(1)  The progress and effectiveness of chemical and biological weapons control regimes, specifically, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

(2)  The effectiveness of the main non-proliferation regimes' verification and enforcement procedures

1.  As Chairman of the National Advisory Committee [NAC] on the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 and as a member of the Scientific Advisory Board [SAB] to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] I have a unique combined perspective of seeing what a Treaty does and does not do.

  2.  The Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] prompted many countries—frankly, more than expected—to declare their weapons stocks. This was a good start.

  3.  Since many of the declared stocks were effectively unusable, the CWC also provided an incentive for getting help in disposing of stocks, although in the case of Russia the logistics are such that this process will take many years. In this sense the CWC has had a discernible and positive environmental effect.

  4.  Moreover, the operation of the CWC has clearly brought some benefit in terms of confidence building among States Parties. Since the CWC came into effect there has been no allegation of, or challenge to, any States party about CWs.

  5.  These have been some of the many benefits of the CWC but there are also many weaknesses.

  6.  Firstly, in the detailed discussions that continually take place in the OPCW there is a tendency to focus overmuch on the legalistic wording of its implementation rather than on the intent of the CWC.

  7.  Because weapons of mass destruction are often considered "high tech," solutions to the problems of the enforcement and monitoring of Treaties are usually also sought from science. In reality the real problem is the political will to resolve difficulties. Science issues become excuses for delays while politicians are reluctant to face up to the obvious and simple solutions.

  8.  Secondly, too many countries raise too many objections to the inspection procedures that would be necessary at industrial sites if full compliance were to be ensured.

  9.  Thirdly, attention is too focused on traditional agents such as mustard and nerve gas. Newer and yet-to-be-found chemical agents are supposed to be controlled by the "general purpose criteria" under the CWC—but international inspection methodology applied to these criteria is not yet available. Current inspection and verification procedures are insufficient to deal with potential threats arising from the unscrupulous exploitation of chemical compounds not currently listed in the Schedules to the Chemical Weapons Act 1996.

  10.  Only National Authorities can really act to implement these criteria. But the problem is that the procedures necessary to do so would be considered unacceptably intrusive in most democratic countries.

  11.  It is equally true that industrial countries with advanced research facilities face a dilemma if they come across new chemicals or toxins which could have potential as Chemical Weapons: namely whether or not to notify the international community to their existence, not least for fear that this would benefit international terrorism.

  12.  The willingness of signatories to the CWC to accept challenge inspections has yet to be tested.

  13.  the UK's response to the CWC has been exemplary but the Government should not be seduced into thinking that all the key problems have been solved. The Annual Report makes this clear.

  14.  I should like to take this opportunity to suggest to the Select Committee that more could be done by Parliament itself to draw attention to the complex issues involved in international action to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

  15.  It would be beneficial if Parliament had a regular opportunity to debate the issues involved. Perhaps the Select committee may wish to recommend that Parliamentary time to be made available for debates on the Annual Reports by the Secretary of State.