Thus, for example, mandatory declarations are
assessed as providing increased transparency and enhanced confidence
in compliance. Their applicability is limited to those facilities
which will be required to be declared. Their acceptability is
seen as high as no Commercial proprietary Information (CPI) will
be required to make such declarations and their number is modest—of
the order of 10s in a developed country. Their reliability (based
on the adequate record of BTWC Confidence Building Measures),
is assessed as poor in isolation, but this could be improved to
good by the declaration follow-up procedures and through the measures
in the Protocol to ensure that declarations are submitted. Their
contribution to the long-term sustainability of the regime is
only moderate. Their cost-effectiveness is judged to be high as
the number is small and no CPI is required to be declared, but
the benefit to the regime is substantial as the most relevant
facilities will be declared. The potential for abuse is seen as
moderate as few facilities will be declared in each country. Similarly
the deterrence of non-compliance through declarations in isolation
is seen as moderate as is the promotion of universality.
8. A review of this assessment, and of a
similar assessment of the CWC, confirms that the negotiators of
the BTWC Protocol regime have successfully tailored the regime
to address the deterrence of offensive biological weapons programmes,
and that they have benefited from the experience of implementing
the CWC. There is, for example, no parallel in the CWC to the
BTWC Protocol's provisions for ensuring the submission of declarations.
Overall, however, the structural architecture of the two control
regimes is closely similar. This may be described in terms of
a jigsaw analogy. There is no requirement to have all the pieces
of the jigsaw to be confident of compliance so long as all the
pieces are clearly from the same picture. It is for this reason
that it is vital that the BTWC Protocol regime is a three pillar
regime with mandatory declarations, the completeness and accuracy
of which are ensured through declaration follow-up procedures
which include infrequent visits and declaration clarification
procedures, and both field and facility investigations.[13]
9. In short, we argue that the BTWC Protocol
is being crafted so that it will achieve the requirements for
an effective and reliable regime which, in accordance with the
mandate given to the Ad Hoc Group, will strengthen the effectiveness
and improve the implementation of the BTWC and thereby strengthen
the norm against biological weapons. The real question, therefore,
is to ensure that there is the international political will to
bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion now that,
as Ambassador Tibor Toth, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, has stated,[14]
they are well into the endgame. We urge that the Committee should
recommend that the UK at the top political level should make clear
that early completion of the BTWC Protocol is of paramount importance
to prevent the development and use of biological weapons. Furthermore,
the UK should continue to take the lead in the Ad hoc Group negotiation
of an efficient and effective Protocol seeking solutions that
will gain international consensus support.
10. Although the Ad Hoc Group negotiations
started in 1995, and were preceded by two years of technical discussions
in the VEREX process, it cannot be automatically assumed that
the necessary international political will does exist to quickly
complete an effective Protocol. It is notable that despite the
prominent discussion of the modern biotechnology revolution, and
the need to control its consequences, few of the relevant expert
communities, with some notable exceptions,[15]
have paid anything other than passing attention to the importance
of the Protocol. Moreover, once an effective BTWC Protocol is
agreed, it will be some time before it enters into force. It will
be critical during this period that adequate national legislation
is put into place in all the States Parties to the Protocol. We
urge that the Committee should recommend that the UK should develop
mechanisms whereby UK and European Community aid to developing
countries is focused on the development of the necessary infrastructure
to implement the BTWC Protocol and to strengthen national capabilities
to carry out surveillance of and counter outbreaks of infectious
disease with consequential benefits to both developing and developed
States.
11. Furthermore, as the UK is one of the
three Depository States (along with Russia and the United States)
for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and is one of
the most active states in the negotiation of the BTWC Protocol,
consideration might be given to how to take forward the agreed
language in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference
in 1996 that:[16]
The UK, as a leading centre in the development
of modern biotechnology and genomics, is uniquely well placed
to promote nationally and internationally the benefits of the
BTWC Protocol regime and the importance of promoting the understanding
of scientific communities both nationally and internationally
of the obligations of the BTWC and its Protocol. We would, therefore,
urge the Committee to recommend that the Government launch an
initiative comparable to the Darwin Initiative launched by the
UK to promote the implementation of the Convention and Biological
Diversity. Such an initiative could launch a major programme of
information and education on this subject throughout the scientific,
medical and educational communities in the UK and around the world.
CONCLUSIONS
12. The Foreign Affairs Committee is recommended:
Mr R DandoG S PearsonS M Whitby
14
Toth T (1999) Time to Wrap Up. The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 46,
1-3. Back
15
British Medical Association (1999) Biotechnology, Weapons and
Humanity, Harwood Academic Publishers, London. Back
16
United Nations (1992) Final Document: Third Review Conference
of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva.
Back