The designation of state sponsors of terrorism by the United States--and the
imposition of sanctions--is a mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism
as a means of political expression. US policy is intended to compel state sponsors
to renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists
to justice for past crimes.
The United States is committed to holding terrorists and those who harbor them
accountable for past attacks, regardless of when the acts occurred. The United
States has a long memory and will not simply expunge a terrorist's record because
time has passed. The states that choose to harbor terrorists are similar to
accomplices who provide shelter for criminals--and the United States will hold
them accountable for their "guests'" actions. International terrorists
should know before they contemplate a crime that they cannot hunker down afterward
in a safehaven and be absolved of their crimes.The United States is committed
firmly to removing countries from the state sponsor list once they have taken
necessary steps to end their link to terrorism. In fact, the Department of State
is engaged in ongoing discussions with state sponsors interested in being removed
from the list.
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan remain the seven governments
that the US Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international
terrorism. Iran continued to support numerous terrorist groups-- including the
Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)--in their
efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process through terrorism. Although
there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions of certain
state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active
state sponsor of terrorism. Iraq continued to provide safehaven and support
to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons,
and protection to the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that
opposes the current Iranian regime. Syria continued to provide safehaven and
support to several terrorist groups, some of which oppose the Middle East peace
process. Libya had yet to fully comply with the requirements of the relevant
UN Security Council resolutions related to the trial of those accused of downing
Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. North Korea harbored several hijackers
of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in the 1970s and maintained links
to Usama Bin Ladin and his network. Cuba continued providing safehaven to several
terrorists and US fugitives and maintained ties to other state sponsors and
Latin American insurgents. Finally, Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place,
safehaven, and training hub for members of Bin Ladin's al-Qaida, Lebanese Hizballah,
al-Jihad, al-Gama'at, PIJ, HAMAS, and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO).
State sponsorship has decreased over the past several decades. As it decreases,
it becomes increasingly important for all countries to adopt a "zero tolerance"
for terrorist activity within their borders. Terrorists will seek safehaven
in those areas where they are able to avoid the rule of law and to travel, prepare,
raise funds, and operate. In 1999 the United States actively researched and
gathered intelligence on other states that will be considered for designation
as state sponsors. If the United States deems a country to "repeatedly
provide support for acts of international terrorism," it is required by
law to add that nation to the list.
In 1999 the United States increasingly was concerned about reports of Pakistani
support for terrorist groups and elements active in Kashmir, as well as Pakistani
relations with the Taliban, which continued to harbor terrorists such as Usama
Bin Ladin. In the Middle East, the United States was concerned that a variety
of terrorist groups operated and trained inside Lebanon with relative impunity.
Lebanon also was unresponsive to U.S. requests to bring to justice terrorists
who attacked U.S. citizens and property in Lebanon in previous years.
Cuba
Cuba continued to provide safehaven to several terrorists and U.S. fugitives
in 1999. A number of Basque ETA terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some
years ago continued to live on the island, as did several U.S. terrorist fugitives.
Havana also maintained ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin
American insurgents. Colombia's two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both maintained
a permanent presence on the island. In late 1999, Cuba hosted a series of meetings
between Colombian Government officials and ELN leaders.
Iran
Although there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions
of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most
active state sponsor of terrorism. These state institutions, notably the Revolutionary
Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, continued to be involved
in the planning and execution of terrorist acts and continued to support a variety
of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.
A variety of public reports indicate Iran's security forces conducted several
bombings against Iranian dissidents abroad. Iranian agents, for example, were
blamed for a truck bombing in early October of a Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) terrorist
base near Basrah, Iraq, that killed several MEK members and non-MEK individuals.
Iran continued encouraging Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups--including
HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC--to use violence,
especially terrorist attacks, in Israel to undermine the peace process. Iran
supported these groups with varying amounts of money, training, and weapons.
Despite statements by the Khatami administration that Iran was not working against
the peace process, Tehran stepped up its encouragement of, and support for,
these groups after the election of Israeli Prime Minister Barak and the resumption
of Israel-Syria peace talks. In a gesture of public support, President Khatami
met with Damascus-based Palestinian rejectionist leaders during his visit to
Syria in May. In addition, Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei reflected Iran's
covert actions aimed at scuttling the peace process when he sponsored a major
rally in Tehran on 9 November to demonstrate Iran's opposition to Israel and
peace. Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist speakers at the rally reaffirmed
their support for violent jihad against Israel. A Palestinian Islamic
Jihad representative praised a bombing in Netanya that occurred days before
and promised more such attacks.
Tehran still provided safehaven to elements of Turkey's separatist PKK that
conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and against Turkish targets in
Europe. One of the PKK's most senior at-large leaders, Osman Ocalan, brother
of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, resided at least part-time in Iran.
Iran also provided support to terrorist groups in North Africa and South and
Central Asia, including financial assistance and training.
Tehran accurately claimed that it also was a victim of terrorism, as the opposition
Mujahedin-e Khalq conducted several terrorist attacks in Iran. On 10 April the
group assassinated Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the Iranian Armed Forces
Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff.
Iraq
Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international terrorism in 1999. Although
Baghdad focused primarily on the antiregime opposition both at home and abroad,
it continued to provide safehaven and support to various terrorist groups.
Press reports stated that, according to a defecting Iraqi intelligence agent,
the Iraqi intelligence service had planned to bomb the offices of Radio Free
Europe in Prague. Radio Free Europe offices include Radio Liberty, which began
broadcasting news and information to Iraq in October 1998. The plot was foiled
when it became public in early 1999.
The Iraqi opposition publicly stated its fears that the Baghdad regime was
planning to assassinate those opposed to Saddam Hussein. A spokesman for the
Iraqi National Accord in November said that the movement's security organs had
obtained information about a plan to assassinate its secretary general, Dr.
Iyad 'Allawi, and a member of the movement's political bureau, as well as another
Iraqi opposition leader.
Iraq continued to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist
groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF),
and the former head of the now-defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who
masterminded several bombings of U.S. aircraft.
Iraq provided bases, weapons, and protection to the MEK, an Iranian terrorist
group that opposes the current Iranian regime. In 1999, MEK cadre based in Iraq
assassinated or attempted to assassinate several high-ranking Iranian Government
officials, including Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, Deputy Chief of Iran's
Joint Staff, who was killed in Tehran on 10 April.
Libya
In April 1999, Libya took an important step by surrendering for trial the
two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in
1988. The move responded directly to the US-UK initiative; concerted efforts
by the Saudi, Egyptian, and South African Governments; and the active engagement
of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General. At yearend, however,
Libya still had not complied with the remaining UN Security Council requirements:
payment of appropriate compensation; acceptance of responsibility for the actions
of its officials; renunciation of, and an end to, support for terrorism; and
cooperation with the prosecution and trial. Libyan leader Qadhafi repeatedly
stated publicly during the year that his government had adopted an antiterrorism
stance, but it remained unclear whether his claims of distancing Libya from
its terrorist past signified a true change in policy.
Libya also remained the primary suspect in several other past terrorist operations,
including the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin in 1986 that killed two
US servicemen and one Turkish civilian and wounded more than 200 persons. The
trial in Germany of five suspects in the bombing, which began in November 1997,
continued in 1999.
In 1999, Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organization and distanced itself from
the Palestinian rejectionists, announcing that the Palestinian Authority was
the only legitimate address for Palestinian concerns. Libya still may have retained
ties to some Palestinian groups that use violence to oppose the Middle East
peace process, however, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC.
North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) continued to provide safehaven
to the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in
the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. P'yongyang
allowed members of the Japanese Diet to visit some of the hijackers during the
year. In 1999 the D.P.R.K. also attempted to kidnap in Thailand a North Korean diplomat
who had defected the day before. The attempt led the North Korean Embassy to
hold the former diplomat's son hostage for two weeks. Some evidence also suggests
the D.P.R.K. in 1999 may have sold weapons directly or indirectly to terrorist groups.
Sudan
Sudan in 1999 continued to serve as a central hub for several international
terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. The Sudanese
Government also condoned Iran's assistance to terrorist and radical Islamist
groups operating in and transiting through Sudan.
Khartoum served as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for members
of the Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Gama'at al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad, the Palistinian
Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and Abu Nidal organization. Sudan's support to these groups
included the provision of travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge. Most
of the groups maintained offices and other forms of representation in the capital,
using Sudan primarily as a secure base for organizing terrorist operations and
assisting compatriots elsewhere.
Sudan still had not complied with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054,
and 1070 passed in 1996--which demand that Sudan end all support to terrorists--despite
the regime's efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism. They also require
Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian Gama'at fugitives linked to the assassination
attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese
officials continued to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and that
they had a role in the attack. | 