The United Kingdom's policy on weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) is often contradictory, leading to a confusion
of objectives and actions, Britain has taken a positive lead in
strengthening the verification for treaties such as the comprehensive
test ban treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),
and has taken welcome steps in transparency and unilateral nuclear
weapons reductions. Too often, however, Britain lets commercial
interests and relations with key allies, particularly the United
States, dominate decision-making to the detriment of our non-proliferation
objectives and global security.
In the interests of brevity and as my expertise
is primarily in multilateral negotiations, I shall restrict the
evidence given here to the progress and effectiveness of the non-proliferation
regimes associated with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and BWC, including consideration of verification
and enforcement, and the UK's role.
DEEPENING CRISIS
IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
International political and security relations
are the context within which the various treaties and instruments
for prohibiting, reducing, controlling or regulating weapons of
mass destruction must operate. During 1999, relations between
key states deteriorated badly, exacerbated by nationalist sentiment,
electioneering, and dysfunctional domestic policies. From a growing
convergence of concerns and approaches among the P-5 (the permanent
members of the UN Security Council; Britain, China, France Russia
and the United States) during the early 1990s regarding the need
to prevent the proliferation of WMD, there is now increasing mistrust
between the United States and both China and Russia, due in part
to US ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans, the wars in Yugoslavia
and Chechnya, and US accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage.
Though much was achieved between 1990 and 1995,
arms control has dried up and conditions have deteriorated since
1995. Worrying signs include:
THE NPT
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which now has 187 States Parties, will hold its Sixth Review Conference
in New York, 24 April to 19 May 2000. The purpose of the NPT,
which entered into force in 1970, was to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons. The Treaty enshrined two central agreements: in return
for foregoing the option of acquiring nuclear weapons for themselves,
non-nuclear weapon states were promised progress on nuclear disarmament
and unimpeded access to nuclear energy for non-military uses.
The latter provision is increasingly viewed as a proliferation
driver, leading to suspicions against developing states such as
Iran who have no obvious energy motivation for developing an uneconomic
an arguably unsafe nuclear energy programme. Only four countries
now remain outside the NPT: Cuba, which has no nuclear programme,
India, Israel and Pakistan.
Five years ago, the NPT was indefinitely extended,
a decision taken together with agreements for strengthening its
review process and a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, to serve as a yardstick against
which to measure the progressive implementation of the Treaty.
At the same time, NPT parties adopted a Resolution on the Middle
East, which called for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction
in the Middle East.
The 2000 Review Conference will be the first
opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the new review process
and the prospects for maintaining a strong and credible regime
to reduce nuclear dangers and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The prognosis is profoundly worrying, with the real risk that
the Conference will become bitterly divided. The mood among diplomats
and many non-proliferation and international relations watchers
regarding the forthcoming NPT Review Conference is pessimistic.
The non-proliferation regime is in crisis and the NPT review process
since 1995 has disappointed more than it has satisfied. If judged
on its ability to address substantive issues, which are fundamental
to the health and longevity of a strong non-proliferation regime,
the three preparatory committee meetings held between 1997 and
1999 must be judged far from successful.
I will not go into detail here about the procedural
questions facing the 2000 NPT Conference, as that is probably
beyond the purview of the Committee. A full preview of the political
and procedural challenges may be found in the latest report from
the Acronym Institute.[2]
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
AT THE
NPT
There is likely to be strong pressure for addressing
nuclear disarmament and the proliferation threat posed by India,
Pakistan and Israel, especially in the wake of the South Asian
nuclear tests conducted in 1998 and the more open development
of nuclear doctrines and arsenals. Two issues crystallised disagreement
and near-failure in 1995 and during the review process: the Middle
East, specifically Arab concerns about Israel's nuclear capabilities,
and nuclear disarmament. In 2000, the critical issues may additionally
include US plans to deploy ballistic missile defence (BMD), the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and whether the nuclear
powers are prepared to make an unequivocal commitment to nuclear
disarmament and discuss practical steps towards meeting their
Article VI obligations.
UNIVERSALITY, SOUTH
ASIA AND
THE MIDDLE
EAST
How the NPT parties address the nuclear capabilities
in South Asia and the Middle East may determine the future credibility
of the regime as far as some significant non-nuclear weapon state
parties are concerned. In particular, South Africa, Brazil, Egypt
and Japan have all indicated that failure to address proliferation
could cause them to reassess whether their commitment under the
NPT not to acquire nuclear arms meets their security needs. The
likelihood of withdrawal from the NPT if the 2000 Review Conference
fails is unlikely in the short term. A more credible risk is that
countries may lose confidence in the regime and hedge their bets,
which could provoke a destabilising spiral of eroding confidence
and unilateralist responses.
The central dilemma is how to secure co-operation
from India, Israel and Pakistan in global arms control and non-proliferation
efforts without condoning or rewarding nuclear proliferation.
In the present political circumstances, there
is no prospect of India, Israel or Pakistan giving up their nuclear
capabilities and adhering to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Nor could they become acknowledged as nuclear weapon states without
undesirable legal and political consequences. While continuing
to make calls for the hold-out countries to accede to the NPT,
some governments are increasingly making the pragmatic argument
that it is most important to persuade these three de facto
nuclear weapon possessors to undertake the obligations in the
NPT of not transferring nuclear weapon technology or materials,
to persuade them to adhere fully to the CTBT and halt production
of fissile materials, and to put in place non-proliferation controls
and safer mechanisms for ensuring the reliability of command,
communication and control systems. There is a danger, however,
that such an approach could slide into acceptance of three more
nuclear weapon states, which could be highly destabilising for
the Middle East and Asia, and may result in some NPT parties re-evaluating
their obligations as non-nuclear weapon states.
The motivations underlying the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by the three countries were different, so tailored
approaches would be needed to bring all remaining four states
on board. While regional approaches, including confidence and
peace building arrangements, are necessary for long-term solutions,
the NPT could consider what else it can do to diminish the salience
and status associated with nuclear weapons and to reinforce the
benefits of non-proliferation.
An interesting paper on universality was submitted
late in the Third Preparatory Committee (1999) by Malaysia, which
merits further attention. Seeking to find a practical way for
NPT parties to engage with non-NPT members, Malaysia proposed
an annual high-level consultation meeting between representatives
of the NPT States Parties and the four countries remaining outside
the Treaty. During these meetings "States Parties would present
arguments on the benefits of NPT membership" and the four
would be expected "to provide information . . . on their
needs and ideas regarding their possible membership in the Treaty".
Emphasising that "a finger-pointing exercise" assigning
blame was to be avoided, Malaysia gave further details on how
the consultation meetings could be initiated and structured.[3]
Malaysia's proposal for annual high-level consultation meetings
could provide a useful mechanism for dialogue and constructive
engagement between representatives of the NPT States Parties and
the four countries remaining outside the Treaty.
Anger by states in the Middle East regarding
Israel's nuclear programme (believed to be some 200-300 nuclear
weapons[4])
nearly derailed the 1995 Conference and could do the same in 2000.
By refusing to consider any extension decision unless the issue
was addressed, the 14 members of the League of Arab States in
1995 won a significant victory by having a separate resolution
on the Middle East sponsored by the depository States and adopted
by the 1995 Conference without a vote. Egypt has subsequently
spearheaded moves at each of the PrepComs for action on implementing
the Resolution, which calls (among other things) for a zone free
of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Despite the
more flexible approach of Prime Minister Ehud Barak on a number
of security and regional issues, the Israeli nuclear programme
is still treated as inviolate; the US "protects" Israel
from pressure to comply with the NPT; and there are no indications
of an Israeli willingness to give up its nuclear capabilities.
Egypt has already made clear its intention of calling for a subsidiary
body to address the Middle East.
There are constructive ways for addressing this
issue that would not block the Conference, but the major protagonists,
including the United States and the Arab States, often seem to
lack the necessary willingness to compromise. France and Britain
have in the past attempted to broker compromises, but need to
do more in between the NPT meetings. Everything depends on regional
security and the peace process. This is the responsibility of
both sides: to address the security threats posed by Israel's
nuclear capabilities and also to address and ameliorate the security
threats to Israel from neighbouring countries, some of which may
be armed with chemical and biological armaments and pursuing more
sophisticated missile development programmes.
Despite its desire to shield Israel from adverse
comment, it would be helpful if the United States were to agree
to the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II
on the Middle East Resolution, with a mandate to consider all
aspects of that resolution and report back to MC II with recommendations
for actions consistent with the NPT that could be undertaken by
States Parties to help create the conditions for longer term solutions.
At the same time, it will be necessary for the Arab states and
Iran to address their own parts of the equation. While it is okay
to use the Treaty as a platform to raise their concerns, it is
counterproductive and destructive to treat the NPT merely as a
stick with which to beat Israel and the United States. The US
is wrong in its attempts to keep Israel's nuclear programme out
of the NPT deliberations, but there are similar dangers in Arab
strategies that overburden the NPT with regional demands that
the Treaty does not have the powers to meet.
Britain as a depository state, with at least
nominal responsibility for the Middle East resolution, could perhaps
convene meetings with the United States and Russia, as a first
step, to work out a common approach. Although there are bilateral
meetings between the United States and Egypt on the Resolution,
these can sometimes be acrimonious and hostile. Perhaps Britain
could offer to convene small meetings of key states on "neutral
territory" to explore the intentions and aspirations of the
Arab parties to the NPT and the practicalities of addressing those
of their concerns with regard to Israel that can realistically
be considered in the NPT context.
NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE
NPT
International efforts to bring Iraq and North
Korea back fully into the non-proliferation regime after both
violated their obligations under the NPT have highlighted the
weaknesses in non-proliferation verification and compliance mechanisms
in the face of determined attempts to cheat. There was a concerted
attempt to learn the lessons from these two examples of clandestine
nuclear programmes, which resulted in the IAEA negotiating Additional
Protocols to the safeguards mandated in Article III of the NPT,
with wider provisions covering undeclared facilities and more
effective inspections. So far, however, the rate of signature
and ratification of the Additional Protocols has been abysmal.
Only eight countries, not including Britain, have so far ratified.
For Britain and France, at the very least, to have ratified before
the 2000 NPT Conference would be an important signal of their
commitment to strengthening the safeguards regime and improving
IAEA powers for monitoring and inspecting nuclear capable states.
Iraq and North Korea pose further problems.
Both sought to develop WMD in extensive and persistent programmes.
Through their membership of the NPT (despite an early attempt
from North Korea to withdraw), the IAEA has some rights under
its safeguards agreements. The 1994 Agreed Framework with the
United States provided a mechanism for ensuring co-operation with
IAEA inspections in return for substantial financial and technical
assistance in building gas reactors deemed to be a less-proliferation-sensitive
means of producing nuclear energy. There are persistent problems
with North Korea, however, which continues to be a major producer
and exporter of WMD-capable missiles and missile production technologies.
At one point North Korean officials said they would halt missile
exports if they received compensation at the level of $1 billion
per year, an offer the US rejected as blackmail.
The IAEA had expressed confidence that Iraq's
nuclear capabilities had been found and dismantled by December
1998, when US and British bombing raids on Iraq signalled the
definite demise of UNSCOM after Saddam Hussein had engaged in
further brinkmanship, refusing co-operation and access to the
UNSCOM inspections. The degree to which the full extent of Iraq's
chemical and biological weapons capabilities had been exposed
and nullified is another matter, and one which the newly formed
UNMOVIC will now have to address. The bombing raids, apparently
intended to force Saddam Hussein to comply with UNSCOM had the
opposite effect, which at the very least has made the IAEA's job
of continuing to monitor Iraq's nuclear programme very much more
difficult.
Where a country is ruled by autocratic leadership
or military or totalitarian dictatorship, heavy-handed military
actions or sanctions are highly unlikely to cause a change of
policy and may drive a country even further towards seeking WMD.
Even if the United States is unable to find alternatives, Britain
should beware of using military force or punitive sanctions in
ways that provoke or harden the behaviour and developments that
we are seeking to prevent.
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Britain, together with the other NPT nuclear
weapon states, is perceived as having failed to comprehend that
the options facing the world in 2000 are not proliferation versus
non-proliferation, the latter assuming the continued possession
"for the foreseeable future" of five nuclear arsenals,
with perhaps some arms control limitations and management. Since
the end of the Cold War, as we clearly stated by the Tokyo Forum,
it is now clear that the alternative to disarmament is proliferation,
so the choice facing us is "between the assured dangers of
proliferation and the challenges of disarmament."[5]
The Tokyo Forum rightly argued that the way to deal with the dilemma
posed by the South Asian nuclear ambitions, is both to strengthen
non-proliferation measures and to reduce and eliminate nuclear
weapons. In order to make progress on both these objectives much
more must be done to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons—to
delegitimise and devalue them in political and military perceptions.
In 1995, the NPT parties set themselves a programme
of action for nuclear disarmament, which identified as key objectives:
a CTBT by 1996; negotiations on a treaty banning the production
of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; and the determined pursuit
of systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament.
CTBT
The CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, but
has huge hurdles to overcome before it can enter into force, which
requires the accession of all nuclear capable states. India, Pakistan
and North Korea have not yet signed, and the CTBT received a further
blow in October 1999, when the US Senate voted against ratification
amidst contradictory Republican claims that the CTBT was inadequate
and that the United States should not permit any international
constraints on its ability to test and modernise its nuclear forces.
It will be essential for the NPT parties to underline the importance
they attach to the CTBT, without scapegoating any individual countries,
as that could be counterproductive to the main purpose of bringing
everyone on board. One way could be to convene a special plenary
session on the CTBT at the 2000 Conference and hold the next Special
Conference on Entry into Force (under Article XIV of the CTBT)
soon after the US election in November 2000, thereby hoping that
the positive example and concerns of a wide range of US allies
may influence the new government to put the Treaty forward for
ratification in 2001.
FISSBAN[6]/FMCT
Negotiations on a treaty tackling fissile materials—the
fissban or "cut-off treaty"—have failed to get
off the ground in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Despite
a mandate in 1995, the issue has become mired in arguments over
whether the treaty should address existing stockpiles as well
as banning future production. It has also fallen linkage to procedural
linkage. China has linked this issue with missile defence, fearing
that if the United States is able to deploy a national missile
defence system with confidence—and share missile defence
technology with Japan and Taiwan—then China's smaller arsenal
could lose its deterrent value. Because the CD must take its decisions
on a work programme every year, by consensus, convening fissban
negotiations is being held hostage to China's demands—opposed
by the United States—for a committee to discuss "prevention
of an arms race in outer space" (PAROS). China's motivation
is twofold: it wants the CD to address missile defence so as to
put stronger pressure on the United States, and it is reassessing
the credibility and size of its nuclear forces, considering whether
to restart production of fissile materials. As Beijing's reluctance
grows, Israel, India and Pakistan are content to see delays in
negotiating a fissban, as they are continuing to produce as much
plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium as they can.
Britain is the first of the NWS to be fully
transparent about our holdings of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium for weapons. This is an important and laudable step, which
should be followed by appeals to the remaining NWS to do likewise.
A number of European countries, such as Norway, Germany and Switzerland
have called for the NWS to undertake parallel confidence-building
measures with regard to their existing stockpiles. Britain would
be well placed to push for this among the P-5.
More up-front opposition by Britain and the
rest of Europe towards US missile defence plans could also help
build a bridge towards China. Beijing might be more prepared to
lift its veto in the CD if it felt that the BMD threats were being
addressed more collectively elsewhere.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE
An issue which could well derail the 2000 Review
Conference is that of ballistic missile defence. Though US missile
defence plans do not violate the NPT per se, they are being
deployed in a context which is highly destabilising and could
precipitate a new nuclear arms race. One problem is that at present
it is not entirely clear what US plans would entail. Ballistic
missile defences can be "theatre" (TMD), designed to
intercept short-range missiles, or "national" (NMD),
intended to protect the territory of the entire United States
from long-range missile attack. Research in the United States
is now underway on a "thin" NMD, meant to provide protection
from very limited numbers of long-range missiles carrying nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons, hypothetically launched by a "rogue"
state or terrorist. Most analysts consider that the risk of nuclear,
chemical or biological attack is less likely to be delivered by
missiles, which presupposes an attack from a state or very sophisticated
military organisation. The most likely means of delivery, whether
from rogue state or non-state terrorist faction, would be internally
or hand-delivered: a bomb on a truck, poisoning of water supplies
or public places, with devastating but geographically relatively
limited effect.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and
Israel have already deployed Patriot, a version of TMD which does
not violate the ABM or other treaty commitments. Japan's interest
in TMD was impelled by the provocative test flight of the North
Korean "Taepo-dong" missile in 1998, since which time
the United States has been discussing a joint TMD research project
with Japan and also Taiwan. The United States now wants to bring
NATO states into participation in developing BMD, to neutralise
the growing chorus of opposition in Europe. Critics of US NMD
plans focus on three major problems:
Ballistic missile defences would incorporate
satellite-based sensors to detect and track missile launches and
target and guide the interceptors. The expensive upgrading of
tracking, intelligence and targetting systems associated with
the plans raises a further concern for NPT parties, some of whom
fear that missile defence is just the first step toward the weaponisation
of space and a new arms race to gain military control over outer
space. In June 2000, President Clinton is currently scheduled
to take the next decision on whether to commit to deploying NMD.
Because of a series of well-publicised test failures, he may be
persuaded to postpone this decision, but whether he does so or
not, the Republicans seem determined to fund "son of star
wars" until they can get it to work.
International concern is growing. Russia, China
and Belarus co-sponsored the first-ever resolution to the 1999
UN General Assembly on "Preservation and Compliance with
the ABM Treaty" (UNGA 54/54A). Including an amendment on
missile proliferation put forward by France, the ABM resolution
was adopted by 80 votes to 4, with 68 abstentions. France voted
with China and Russia in favour. The United States was joined
only by Latvia, Micronesia and Israel in opposing. However, US
pressure was exerted to ensure that most of NATO and Europe—including
Britain—abstained.
In view of the predictable proliferation-driving
consequences if the US pushes ahead in its research and programme
for national missile defences, regardless of whether or not the
US is eventually able to make the system work, Britain needs to
work out a consistent, non-proliferation approach to these destabilising
plans. In addition to political and diplomatic approaches underlining
to the US Government the damaging effects of its missile defence
policies on British, European and international security, Britain
should seriously consider withholding (and refusing to upgrade)
the bases at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill which are earmarked
to play a role in the US missile defence programme.
DEVALUING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The non-nuclear countries are sending ever stronger
signals that without nuclear disarmament the non-proliferation
norm will become discredited. In the wake of the advisory opinion
of the World Court in July 1996, demands are growing for the nuclear
powers to agree to an NPT-based mechanism for discussing next
steps. A front-runner for action is the proposal from the New
Agenda Coalition (launched by a cross-group of key non nuclear
countries in June 1998) for the establishment of a subsidiary
body to deliberate on practical steps aimed at reducing nuclear
dangers and de-emphasising the role of nuclear weapons in security
strategies.
Possible subjects for such talks might include:
Some states fear that making any demands for
nuclear disarmament steps to be discussed will result in deadlock
at the NPT and CD, as the major nuclear powers will refuse. While
expecting full agreement on the topics for debate might be overly
ambitious at this stage, the nuclear weapon states are increasingly
split among themselves, and fast running out of excuses for refusing
to accept either an NPT-based or CD-based mechanism for addressing
practical ways forward. If the non-nuclear weapon states gave
up trying it would be tantamount to accepting the indefinite possession
of nuclear weapons by some countries, a state of affairs incompatible
with the aspirations and commitments enshrined in the NPT.
OVERSEEING NPT IMPLEMENTATION
The NPT was not set up with an implementing
organisation, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or the CTBTO. As pointed out by Jayantha
Dhanapala, the President of the 1995 NPT Conference, and now Under
Secretary-General of the United Nations, in charge of the Department
for Disarmament Affairs, the IAEA existed before the NPT; while
suited to perform the functions outlined in Articles III and IV,
the IAEA was not constituted or empowered to oversee other important
aspects of the Treaty. Dhanapala proposed that NPT parties "consider
the possibility of electing a governing council for the NPT to
act as an ombudsman to receive complaints about non-compliance
and difficulties which States Parties may be experiencing in the
Treaty regime". He recommended that the 2000 Review Conference
should consider electing a body comparable to the Executive Councils
in the OPCW and CTBTO, which would oversee implementation and
compliance and could "make recommendations to the general
membership and, if necessary, to the Security Council". Noting
that "there is a grave danger that persistent suspicions
without verifiable proof to substantiate them and to justify the
withholding of NPT benefits may drive some States out of the NPT
regime instead of keeping them within it and under the constraints
of international law", Dhanapala argued that setting up an
Executive Council would not require an amendment to the Treaty,
and that it would help to strengthen the regime and provide a
more even-handed approach to problems within the Treaty, including
allegations of non-compliance.[7]
The Tokyo Forum recommended something similar, calling for "a
permanent secretariat and consultative commission" to deal
with questions of compliance and to consider strengthening measures
for the Treaty.[8]
BWC
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) was concluded in 1972. It prohibited the use, development,
production and stockpiling of biological weapons, but contained
no measures for implementing, verifying or enforcing its provisions.
For the past five years, a group of States Parties has been meeting
in Geneva to negotiate a protocol on verification to be added
to the BWC. They have just concluded their 18th session, and now
have a substantial rolling text.
The two most difficult issues relate to compliance
measures (proposed Article III) and scientific and technological
exchange and cooperation (proposed Article VII).[9]
Without going into extraneous detail here, heavy pressure from
the US pharmaceutical industry, which is also unhappy with the
restrictions and bureaucracy which accompanied verification of
the CWC, is driving the US to negotiate for weaker provisions
on "visits" (on-site inspections) than deemed necessary
by many others, including Britain. Believing that the US must
not become isolated, Britain has recently weakened its own positions,
proposing "transparency visits" as an alternative to
the "randomly selected visits" favoured by most of the
Western countries. The crux of the dilemma is the fear that if
the verification provisions are not to US industry's liking, the
United States could walk away from the BWC protocol. There is,
however, another danger. Watering down the inspection provisions
does not guarantee US ratification, but could leave the BWC after
five years of negotiations with a protocol that fails to do the
job required of it. If the verification provisions are too weak,
this could also be used by some factions in the US Congress to
condemn the protocol and refuse to ratify in any case.
Many BWC parties believe that it is necessary
to get the strongest feasible verification protocol, and then
develop political strategies to bring reluctant states or interest
groups on board. Britain's strategy of offering weaker "compromise"
proposals in order to prevent US isolation needs to be rethought,
as it could be counterproductive for our own and international
security interests.
ASSESSMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The regimes governing the non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction are still generally strong, but
in the era of post-Cold War uncertainties, the normative and organisational
foundations are under pressure.[10]
Threats to the regimes arise from (among other things) the growing
appeal of nationalism and religious fundamentalism; a deterioration
of relations among key states; an uneven record of addressing
non-compliance and violations; neglect; complacence; weak leadership;
and the culture of "ultimate security backed up by ultimate
weaponry" driven particularly by the retention of nuclear
weapons by a small number of dominant states despite the fact
that 182 countries have renounced them.
Challenges to the non-proliferation regimes
in the post-Cold War environment include:
While it is important to reinforce the credibility
of the non-proliferation instruments already in force by implementing
their full provisions, including the destruction of WMD armaments
possessed by dominant states, the threats to the non-proliferation
regimes need to be countered by a wider range of approaches as
well. High tech military responses can exacerbate the threats
they are intended to counteract, as illustrated by missile defence.
3
Working paper submitted by Malaysia, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/26. Back
4
Statement by Issam Makhoul MK to the Israeli Knesset, 2 February
2000. Back
5
"Facing Nuclear Dangers: an action plan for the twenty-first
century", The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament, Tokyo, 25 July 1999. Back
6
The abbreviation "fissban" is used here in preference
to "FMCT" as one of the problems faced by the negotiations
is that of definitions and scope. A "cut-off treaty"
is deemed to halt only future production. Pakistan, South Africa
and most of the NAM increasingly use the acronym "FMT"
designating Fissile Material Treaty. In so doing, they are showing
that they expect the scope also to encompass past production,
as in the existing stockpiles. The NWS, India and Israel are presently
only prepared to consider a cut-off treaty dealing with future
production and not stocks. In discussing this issue, The Acronym
Institute uses the term "fissban" which is more neutral
and does not prejudge the question of scope. Back
7
Jayantha Dhanapala, "The NPT Review Process: Identifying
New Ideas to Strengthen the Regime" in the Enhanced Review
Process: Towards 2000, UNIDIR Newsletter 37, pp 9-14. Back
8
Key Recommendations 1, Tokyo Forum, op. cit. p 55. Back
9
See Graham Pearson "The BTWC Protocol Enters the Endgame",
Disarmament Diplomacy 39, July/August 1999 pp 6-13 and
Henrietta Wilson "Strengthening the BWC: Issues for the ad
hoc Group" Disarmament Diplomacy 42, December 1999,
pp 27-34. Back
10
This section derives from a paper by Amy Sands to the Monterey
Non-proliferation Strategy Group, of which Rebecca Johnson is
a member, July 1999. Back