INTRODUCTION

  1.  A grave deterioration in international nuclear relations has occurred over the past three to four years. Tensions have increased between nuclear-armed states (now counting India and Pakistan amongst them) and the institutions of arms control, including the non-proliferation regime, are in serious jeopardy. Although circumstances have changes, the political atmosphere is reminiscent of the early Cold War. Mistrust abounds, power balancing is regaining ascendancy in international politics, and spending on arms is increasing. There is even concern that inhibitions against the usage of nuclear weapons may be weakening.

  2.  It is hard to say whether this is a temporary setback or a descent into lasting disorder. It will probably turn out to be something in between. If history is any guide, the great dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction will force states to act with restraint and to seek new solutions (WMD carry an "ordering imperative"). However, the opportunities to "imprison" WMD that appeared to lie before the international community in the early 1990s have probably been lost. The challenge today is to protect the central norms and institutions of arms control from an even worse disintegration whilst addressing the causes of the deterioration.

  3.  The recent sense of crisis has stemmed in significant part from shifts in US attitudes and policies, as exemplified by the US Government's proposals on ballistic missile defences and the Senate's rejection of the CTBT, and from apprehension over the directions in which a new administration and Congress may move after the coming elections. For the first time in nuclear history, the US is widely regarded as the source of problems rather than the provider of solutions. When the world's most powerful state grudges its support for the institutions of co-operative security, they are bound to be shaken. The British Government finds itself in a difficult position as a result. Britain's interests are being significantly threatened by US behaviour, yet its desire for close relations with the US and its dependence on the US for its security are undiminished.

  4.  As in the past, Britain can make important contributions to the prevention of WMD proliferation especially through the strengthening of treaties and regimes. However, its capacity to do so now depends heavily on US policy and on developments in US politico-military relations with China and Russia in particular. Can the UK exert any useful influence in these regards? Should it try to exert such influence, and to which ends? These are the central questions now facing the British Government in this field.

  5.  This memorandum will briefly outline the reasons for the deterioration in nuclear relations, the consequences for nuclear arms control, and the role that the British Government has played and might play.

CAUSES OF THE DETERIORATION

  6.  In retrospect, the period from 1987 to 1996 was a golden age of arms control. Military arsenals of many kinds were substantially reduced, new arms control treaties and agreements were concluded, large parts of the former Soviet Union were denuclearised, and the elimination of whole classes of weapon (notably chemical and biological weapons and intermediate-range nuclear weapons) began to be undertaken. The period was marked by extensive international co-operation, including close collaboration between China, Russia and the US within the UN Security Council. The advances in arms control were encouraged by a hope—and belief—in many quarters that an inherently more peaceful international order would emerge from economic globalisation and the spread of democracy.

  7.  There is no simple explanation for the deterioration that began in the mid-1990s. It was brought about by an unexpected cocktail of events and trends which turned a virtuous into a vicious circle. In brief, six main causes can be identified:

(i)  Great winners, great losers

  The 1990s have seen dramatic shifts in the relative fortunes of peoples and states especially as a consequences of economic, and technological changes. The result, depending on one's location, has been comfort or distress, stability or instability, triumphalism or humiliation. The United States and China have been the great beneficiaries (so far) whilst other economic power centres have experienced collapse (Russia, parts of Asia and Africa .  .  . ) or stagnation (Japan, Germany .  .  . ). The political effects of these economic changes have been reinforced by developments in military capabilities which have again favoured the US whose conventional military power has burgeoned while that of other states has diminished in relative terms (and absolute terms in Russia's case).

Suddenly, there have been very big winners and very big losers in the international system. Furthermore, the prospect of a politically unreformed and unpredictable China gaining hegemonic influences began to unhinge previous assumptions about security relations, especially in Asia. Balancing US and/or Chinese power, and the balance of power between the US and China, became preoccupations for many states, China and the US included. Inevitably, the status of nuclear weapons rose as a consequence.

(ii)  US threat perceptions?

  There has been a profound change in threat perceptions in the United States over the past five or so years. A great anxiety has developed around the perception that irrational (even suicidal) minor actors armed with lethal weapons (especially biological weapons) pose major threats which cannot be countered by the traditional deterrence and arms control. Against a background of concern over civil order within the US, an unco-ordinated but terrifying army of "rogue states", "terrorists" and other actors has assembled in the public and political minds against the American people and government.

These fears may have been exaggerated, but perception matter most. The need to find a response to these new threats has become paramount for many constituencies in the US. This compulsion has helped to create the political grounds for ballistic missile defences, even if those defences would offer little or no protection against most of the new threats.

(iii)  Nationalism

  Arms control has been thwarted by nationalistic trends in a number of states which have been reflected in increasing assertiveness, an obsession with status and self-esteem, and a disdain for co-operative politics. Prominent examples have been the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party's testing of nuclear weapons soon after its assumption of power in 1998 and its decision to embark on an ambitious deployment programme; the Russian Duma's refusal to ratify the START II arms reduction treaty and the Russian Government's increasing identification of nuclear weapons with the project of national recovery; and the Republican-dominated US Congress's obstruction of various arms control treaties, deafness to the interests of other states (including close allies, as shown by its disregard to the Blair-Chirac-Schröder letter on the CTBT), and growing resistance to external verification of US treaty compliance.

(iv)  Iraq and the efficacy of verification

  Iraq's successful evasion of international safeguards prior the Gulf War, and its later systematic efforts to disguise the true extent of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapon programmes, have dealt a blow to confidence in the institutions and techniques of verification. Although the IAEA safeguards system has since been reformed (the 1997 Additional Protocol), and although UNSCOM and the IAEA had considerable success in revealing and destroying Iraq's programmes prior to 1998, verification has taken a knock. There are particular concerns about the difficulties of detecting biological weapon programmes given their dual-use nature and the small scale of production facilities.

  The manner of UNSCOM's demise has also damaged trust in cooperative security. The alleged use of UNSCOM by US intelligence agencies to gather information beyond its remit undermined the authority of the United Nations and the perceived integrity of those charged with overseeing Iraq's disarmament. It also aggravated the splits with the UN Security Council which continue to bedevil efforts to revive verification and disarmament in Iraq.

(v)  Regional conflict

  Worsening political relations in the mid-1990s in three regions—the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia—both reinforced the commitments of key states to weapons of mass destruction and undermined confidence that solutions could be found through multilateral regimes. The spread of missile technologies in each region has heightened insecurity. In the Middle East, the situation has been improved (one fears temporarily) by the change of government in Israel but Iran and Iraq's determination to acquire WMD appears undiminished. In East Asia and South Asia the outlook has gone from bad to worse. Conflict between India and Pakistan has intensified since the weapon tests in 1998, and North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes, the tensions over Taiwan, and other disputes in East Asia are becoming dangerous to everyone's security. Amongst other things, Japan has been made to feel less secure and there are concerns that its renunciation of nuclear weapons may not hold if matters deteriorate further.

(vi)  Disputes over disarmament

  The very success of the NPT in committing the great majority of states to live without nuclear weapons began to focus attention in the mid-1990s on the behaviour of the eight states with nuclear weapon programmes (India, Israel, Pakistan add the five acknowledged weapon states). At the NPT Extension Conference in 1995, the NWS ostensibly deepened their commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament through the conclusion and implementation of treaties banning nuclear testing and fissile material production, and through the "determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons". Since 1995 the sense of disillusion amongst NNWS has become profound as the policies of Russia and the US in particular have moved in opposite directions. Unfortunately, their anger has been exploited by India and a few other states which have demanded negotiations on disarmament before they will consent to further involvement in multilateral arms control. This has been especially damaging within the Conference on Disarmament, the body charged with the negotiation of multilateral security treaties, which operates under consensus rules.

CONSEQUENCES FOR ARMS CONTROL

  8.  The deterioration in international security, and the trend towards "competitive unilateralism", has brought a loss of trust amongst nation states and a reduced capacity to work together to find common solutions. In the arms control field, the costs have been felt in a number of respects:

(a)  Frustration of new initiatives

  It has been difficult to develop new arms control measures. A prime example is the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) whose negotiation was placed firmly on the arms control agenda in 1993 by the United Nations and by President Clinton. A negotiating mandate was agreed by the Conference on Disarmament in 1997 but no progress has since been possible. There is little hope that negotiation of this important Treaty can begin in the near term.

(b)  Difficulties on concluding negotiations

  Negotiations of treaties begun in the early-to-mid-1990s have been hard to conclude. Wrapping up the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has, for instance, taken much longer than expected, partly because of the US administration's concerns over Congressional acceptance of intrusive verification.

(c)  Difficulties of implementing new treaties and agreements

  No bilateral arms control treaty negotiated by the Russian and US Governments has come into force since 1994. Prominent examples of negotiated treaties that have become stuck in their respective legislatures are START II and the ABM demarcation agreements. Attaining signatures to and ratifications of multilateral treaties has also become increasingly difficult. The CTBT's travails are well known (only Britain and France among the nuclear-armed states have ratified it). There should be equal concern over the slow pace at which the IAEA safeguards reforms (the Additional Protocol to INFCIRC/153) are being brought into force amongst member countries.

(d)  Established agreements are no longer respected by their main parties

  The ABM Treaty has always had its enemies in the US, but there is growing bi-partisan agreement in Washington that the Treaty will at least have to be amended. This is bringing threats from Russia and China that they will no longer be bound by other treaties and commitments. The ABM Treaty is not an isolated example. Russia is also widely regarded as having breached the letter of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines through its recent sale of nuclear reactors to India (the Guidelines have required full-scope safeguards since 1992), and there are concerns about its continuing nuclear trade with Iran.

(e)  Difficulties of responding to non-compliance

  The loss of cohesion within the UN Security Council has made it more difficult to agree (or continue agreeing) on appropriate responses to acts of non-compliance. Iraq is the primary example, although the tensions between the US and China have also hindered the efforts to find a common approach to the dangers presented by the North Korean nuclear and missile programmes.

(f)  Weakening of trust in states' commitments to honour NPT obligations

  States Parties' confidence in the NPT and in other Parties' preparedness to honour the commitments made under its banner have been badly damaged by recent events. In particular, there is a perception amongst NNWS that the commitments made in 1995 when agreeing to the NPT's indefinite extension (enshrined in the Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament) have been dishonoured by the NWS and especially by the United States, China and Russia. The forthcoming NPT Review Conference is expected to be a stormy affair. The worst outcome would be that the Treaty and its related institutions (notably the IAEA safeguards system) would lose their efficacy, even to the point of some states leaving the Treaty. Such a disintegration still seems unlikely, but the circumstances in which it could happen can now be imagined. If confidence is not restored soon, some States Parties may feel obliged to take precautionary steps to establish weapon capabilities.

  10.  A wish list of things to be achieved can easily be drawn up from the above: early completion, signature and ratification of the BTWC Protocol; ratification of the CTBT by the US, China, Russia and India; the return of UN-sponsored verification teams to Iraq; ratification of START II and the ABM Demarcation Agreement; and so on. Unfortunately, there can be little progress without a change of mood and a desire to embrace arms control again in some of the world's principal capitals.

  11.  One possibility is that international nuclear relations could return to a situation resembling that pertaining in the Cold War, whereby the NWS would reassert freedom to extend their nuclear capabilities while expecting the NNWS to continue honouring their renunciations of nuclear weapons. This is unlikely to be acceptable. The fabric of the NPT would be torn apart by any return to the status quo ante.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BRITAIN AND FOR BRITISH POLICY

  12.  The UK is a nuclear weapon state in fact and under international law. Along with France, its policies and attributes have increasingly marked it apart, especially in the past few years, from the other NWS. In particular:

—  the British nuclear capability is comparatively small if still lethal. It has been reduced to a single weapon system (Trident), the Army and Air Force are no longer "nuclear-capable", and the number of deployed warheads has been reduced. Furthermore, the British deterrent is even less independent than previously given that the Trident missiles are serviced in the US;

—  by ratifying the CTBT Britain has committed itself to no further explosive testing (China, Russia and the US have not ratified the Treaty). In 1995, the British Government also announced that it would no longer produce fissile material for weapons purposes. As such, Britain can no longer expand or develop its nuclear force substantially without breaching international undertakings;

—  all but one facility involved in the production of fissile material have been shut down or placed under international safeguards. The exception is the Chapelcross power station at Annan where tritium is produced. This contrasts with Russia and the US where the bulk of facilities are still subject to no international inspection;

—  British governments have committed themselves wholeheartedly to multilateral arms control in the 1990s (after some initial resistance to the CTBT). They have played prominent parts in the negotiation of the CWC, the CTBT and the BWC Protocol, in the establishment of the CWC and CTBT verification institutions (the OPCW and CTBTO) in the NPT's extension, and in preparation for the FMCT's negotiation. In my experience, the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DTI have worked together very effectively in pursuit of these objectives;

—  Britain has considerable diplomatic influence as a close ally of the US (within and without NATO), as member of the European Union (with increasingly strong ties to France on security policy), as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (and member of the "P5"), as a respected middle-ranking power which still has some global reach, and as a state which shares some of the attributes of the NWS and the NNWS (the latter, for instance, through its openness to international inspection).

  13.  For all these reasons, the UK now finds itself in an uncomfortable situation. It has set its store on the salience of nuclear weapons being reduced in international politics, but their salience (not least for Russia) is increasing again. It has invested heavily in multilateral arms control which is in difficulty on many fronts. And it cherishes, and has placed its reliance upon, its "special relationship" with a United States some of whose policies have shifted in directions which are damaging to British interests. In many respects, a greater meeting of minds exists on these security issues across the Channel than across the Atlantic.

  14.  It needs recognising that the UK has little or no influence over some of the problems confronting international nuclear relations. Although it has a role when matters come before the UN Security Council, the UK has little sway on these matters in the Middle East and Far East and, despite historical ties and recent diplomatic initiatives, in South Asia. Britain also has little power to affect the strategic decisions taken by China and Russia.

  15.  Britain's influence is nevertheless considerable in other respects. Its primary influence lies in the field of multilateral diplomacy and through its relations with the US. Britain can make three particular contributions at this time in these regards, especially if it operates in close alliance with its European partners and especially with France.

  Firstly, the British Government should constantly stress its belief in the importance of arms control and its attachment to the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament. By so doing, it should demonstrate that the NWS are not united in disrespect for arms control and that this NWS still holds to its responsibilities under Article VI of the NPT and under the NPT Principles and Guidelines. It is important that Britain (and France) should distance itself, and be heard to be distancing itself, from the anti-arms control rhetoric that is issuing from the US Republican Party and its leaders in particular.

  Secondly, the British Government should maintain a strong commitment to the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of multilateral arms control treaties. Besides providing political and diplomatic support for the CWC, BTWC, CTBT and other treaties (all of which serve British national interests), it should continue its prominent role in developing the techniques and instruments of verification. This includes the work begun by the Atomic Weapons Establishment, in response to the Strategic Defence Review, on the verification of arms reductions and disarmament; the work being carried out by Britain to develop understandings of how best to apply the IAEA safeguards reforms at established nuclear facilities; the provision of technical support to the OPCW and CTBTO; and the continuation of efforts to define the FMCT's scope and its methods of verification. One way of sustaining momentum in arms control in difficult political times is to focus attention on technical issues.

  Thirdly, the UK needs to use all its influence in Washington to persuade the US administration and Congress to shape their polices on ballistic missile defences in such a manner that trust in deterrent relations and in arms control are preserved. If the US wishes to develop a national missile defence, there is probably little that the UK can do to prevent it. But the British Government has opportunity to influence the US Government's definition of detailed objectives, the consultative processes that it adopts with allied and other governments, its precise stance on the ABM Treaty, and its approach to the technology's international development and introduction including the usage of facilities such as Fylingdales on UK sovereign territory.

  The main British objectives should be (a) to limit missile defences to protection against genuine threats which cannot be diminished or deterred by available means, and (b) to uphold the purpose of the ABM Demarcation Agreement which is to allow development of theatre defences whilst preserving strategic deterrence.

  16.  The tone of this memorandum, as of all meetings on nuclear affairs that I have attended over the past year, is predominantly gloomy. The situation is not, however, irrevocable. It can be turned around if the international community, and the US, China, Russia and India in particular, can again find the wisdom and determination to work together to diminish the risks posed by these terrible weapons.

  17.  Finally, it should be observed that there is little public awareness in Britain of the great dangers that confront us. I hope that this inquiry will spur public and parliamentary debate, especially in regard to the decisions on ballistic missile defences which will affect Britain's vital interests in so many ways.

St Andrews

10 February 2000