties being alleged to have used them. In the Pugwash meeting at the weekend, Julian Perry Robinson attended some of the discussions. In those meetings there is confidentiality as to who said what. That is the way it is done. Let me say that this point was picked up. It emerged that there has been some inquiry made into at least three of the four incidents. That illustrates part of the problem that we identify of the lack of visibility to the general public or to the community at large as to what in fact has been done by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In fact, we argued—again this is an example which is very much what Dr Inch's evidence sets out—that worries about confidentiality have constrained the ability of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to be able to say publicly, openly, what is going on. At that Pugwash meeting, we said that we could see a situation that would not be incredible of a challenge inspection being requested, being carried out and no public information ever getting out about it. The main point made about the four particular alleged uses, was that it was not perceived to be the role of the organisation to comment on every journalistic blip. That was the message with which we were left. However, the underlying worry, as Tom Inch said, about the bureaucracy and the inability of the OPCW to be open about what it is doing, comes through loud and clear. The organisation is producing its report for last year and I was told that it put a piece in about an incident but a state said, "Please take it out", which is a right that states have. To my mind that is an unsatisfactory situation.

  112. Should we draw the conclusion from your observation that the number of occasions when chemical weapons have been used has been under-stated or over-stated?
  (Professor Pearson) Most allegations of the use of chemical weapons are unfounded. Over the years there have been many allegations. Very few of them have been investigated. Some have, but the number that has been validated through obtaining samples is quite small.

  113. Can you tell us which have been validated?
  (Professor Pearson) The one that comes to mind is one that came up when I used to run Porton Down. I am not sure whether a certain Member of the Committee was the Minister at the time, but in the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, samples were collected and brought back and we were able to demonstrate without any shadow of doubt that nerve agent GB had been used as well as mustard agent. That is one very clear example. The yellow rain incident occurred when you were the Minister. There was a case when people had obviously died in South East Asia and the sample that came back to the United Kingdom never contained traces of the alleged agent. The work that was carried out at Porton Down showed that the alleged agent—Trichothecene mycotoxins—would not be toxic enough to have caused that effect. But the British Government view, to which I subscribed, was that something was being used. That helps to illustrate the difficulties of getting unequivocal evidence. That points out why the United States embargo on taking samples out of the country under the CWC which is such a bad one.
  (Professor Dando) The cases of massive use of chemical weapons that come to mind are World War I, the Italians against the Ethiopians in the 1930s and the Iraqi use of massive amounts of modern chemical weapons against Iran throughout the 1980s. It is important to understand that the Iraqis' use was not crude. It may have started off crude but it became very sophisticated. The Iraqis felt that it was very effective for the purposes to which they put it. That is an example of modern chemical weapons very recently used on a massive scale and considered by those involved to have been very effective.

  114. Why are those cases not cited? I remember seeing television pictures that appeared to be evidence.
  (Dr Inch) These are more recent allegations. I would like to return to what Graham Pearson said on the kind of attitudes existing in the OPCW about promulgating what information is available. On several occasions you have asked what should the British Government do. It is imperative, I think, that the British Government, at the highest level, should take initiatives to try and get people to focus on the intent of the convention and not be bound up by the bureaucracy of it. It is very unfortunate that we see too many people standing on their dignity or falsely concerned about commercial sensitivities and so on, rather than saying, "Our will is to make sure that the Chemical Weapons Convention is as effective as possible". It is an intriguing observation, that when you talk to the people, the scientists and technical people dealing with it, they do not see the same problems as some people in state departments of one country or another who seem to be more sensitive to political considerations. We need a strong political will. I believe that the British Government could display that at the highest level to try to make the convention, as written, more effective than it is. Perhaps the countries should adhere to the general purpose criteria, rather than take legalistic approaches to many of the things in the convention. Not too long ago some people seemed to believe what is in the convention as being set in tablets of stone, but if we were gods we would not be sitting here. We are trying to learn as we try to implement it. Some people do not want to learn; they want to stick rigidly to what was written, which I think is unfortunate.

  115. Professor Dando, you referred to the Iraq/Iran case. As far as the Iraqis were concerned, the use of the chemical weapons was seen as militarily effective. Given that and given the relative cheapness of it, is it not surprising that chemical weapons have not been used more, in view of the range of conflicts that occur? If the incidence is surprisingly small, why?
  (Professor Dando) We have been fortunate in a sense that many people in the military do not like these kinds of weapon systems.

  116. Is there an international military conspiracy not to do themselves out of business?
  (Professor Dando) There is a long-standing distaste for the use of poisoned weapons. That has been enacted steadily in more and more secure forms of law, particularly over the past 150 years. The norm that these things should not be used has been a restraint to a considerable extent, but it is a restraint that I believe will become more fragile as technology develops. It is important that we reinforce that restraint and strengthen that norm because the technological revolution going on at the moment, in biotechnology, genomics and in some aspects of chemistry, will produce a whole new range of possibilities. Therefore, strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and ensuring that Chemical Weapons Convention is implemented fully is extremely important as a means of preventing proliferation at this stage.

  117. So the change in technology may break down that powerful, long-standing military reserve or will the non-military personnel find it more and more "attractive"?
  (Professor Dando) I suspect that there will be more and more possibilities put forward by people in the scientific and technological community towards the military community in that respect.

  118. Is it true that the reason that Hitler did not use chemical weapons in the Second World War was because he knew that we could respond in kind?
  (Professor Dando) The non-use of chemical weapons in the Second World War came about through very complex causes. You must remember that through the war there were large amounts of chemical weapons available very near the front on both sides. The Bari incident is a clear example of where we had a large amount of chemical weapons in Bari harbour when there was an unexpected strategic attack and the mustard gas killed a fairly large number of soldiers and civilians. It was not used, and the reasons why it was not used are quite complex, but certainly deterrence was one aspect.

  119. On terrorism, how well organised do you think that the UK Government are to deal with the threat of chemical and biological terrorism?
  (Professor Pearson) In the UK?