INTRODUCTION
During the 45 years of the Cold War nuclear
confrontation, there were two periods of intensive anti-nuclear
campaigning in western countries. The first lasted from 1959 to
1963. It developed initially in response to widespread concerns
about the health effects of the atmospheric testing of nuclear
weapons, but was given a substantial added boost as large numbers
of powerful thermonuclear weapons were deployed and as the first
ICBMs joined the long-range bombers in the forces of the United
States and the Soviet Union.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis of the autumn
of 1962, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
began to improve. In the so-called "Kennedy experiment",
President Kennedy initiated a series of moves, starting with a
moratorium on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, aimed at curbing
the nuclear confrontation, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev reciprocated,
and a process of confidence-building measures was set in motion
that lasted until Kennedy's assassination. The direct result was
a treaty involving the United States, the Soviet Union and the
United Kingdom, that banned all further atmospheric testing. This
was completed in 1963 and there were further treaties agreed late
in the decade, not least the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As East-West strategic relations improved, the
United States became embroiled in the Vietnam War, with substantial
domestic implications, and with the anti-war movement stretching
over much of the rest of the decade, there was little further
anti-nuclear activity in North America or Europe.
At the end of the seventies, with new Cold War
tensions erupting in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,
the Iranian Revolution, and development of many new nuclear weapons,
a new surge of anti-nuclear campaigning emerged that was to last
through to the mid-1980s and finally died down as the Cold War
came to an end. From around 1989 onwards, there was a belief that
a post-Cold War world could usher in a new world order, a concept
dealt a rapid blow by the Gulf War, the collapse of Yugoslavia
into war and civil disruption in many parts of the old Soviet
Union.
During the course of the 1990s, the nuclear
issue retreated from the arena of public concern, with only occasional
flurries coinciding with such events as the French nuclear testing
in the Pacific, and the World Court ruling on nuclear weapons.
The perception was that with the nuclear arms race between the
United States and Russia now out of the way, the dangers of nuclear
war had passed. This perception was damaged right at the end of
the century with the flurry of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan,
and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban treaty. (1)
The aim of this paper is to explore the extent
of the nuclear developments of the 1990s and to examine the trends
that appear to be emerging for the next 20 years. The core question
to answer is whether there has been a move towards nuclear disengagement
that might even take us towards a nuclear-free world, or whether
there is, in reality, a transition under way that results in a
continuing if quantitatively different commitment to a nuclear
future.
TRENDS IN THE 1990S
The ending of the Cold War coincided with the
all-time peak in world nuclear stockpiles, at close to 70,000
nuclear warheads in the late 1980s. (2) Progress in withdrawing
warheads was slow at first, and much more rapid towards the end
of the 1990s, with a halving of total arsenals by the end of the
century. In the early 1990s, the United States and the Soviet
Union (and its successor, Russia) negotiated the first Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), that limited strategic arsenals
to a maximum of 6,000 warheads each, down from a figure of well
over 10,000 each. This was followed by START II negotiations aiming
at ceilings of 3,500 but this treaty has not been formally implemented.
Britain, France and China all made modest cuts in the nuclear
forces but were not party to the START process.
During the course of the 1980s, Argentina and
Brazil had given up their nuclear ambitions and US pressure on
Taiwan and South Korea appeared to have led them to curtail their
own plans. In the early 1990s, Ukraine, Belorus and Kazakstan
returned Soviet-era nuclear weapons to Russia and South Africa
dismantled its small nuclear arsenal.
There were three specific negative developments
and one area of overall concern. Firstly, the work of the inspectors
of the UN Special Commission on Iraq were able to demonstrate
early in the decade that Iraq had developed a substantial nuclear
weapons programme in the previous decade, using multiple routes
to produce weapons-grade uranium, and would have had a nuclear
capability by the mid-1990s. Secondly, North Korea remained a
state with a siege mentality and an apparent nuclear commitment,
US efforts to control this through bilateral agreement being thoroughly
uncertain. Finally, the continuing tensions between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir were made more serious by Indian and Pakistani
nuclear test programmes and commitments to nuclear forces at the
end of the decade.
The area of overall concern was an abundance
of evidence that, in spite of progress in some areas, the core
nuclear powers were intent on maintaining nuclear forces indefinitely.
Moreover, all five declared nuclear powers now see clearly defined
used for nuclear weapons in the coming decades—the risk
of all-out nuclear war may be diminished, but "small nuclear
wars in far-off places" may become steadily more likely.
Nuclear futures are therefore usefully explored by examining recent
and current developments in the declared nuclear states as well
as trends in proliferation.
US NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990S
Recent US experience with nuclear weapons and
strategy divides into four phases, all of which give useful indicators
of future trends, and all of which relate closely to changes in
domestic politics, especially the political make-up of congress.
All four phases have taken place against background of substantial
cuts in overall nuclear warhead stocks, especially of tactical
nuclear weapons, and the shutting down of most of the nuclear
weapons production facilities, although most of the latter was
due more to safety concerns than redundancy.
The first phase was during the final two years
of the Bush administration, in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the experience of the Gulf War. It was essentially
a process of looking for new tasks for existing nuclear forces,
usually a combination of fears of a resurgent Russia and of perceived
Third World threats against US interests. This was reflected,
late in 1991, in the publication of a leaked draft of the Strategic
Deterrence Study undertaken for US Strategic Air Command (also
known as the Reed Report). (3) Its terms of reference stated the
belief that "the growing wealth of petro-nations and newly
hegemonic powers is available to bullies and crazies, if they
gain control, to wreak havoc on world tranquillity".
The study itself called for a new nuclear targeting
strategy that would include the ability to assemble "a Nuclear
Expeditionary Force . . . primarily for use against China or Third
World targets". (4) There were indications that such a capability
for what was called adaptive targeting existed by 1992. (5) Along
with such developments, there were also indications of new nuclear
weapon research and development programmes aimed at producing
weapons appropriate to new tasks. These included small nuclear
warheads that might be fitted to missiles intended to destroy
missiles armed with biological warheads, others for attacking
deep underground bunkers, as well as electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
warheads for disabling electronic equipment. A seminal article
in Strategic Review in the autumn of 1991 by two Los Alamos researchers
had advocated these kinds of systems for use primarily against
regional threats from third world "rogue" states. (6)
Also at the tail-end of the Bush administration,
a vigorous counter-proliferation initiative began to gain momentum,
aimed primarily at potential nuclear weapon states but taking
in the proliferation of missiles and chemical and biological weapons.
It included substantial emphasis on theatre missile defences (TMD),
stemming partly from the Gulf War experience, but also a reflection
of the increasing disdain in many circles for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty and the belief that it limited US abilities to
develop defences against "rogue" states.
This phase of nuclear thinking and planning
was very much a part of a much more general right-wing agenda.
The Soviet Union was diminishing as a threat, but this was not
the time for the United States to drop its guard. In seeking to
maintain international stability in American interests, it was
essential to have diverse military capabilities at all levels,
including nuclear forces. Any idea of moving away from a comprehensive
nuclear capability and towards a nuclear-free world was anathema.
There was a pronounced change in the political
climate after the Clinton administration took office early in
1993. It brought in a number of people from the Washington arms
control community, giving the community more influence than it
had had since the start of the Carter administration in the late
1970s. In this atmosphere, some opinion formers began to suggest
that a nuclear-free world was both necessary and desirable. Rep
Les Aspin, then Chair of the House Armed Services Committee and
later Secretary of Defence, said "a world without nuclear
weapons would actually be better. Nuclear weapons are still the
big equalizer but now the United States is not the equalizer but
the equalizee." (7)
Such ideas were endorsed by several retired
generals and defence officials, not least the former Chair of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and Robert McNamara,
Kennedy's Secretary of Defence. (8) Much of the motivation was
similar to that of Aspin—a proliferating world would be
difficult to control, whereas a nuclear-free world would be relatively
safe for the United States with its formidable conventional forces,
but opinion in Congress was sufficiently strong to curb a number
of budget proposals for research and development of new nuclear
weapons.
Even so, some analysts suspected that work continued
in classified or "black" programmes and that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, an anodyne term for ensuring the safety of
the nuclear arsenal, included a capability to design and produce
new warheads. Other aspects of this changed climate of opinion
looked more positive. At the Department of Energy, responsible
for producing nuclear weapons, the Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, initiated
a programme of declassifying thousands of documents relating to
the history of the nuclear weapons programme. Even when Clinton's
September 1994 Nuclear Posture Review made clear the administration's
continuing commitment to nuclear weapons, its presentation and
outlook was noticeably less hawkish than that of the Bush administration.
(9)
Already, though, the debate was entering a third
phase, aided hugely by the Republican gains in Congress in the
November 1994 mid-term elections leading to a majority view that
was antagonistic to arms control and favoured increased funding
for new nuclear projects. Among the early casualties was the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency which lost its independence and
was swallowed up by the State Department. Congress also cut funding
for the Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction Program that
aids disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in Russia, and
there was vigorous support for a national missile defence scheme
and opposition to the ABM Treaty.
Although much of the motivation was initially
the risk of a resurgent Russia and the perceived need to counter
Chinese capabilities, this was rapidly augmented by the need to
counter "rogue" states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and
North Korea and their potential for developing chemical and biological
weapons, let alone nuclear weapons. As a report from the Defense
Secretary put it in April 1996:
In testifying in Congress, the Defence Secretary
confirmed that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a
chemical attack:
Such a posture contradicted US negative security
assurances (NSAs) dating back to 1978 which said that the US would
not use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack unless
the attacker was linked to a nuclear-weapons state. When questioned
whether these assurances apply to attacks using chemical or biological
weapons, officials have been very cautious not to make clear NSA
commitments. For example:
THE FUTURE US NUCLEAR POSTURE
The whole of the 1990s is best characterised
by an enduring commitment to a nuclear posture embracing smaller
but highly versatile nuclear forces, with a range of new roles,
especially in the Third World, adding to traditional concerns
about Russia and China. Against this, there has been a lively
and active debate on an alternative view—the desirability
of radically scaling down nuclear arsenals. Though this view held
sway in the first couple of years of the Clinton administration,
it has been in retreat in the later years of the decade and current
prospects are for the vigorous pro-nuclear lobby to prevail.
Such an analysis is supported by two developments
in the closing years of the 1990s, both of which have considerable
implications for the future. The first is the failure of the US
Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT was
completed in 1996 after years of exhaustive negotiation. Although
it did no more than ban nuclear tests, allowing countries to continue
with computer simulations and non-nuclear component testing, it
was hailed as a breakthrough, not least because it included some
quite stringent verification procedures.
Although the US, Russia, Britain, France and
China all signed the treaty, entry into force requires ratification
by them and another 39 states deemed nuclear capable. By the end
of 1999, 26 of these 44 states, including Britain and France,
had ratified the treaty, but many key states had not done so,
including India, Pakistan, Russia, China and Israel. A number
of the states that had not ratified were waiting to see if the
United States would do so. This failure therefore is a very substantial
setback for the treaty—indeed the cornerstone treaty in
efforts to curb the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons
has suffered a serious reversal. Clinton administration officials
declared that the US will abide by the treaty, and there is certainly
a possibility that political pressures in the US may reverse within
two or three years, but there is no disguising that serious damage
was done to prospects for nuclear arms control in 1999.
The second feature of US nuclear policy has
attracted far less attention than the loss of the CTBT, the commitment
to modernising and upgrading its nuclear weapons. This takes two
forms, one being the ability to design and test new nuclear weapons
and the other being the actual process of producing new weapons.
Both of these run directly against the spirit of the CTBT but
there is ample evidence that both processes are under way.
Research and development of novel warhead designs
requires either explosive nuclear tests (which would have been
ruled out by the CTBT) or advanced simulation techniques. Although
there is continuing pressure from some right-wing circles for
a resumption of testing, this is not likely in the near future,
but there has been considerable investment in computer simulation
and other forms of non-explosive testing, certainly far in advance
than any other country. (13)
At first sight, the greater problem for the
US is that, with or without new warhead design, it apparently
lacks facilities to produce new warheads as almost all production
facilities have been shut down, primarily because of safety problems
that have dogged the entire programme for several decades. However,
one plant remains available, the four-acre TA-55 complex at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Within this complex
is Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4), (14) the main purposes of which
are to study weapons' ageing processes and to dismantle the "pits"
or cores of plutonium-based nuclear weapons, but it also has the
capacity to produce new pits, and may already be doing so:
Thus the Stockpile Stewardship Program includes
a capability to produce nuclear weapons, and this is in addition
to a programme to modify existing warheads for new functions.
(16) In September 1995, there were reports that a two-year programme
was being started to modify the B61 free-fall nuclear bomb to
enable it to take on a new earth-penetrating role. This would
enable it to target underground command bunkers or CBW facilities
that were too well protected to be damaged by conventionally-armed
bombs. Progress was rapid and, by the end of 1996 the US Air Force
had an emergency capability of some 50 of the nuclear bombs, with
full operational certification coming 15 months later. (17)
The official government view is that the B61-11
is not a "new" nuclear bomb, merely a modification,
in that existing bombs are upgraded. In a strict technical sense
this is true, but the modification is so substantial that the
weapon can take on entirely new roles. In the past, it would have
been possible for US forces to destroy deeply buried and heavily
protected targets, but only by using massive megaton-range nuclear
weapons that would have produced huge amounts of radioactive fall-out.
The new bomb can burrow down up to 50 feet before it detonates,
producing an earthquake effect with a small explosive force. The
B61-1 is reported to have an explosive yield that can be varied
from 0.3 kilotons to 300 kilotons. It is therefore highly flexible
and fits in firmly with the idea that small but very accurate
nuclear weapons might be used in limited conflicts. (18)
Another nuclear weapon, one of the most numerous
in the whole stockpile, is also being modified. The W76 warhead
is fitted to most of the Trident submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, is carried in a Mk4 re-entry vehicle and is designed
to explode above a target. It is therefore intended for use against
ports, airfields, army bases, industrial centres and the like,
but is not effective against hardened target. To overcome this,
a new fusing system is being developed that will enable the warhead
to be detonated at ground level, having a greater effect against
a much wider range of targets. There are also reports that the
warhead itself may be remanufactured to improve these capabilities.
(19)
The standard warhead on the M-X ICBM, the most
modern in the US inventory, is also reported to be subject to
modifications to increase its capabilities, as is the B83 megaton-range
bomb carried by the B-2 bomber. There are also plans to develop
a new ballistic missile submarine and missile system, to undertake
further modifications to the B61 nuclear bomb and to undertake
research into high-power radio frequency (HPRF) warheads. (20)
In short, what appears at first sight to be
a stewardship programme that has the function of preserving existing
nuclear forces, actually masks a sustained programme of research
and development of new nuclear weapons. In present trends, US
nuclear weapons will be maintained and modernised, and new weapons
will be developed. The motivation arises, in part, from the risk
of nuclear confrontation with existing or new nuclear powers but
also because of the development of other weapons of mass destruction,
especially biological weapons. Although there has been a vigorous
debate about the validity of moving towards a nuclear-free world,
this is having little or no effect on a US nuclear posture that
sees nuclear weapons as an essential component of long-term security.
(21)
THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
After the end of the Cold War, Russian nuclear
force levels dropped dramatically, though in most cases nuclear
weapons were put into storage rather than dismantled. Even so,
production of ballistic missile submarines was stopped, many were
withdrawn from service, and the numbers on patrol dropped to a
handful. No more strategic bombers were produced and only one
ICBM, the SS-25, remained in limited production. Most land-based
tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn to storage, and all naval
tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn by early 1993. (22)
All of these developments were within the context
of an extraordinary decline in the capabilities of Russian military
forces overall. In part, this was because of the collapse of the
old Soviet Union, the fragmenting of the republics and the failure
of the Commonwealth of Independent States to retain any unity
or purpose. Even more significant was the decay of the Russian
economy as the rush to a particularly extreme brand of free-market
capitalism resulted in a rapidly widening wealth-poverty divide,
the impoverishment of a large minority of the Russian population,
and a substantial decline in government revenues.
In the current context, the extent of this change
is reflected in the changes in defence spending compared with
that of the United States. At the end of the Cold War, in 1989,
the Soviet Union's defence budget was estimated at $120 billion,
compared with a US defence budget of $290 billion (both at 1989
prices). The Soviet budget may well have been an underestimate,
possibly excluding significant items such as military space programmes,
the war in Afghanistan and even nuclear programmes. By 1999, the
United States budget was estimated at $276 billion, whereas the
Russian budget was just $31 billion (at 1999 prices). Even allowing
for inflation, the US defence budget shrank somewhat during the
1990s, but the Russian budget collapsed. (23)
Furthermore, Russia was trying to maintain very
large numbers of increasingly obsolete forces, had very little
money for research and development or training, and was able to
purchase hardly any equipment. The state of readiness of the Russian
armed forces by the end of the decade was abysmal, and one of
the key reasons for Russian failure during the first Chechen War
(1994-96) was that its forces were grossly incompetent, with strike
aircraft having to be flown by test pilots and instructors, the
only air force personnel who had even been able to maintain a
minimum number of flying hours to ensure competence.
With this chaotic decline in its economy and
the status of its armed forces, nuclear weapons are seen to provide
a much cheaper military option in the event of security threats
to Russia. (24) This is also indicated by the abandonment of the
no-first use policy of the former Soviet Union. (25) It could
be claimed that the earlier policy was little more than political
rhetoric, but the change does indicate an increased reliance on
nuclear forces in the face of the disarray in conventional forces.
Indeed, there is a clear trend toward seeing nuclear weapons as
a ready answer to foreign threats.
More generally, nuclear forces are seen as almost
the only way of maintaining any semblance of military superpower
status, especially in the face of NATO's perceived eastern encroachment
into Russia's traditional sphere of influence. These trends, in
combination, help explain Russia's continuing commitment to maintaining
core strategic and tactical nuclear forces, including modernising
some systems. In April 1999, shortly after NATO started its air
campaign against Serbia, a special meeting of the Russian Security
Council took place. Following this, the then Secretary, Vladimir
Putin, announced that there would be new investment in strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons, including a further programme of
sub-critical tests intended to ensure the safety of existing systems.
(26)
The new programme has two components—the
speeding up of the production of new weapons and the extension
of the service life of existing systems. By the end of 1999, 20
new SS-27 ICBMs had become operational, the service life of Delta-III
ballistic missile submarines was extended by six years, development
of a new Dolgoruky-class submarine would continue. (27) There
were also indications of a new tactical multipurpose battlefield
missile, first reported to be under development in 1996. Furthermore,
a new nuclear command and control architecture is emerging in
Russia, including a major underground centre at Kosvinsky Mountain
in the Urals. Future plans include two possible responses to any
deployment by the United States of a national missile defence
system—the equipping of the SS-27 with multiple warheads
and the production of a new air-launched cruise missile.
All of the current Russian nuclear developments
are being undertaken at a time of extreme financial stringency,
and this serves to indicate just how important they are believed
to be. They may appeal most strongly to the weakened military
and the extreme nationalists but they are certainly not restricted
to these groups, and the nuclear option is seen as one of the
few sources of military power and status available to an otherwise
impoverished state. Although much of the overall nuclear weapons
infrastructure is in disarray, it would seem that a rigorous process
of selective maintenance of nuclear systems is under way, ensuring
that a core nuclear force involving strategic and tactical weapons
is available. The end result is likely to be a nuclear weapons
posture comprising core strategic forces seeking to counterbalance
western and Chinese forces, together with a range of tactical
forces suited to limited nuclear crises which might well involve
first use against non-nuclear-armed states. According to Roman
Popkovich, Chair of the Defence Committee of the Duma:
BRITAIN, FRANCE AND NATO
Two developments in Britain during the 1990s
served to give the impression that Britain had embarked on a substantial
programme of nuclear disarmament that amounted to a fundamental
change in its nuclear posture. There certainly was a process of
partial de-nuclearisation, but whether that amounted to a real
change in posture was much more debatable.
During the Cold War years, Britain had diverse
nuclear forces and was also a base for numerous US deployments.
At the height of the Cold War tensions of the early 1980s, Britain
maintained a force of four Polaris submarines, and a mixed fleet
of around 200 Tornado, Jaguar, Vulcan and Buccaneer nuclear strike
aircraft, all carrying British-made nuclear warheads. The Royal
Navy maintained Sea Harrier nuclear-capable strike aircraft and
scores of helicopters that could deliver nuclear depth bombs.
The RAF deployed Nimrod anti-submarine aircraft that could deliver
American nuclear depth bombs, and British Army units were equipped
with nuclear-capable 155mm and 203mm howitzers and Lance battlefield
missiles, all intended to use US nuclear shells or warheads. Britain
was also used by the United States for basing ballistic missile
submarines, nuclear-capable strike aircraft and cruise missiles.
By the mid-1990s, all of the US systems except
a small number of nuclear bombs had been withdrawn, as had the
US warheads for use by British forces. Furthermore, all of the
British tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn, with the
exception of a small number intended for Tornado strike aircraft.
This process was conducted under the Conservative administration
of John Major, prompting the ironic notion that it was a singularly
unilateralist government—while Russia was also withdrawing
many nuclear forces, none of the changes in Britain, apart from
the removal of cruise missiles, was covered by arms control treaties.
The Labour Government after 1997 took some further
modest steps. It speeded up the removal of the last of the tactical
nuclear bombs, introduced a greater degree of transparency concerning
the level of nuclear forces, eased the alert status of the Trident
missile submarine force, and stated a commitment to maintain loadings
of nuclear forces on Trident submarines at substantially below
the design capability. Even so, while the withdrawal of the last
of the tactical nuclear bombs meant that Trident became the sole
British nuclear weapon system, it had, in the process, been developed
into a highly versatile system, capable of being deployed in "sub-strategic"
(tactical) and strategic roles.
To take on the sub-strategic role previously
undertaken by bombers, a proportion of the missiles on a Trident
submarine, perhaps six out of 16, will be equipped with small
single warheads with a destructive power of about five to 10 kilotons,
compared with the standard Trident warhead of about 100 kilotons.
As well as being available for independent use by Britain, these
sub-strategic Trident missile warheads will also be available
to NATO.
There are interesting nuances in the history
of British nuclear attitudes that are particularly relevant in
the coming decades. Although most aspects of British nuclear strategy
have related to the Cold War strategic and NATO contexts, a significant
subsidiary thread has been the perceived value of nuclear weapons
as counterbalancing relative weaknesses in conventional forces,
not just in relation to the Soviet Union during the Cold War era,
but also in regional confrontations outside the NATO area.
Tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were
deployed during the Falklands War of 1982, and Britain had a regional
nuclear capability, and indicated a willingness to consider nuclear
use, during the Gulf War of 1991, as it apparently had had during
the much earlier Indonesian confrontation in the early 1960s.
(29) This should not come as any great surprise, since it forms
part of a continuum in military thinking about nuclear weapons
that has parallels in the United States, the Soviet Union, post-Soviet
Russia and France, as well as being clearly represented in NATO's
planning for early first use of nuclear weapons.
Britain reserves the right to deploy Trident
independently of NATO. According to one of the more detailed assessments
of the range of options for sub-strategic Trident warheads:
It is worth noting that three of the four circumstances
envisaged would involve the first use of nuclear weapons by Britain,
but such scenarios resemble aspects of United States and Russian
nuclear targeting and strategy at present and for the foreseeable
future. Britain's Trident missile system is due to remain in service
for the first quarter of the 21st century and it is seen as a
versatile nuclear system capable of operating in diverse conflict
environments. The idea of withdrawing Trident, and with it Britain's
commitment to nuclear forces, is not currently on the UK political
agenda.
The position in France is broadly similar to
that in Britain, except that French nuclear thinking also involves
the need to retain a distinct detachment from the United States.
There has long been a debate in France between a broadly centre
and leftist view of nuclear strategy focusing on minimal deterrence,
an avoidance of limited options and a concentration on policies
to promote non-proliferation, contrasted with a more right-wing
Gaullist view which:
Chirac's Presidential election victory in 1995
ensured a pre-eminence of this view, as demonstrated by the subsequent
decision to resume a nuclear testing programme intended to complete
the development of two warheads and ensure a simulation capability
in the event of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The French nuclear
tests were internationally controversial and caused substantial
opposition within France, but, even so, the fundamental French
commitment to having their own nuclear forces remained domestically
popular.
As with Britain, a number of French nuclear
weapons systems were withdrawn during the 1990s, including a small
force of 18 land-based medium-range nuclear missiles and the Hades
tactical nuclear missile. However, a new class of ballistic missile
submarines is being deployed, and air-launched nuclear missiles
will be updated and will remain in service with the new Rafael
strike aircraft.
French nuclear strategy has four elements, all
of them likely to be relevant for some years to come. The first
is the long-held view that France cannot rely on the United States
for a nuclear umbrella in a disorderly world and must therefore
have its own forces. This view is well nigh certain to persist.
A second and more recent development, that does not contradict
this, is that a number of opinion formers in France would like
to see the development of some kind of European nuclear deterrent,
in conjunction with Britain but not involving the United States.
This outlook has received some support elsewhere in Europe, especially
in Germany, but is bound up with the future of NATO nuclear policy
and the possible development of a so-called European Defence identity.
A third element underlying French nuclear strategy
is the recognition that France's conventional forces are such
that it will rarely be able to respond to a major regional crisis
on its own unless it can supplement its conventional forces with
a nuclear capability. Finally, French nuclear strategy is particularly
geared towards counter-proliferation. One analysis of the French
view was that:
This "suitability" of such a combination
stems from having a low-yield accurate nuclear system appropriate
for precision attacks on military installations, a further move
away from the more traditional French concentration on counter-city
targeting.
NATO's nuclear posture underwent a number of
changes during the 1990s, although these did not include any alteration
to the basic policy of nuclear first use. Its Strategic Concept
of 1991 had accepted that the risk of a nuclear confrontation
was much diminished, as the great majority of all of the sub-strategic
forces allocated to NATO by the United States were withdrawn during
the course of the decade, leaving a few hundred air-delivered
nuclear bombs and Britain's Trident commitment.
Towards the end of the decade, there were growing
internal demands for NATO to engage in a thorough review of its
nuclear posture, with the strongest demands coming from Canada
and Germany. The NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 was dominated
by its involvement in the air war with Serbia, but a modified
Strategic Concept was adopted which paid some attention to demands
for a review. The alliance would maintain, "at a minimum
level consistent with the security environment, adequate sub-strategic
forces based in Europe, which will provide an essential link with
strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link."
(33) This represented little change on the position eight years
before, but a separate statement also reported that the alliance
would be prepared "to consider options for confidence and
security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and
arms control and disarmament". (34)
Although this represented a modestly positive
attitude to de-nuclearisation, it did not seek to promote the
idea of further withdrawals of NATO nuclear forces. Moreover,
one of the key new missions for NATO, embodied in the 1999 Strategic
Concept, was the control of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery. This formed part of planned "improvements
in NATO's capability to undertake new missions to respond to a
broad spectrum of possible threats to Alliance common interests".
(35) Thus, NATO in the post-Cold War era has moved well beyond
a concentrated concern with a threat from the Soviet Union to
a much wider expression of security interests, certainly including
perceived threats from proliferators affecting any part of the
entire alliance, including the Middle East and Asia.
CHINESE NUCLEAR POLICY
While the extent and development of China's
nuclear forces remains largely shrouded in secrecy, and precise
details of nuclear forces, reliability, accuracy and strategy
are not readily available, it is clear that China is fully committed
to retaining nuclear forces. Moreover, recent developments in
Chinese nuclear thinking are potentially disturbing and demonstrate
a firm commitment to nuclear forces that includes an increasing
interest in flexible forces for nuclear war-fighting. There is
also a deep concern over US plans for a national missile defence
which might require China to substantially upgrade its long range
missile forces.
China initially developed nuclear weapons in
the 1950s and 1960s with Soviet aid, but after the rift with Moscow,
maintained an indigenous research, development and production
capability. By the early 1980s, China had perhaps 300 nuclear
weapons, and much of that decade was concerned with improving
the quality of the systems, particularly in relation to reliability
and survivability. The majority of the weapons were considered
strategic, but this was in relation to the Soviet Union, considered
to be the main threat at the time. Very few of the Chinese missiles
could target the United States or Western Europe. (36)
There are three developments of the past decade
that are particularly relevant to the future. The first is an
unequivocal commitment to retaining nuclear forces. China may
not oppose a comprehensive test ban, and it may support the START
process, but its bottom line is a view of nuclear forces as an
integral part of Chinese defence policy. In taking this view,
China seems unable to recognise the effect this has on neighbours
such as India.
The second development is evidence of a Chinese
interest in developing a nuclear posture which, at the regional
level, bears a similarity to NATO's flexible response. The Chinese
are particularly concerned about Russia, where they believe there
is potential for considerable instability coupled with the possibility
of a strongly nationalist government. Such instability on the
Chinese periphery is the context for changes in military thinking:
Finally, but no less important, is China's recent
but substantial concern over American plans for theatre and national
missile defences. There is strong opposition to any US proposal
to facilitate ballistic missile defences in East Asia that might
apply to Japan, South Korea and especially Taiwan, and also opposition
to any longer-term plan for a US national missile shield:
The particular concern was with US plans to
seek an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow
it to develop national missile defences. According to the Director
of Arms Control at the Chinese foreign ministry, Sha Zukang, "Amending
it in search of national missile defense will tip the global balance,
trigger a new arms race and jeopardize world and regional stability."
(39)
Allowing for rhetoric, this and other Chinese
pronouncements at the end of 1999 indicated the concerns that
China felt that its small long-range missile force might be countered
by US anti-missile plans. There was probably a reluctance to engage
in a substantial expansion of Chinese strategic missile forces,
not least on grounds of cost, but recent reports suggest that
China has the potential to do so. Two new ICBMs, the DF-31 and
DF-41, are in their early stages of development, and each might
be capable of carrying multiple warheads. Each might ordinarily
take some years to develop and deploy, but China is capable of
accelerating such a process if required. (40)
In summary, China sees a continuing requirement
for nuclear forces and has a determination to maintain adequate
forces to satisfy its regional security requirements. Moreover,
it is in a position to engage in substantial strategic nuclear
developments, dependent on US decisions on a national missile
defence.
PROLIFERATION
This review of nuclear developments and attitudes
by the five main nuclear powers indicates a solid commitment to
maintaining nuclear forces, and much of this relates to the proliferation,
not just of nuclear weapons, but of weapons of mass destruction
as a whole. As suggested earlier, the 1990s saw some progress
in nuclear disarmament in some former Soviet states and South
Africa, with this added to progress in Latin America and East
Asia in the previous decade. Even so, other developments have
been far less positive, and adding concerns over chemical and
biological weapons results in an analysis that indicates some
major problems of international security in the coming decades.
In the Middle East, Israel retains substantial
nuclear forces, a factor frequently ignored in concerns over weapons
proliferation among Arab states. Israel's nuclear forces are believed
to comprise at least 100 warheads, including thermonuclear weapons
and, quite probably, enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons. Delivery
systems include nuclear-capable aircraft and the Jericho 2 ballistic
missile with a range of up to 1,200 miles. Israel may also have
a chemical and biological weapons capability, whereas Syria has
concentrated on chemical weapons, with deliver by missile or aircraft.
Egypt has the technical potential to develop a wide range of chemical
and biological weapons and almost certainly has an existing chemical
weapons capability, and neighbouring Libya has had ambitions to
develop weapons of mass destruction but, apart from some chemical
weapons, the results may have been limited.
The Iraqi plans to develop nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons in the 1980s were substantial. The extent
of their capabilities, achieved within a decade, had substantial
regional implications, not least encouraging Saudi Arabia to acquire
ballistic missiles from China and allow substantial US forces
to be based on its territory, and stimulating Israel to invest
heavily in ballistic missile defences.
Iran is situated next to one substantial nuclear
power, Russia, another recent nuclear power, Pakistan, and a state
with clear pretensions to have weapons of mass destruction, Iraq.
In such circumstances it would be simplistic not to expect Iran
to be seeking some kind of missile force equipped with weapons
of mass destruction. (41)
In South Asia, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
tests in 1998 were both designed to prove a number of warhead
designs. In the case of India, one assessment is that there are
proven designs for a powerful two-stage thermonuclear weapon,
a standard fission weapon in the 10-15 kiloton range and a smaller
tactical nuclear weapon, probably in the 2-3 kiloton range. All
of these weapons are plutonium-based, and India may have sufficient
fissile material for around 50 warheads. Pakistan appears to have
a single uranium-based fission weapon, possibly incorporating
a Chinese design, and may be able to produce around 12 weapons.
With both states, there is potential for the development of significant
nuclear arsenals within five years involving free-fall bombs as
well as warheads for ballistic missiles. (42) In the view of a
British foreign office minister, Peter Hain, India and Pakistan
were "very close" to a nuclear exchange over Kashmir
during the Summer of 1999, following incursions into an Indian-controlled
part of the province. (43)
In East Asia, South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear
weapons programmes appear to be on ice, and Japan, which could
readily produce nuclear weapons, continues to hold back from doing
so. The status of impoverished North Korea's nuclear ambitions
remains open to question, but it should be remembered that the
development of chemical and biological weapons by all major states
in the region, including China, is feasible and may already have
happened in some cases.
Indeed, the proliferation of chemical, and especially
biological weapons, together with ballistic missiles, in East
Asia and the Middle East especially, is a feature of the concerns
of the major existing nuclear powers, especially the United States
and its NATO allies.
NUCLEAR FUTURES
This paper started with the comment that there
had been two substantial periods of anti-nuclear concern in the
West, in the early 1960s and early 1980s, but that general perceptions
since the ending of the Cold War were that issues of nuclear instability
and proliferation were of little concern, except when prompted
by events such as the French nuclear tests in the mid-1990s and
the more recent nuclear arms race in South Asia. The paper has
attempted only a brief analysis of the actual postures and policies
of the existing nuclear powers, with an added note on the proliferation
of other weapons of mass destruction. But even this shows that
the "nuclear future" is far less benign than is commonly
believed.
As part of its intention of remaining the world's
most powerful state, the US is committed to maintaining and upgrading
its nuclear forces and has developed a posture that retains a
commitment to first use against a variety of threats. It is concerned
with Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities and with the possibility
of other states acquiring nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, it is highly likely to develop some kind of national
missile defence that, in turn, encourages Russia and China to
upgrade their own forces. The damage to the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty and the possible loss of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty both indicate that prospects for arms control have diminished,
and this includes a reduced likelihood of further cuts in strategic
arsenals in the START process.
Russia, in turn, is actually embracing nuclear
options to a greater extent than a decade ago, prompted partly
by trends in the US but also by the collapse of its conventional
forces. The disarray in much of Russia's nuclear industry is a
concern for proliferation, and the instability of Russia, along
with US trends, prompts China to enhance its own nuclear forces.
Meanwhile, Britain and France have reduced their arsenals but
remain committed to nuclear forces, with each country engaged
in substantial modernisation programmes, as well as having their
own concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In the Middle East and South Asia, nuclear stability is clearly
lacking, and the combination of nuclear proliferation with that
of chemical and biological weapons suggests a continuing danger
that is likely to grow.
Perhaps the most worrying aspect is the trend
towards usable nuclear weapons—the idea of "small nuclear
wars in far-off places". Development of new nuclear weapons
designed for specific functions in conflicts in the Third World,
whether by the US, Britain or France, the willingness of Russia
and China to look to versions of flexible response are all indicators
of this notion. Many analysts have argued that the most dangerous
aspect of the Cold War was the long-held belief that a limited
nuclear war could be fought and won. That mentality has endured
beyond the end of the Cold War and is deeply embedded in the strategic
thinking of the nuclear powers.
In looking ahead over the next 20 years or so,
and concentrating for now on existing trends, we have to conclude
that prospects for controlling nuclear weapons deteriorated in
the final few years of the 1990s, and there is no immediate sign
of an improvement. The trends are, if anything, in the opposite
direction. The widespread public perception that nuclear weapons
are of diminishing concern is fundamentally wrong—the danger
of an all-out nuclear war between two superpower alliances has
diminished, but the prospects for a stable route to a world in
which nuclear weapons are abolished or are even effectively controlled
are, on present trends, minimal.
NOTES
1. For a review of problems of nuclear proliferation,
see: Rebecca Johnson, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads",
Special Briefings Series on UK Nuclear Weapons Policy,
No. 3, (London, International Security Information Service, January
2000).
2. Robert S Norris and William M Arkin,
"Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1997", The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, (November/December, 1997).
3. Strategic Advisory Group of the Joint
Strategic Target Planning Group, US Strategic Air Command: "The
Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order", reported
in Navy News and Undersea Technology, (Washington DC, 13
January 1992).
4. Ibid.
5. Elaine Grossman, "DOD has 'Significant'
Ability to Alter Nuclear Weapons Targeting on Short Notice",
Inside the Air Force, Vol 3, No 32, p1 (7 August 1994).
Two years after the Reed Report, it was reported that the staff
at US Strategic Command (the successor to Strategic Air Command
with the inclusion of control of US ballistic missile submarines)
were "in the early stages of building and testing computer
models that could enable Mr Clinton to aim nuclear weapons at
third world nations that threaten the interests of the United
States and its allies.", see: Eric Schmitt, "Head of
Nuclear Forces Plans for a New World" New York Times,
25 February 1993.
6. Thomas W Dowler and Joseph S Howard III,
"Countering the Threat of the Well-armed Tyrant": A
Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons", Strategic Review,
Fall 1991.
7. Les Aspin, "Three Propositions for
a New Nuclear Era", commencement address at MIT, 1 June 1992.
8. General Powell, then Chair of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, clearly stated his commitment that "we will
eventually see the time when the number of nuclear weapons is
down to zero", (speech at Harvard University, 10 June, 1993).
The Henry L Stimson Center began its Project on Eliminating
Weapons of Mass Destruction, in January 1994. This was chaired
by the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General
Andrew Goodpaster, and included three other retired generals and
Robert McNamara. This involvement of the military, coupled with
the work of a number of academic analysts, gave a new emphasis
to ideas of a nuclear-free world. See, for example: Barry M Blechman
and Cathleen S Fisher, "Phase Out the Bomb", Foreign
Policy, No 97 (Winter 1994-95).
9. Also during this period, Congress blocked
funds for some new nuclear warhead developments. For example,
Project PLYWD, a post-Gulf war programme to produce a precision
low-yield nuclear warhead was halted by legislation banning development
of weapons below five kilotons. See, Robert S Norris and William
M Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook", The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, (July/August 1994).
10. Proliferation, Threat and Response,
Office of the Secretary of Defence, April 1996.
11. Carol Giacomo, "US May Use Nuclear
Force Against Chemicals", Reuters News Reports, 28
March 1996.
12. Letter from Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director,
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 24 January 1996.
13. In 1995, the Department of Energy announced
that Sandia National Laboratories would acquire a new supercomputer,
ten times faster than the most powerful computer then available,
which would enhance the ability to produce nuclear weapons without
nuclear test explosions. See "Industry Outlook", Aviation
Week and Space Technology, 13 November 1995.
14. William B Scott, "National Labs
Fill Gap in Weapons Stewardship", Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 22 January 1996.
15. Ibid.
16. The Los Alamos facility was one of several
options considered in order to preserve a nuclear weapons production
capability. "Another would be to develop a module that could
be taken to other sites—such as the Savannah River weapons
plant—to quickly increase production or rebuild capacities
if need be." Ibid.
17. "US Nuclear Bomb Passes Final Drop
Test", Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 April 1998. For a
detailed assessment of the B61-11, see: Greg Mello, "New
Bomb, No Mission", The Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists,
May/June 1997.
18. Mello, "New Bomb, No Mission".
19. Willilam M Arkin, "What's New",
The Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, November/December,
1997.
20. Arkin, "What's New". For an
account of the move from Cold War nuclear targeting to nuclear
war plans appropriate to limited threats, see: William M Arkin
and Hans Kristensen, "Dangerous Directions", The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998.
21. For an analysis of the putative role
of US nuclear weapons in counter-proliferation, see: Hans M Kristensen
and Joshua Handler, "the US and Counter-Proliferation, a
New and Dubious Role for US Nuclear Weapons", Security
Dialogue, Vol 27, No 4 (1996). For an account of nuclear weapon
research and development programmes, especially in relation to
Third World targeting, see: Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Futures:
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy",
BASIC Research Report 98.2, (London and Washington DC:
British American Security Information Council, 1998).
22. Dunbar Lockwood, "The Status of
US, Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia",
Arms Control Today, (November, 1994).
23. Data from The Military Balance 1989-90,
and The Military Balance 1999-2000, (London: The International
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989 and 1999).
24. "Russia Builds Up Nuclear Forces
as Prospects for START II Fade", Defense News, 4 December
1995. See also, Barbara Starr, "NATO Growth "Increases
Russian Nuclear Threat", Jane's Defence Weekly, 17
December 1997.
25. Lockwood, "The Status of US, Russian
and Chinese Nuclear Forces".
26. "Kremlin to Bolster Nuclear Stockpile"
Washington Post, 30 April 1999. See also, The Military
Balance 1999-2000.
27. The Military Balance 1999-2000.
28. Yuri Golotyuk, "Russia Clenches
its Nuclear Fist", Izvestia, 23 March 1999.
29. Paul Rogers, "Sub Strategic Trident:
A Slow-Burning Fuse", London Defence Studies No 34,
(London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1996).
30. David Miller, "Britain Ponders
Single Warhead Option" International Defence Review.
(September, 1994).
31. David S Yost, "Nuclear Debates
in France" Survival, Vol 36, No 4 (Winter 1994-95).
32. Giovanni de Briganti, "France to
Replace Mirage IVP Bomber Fleet by 1997" Defense News,
8 January 1996.
33. Strategic Concept, paragraph
64, NATO, Brussels, April 1999.
34. Summit Communique, NATO, Washington
DC, 26 April 1999.
35. NATO Summit: The New Strategic Concept
Fact Sheet, The White House, Washington DC, 26 April 1999.
36. Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando, The
Directory of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms and Disarmament,
1990, (London, Tri-Service Press, 1990).
37. Alistair Iain Johnston, "China's
New `Old Thinking'", International Security, Vol 20,
No 3 (Winter 1995-1996).
38. Erik Eckholm, "China to US: Back
Off Treaty Changes", The New York Times, 25 November
1999.
39. Ibid.
40. Robert S Norris and William M Arkin,
"Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1999", The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, (May/June, 1999).
41. James Risen and Judith Miller, "CIA
Now Says it is Less Sure That Iran Cannot Make Nuclear Bomb",
International Herald Tribune, 18 January 2000.
42. Robert S Norris and William M Arkin,
"After the Tests: India and Pakistan Update", The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (September/October, 1988).
43. Michael Evans, "Kashmir `nearly
led to nuclear clash'", The Times, London, 29 November
1999.