I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(i) Legacy of the Past
As the world stands poised to enter the next century,
it finds itself equipped with institutions and mechanisms to prevent
further states acquiring nuclear weapons that were created to
handle the proliferation problems of several decades ago. These
arrangements centre upon the International Atomic Agency (IAEA),
established in 1957, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968
and entered into force in 1970. They were initiated in a global
politico-military context radically different from that of today.
The likely proliferators were almost all allies of the United
States, and the security problems which might lead them to proliferate
were seen to emanate largely from the USSR. One of the problems
these potential proliferators posed for both the United States
and the USSR was that any nuclear weapons owned by their own allies
might have been used to start a nuclear war which could escalate
out of control in global Armageddon. Moreover, the growth points
in the emerging international nuclear power industry were located
in these same allied states. What was deemed necessary at the
time was a means to offer them nuclear security without their
acquiring their own nuclear weapons, while yet allowing their
nuclear power infrastructure to develop. The answer was found
in a combination of United States nuclear security guarantees,
underpinned by the stationing of its weapons on their territories,
and the political and legal commitments to non-acquisition of
nuclear weapons contained in the NPT and assured by the IAEA safeguards
system.
During the 1970s, the majority of the states
which had been perceived as possible proliferators in the 1960s—Australia,
West Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland—became
parties to the NPT. At the same time a different group of states
were generating proliferation concerns—Argentina, Brazil,
India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan.
All perceived themselves to be subject to significant regional
security threats. Yet the strength of the non-nuclear weapon norm
was such that ambiguity generated by non-membership of the NPT
appeared to be a more attractive and stable posture for them than
an open declaration of nuclear-weapon status. In addition, United
States conventional arms exports or security guarantees may have
persuaded some of them to desist from such a declaration.
(ii) The changed environment of the 1990s
In the 1990s, two conflicting trends have appeared
in the nuclear proliferation area. One the one hand, the NPT has
been strengthened by many new accessions as the Cold War and several
regional conflicts ended. This has left only four states—Cuba,
India, Israel and Pakistan—as non-parties to the Treaty.
Also, in 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. In addition,
stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been significantly reduced,
and their global salience has fallen, both in military and political
terms. Above all, the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons
established after 1945 has been sustained. On the other hand,
four new types of proliferation threat have emerged during the
1990s:
These developments have taken place against
a background of stagnating nuclear-power production in Europe
and the Americas, but a continued expansion in Asia.
The NPT and the non-proliferation system have
provided an effective framework for handling most of these challenges.
By insisting that the Russian Federation was the successor state
to the USSR, and that all of the other fragments of the Soviet
Union should accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS),
the first challenge was overcome. The second has proved much more
problematic to handle, while the third has led to a major overhaul
of the IAEA safeguards system and its re-orientation from seeking
to identify diversion from declared activities towards uncovering
undeclared ones. The fourth has generated mixed reactions ranging
from arguments that it has demonstrated the total failure and
bankruptcy of the existing non-proliferation regime and the NPT,
to assertions that it leaves both unaffected as these states are
outside of the regime and non-parties to the Treaty.
This is the context in which the current non-proliferation
regime was created and has evolved. That regime was shaped by
several specific challenges, some of which no longer appear to
exist. Ad hoc attempts have been made to adapt it to the new ones
which have emerged. The central issue which confronts the global
community at the turn of the century is thus whether a continued
process of incremental change and adaption will be adequate to
meet the challenges of the 21st century, or whether revolutionary,
rather than evolutionary, changes are necessary to cope with the
challenges of the future.
(iii) Future Proliferation Challenges
Events in the 1990s have demonstrated that the
proliferation challenges of the future are likely to emerge from
several different sources, including:
At the same time, developments in delivery system
technologies and those associated with nuclear-weapons may threaten
to make more fungible the line between what constitutes a nuclear-weapon
state and what is a non-nuclear weapon one, leading to greater
attention being paid to political commitments not to acquire nuclear
weapons, rather than technical barriers.
II. THE EXISTING
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION
INSTRUMENTS
(i) Introduction
The existing multilateral nuclear non-proliferation
regime comprises both regional and international components, as
well as capability denial elements. These are based upon differing
commitments. In the case of the regional components, the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone
(NWFZ) treaties, the key commitment is that states parties will
not acquire nuclear weapons or allow them to be stationed on their
territories. At the same time the nuclear-weapon states (NWS)
have made an unconditional commitment, known as a negative security
assurance (NSA), that they will not threaten or use nuclear weapons
against such states. This component of the regime has increased
greatly in its global coverage and non-proliferation significance
over the last decade, not least because of the unconditional nature
of the NSAs and the commitments made by NWFZ states parties go
well beyond those contained in the international component of
the regime.
This international component's structure was
determined by the realities of the situation in 1968 when only
five NWS existed, and an assumption that none were likely to agree
to disarm as a pre-condition for bringing into force a nuclear
non-proliferation regime. As a consequence the NPT recognised,
at least on a temporary basis, the existence of two classes of
states, NWS and NNWS, and required each to make different commitments.
However, in neither case was there any prohibition on stationing
nuclear weapons on the territory of another state, nor was there
any provision for negative security assurances contained in the
Treaty text.
The capability elements rests on export controls.
These have been in existence in an evolving multilateral form
since 1945, and are designed to make it more difficult for a potential
proliferator to acquire nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems
by constraining transfers of relevant materials and technology.
The regional and international elements are
multilateral methods of restraining states' perceived need for
nuclear weapons: the capability elements seeks to limit the availability
of the materials and technologies to make such weapons. Since
this dual/triple-track, supply/demand approach to multilateral
non-proliferation efforts were initiated in the late 1960s, evolutionary
developments have taken place in all of these contexts. In particular,
its regional components are now setting standards for non-proliferation
agreements that the global components cannot yet emulate. But
more needs to be done if the proliferation challenges of the next
century are to be successfully addressed.
(ii) Regional Instruments(i) The Treaty of Tlatelolco
Although the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was the
first Treaty to ban nuclear explosions on a continent, and by
implication the development or stationing of nuclear weapons,
it was the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in February 1967, which
first attempted to apply similar restrictions to permanently settled
territory. It created a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat
to oversee its implementation. In its original form this Treaty
banned nuclear weapons, but not explosions of nuclear devices,
and had a mechanism for challenge inspections. The Treaty languished
for many years with the two major states in the region, Argentina
and Brazil, as non-parties, but in 1992 proposals were put forward
for a series of amendments, which removed the challenge inspection
element, and gave the IAEA safeguards system alone the task of
verifying compliance with the Treaty. The amended Treaty was subsequently
signed by Argentina and Brazil, and has now been ratified by all
eligible parties except Cuba. This process was heavily dependent
upon a bilateral process between Argentina and Brazil which led
to the creation of a joint nuclear control commission, ABACC and
the subsequent negotiation of a quadripartite safeguards agreement
between Argentina, Brazil the Tlatelolco Treaty secretariat, OPANAL,
and the IAEA.
(ii) The Treaty of Rarotonga
This South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
came into force in December 1986. It specifically bans the stationing
of nuclear devices, not just nuclear weapons, on the territories
of its parties, as well as their testing and acquisition, and
also any dumping of nuclear waste. It tasks the IAEA with applying
safeguards to its states parties. Its main organ is a representative
Consultative Committee.
(iii) The Treaty of Bangkok
This Treaty, signed in December 1995, created
the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Its restrictions
and commitments are similar to those in the Treaty of Rarotonga,
and its organs comprise a Commission and an Executive Committee.
It has a system for dealing with allegations of non-compliance
which involves requests for clarification, requests for a fact-Finding
Mission and procedures for taking remedial action. Although it
has come into force for states within the zone, its Protocol has
yet to be signed by the five NWS because of perceived ambiguities
in its drafting and the use of disputed Exclusive Economic Zone
boundaries to demarcate it.
(iv) The Treaty of Pelindaba
This Treaty covers all of Africa, and those
territories of Egypt to the east of the Suez Canal. It was opened
for signature in April 1996. It contains all the restrictions
found in the Treaty of Bangkok, but goes further in providing
mechanisms for the destruction of existing nuclear devices; commitments
on conditions for exports to non-nuclear-weapon states; physical
protection requirements; and prohibition of attacks on nuclear
installations within the zone. It has detailed provisions for
dealing with compliance issues, and its organs comprise an African
Commission of Nuclear Energy and a Conference of the parties to
be held every two years. It has yet to enter into force, as the
necessary 28 instruments of ratification have not been deposited
with the Secretary-General of the OAU.
(v) Other Agreements
Two further agreements on nuclear-weapon-free
zones have been negotiated. One is a product of the agreements
on the re-unification of Germany, under which nuclear-weapons
were not to be stationed in the territory of the former GDR. A
second is the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation
of the Korean Peninsula" signed in December 1991 by the DPRK
and the RoK. This was followed in March 1992 by an "Agreement
on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear
Control Committee". However, negotiations on the implementation
of these agreements rapidly became stalemated. In addition, Mongolia
has declared itself to be a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone,
and has been recognised as such by a resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly. Negotiations are ongoing on the formation
of a NWFZ in Central Asia, and aspirations have existed for some
decades to create such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe
and South Asia. Finally, proposals have been made to formalise
links between existing Southern Hemisphere NWFZ's, in part to
emphasise that almost all the states in that Hemisphere are within
such zones. Over 100 states are now part of NWFZs, and are thus
potentially in receipt of unconditional NSA's from the NWS.
(iii) International Instruments(i) The NPT
The NPT is usually described as the cornerstone
of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime because the commitments
contained within it are the basis upon which other international
aspects of the global regime have been constructed or justified.
Of necessity, the Treaty text had to acknowledge the existence
of two types of state when it was being drafted, NWS and non-nuclear
weapon NNWS. Each type accepts different commitments, while others
are common. These commitments fall into four distinct categories:
It should be noted that the amendment provisions
make it very difficult to change the Treaty text, and that a NWS
is defined as one which exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January
1967. To have used any other type of definition would have encouraged
further proliferators, but its existence has been central to some
of the difficulties created for the regime by the May 1998 nuclear
tests in South Asia. For to recognise India and Pakistan as NWS
would place them in a category not recognised by the NPT, whereas
to ignore their actions and capabilities might lead to arms racing
and nuclear crises in the region and leave open the possibility
of nuclear-weapon technologies being transferred to NNWS. Thus
one major issue for NPT states parties in the policies which should
be pursued in relation to the four non-parties to the Treaty,
and to what extent attempts should be made to assimilate them
into the regime, and with what status.
In contrast to some of the NWFZ Treaties, the
NPT text contains no provisions for any permanent institutions
or executive bodies, other than the option of continuing to hold
a conference to review the operation of the Treaty every five
years, and no mechanisms to deal with non-compliance with its
terms, as against detecting such non-compliance.
The package of non-proliferation, disarmament
and peaceful nuclear energy measures contained within the text
has inevitably given rise to tensions between the parties in their
deliberations over which types of measures are to have precedence.
These tensions have been exposed frequently at NPT Review Conferences.
In 1995 the Treaty was extended indefinitely, but in the context
of decision documents on Strengthening the Review Process and
on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, as well as a Resolution on the Middle East. One consequence
of this package was the creation of a revised process for reviewing
the operations of the Treaty, starting in 1997, and involving
meetings of a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) authorised to discuss
substantive matters in the three years leading up to a review
conference. This revised process has been affected by these long
standing tensions and a lack of consensus on its modalities, and
it has yet to be fully implemented. In particular, some states
argue that because these PrepCom sessions are not meetings of
the parties, but subordinate bodies of the Review Conferences,
they are not capable of acting as functional substitutes for the
Treaty's lack of any standing executive body or other permanent
organ.
(ii) The IAEA/NPT Safeguards System
This system is mandatory for states parties
to NWFZ agreements and the NNWS states parties to the NPT. It
is operated by the IAEA in Vienna, on behalf of parties to all
the non-proliferation Treaties. It monitors fissile materials,
without which a nuclear-weapon cannot be produced, and is intended
to detect diversion of such materials from declared facilities,
or its clandestine production in undeclared plants. The document
spelling out what is involved for each NNWS party to such Treaties,
known as an INFCIRC/153, is a contract between individual states
or groups of states and the Agency.
Following the revelations of the clandestine
nuclear programme in Iraq, the operations of the safeguards system
were amended to address more positively the case of clandestine
proliferation. This led to a programme, then known by the Agency
as 93+2, to re-evaluate the operations of the entire safeguards
system. Two types of changes were proposed: those which could
be accomplished under existing INFCIRC/153 agreements and those
which needed additional legal authority. The first started to
be implemented in 1996: the Additional Protocol enabling the second
type to be implemented has now been agreed and several states
have brought it into force. Unfortunately, the consequence is
that until all NPT parties have done likewise, two differing safeguards
systems will be operating in parallel, the new one, now known
as the integrated Safeguards System, and the older, less capable
and efficient one. This places a high priority on acceptance by
all NPT parties of the Additional Protocol.
One consequence of these arrangements is that
the IAEA does not verify an individual state's compliance with
the NPT, just with the terms of its NPT safeguards agreement with
the Agency. The scope of the NPT verification arrangements are
thus much narrower than is the case with the verification system
for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In particular, it is
not seeking specifically to uncover evidence of weaponisation
activities involving non-fissile materials. Also, the IAEA reports
findings of non-compliance with its agreements to its Board of
Governors and then the UN Security Council, rather than any NPT
body. This contrasts strongly with the position of states parties
under some of the NWFZ Treaties, where the Agency would report
its findings to their regional executive organs, which may have
agreed specific procedures to handle such situations. Lastly,
the Agency Board of Governors includes states which are non-parties
to NPT, thus giving them an opportunity to intervene in Treaty
non-compliance questions.
Another function performed by the IAEA for the
NPT parties, through the operations of its Zangger Committee and
the lists of relevant items it maintains, is to determine which
nuclear related technologies should be the subject of Agency safeguards
if they were to be exported to non-NPT parties.
(iii) Other Arms Control Agreements
The explosive testing of nuclear devices was
regarded in the period 1949-1968 as the key indicator of the transition
from being a NNWS to being a NWS. As a consequence this was the
act used by the drafters of the NPT to define the latter, and
it was also one of the reasons for the strong emphasis placed
on negotiating a Treaty banning all nuclear explosive testing
from 1955 onwards. For in 1955 such a Treaty was a de facto
non-proliferation treaty. Although the negotiations of the late
1950s and early 1960s did not lead to a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), they did produce a partial treaty limiting such
testing to underground locations, the PTBT, in 1963. Negotiations
on a CTBT restarted in 1994 and the Treaty was opened for signature
in 1996. By 1994, however, its non-proliferation effects were
limited mainly to its positive role as a long-standing disarmament
measure in the politics of the NPT review process and to constraining
three of the non-parties to the NPT, India, Israel and Pakistan,
from abandoning their nuclear ambiguity. As a consequence the
Treaty was drafted in a manner which prevented it from coming
into force unless they had ratified it, with a conference to review
the situation being convened three years after it was open for
signature, and yearly thereafter. This conference was held in
September 1999, but any positive impact it might have made upon
the non-NPT parties was largely lost in the negative consequences
of the decision of the US Senate to refuse to ratify the Treaty
soon afterwards. Meanwhile, India, Israel and Pakistan have all
indicated a willingness to sign the Treaty, but only Israel has
done so and none have yet ratified it.
A second item that has been on the nuclear arms
management agenda since the 1950s is a Treaty terminating all
production of fissile material for military explosive purposes,
known as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT. Whereas the
CTBT was then regarded as a means of both prevents the emergency
of additional NWS and halting the qualitative development of existing
arsenals, an FMCT was originally seen as a method of preventing
further expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and denying material
to build weapons to potential proliferators. In that context,
it was a functional equivalent to the existing IAEA/NPT safeguards
arrangements, as if it had been implemented at the end of the
1950s, it would probably have resulted in all nuclear materials
in NNWS parties being placed under safeguards. Although the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) was given a mandate by the United Nations
General Assembly to negotiate such an agreement in 1993, and in
1995 the CD adopted a report on the setting-up of an ad hoc
Committee to negotiate such a Treaty, it was 1998 before this
Committee was created. The delay was a product of two factors:
attempts by India and others to link its creation with that of
a similar committee on disarmament, and the desire of Pakistan
and others to have stocks of fissile materials covered in such
a Treaty. Although India, Israel and Pakistan all agreed to participate
in such negotiations in 1998, there are few indications that it
will be negotiated swiftly, and one indicator of its current difficulties
is that many states now argue that it is a negotiation to produce
a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), rather than an FMCT.
(iv) Security Assurances and No First Use Agreements
The desire for NNWS to be given Security Assurances
by the NWS as part of the negotiations on the text of the NPT
had two roots: the demand that states of the non-aligned movement
(NAM) should have similar guarantees to those provided by the
US and USSR to their military allies and the desire that all NNWS
should receive such assurances as a quid pro quo for surrendering
their option to acquire such weapons. Such global assurances have
been provided since 1968 in two forms; negative ones (NSAs) committing
NWS not to attack them and positive ones (PSAs) promising assistance
in the event of attack or threat of attack with nuclear weapons.
The NSAs were originally provided through unilateral national
statements in the period after 1978, and these were last repeated
in 1995: the PSA's in the form of a Security Council Resolution
255 of 1968. In 1995 they were brought together through Security
Council Resolution 984, which mainly focused on PSAs but also
included reference to NSAs.
Current discussions on NSAs have focused on
four issues. One is the desirability of all the NWS agreeing on
a common formula to express their unilateral security assurances.
A second is whether these assurances can be brought together in
a multilateral legal form. A third is to remove the current restrictive
conditions imposed by four of the five NWS for the implementation
of those assurances. A fourth is whether NSA's should only be
given to NPT parties, and thus be negotiated in an NPT forum,
or should be given to all NNWS and be negotiated in the CD.
One reason for the lack of a common NWS formula
is that China's unconditional NSAs are unacceptable to the other
four NWS. China's position is consistent with its argument that
all the NWS should subscribe to an agreement on no-first use of
nuclear weapons. From this perspective, any No-first Use Treaty
would automatically offer the legally binding assurances sought
by NNWS.
(iv) Capaility Denial Instruments(i) Introduction
From 1946 onwards, mechanisms to deny to potential
proliferators materials and information relevant to the manufacture
of nuclear weapons have been an integral part of national nuclear
non-proliferation policies. Such national export controls have
been seen as a means of physically preventing a state proliferating,
or at least retarding this process and making it more costly.
Emphasis has always been placed on uniformity of application of
such mechanisms, and thus the usual format has been to engage
in multilateral discussions on what should be denied, and then
translate the agreements that emerged into national export control
legislation. Unlike other non-proliferation instruments, these
have not been open to universal membership, and their application
has been argued to encompass areas within the discretion of the
sovereign authority of individual states, and thus immune from
multilateral intervention. While the ability of such mechanisms
to significantly slow-down a determined proliferator from acquiring
nuclear weapons is now the subject of debate, they continue to
be regarded as a means of making proliferation more difficult
and buying-time for other non-proliferation instruments to operate.
One problem with the application of such controls
is that they are difficult to extend to intangibles, such as information,
consultancy services and the movement of trained specialists between
countries. This has been addressed in some countries by including
"catch-all" clauses in export control legislation, which
enable states to cover goods and technologies not specifically
listed or identified as a proliferation threat. This raises sensitive
questions concerning individual freedom, free-trade and the free
exchange of ideas, but such legislation may be the only way of
deterring and preventing nationals of one country assisting the
proliferation activities of another.
(ii) The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, following the
Indian nuclear test the previous year, to seek consensus on common
guidelines its members would follow in drawing-up national export
controls. At that stage it consisted of the seven major supplier
states, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the US, the UK and the
USSR. It agreed that five conditions should be attached to exports
of nuclear items by its members:
These conditions were published by the IAEA
at the request of the NSG governments in 1978 as INFCIRC/254.
The guidelines at this stage covered both complete nuclear facilities
and components which could be used to construct them, but not
dual-use technologies.
The NSG and its guidelines subsequently became
a source of disagreement in NPT Conferences, as many developing
states alleged that they contravened Article IV of the NPT giving
NNWS unconstrained access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
The NSG states, however, argued that they mainly affected non-NPT
parties and were necessary to enable them to fulfil their commitments
not to assist proliferators. At the same time a major source of
disagreement among NSG members was whether the safeguards specified
in the NPT's Article III.2 as a condition of supply to non-NPT
parties should be interpreted as dependent on all fissile materials
within a state being under NPT/IAEA full-scope safeguards, not
just safeguards on the exported item.
Two specific issues stimulated the reconvening
of the NSG in 1991: Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and the
dissolution of the USSR and the fragmentation of its over-arching
export control arrangements. By that time 26 states were adhering
to the NSG guidelines. At a further meeting in 1993 new export
control arrangements were agreed comprising four elements: a revised
set of export guidelines; a list of dual-use items for which export
licences would be required, and rules for their denial; a memorandum
of understanding covering methods of exchanging information on
export applications among members of the NSG; and a commitment
to export goods covered by the nuclear export guidelines (but
not the dual-use lists) only to countries to which the IAEA applied
full-scope safeguards.
The NSG now comprises over 30 member states
who meet annually. An essential requirement for membership is
a state having in place effective nuclear export control legislation
and mechanisms. However, it is still regarded as a secret club
by many NAM developing states, which believe its rules hamper
their access to technologies essential for their economic development.
To dispel these perceptions, the NSG has held annual seminars
since 1997 on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation
which are open to all states, but the requirement contained in
the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives decision document
for a dialogue between supplier and recipient states has yet to
be fully met.
(iii) Export Controls: The MTCR
While bi-lateral nuclear arms control agreements
between the US and USSR focused on delivery systems, and means
to destroy them, the non-proliferation regime has concentrated
on restricting the supply of fissile materials to potential proliferators.
In the early-1980s, however, seven leading western states (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US) started negotiations
on methods of limiting the transfer of missiles, their components
and their related technologies to potential nuclear proliferators.
This led to them adopting in 1987 a set of export control guidelines
under an arrangement known as the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). This was based on the existence of two categories of missile
related technologies. There was an assumption that the transfer
of items in the first category, related to missiles capable of
carrying a 1,000 kg payload over a range of 300 kilometres, would
be denied (this figure was reduced to 500 kg in 1993 to cover
carriage of chemical and biological weapons), while those in the
second would be scrutinised carefully.
Unlike the NPT/NSG relationship, the MTCR has
no corresponding multilateral treaty to which it relates. At least
two proposals have been made to remedy this. One is to multilateralise
the existing INF treaty; a second is to negotiate a new Treaty
based upon the structure of the NPT, with provisions to legitimate
defensive missile systems and "peaceful use" activities
as the use of satellite launchers.
(iv) Physical Protection
Physical protection, an activity closely linked
to issues of safety, covers the setting of international standards
for preventing theft or clandestine diversion of fissile materials.
This requires adequate containment of such materials both in nuclear
facilities and in transit. It involves trained and armed personnel
with formal policing powers; perimeter fencing and monitoring;
and specially designed storage facilities and containers, and
vehicles for transportation use. In 1971 the IAEA established
an Advisory Group of experts to assess the problem of physical
protection, and in 1975 their recommendations were published as
a guide to the minimum standards states should adopt. The Convention
on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which followed was
opened for signature in 1980, but did not enter into force until
1987. It established agreed conditions for safe storage and transfer
of nuclear materials, and was mainly concerned with material in
transit. It has a provision for review conferences to be held
at five-yearly intervals. The first of these was held in 1992,
the second in 1997, when 41 countries attended.
Concern over the safety of the transport of
nuclear materials by sea led in 1992 to a joint working group
of the IAEA and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
to establish a code for the safe carriage of irradiated fuel,
plutonium and high-level radioactive waste on board ships. This
was followed in 1994 by the adoption of a Convention on Nuclear
Safety, which entered into force in 1996. Finally in 1997 a Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive
Waste Management was opened for signature. All of these measures
directly or indirectly assist in preventing both non-state and
state actors stealing or diverting nuclear materials for use in
weapons, though the safety measures are not normally regarded
as non-proliferation ones.
III. THE CORE
PROBLEMS IN
CONTROLLING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION IN
THE NEXT
CENTURY
What has evolved over the last 30 years is thus
a complex network of international norms, standards, treaties,
conventions, regimes, groupings, commitments, mechanisms and other
arrangements, all of which comprise the existing global nuclear
non-proliferation regime. Some of these elements have the effect
of modifying potential motivations for nuclear proliferation;
others make if physically difficult and costly for that proliferation
to occur. What seems clear, however, is that given its comprehensiveness,
it would be foolish to abandon the existing regime and attempt
to construct a new one on the basis of completely different principles
and instruments. Rather, what seems necessary is to examine each
of these instruments and offer proposals for amending them to
meet future challenges: evolution, not revolution, should be the
basis upon which to proceed.
At the same time, it has to be recognised that
although in some countries the nuclear technological elite may
play a dominate role in decisions concerning national nuclear
programmes, decisions to proliferate are usually going to be dependent
upon developments in political, economic or security areas. If
international political frictions and military security concerns
did not exist, there would probably be no nuclear proliferation
problem. Unfortunately they do, and for this reason it is necessary
to make provision for influencing the context in which such decisions
might be taken and executed. But at the same time it is only through
actions outside of the nuclear area, including moves to resolve
regional conflicts and expand arms control arrangements to cover
non-nuclear activities, that nuclear proliferation can be prevented.
As the world becomes increasingly open to global
influences, and the problem of failed states becomes more acute,
a new set of problems may arise as a consequence of a loss of
physical security around nuclear storage and production facilities,
and the emergence of non-state actors. It has to be recognised
that some of the methods of dealing with threats such as nuclear
terrorism and blackmail may involve changing current attitudes
towards the basis of the international state system, namely the
national sovereignty of the individual state and the reluctance
of states to intervene in the internal affairs of others. This
question also has a bearing on an increasingly significant issue
which has emerged in the 1990s: the lack of effective mechanisms
within the international components of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime to deal with non-compliance with its rules, and the inability
of the United Nations machinery to deal effectively with this
matter. Events surrounding the Iraq and DPRK cases, as well as
the inability of the international community to respond effectively
to the tests in South Asia, illustrate this point. Unless this
deficiency can be addressed effectively, there is a real possibility
that the regime will whither and die.
Finally, it has to be recognised that the basis
for the international elements of the regime remains as discriminatory
as it was in 1968 and when the NPT was signed. The example set
by NWS in continuing to reduce the salience and numbers of their
nuclear-weapons, and making these numbers and their stocks of
fissile materials transparent, has an important impact upon the
atmosphere of NPT meetings, and the ability of the parties to
work collectively to strengthen the regime. It is important that
this process should continue, and not come to a halt: they must
continue to be seen to be fulfilling their commitment to ultimately
eliminate nuclear weapons from their arsenals. To cease to do
so would generate a major crisis within the NPT community, which
might prove impossible to resolve and lead to the political collapse
of the Treaty.
IV. SOME PROPOSALS FOR ACTION IN RELATION TO EXISTING INSTRUMENTS
1. Regional Instruments
1.i To bring fully into force the Treaties
of Bangkok and Pelindaba, and their Protocols, as well as establishing
their regional institutions.
1.ii To rapidly conclude and bring into
force of a Treaty to create a Central Asian NWFZ.
1.iii To promote the creation of other NWFZs,
and to link together those that do exist.
2. International InstrumentsNPT
2.i To review the ability of its parties
to react effectively to cases of proliferation, and to evaluate
options for enhancing this, such as a more permanent executive
organs.
The IAEA/NPT Safeguards System
2.ii To give the IAEA positive powers to
seek evidence of weaponisation by NPT NNWS.
2.iii To give the IAEA additional powers
to implement safeguards by encouraging all NPT parties to bring
into force the Additional Protocol to their existing INFCIRC/153
agreements.
Other Arms Control Agreements
2.iv To urge all states to sign and ratify
the CTBT as a matter of urgency, especially those necessary to
bring it into force such as the US, India, Pakistan and Israel.
2.v To seek to resolve concerns over subcritical
testing involving fissile materials.
2.vi To urge all states to negotiate an
FMCT without preconditions, and in the meantime institute or sustain
a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for explosive
devices until its negotiation has been completed.
2.vii To urge states to emulate the UK and
place under IAEA safeguards facilities previously used to produce
fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices, and to decommission
and dismantle facilities they have used previously for that sole
purpose.
Security Assurances and No First Use Agreements
2.viii To seek agreement urgently on a common
formula for negative security assurances to NPT NNWS parties.
3. CAPABILITY DENIAL INSTRUMENTS
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
3.i To encourage all non-member states to
adopt strict and effective nuclear export controls similar to
those required for NSG membership.
3.ii To make acceptance of the IAEA Additional
Protocol and implementation of its integrated safeguards system
a condition of nuclear supply.
Export Controls: The MTCR
3.iii To initiate moves to establish new
instruments or frameworks to restrict possession, development
and deployment of offensive missiles.
Physical Protection
3.iv To support the convening of an IAEA
experts group to review the effectiveness of the 1987 Convention
of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.
4. FUTURE CHALLENGES
4.i To seek to create a much stronger international
mechanism to prevent nuclear smuggling, and to assist states to
enhance their export control systems.
4.ii To negotiate an international treaty
against nuclear terrorism, and take measures to encourage the
early entry-into-force of the International Convention of the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing.