Index

Memorandum submitted by Professor Paul Rogers, University of Bradford

INTRODUCTION

  During the 45 years of the Cold War nuclear confrontation, there were two periods of intensive anti-nuclear campaigning in western countries. The first lasted from 1959 to 1963. It developed initially in response to widespread concerns about the health effects of the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, but was given a substantial added boost as large numbers of powerful thermonuclear weapons were deployed and as the first ICBMs joined the long-range bombers in the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

  After the Cuban Missile Crisis of the autumn of 1962, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union began to improve. In the so-called "Kennedy experiment", President Kennedy initiated a series of moves, starting with a moratorium on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, aimed at curbing the nuclear confrontation, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev reciprocated, and a process of confidence-building measures was set in motion that lasted until Kennedy's assassination. The direct result was a treaty involving the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, that banned all further atmospheric testing. This was completed in 1963 and there were further treaties agreed late in the decade, not least the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

  As East-West strategic relations improved, the United States became embroiled in the Vietnam War, with substantial domestic implications, and with the anti-war movement stretching over much of the rest of the decade, there was little further anti-nuclear activity in North America or Europe.

  At the end of the seventies, with new Cold War tensions erupting in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution, and development of many new nuclear weapons, a new surge of anti-nuclear campaigning emerged that was to last through to the mid-1980s and finally died down as the Cold War came to an end. From around 1989 onwards, there was a belief that a post-Cold War world could usher in a new world order, a concept dealt a rapid blow by the Gulf War, the collapse of Yugoslavia into war and civil disruption in many parts of the old Soviet Union.

  During the course of the 1990s, the nuclear issue retreated from the arena of public concern, with only occasional flurries coinciding with such events as the French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and the World Court ruling on nuclear weapons. The perception was that with the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia now out of the way, the dangers of nuclear war had passed. This perception was damaged right at the end of the century with the flurry of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. (1)

  The aim of this paper is to explore the extent of the nuclear developments of the 1990s and to examine the trends that appear to be emerging for the next 20 years. The core question to answer is whether there has been a move towards nuclear disengagement that might even take us towards a nuclear-free world, or whether there is, in reality, a transition under way that results in a continuing if quantitatively different commitment to a nuclear future.

TRENDS IN THE 1990S

  The ending of the Cold War coincided with the all-time peak in world nuclear stockpiles, at close to 70,000 nuclear warheads in the late 1980s. (2) Progress in withdrawing warheads was slow at first, and much more rapid towards the end of the 1990s, with a halving of total arsenals by the end of the century. In the early 1990s, the United States and the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia) negotiated the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), that limited strategic arsenals to a maximum of 6,000 warheads each, down from a figure of well over 10,000 each. This was followed by START II negotiations aiming at ceilings of 3,500 but this treaty has not been formally implemented. Britain, France and China all made modest cuts in the nuclear forces but were not party to the START process.

  During the course of the 1980s, Argentina and Brazil had given up their nuclear ambitions and US pressure on Taiwan and South Korea appeared to have led them to curtail their own plans. In the early 1990s, Ukraine, Belorus and Kazakstan returned Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia and South Africa dismantled its small nuclear arsenal.

  There were three specific negative developments and one area of overall concern. Firstly, the work of the inspectors of the UN Special Commission on Iraq were able to demonstrate early in the decade that Iraq had developed a substantial nuclear weapons programme in the previous decade, using multiple routes to produce weapons-grade uranium, and would have had a nuclear capability by the mid-1990s. Secondly, North Korea remained a state with a siege mentality and an apparent nuclear commitment, US efforts to control this through bilateral agreement being thoroughly uncertain. Finally, the continuing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir were made more serious by Indian and Pakistani nuclear test programmes and commitments to nuclear forces at the end of the decade.

  The area of overall concern was an abundance of evidence that, in spite of progress in some areas, the core nuclear powers were intent on maintaining nuclear forces indefinitely. Moreover, all five declared nuclear powers now see clearly defined used for nuclear weapons in the coming decades—the risk of all-out nuclear war may be diminished, but "small nuclear wars in far-off places" may become steadily more likely. Nuclear futures are therefore usefully explored by examining recent and current developments in the declared nuclear states as well as trends in proliferation.

US NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990S

  Recent US experience with nuclear weapons and strategy divides into four phases, all of which give useful indicators of future trends, and all of which relate closely to changes in domestic politics, especially the political make-up of congress. All four phases have taken place against background of substantial cuts in overall nuclear warhead stocks, especially of tactical nuclear weapons, and the shutting down of most of the nuclear weapons production facilities, although most of the latter was due more to safety concerns than redundancy.

  The first phase was during the final two years of the Bush administration, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the experience of the Gulf War. It was essentially a process of looking for new tasks for existing nuclear forces, usually a combination of fears of a resurgent Russia and of perceived Third World threats against US interests. This was reflected, late in 1991, in the publication of a leaked draft of the Strategic Deterrence Study undertaken for US Strategic Air Command (also known as the Reed Report). (3) Its terms of reference stated the belief that "the growing wealth of petro-nations and newly hegemonic powers is available to bullies and crazies, if they gain control, to wreak havoc on world tranquillity".

  The study itself called for a new nuclear targeting strategy that would include the ability to assemble "a Nuclear Expeditionary Force . . . primarily for use against China or Third World targets". (4) There were indications that such a capability for what was called adaptive targeting existed by 1992. (5) Along with such developments, there were also indications of new nuclear weapon research and development programmes aimed at producing weapons appropriate to new tasks. These included small nuclear warheads that might be fitted to missiles intended to destroy missiles armed with biological warheads, others for attacking deep underground bunkers, as well as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads for disabling electronic equipment. A seminal article in Strategic Review in the autumn of 1991 by two Los Alamos researchers had advocated these kinds of systems for use primarily against regional threats from third world "rogue" states. (6)

  Also at the tail-end of the Bush administration, a vigorous counter-proliferation initiative began to gain momentum, aimed primarily at potential nuclear weapon states but taking in the proliferation of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. It included substantial emphasis on theatre missile defences (TMD), stemming partly from the Gulf War experience, but also a reflection of the increasing disdain in many circles for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the belief that it limited US abilities to develop defences against "rogue" states.

  This phase of nuclear thinking and planning was very much a part of a much more general right-wing agenda. The Soviet Union was diminishing as a threat, but this was not the time for the United States to drop its guard. In seeking to maintain international stability in American interests, it was essential to have diverse military capabilities at all levels, including nuclear forces. Any idea of moving away from a comprehensive nuclear capability and towards a nuclear-free world was anathema.

  There was a pronounced change in the political climate after the Clinton administration took office early in 1993. It brought in a number of people from the Washington arms control community, giving the community more influence than it had had since the start of the Carter administration in the late 1970s. In this atmosphere, some opinion formers began to suggest that a nuclear-free world was both necessary and desirable. Rep Les Aspin, then Chair of the House Armed Services Committee and later Secretary of Defence, said "a world without nuclear weapons would actually be better. Nuclear weapons are still the big equalizer but now the United States is not the equalizer but the equalizee." (7)

  Such ideas were endorsed by several retired generals and defence officials, not least the former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Secretary of Defence. (8) Much of the motivation was similar to that of Aspin—a proliferating world would be difficult to control, whereas a nuclear-free world would be relatively safe for the United States with its formidable conventional forces, but opinion in Congress was sufficiently strong to curb a number of budget proposals for research and development of new nuclear weapons.

  Even so, some analysts suspected that work continued in classified or "black" programmes and that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, an anodyne term for ensuring the safety of the nuclear arsenal, included a capability to design and produce new warheads. Other aspects of this changed climate of opinion looked more positive. At the Department of Energy, responsible for producing nuclear weapons, the Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, initiated a programme of declassifying thousands of documents relating to the history of the nuclear weapons programme. Even when Clinton's September 1994 Nuclear Posture Review made clear the administration's continuing commitment to nuclear weapons, its presentation and outlook was noticeably less hawkish than that of the Bush administration. (9)

  Already, though, the debate was entering a third phase, aided hugely by the Republican gains in Congress in the November 1994 mid-term elections leading to a majority view that was antagonistic to arms control and favoured increased funding for new nuclear projects. Among the early casualties was the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which lost its independence and was swallowed up by the State Department. Congress also cut funding for the Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction Program that aids disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in Russia, and there was vigorous support for a national missile defence scheme and opposition to the ABM Treaty.

  Although much of the motivation was initially the risk of a resurgent Russia and the perceived need to counter Chinese capabilities, this was rapidly augmented by the need to counter "rogue" states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea and their potential for developing chemical and biological weapons, let alone nuclear weapons. As a report from the Defense Secretary put it in April 1996:

  In testifying in Congress, the Defence Secretary confirmed that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a chemical attack:

  Such a posture contradicted US negative security assurances (NSAs) dating back to 1978 which said that the US would not use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack unless the attacker was linked to a nuclear-weapons state. When questioned whether these assurances apply to attacks using chemical or biological weapons, officials have been very cautious not to make clear NSA commitments. For example:

THE FUTURE US NUCLEAR POSTURE

  The whole of the 1990s is best characterised by an enduring commitment to a nuclear posture embracing smaller but highly versatile nuclear forces, with a range of new roles, especially in the Third World, adding to traditional concerns about Russia and China. Against this, there has been a lively and active debate on an alternative view—the desirability of radically scaling down nuclear arsenals. Though this view held sway in the first couple of years of the Clinton administration, it has been in retreat in the later years of the decade and current prospects are for the vigorous pro-nuclear lobby to prevail.

  Such an analysis is supported by two developments in the closing years of the 1990s, both of which have considerable implications for the future. The first is the failure of the US Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT was completed in 1996 after years of exhaustive negotiation. Although it did no more than ban nuclear tests, allowing countries to continue with computer simulations and non-nuclear component testing, it was hailed as a breakthrough, not least because it included some quite stringent verification procedures.

  Although the US, Russia, Britain, France and China all signed the treaty, entry into force requires ratification by them and another 39 states deemed nuclear capable. By the end of 1999, 26 of these 44 states, including Britain and France, had ratified the treaty, but many key states had not done so, including India, Pakistan, Russia, China and Israel. A number of the states that had not ratified were waiting to see if the United States would do so. This failure therefore is a very substantial setback for the treaty—indeed the cornerstone treaty in efforts to curb the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons has suffered a serious reversal. Clinton administration officials declared that the US will abide by the treaty, and there is certainly a possibility that political pressures in the US may reverse within two or three years, but there is no disguising that serious damage was done to prospects for nuclear arms control in 1999.

  The second feature of US nuclear policy has attracted far less attention than the loss of the CTBT, the commitment to modernising and upgrading its nuclear weapons. This takes two forms, one being the ability to design and test new nuclear weapons and the other being the actual process of producing new weapons. Both of these run directly against the spirit of the CTBT but there is ample evidence that both processes are under way.

  Research and development of novel warhead designs requires either explosive nuclear tests (which would have been ruled out by the CTBT) or advanced simulation techniques. Although there is continuing pressure from some right-wing circles for a resumption of testing, this is not likely in the near future, but there has been considerable investment in computer simulation and other forms of non-explosive testing, certainly far in advance than any other country. (13)

  At first sight, the greater problem for the US is that, with or without new warhead design, it apparently lacks facilities to produce new warheads as almost all production facilities have been shut down, primarily because of safety problems that have dogged the entire programme for several decades. However, one plant remains available, the four-acre TA-55 complex at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Within this complex is Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4), (14) the main purposes of which are to study weapons' ageing processes and to dismantle the "pits" or cores of plutonium-based nuclear weapons, but it also has the capacity to produce new pits, and may already be doing so:

  Thus the Stockpile Stewardship Program includes a capability to produce nuclear weapons, and this is in addition to a programme to modify existing warheads for new functions. (16) In September 1995, there were reports that a two-year programme was being started to modify the B61 free-fall nuclear bomb to enable it to take on a new earth-penetrating role. This would enable it to target underground command bunkers or CBW facilities that were too well protected to be damaged by conventionally-armed bombs. Progress was rapid and, by the end of 1996 the US Air Force had an emergency capability of some 50 of the nuclear bombs, with full operational certification coming 15 months later. (17)

  The official government view is that the B61-11 is not a "new" nuclear bomb, merely a modification, in that existing bombs are upgraded. In a strict technical sense this is true, but the modification is so substantial that the weapon can take on entirely new roles. In the past, it would have been possible for US forces to destroy deeply buried and heavily protected targets, but only by using massive megaton-range nuclear weapons that would have produced huge amounts of radioactive fall-out. The new bomb can burrow down up to 50 feet before it detonates, producing an earthquake effect with a small explosive force. The B61-1 is reported to have an explosive yield that can be varied from 0.3 kilotons to 300 kilotons. It is therefore highly flexible and fits in firmly with the idea that small but very accurate nuclear weapons might be used in limited conflicts. (18)

  Another nuclear weapon, one of the most numerous in the whole stockpile, is also being modified. The W76 warhead is fitted to most of the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, is carried in a Mk4 re-entry vehicle and is designed to explode above a target. It is therefore intended for use against ports, airfields, army bases, industrial centres and the like, but is not effective against hardened target. To overcome this, a new fusing system is being developed that will enable the warhead to be detonated at ground level, having a greater effect against a much wider range of targets. There are also reports that the warhead itself may be remanufactured to improve these capabilities. (19)

  The standard warhead on the M-X ICBM, the most modern in the US inventory, is also reported to be subject to modifications to increase its capabilities, as is the B83 megaton-range bomb carried by the B-2 bomber. There are also plans to develop a new ballistic missile submarine and missile system, to undertake further modifications to the B61 nuclear bomb and to undertake research into high-power radio frequency (HPRF) warheads. (20)

  In short, what appears at first sight to be a stewardship programme that has the function of preserving existing nuclear forces, actually masks a sustained programme of research and development of new nuclear weapons. In present trends, US nuclear weapons will be maintained and modernised, and new weapons will be developed. The motivation arises, in part, from the risk of nuclear confrontation with existing or new nuclear powers but also because of the development of other weapons of mass destruction, especially biological weapons. Although there has been a vigorous debate about the validity of moving towards a nuclear-free world, this is having little or no effect on a US nuclear posture that sees nuclear weapons as an essential component of long-term security. (21)

THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

  After the end of the Cold War, Russian nuclear force levels dropped dramatically, though in most cases nuclear weapons were put into storage rather than dismantled. Even so, production of ballistic missile submarines was stopped, many were withdrawn from service, and the numbers on patrol dropped to a handful. No more strategic bombers were produced and only one ICBM, the SS-25, remained in limited production. Most land-based tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn to storage, and all naval tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn by early 1993. (22)

  All of these developments were within the context of an extraordinary decline in the capabilities of Russian military forces overall. In part, this was because of the collapse of the old Soviet Union, the fragmenting of the republics and the failure of the Commonwealth of Independent States to retain any unity or purpose. Even more significant was the decay of the Russian economy as the rush to a particularly extreme brand of free-market capitalism resulted in a rapidly widening wealth-poverty divide, the impoverishment of a large minority of the Russian population, and a substantial decline in government revenues.

  In the current context, the extent of this change is reflected in the changes in defence spending compared with that of the United States. At the end of the Cold War, in 1989, the Soviet Union's defence budget was estimated at $120 billion, compared with a US defence budget of $290 billion (both at 1989 prices). The Soviet budget may well have been an underestimate, possibly excluding significant items such as military space programmes, the war in Afghanistan and even nuclear programmes. By 1999, the United States budget was estimated at $276 billion, whereas the Russian budget was just $31 billion (at 1999 prices). Even allowing for inflation, the US defence budget shrank somewhat during the 1990s, but the Russian budget collapsed. (23)

  Furthermore, Russia was trying to maintain very large numbers of increasingly obsolete forces, had very little money for research and development or training, and was able to purchase hardly any equipment. The state of readiness of the Russian armed forces by the end of the decade was abysmal, and one of the key reasons for Russian failure during the first Chechen War (1994-96) was that its forces were grossly incompetent, with strike aircraft having to be flown by test pilots and instructors, the only air force personnel who had even been able to maintain a minimum number of flying hours to ensure competence.

  With this chaotic decline in its economy and the status of its armed forces, nuclear weapons are seen to provide a much cheaper military option in the event of security threats to Russia. (24) This is also indicated by the abandonment of the no-first use policy of the former Soviet Union. (25) It could be claimed that the earlier policy was little more than political rhetoric, but the change does indicate an increased reliance on nuclear forces in the face of the disarray in conventional forces. Indeed, there is a clear trend toward seeing nuclear weapons as a ready answer to foreign threats.

  More generally, nuclear forces are seen as almost the only way of maintaining any semblance of military superpower status, especially in the face of NATO's perceived eastern encroachment into Russia's traditional sphere of influence. These trends, in combination, help explain Russia's continuing commitment to maintaining core strategic and tactical nuclear forces, including modernising some systems. In April 1999, shortly after NATO started its air campaign against Serbia, a special meeting of the Russian Security Council took place. Following this, the then Secretary, Vladimir Putin, announced that there would be new investment in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including a further programme of sub-critical tests intended to ensure the safety of existing systems. (26)

  The new programme has two components—the speeding up of the production of new weapons and the extension of the service life of existing systems. By the end of 1999, 20 new SS-27 ICBMs had become operational, the service life of Delta-III ballistic missile submarines was extended by six years, development of a new Dolgoruky-class submarine would continue. (27) There were also indications of a new tactical multipurpose battlefield missile, first reported to be under development in 1996. Furthermore, a new nuclear command and control architecture is emerging in Russia, including a major underground centre at Kosvinsky Mountain in the Urals. Future plans include two possible responses to any deployment by the United States of a national missile defence system—the equipping of the SS-27 with multiple warheads and the production of a new air-launched cruise missile.

  All of the current Russian nuclear developments are being undertaken at a time of extreme financial stringency, and this serves to indicate just how important they are believed to be. They may appeal most strongly to the weakened military and the extreme nationalists but they are certainly not restricted to these groups, and the nuclear option is seen as one of the few sources of military power and status available to an otherwise impoverished state. Although much of the overall nuclear weapons infrastructure is in disarray, it would seem that a rigorous process of selective maintenance of nuclear systems is under way, ensuring that a core nuclear force involving strategic and tactical weapons is available. The end result is likely to be a nuclear weapons posture comprising core strategic forces seeking to counterbalance western and Chinese forces, together with a range of tactical forces suited to limited nuclear crises which might well involve first use against non-nuclear-armed states. According to Roman Popkovich, Chair of the Defence Committee of the Duma:

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND NATO

  Two developments in Britain during the 1990s served to give the impression that Britain had embarked on a substantial programme of nuclear disarmament that amounted to a fundamental change in its nuclear posture. There certainly was a process of partial de-nuclearisation, but whether that amounted to a real change in posture was much more debatable.

  During the Cold War years, Britain had diverse nuclear forces and was also a base for numerous US deployments. At the height of the Cold War tensions of the early 1980s, Britain maintained a force of four Polaris submarines, and a mixed fleet of around 200 Tornado, Jaguar, Vulcan and Buccaneer nuclear strike aircraft, all carrying British-made nuclear warheads. The Royal Navy maintained Sea Harrier nuclear-capable strike aircraft and scores of helicopters that could deliver nuclear depth bombs. The RAF deployed Nimrod anti-submarine aircraft that could deliver American nuclear depth bombs, and British Army units were equipped with nuclear-capable 155mm and 203mm howitzers and Lance battlefield missiles, all intended to use US nuclear shells or warheads. Britain was also used by the United States for basing ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-capable strike aircraft and cruise missiles.

  By the mid-1990s, all of the US systems except a small number of nuclear bombs had been withdrawn, as had the US warheads for use by British forces. Furthermore, all of the British tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn, with the exception of a small number intended for Tornado strike aircraft. This process was conducted under the Conservative administration of John Major, prompting the ironic notion that it was a singularly unilateralist government—while Russia was also withdrawing many nuclear forces, none of the changes in Britain, apart from the removal of cruise missiles, was covered by arms control treaties.

  The Labour Government after 1997 took some further modest steps. It speeded up the removal of the last of the tactical nuclear bombs, introduced a greater degree of transparency concerning the level of nuclear forces, eased the alert status of the Trident missile submarine force, and stated a commitment to maintain loadings of nuclear forces on Trident submarines at substantially below the design capability. Even so, while the withdrawal of the last of the tactical nuclear bombs meant that Trident became the sole British nuclear weapon system, it had, in the process, been developed into a highly versatile system, capable of being deployed in "sub-strategic" (tactical) and strategic roles.

  To take on the sub-strategic role previously undertaken by bombers, a proportion of the missiles on a Trident submarine, perhaps six out of 16, will be equipped with small single warheads with a destructive power of about five to 10 kilotons, compared with the standard Trident warhead of about 100 kilotons. As well as being available for independent use by Britain, these sub-strategic Trident missile warheads will also be available to NATO.

  There are interesting nuances in the history of British nuclear attitudes that are particularly relevant in the coming decades. Although most aspects of British nuclear strategy have related to the Cold War strategic and NATO contexts, a significant subsidiary thread has been the perceived value of nuclear weapons as counterbalancing relative weaknesses in conventional forces, not just in relation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, but also in regional confrontations outside the NATO area.

  Tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were deployed during the Falklands War of 1982, and Britain had a regional nuclear capability, and indicated a willingness to consider nuclear use, during the Gulf War of 1991, as it apparently had had during the much earlier Indonesian confrontation in the early 1960s. (29) This should not come as any great surprise, since it forms part of a continuum in military thinking about nuclear weapons that has parallels in the United States, the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia and France, as well as being clearly represented in NATO's planning for early first use of nuclear weapons.

  Britain reserves the right to deploy Trident independently of NATO. According to one of the more detailed assessments of the range of options for sub-strategic Trident warheads:

  It is worth noting that three of the four circumstances envisaged would involve the first use of nuclear weapons by Britain, but such scenarios resemble aspects of United States and Russian nuclear targeting and strategy at present and for the foreseeable future. Britain's Trident missile system is due to remain in service for the first quarter of the 21st century and it is seen as a versatile nuclear system capable of operating in diverse conflict environments. The idea of withdrawing Trident, and with it Britain's commitment to nuclear forces, is not currently on the UK political agenda.

  The position in France is broadly similar to that in Britain, except that French nuclear thinking also involves the need to retain a distinct detachment from the United States. There has long been a debate in France between a broadly centre and leftist view of nuclear strategy focusing on minimal deterrence, an avoidance of limited options and a concentration on policies to promote non-proliferation, contrasted with a more right-wing Gaullist view which:

  Chirac's Presidential election victory in 1995 ensured a pre-eminence of this view, as demonstrated by the subsequent decision to resume a nuclear testing programme intended to complete the development of two warheads and ensure a simulation capability in the event of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The French nuclear tests were internationally controversial and caused substantial opposition within France, but, even so, the fundamental French commitment to having their own nuclear forces remained domestically popular.

  As with Britain, a number of French nuclear weapons systems were withdrawn during the 1990s, including a small force of 18 land-based medium-range nuclear missiles and the Hades tactical nuclear missile. However, a new class of ballistic missile submarines is being deployed, and air-launched nuclear missiles will be updated and will remain in service with the new Rafael strike aircraft.

  French nuclear strategy has four elements, all of them likely to be relevant for some years to come. The first is the long-held view that France cannot rely on the United States for a nuclear umbrella in a disorderly world and must therefore have its own forces. This view is well nigh certain to persist. A second and more recent development, that does not contradict this, is that a number of opinion formers in France would like to see the development of some kind of European nuclear deterrent, in conjunction with Britain but not involving the United States. This outlook has received some support elsewhere in Europe, especially in Germany, but is bound up with the future of NATO nuclear policy and the possible development of a so-called European Defence identity.

  A third element underlying French nuclear strategy is the recognition that France's conventional forces are such that it will rarely be able to respond to a major regional crisis on its own unless it can supplement its conventional forces with a nuclear capability. Finally, French nuclear strategy is particularly geared towards counter-proliferation. One analysis of the French view was that:

  This "suitability" of such a combination stems from having a low-yield accurate nuclear system appropriate for precision attacks on military installations, a further move away from the more traditional French concentration on counter-city targeting.

  NATO's nuclear posture underwent a number of changes during the 1990s, although these did not include any alteration to the basic policy of nuclear first use. Its Strategic Concept of 1991 had accepted that the risk of a nuclear confrontation was much diminished, as the great majority of all of the sub-strategic forces allocated to NATO by the United States were withdrawn during the course of the decade, leaving a few hundred air-delivered nuclear bombs and Britain's Trident commitment.

  Towards the end of the decade, there were growing internal demands for NATO to engage in a thorough review of its nuclear posture, with the strongest demands coming from Canada and Germany. The NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 was dominated by its involvement in the air war with Serbia, but a modified Strategic Concept was adopted which paid some attention to demands for a review. The alliance would maintain, "at a minimum level consistent with the security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe, which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link." (33) This represented little change on the position eight years before, but a separate statement also reported that the alliance would be prepared "to consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament". (34)

  Although this represented a modestly positive attitude to de-nuclearisation, it did not seek to promote the idea of further withdrawals of NATO nuclear forces. Moreover, one of the key new missions for NATO, embodied in the 1999 Strategic Concept, was the control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery. This formed part of planned "improvements in NATO's capability to undertake new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats to Alliance common interests". (35) Thus, NATO in the post-Cold War era has moved well beyond a concentrated concern with a threat from the Soviet Union to a much wider expression of security interests, certainly including perceived threats from proliferators affecting any part of the entire alliance, including the Middle East and Asia.

CHINESE NUCLEAR POLICY

  While the extent and development of China's nuclear forces remains largely shrouded in secrecy, and precise details of nuclear forces, reliability, accuracy and strategy are not readily available, it is clear that China is fully committed to retaining nuclear forces. Moreover, recent developments in Chinese nuclear thinking are potentially disturbing and demonstrate a firm commitment to nuclear forces that includes an increasing interest in flexible forces for nuclear war-fighting. There is also a deep concern over US plans for a national missile defence which might require China to substantially upgrade its long range missile forces.

  China initially developed nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s with Soviet aid, but after the rift with Moscow, maintained an indigenous research, development and production capability. By the early 1980s, China had perhaps 300 nuclear weapons, and much of that decade was concerned with improving the quality of the systems, particularly in relation to reliability and survivability. The majority of the weapons were considered strategic, but this was in relation to the Soviet Union, considered to be the main threat at the time. Very few of the Chinese missiles could target the United States or Western Europe. (36)

  There are three developments of the past decade that are particularly relevant to the future. The first is an unequivocal commitment to retaining nuclear forces. China may not oppose a comprehensive test ban, and it may support the START process, but its bottom line is a view of nuclear forces as an integral part of Chinese defence policy. In taking this view, China seems unable to recognise the effect this has on neighbours such as India.

  The second development is evidence of a Chinese interest in developing a nuclear posture which, at the regional level, bears a similarity to NATO's flexible response. The Chinese are particularly concerned about Russia, where they believe there is potential for considerable instability coupled with the possibility of a strongly nationalist government. Such instability on the Chinese periphery is the context for changes in military thinking:

  Finally, but no less important, is China's recent but substantial concern over American plans for theatre and national missile defences. There is strong opposition to any US proposal to facilitate ballistic missile defences in East Asia that might apply to Japan, South Korea and especially Taiwan, and also opposition to any longer-term plan for a US national missile shield:

  The particular concern was with US plans to seek an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow it to develop national missile defences. According to the Director of Arms Control at the Chinese foreign ministry, Sha Zukang, "Amending it in search of national missile defense will tip the global balance, trigger a new arms race and jeopardize world and regional stability." (39)

  Allowing for rhetoric, this and other Chinese pronouncements at the end of 1999 indicated the concerns that China felt that its small long-range missile force might be countered by US anti-missile plans. There was probably a reluctance to engage in a substantial expansion of Chinese strategic missile forces, not least on grounds of cost, but recent reports suggest that China has the potential to do so. Two new ICBMs, the DF-31 and DF-41, are in their early stages of development, and each might be capable of carrying multiple warheads. Each might ordinarily take some years to develop and deploy, but China is capable of accelerating such a process if required. (40)

  In summary, China sees a continuing requirement for nuclear forces and has a determination to maintain adequate forces to satisfy its regional security requirements. Moreover, it is in a position to engage in substantial strategic nuclear developments, dependent on US decisions on a national missile defence.

PROLIFERATION

  This review of nuclear developments and attitudes by the five main nuclear powers indicates a solid commitment to maintaining nuclear forces, and much of this relates to the proliferation, not just of nuclear weapons, but of weapons of mass destruction as a whole. As suggested earlier, the 1990s saw some progress in nuclear disarmament in some former Soviet states and South Africa, with this added to progress in Latin America and East Asia in the previous decade. Even so, other developments have been far less positive, and adding concerns over chemical and biological weapons results in an analysis that indicates some major problems of international security in the coming decades.

  In the Middle East, Israel retains substantial nuclear forces, a factor frequently ignored in concerns over weapons proliferation among Arab states. Israel's nuclear forces are believed to comprise at least 100 warheads, including thermonuclear weapons and, quite probably, enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons. Delivery systems include nuclear-capable aircraft and the Jericho 2 ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,200 miles. Israel may also have a chemical and biological weapons capability, whereas Syria has concentrated on chemical weapons, with deliver by missile or aircraft. Egypt has the technical potential to develop a wide range of chemical and biological weapons and almost certainly has an existing chemical weapons capability, and neighbouring Libya has had ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction but, apart from some chemical weapons, the results may have been limited.

  The Iraqi plans to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the 1980s were substantial. The extent of their capabilities, achieved within a decade, had substantial regional implications, not least encouraging Saudi Arabia to acquire ballistic missiles from China and allow substantial US forces to be based on its territory, and stimulating Israel to invest heavily in ballistic missile defences.

  Iran is situated next to one substantial nuclear power, Russia, another recent nuclear power, Pakistan, and a state with clear pretensions to have weapons of mass destruction, Iraq. In such circumstances it would be simplistic not to expect Iran to be seeking some kind of missile force equipped with weapons of mass destruction. (41)

  In South Asia, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 were both designed to prove a number of warhead designs. In the case of India, one assessment is that there are proven designs for a powerful two-stage thermonuclear weapon, a standard fission weapon in the 10-15 kiloton range and a smaller tactical nuclear weapon, probably in the 2-3 kiloton range. All of these weapons are plutonium-based, and India may have sufficient fissile material for around 50 warheads. Pakistan appears to have a single uranium-based fission weapon, possibly incorporating a Chinese design, and may be able to produce around 12 weapons. With both states, there is potential for the development of significant nuclear arsenals within five years involving free-fall bombs as well as warheads for ballistic missiles. (42) In the view of a British foreign office minister, Peter Hain, India and Pakistan were "very close" to a nuclear exchange over Kashmir during the Summer of 1999, following incursions into an Indian-controlled part of the province. (43)

  In East Asia, South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programmes appear to be on ice, and Japan, which could readily produce nuclear weapons, continues to hold back from doing so. The status of impoverished North Korea's nuclear ambitions remains open to question, but it should be remembered that the development of chemical and biological weapons by all major states in the region, including China, is feasible and may already have happened in some cases.

  Indeed, the proliferation of chemical, and especially biological weapons, together with ballistic missiles, in East Asia and the Middle East especially, is a feature of the concerns of the major existing nuclear powers, especially the United States and its NATO allies.

NUCLEAR FUTURES

  This paper started with the comment that there had been two substantial periods of anti-nuclear concern in the West, in the early 1960s and early 1980s, but that general perceptions since the ending of the Cold War were that issues of nuclear instability and proliferation were of little concern, except when prompted by events such as the French nuclear tests in the mid-1990s and the more recent nuclear arms race in South Asia. The paper has attempted only a brief analysis of the actual postures and policies of the existing nuclear powers, with an added note on the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. But even this shows that the "nuclear future" is far less benign than is commonly believed.

  As part of its intention of remaining the world's most powerful state, the US is committed to maintaining and upgrading its nuclear forces and has developed a posture that retains a commitment to first use against a variety of threats. It is concerned with Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities and with the possibility of other states acquiring nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it is highly likely to develop some kind of national missile defence that, in turn, encourages Russia and China to upgrade their own forces. The damage to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the possible loss of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty both indicate that prospects for arms control have diminished, and this includes a reduced likelihood of further cuts in strategic arsenals in the START process.

  Russia, in turn, is actually embracing nuclear options to a greater extent than a decade ago, prompted partly by trends in the US but also by the collapse of its conventional forces. The disarray in much of Russia's nuclear industry is a concern for proliferation, and the instability of Russia, along with US trends, prompts China to enhance its own nuclear forces. Meanwhile, Britain and France have reduced their arsenals but remain committed to nuclear forces, with each country engaged in substantial modernisation programmes, as well as having their own concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the Middle East and South Asia, nuclear stability is clearly lacking, and the combination of nuclear proliferation with that of chemical and biological weapons suggests a continuing danger that is likely to grow.

  Perhaps the most worrying aspect is the trend towards usable nuclear weapons—the idea of "small nuclear wars in far-off places". Development of new nuclear weapons designed for specific functions in conflicts in the Third World, whether by the US, Britain or France, the willingness of Russia and China to look to versions of flexible response are all indicators of this notion. Many analysts have argued that the most dangerous aspect of the Cold War was the long-held belief that a limited nuclear war could be fought and won. That mentality has endured beyond the end of the Cold War and is deeply embedded in the strategic thinking of the nuclear powers.

  In looking ahead over the next 20 years or so, and concentrating for now on existing trends, we have to conclude that prospects for controlling nuclear weapons deteriorated in the final few years of the 1990s, and there is no immediate sign of an improvement. The trends are, if anything, in the opposite direction. The widespread public perception that nuclear weapons are of diminishing concern is fundamentally wrong—the danger of an all-out nuclear war between two superpower alliances has diminished, but the prospects for a stable route to a world in which nuclear weapons are abolished or are even effectively controlled are, on present trends, minimal.

NOTES

  1.  For a review of problems of nuclear proliferation, see: Rebecca Johnson, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads", Special Briefings Series on UK Nuclear Weapons Policy, No. 3, (London, International Security Information Service, January 2000).

  2.  Robert S Norris and William M Arkin, "Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1997", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (November/December, 1997).

  3.  Strategic Advisory Group of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Group, US Strategic Air Command: "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order", reported in Navy News and Undersea Technology, (Washington DC, 13 January 1992).

  4.  Ibid.

  5.  Elaine Grossman, "DOD has 'Significant' Ability to Alter Nuclear Weapons Targeting on Short Notice", Inside the Air Force, Vol 3, No 32, p1 (7 August 1994). Two years after the Reed Report, it was reported that the staff at US Strategic Command (the successor to Strategic Air Command with the inclusion of control of US ballistic missile submarines) were "in the early stages of building and testing computer models that could enable Mr Clinton to aim nuclear weapons at third world nations that threaten the interests of the United States and its allies.", see: Eric Schmitt, "Head of Nuclear Forces Plans for a New World" New York Times, 25 February 1993.

  6.  Thomas W Dowler and Joseph S Howard III, "Countering the Threat of the Well-armed Tyrant": A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons", Strategic Review, Fall 1991.

  7.  Les Aspin, "Three Propositions for a New Nuclear Era", commencement address at MIT, 1 June 1992.

  8.  General Powell, then Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clearly stated his commitment that "we will eventually see the time when the number of nuclear weapons is down to zero", (speech at Harvard University, 10 June, 1993). The Henry L Stimson Center began its Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, in January 1994. This was chaired by the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Andrew Goodpaster, and included three other retired generals and Robert McNamara. This involvement of the military, coupled with the work of a number of academic analysts, gave a new emphasis to ideas of a nuclear-free world. See, for example: Barry M Blechman and Cathleen S Fisher, "Phase Out the Bomb", Foreign Policy, No 97 (Winter 1994-95).

  9.  Also during this period, Congress blocked funds for some new nuclear warhead developments. For example, Project PLYWD, a post-Gulf war programme to produce a precision low-yield nuclear warhead was halted by legislation banning development of weapons below five kilotons. See, Robert S Norris and William M Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (July/August 1994).

  10.  Proliferation, Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defence, April 1996.

  11.  Carol Giacomo, "US May Use Nuclear Force Against Chemicals", Reuters News Reports, 28 March 1996.

  12.  Letter from Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 24 January 1996.

  13.  In 1995, the Department of Energy announced that Sandia National Laboratories would acquire a new supercomputer, ten times faster than the most powerful computer then available, which would enhance the ability to produce nuclear weapons without nuclear test explosions. See "Industry Outlook", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 November 1995.

  14.  William B Scott, "National Labs Fill Gap in Weapons Stewardship", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 January 1996.

  15.  Ibid.

  16.  The Los Alamos facility was one of several options considered in order to preserve a nuclear weapons production capability. "Another would be to develop a module that could be taken to other sites—such as the Savannah River weapons plant—to quickly increase production or rebuild capacities if need be." Ibid.

  17.  "US Nuclear Bomb Passes Final Drop Test", Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 April 1998. For a detailed assessment of the B61-11, see: Greg Mello, "New Bomb, No Mission", The Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997.

  18.  Mello, "New Bomb, No Mission".

  19.  Willilam M Arkin, "What's New", The Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, 1997.

  20.  Arkin, "What's New". For an account of the move from Cold War nuclear targeting to nuclear war plans appropriate to limited threats, see: William M Arkin and Hans Kristensen, "Dangerous Directions", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998.

  21.  For an analysis of the putative role of US nuclear weapons in counter-proliferation, see: Hans M Kristensen and Joshua Handler, "the US and Counter-Proliferation, a New and Dubious Role for US Nuclear Weapons", Security Dialogue, Vol 27, No 4 (1996). For an account of nuclear weapon research and development programmes, especially in relation to Third World targeting, see: Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy", BASIC Research Report 98.2, (London and Washington DC: British American Security Information Council, 1998).

  22.  Dunbar Lockwood, "The Status of US, Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia", Arms Control Today, (November, 1994).

  23.  Data from The Military Balance 1989-90, and The Military Balance 1999-2000, (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989 and 1999).

  24.  "Russia Builds Up Nuclear Forces as Prospects for START II Fade", Defense News, 4 December 1995. See also, Barbara Starr, "NATO Growth "Increases Russian Nuclear Threat", Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 1997.

  25.  Lockwood, "The Status of US, Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces".

  26.  "Kremlin to Bolster Nuclear Stockpile" Washington Post, 30 April 1999. See also, The Military Balance 1999-2000.

  27.  The Military Balance 1999-2000.

  28.  Yuri Golotyuk, "Russia Clenches its Nuclear Fist", Izvestia, 23 March 1999.

  29.  Paul Rogers, "Sub Strategic Trident: A Slow-Burning Fuse", London Defence Studies No 34, (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1996).

  30.  David Miller, "Britain Ponders Single Warhead Option" International Defence Review. (September, 1994).

  31.  David S Yost, "Nuclear Debates in France" Survival, Vol 36, No 4 (Winter 1994-95).

  32.  Giovanni de Briganti, "France to Replace Mirage IVP Bomber Fleet by 1997" Defense News, 8 January 1996.

  33.  Strategic Concept, paragraph 64, NATO, Brussels, April 1999.

  34.  Summit Communique, NATO, Washington DC, 26 April 1999.

  35.  NATO Summit: The New Strategic Concept Fact Sheet, The White House, Washington DC, 26 April 1999.

  36.  Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando, The Directory of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms and Disarmament, 1990, (London, Tri-Service Press, 1990).

  37.  Alistair Iain Johnston, "China's New `Old Thinking'", International Security, Vol 20, No 3 (Winter 1995-1996).

  38.  Erik Eckholm, "China to US: Back Off Treaty Changes", The New York Times, 25 November 1999.

  39.  Ibid.

  40.  Robert S Norris and William M Arkin, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1999", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May/June, 1999).

  41.  James Risen and Judith Miller, "CIA Now Says it is Less Sure That Iran Cannot Make Nuclear Bomb", International Herald Tribune, 18 January 2000.

  42.  Robert S Norris and William M Arkin, "After the Tests: India and Pakistan Update", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (September/October, 1988).

  43.  Michael Evans, "Kashmir `nearly led to nuclear clash'", The Times, London, 29 November 1999.