1. Modern biotechnology will provide the
scientific basis for major industrial developments over the next
few decades and will deliver many benefits to civil society, especially
in medicine and agriculture.[1]
However, as such advances in biology and medicine have been used
by major States during the past century to develop biological
weapons,[2]
these new capabilities could also be misused. Dangerous new threats
to civilised society could arise, as was well illustrated by the
misuse of genetic engineering to modify standard biological agents
in the massive covert offensive biological weapons programme of
the former Soviet Union,[3]and
the recent widespread recognition of the threat that biological
weapons could cause to agriculture.
2. Of the three types of weapons of mass
destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological—it can
be argued that biological weapons today presents the greatest
threat. Biological weapons can cause similar numbers of casualties
to nuclear weapons,[4]are
far easier to produce and are prohibited by an arms control agreement
that lacks any effective verification mechanism. That is why the
current Ad Hoc Group negotiations by the States Parties to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to agree a Protocol
to strengthen the Convention are so important. However, strengthening
the Convention through a Protocol will not alone be sufficient
to prevent proliferation, rather the strengthened Convention would
form the centrepiece of a range of policies which together will
form a stronger barrier to proliferation. Faced with good intelligence,
effective defence, international norms embodied in international
arms control agreements, export controls and a known willingness
of international society to act to counter violations it is much
more likely that potential violators will be deterred.[5]
3. It is widely accepted that of all the
arms control agreements, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
regime is that of the closest relevance to the emerging BTWC Protocol
regime. Both regimes are concerned with the total prohibition
of agents that attack humans and animals through the air, and
indeed, the two regimes overlap in that both cover toxins. The
CWC regime also includes the destruction of chemical weapons and
chemical weapons production facilities; there are rightly no parallel
provisions in the BTWC Protocol regime. However, that apart, the
two regimes are strikingly similar in their provisions for data
monitoring and the verification of activities not prohibited.
It has, nevertheless, been argued by some that the BTWC is orders
of magnitude more difficult to monitor than nuclear, chemical
or conventional arms control accords.[6]
This argument suggests that the dual-use (civil and military applications)
problem in regard to biotechnology is different in kind from that
in regard to chemical technology. Careful detailed analysis shows
that this is not so: whilst there are some differences between
the technologies which might affect the verification regime, there
are also strong similarities.[7]
In addition, there are several elements which are much more developed
in the Protocol regime than in the CWC regime: the Protocol provisions
for scientific and technical exchange for peaceful purposes and
technical co-operation are a particular example.
4. In fact, verification in the two regimes
is directly analogous. Although the CWC has lists of chemicals
in Schedules reflecting the different risks to the Convention
and links the tightness of the monitoring to these Schedules,
there are many chemicals that could be used as chemical weapons
that are not on the Schedule lists. This is particularly the case
if assumptions such as the need for stability and reasonably long
storage life are dropped.[8]
Thus the list of chemicals in the CWC Schedules are not, and cannot
be, comprehensive lists—and the same will be true for any
lists of biological and toxin agents in the emerging BTWC Protocol.
Verification, confidence and trust therefore does not come about
in the CWC regime because all relevant items are monitored. Yet,
it is clear that in general the international community is increasingly
gaining confidence in the way in which the CWC is being implemented.[9]
It follows, logically, that a satisfactory Protocol regime can
be devised to effectively strengthen the BTWC.
5. The mandate given to the Ad Hoc Group
by the Special Conference of States Parties in 1994 can be used
to draw up a list of criteria by which to judge the extent to
which the requirements of the mandate are being met in the emerging
Protocol.[10]
We have suggested the following set of criteria from such an analysis:
Given the closeness of the two regimes it is
possible to use these criteria to make a rounded comparative judgement
of both the CWC and the BTWC Protocol regimes. It is also, to
an extent, possible to quantify the analysis.[11]
6. The central elements of the BTWC Protocol
are:[12]
7. A judgement of the value of each of these
elements against each set of criteria is set out in Table 1 (over-page):
2
Dando, M R (199) The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology
and Medicine on the Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare
Programmes in the Twentieth Century. Defence Analysis,
15, (1), 43-62. Back
3
Alibek, K and Handelman, S (1999) Biohazard: The Chilling
True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in
the World. Random House, New York. Back
4
Office of Technology Assessment (1993) Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. Office of Technology
Assessment, United States Congress, (OTA-ISC-559). Washington
DC, August. Back
5
Pearson, G S (1993) Prospects for chemical and biological arms
control: the web of deterrence. The Washington Quarterly, Spring,
145-162. Back
6
Smithson, A E (1999) Tall Order: Crafting a Meaningful Verification
Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. Politics and
the Life Sciences, (in press). Back
7
Tucker, J B (1998) Verification Provision of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention.
In Smithson, A E (ed) Biological Weapons Proliferation : Reasons
for Concern, Courses for Action. The Henry L Stimpson Center,
Report No. 24, January. Back
8
Pearson, G S (1995) Chemical and Biological Defence: An Essential
Security Requirement. Proceedings of the 8th International
Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare
Agents, Stockholm, Sweden, 11-16 June. Back
9
Arms Control Today (1999) The CWC at the Two-Year Mark:
An Interview with Dr John Gee. April/May, 3-9. Back
10
Pearson, G S and Dando, M R (1999) The Emerging Protocol: An
Integrated Reliable and Effective Regime. Briefing paper No
25, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. Available
at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sblwc>. Back
11
Pearson, G S (1999) The Emerging Protocol: A Quantified Evaluation
of the Regime. Briefing Paper No 27, Department of Peace Studies,
University of Bradford. Available at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc>. Back
12
Full texts of the developing Protocol through the last five years
and commentary on the developments are available on the Bradford
Project on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Website at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc>. Back