DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

The United States leads international efforts to develop and sustain global norms against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery means (NBC/M), often referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It actively engages in dialogues with states around the world to persuade them not to acquire these NBC weapons capabilities or to eliminate capabilities already developed. The United States also works with states to combat proliferation by assisting them in gaining and assuring greater control over sensitive dual-use equipment and technology.

The Gulf War experience showed the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning. As noted in the 1997 National Security Strategy, the United States must plan and prepare to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use unconventional approaches that avoid U.S. strengths while exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities. Because of U.S. conventional military dominance, adversaries who might challenge the United States are likely to do so using unconventional means, including NBC weapons. As a result, DoD must continue to prepare for the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. U.S. forces must be trained and equipped for all potential missions, including those in which opponents might use or threaten to use NBC weapons.

To meet these challenges and implement guidance contained in a Presidential directive, Secretary of Defense Aspin launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in December 1993. The Counterproliferation Initiative contributes greatly to U.S. government efforts to prevent or reverse the acquisition of NBC weapons. It also calls for the development of the capabilities needed to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons if prevention fails. The Initiative ensures that U.S. forces are equipped and trained to prevail in future major theater wars that may involve NBC threats.

The United States’ primary goal continues to be stopping proliferation. Because efforts to prevent, stop, or reverse proliferation may not always succeed, DoD is undertaking a variety of programs and activities to deter the use of NBC weapons against U.S. and allied forces, as well as against the territories of the United States and its friends and allies. The effectiveness of these efforts will depend on the perceptions and assessments of potential aggressors who possess NBC weapons regarding the resolve of the United States to deal with such threats. Indeed, the knowledge that the United States has a powerful and ready nuclear capability is a significant deterrent to the use of these weapons.

Effective deterrence will depend on a range of nuclear and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. In particular, military preparations for operations in an NBC environment will make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying military power in defense of its national interests. The United States will be prepared to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means, thereby demonstrating to any potential aggressor that the risks incurred from using NBC weapons would far outweigh any advantages gained.

DoD plays a vital role in supporting all facets of national counterproliferation policy. Many capabilities developed to deal with NBC proliferation on the battlefield—especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means—effectively support international regimes, export controls, and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.

This section outlines steps the Department is taking to respond to the challenges of proliferation and to deal with the military threats posed by NBC weapons. DoD’s response to proliferation takes three forms: international proliferation prevention; protection of U.S. civilians and military forces if faced with the threat or use of NBC weapons; and counterforce capability to eliminate NBC targets.

Proliferation prevention is the United States’ primary objective. DoD’s contributions are part of a coordinated national and international effort involving many U.S. government departments and agencies, allied nations, and international organizations. DoD support includes the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program; DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterproliferation program; export control activities; and DoD inspection, verification, and enforcement support for the treaties and arms control regimes that limit or prohibit NBC weapons and associated delivery systems.

The President’s 1997 National Security Strategy points out the importance of shaping the international environment to enhance U.S. and global security, as well as preventing and reducing threats stemming from proliferation. The United States has a range of tools at its disposal to accomplish this. These tools include the use of diplomacy, international assistance, arms control agreements and regimes, nonproliferation initiatives, and military activities. DoD’s efforts to respond to proliferation through prevention utilize each of these tools.

International norms, rules, and standards make an important contribution to proliferation prevention. In addition to creating common social and moral standards and an atmosphere of restraint, they often provide the preconditions, e.g., inspections, that impede proliferation. These international norms, rules, and standards can be specifically incorporated into export control and arms control agreements or they can result from informal arrangements between states.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure of the Soviet Union remained in four of the New Independent States—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. An estimated 30,000 tactical and strategic nuclear warheads remained in the former Soviet Union, with approximately 6,000 of them in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The breakup of the Soviet system heightened the belief that the former Soviet republics would not be able to safeguard these nuclear weapons. Potential international consequences posed by this situation included diversion or unauthorized use of weapons, diversion of fissile materials, and possible participation of former Soviet weapons scientists in proliferation efforts in other countries.

While this situation posed potentially serious threats to U.S. and international security, the demise of the Soviet Union also created unique opportunities for cooperative reduction of the threat. Therefore, in 1991, Congress enacted the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act and designated DoD as executive agent for the CTR Program created by the Act.

CTR activities have contributed significantly to the reduction of the proliferation threat over the past four years. U.S. offers of assistance under the program were instrumental in convincing Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus and that they could shoulder the economic, political, and technical burdens of weapons dismantlement and demilitarization. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the CTR Program has assisted these four states with the elimination (or, in the case of Russia, reduction) of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, proliferation prevention efforts, and the dismantlement and transformation of infrastructure associated with these weapons.

By providing equipment, facilities, logistical and operational support, and technical expertise, the CTR Program helped Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus meet their commitments to become non-nuclear weapons states (in accordance with the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). CTR is also assisting Russia in both meeting and accelerating completion of its START obligations and in beginning to destroy the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpile.

In addition to eliminating actual weapons and weapons delivery systems, the CTR Program is addressing nuclear weapons transportation and storage security, as well as the safety and security of weapons-derived fissile material. CTR has also sought to reduce the threat to the United States and its allies by working with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to convert former WMD and delivery system production facilities and personnel to peaceful commercial pursuits. CTR projects are converting 17 of those factories to civilian use. Science and Technology Centers, funded initially by the CTR Program, have created opportunities for over 17,000 former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers in peaceful civilian research. Approximately 15,000 of these scientists were in the four CTR-recipient countries. All these projects reduce the threat while also contributing to the development of free-market economies.

In Russia, CTR assistance helped remove about 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads from deployment sites. Additionally, all strategic warheads (about 3,400) have been transported from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to Russia. (These included both operational warheads and warheads in storage.) The CTR Program is helping Russia to centralize fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons, in limited numbers of safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage areas by providing assistance in the design and construction of a Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak, Russia, and the design and fabrication of fissile material storage containers. The CTR Program also provides assistance to strengthen safety, security, control, and accounting of nuclear weapons during movement and while in interim storage, pending their dismantlement.

The CTR Program is providing assistance in the form of a Nuclear Weapons Automated Inventory Control and Management System which will provide an architecture to monitor and track nuclear weapons destined for dismantlement. DoD is also providing an ASSESS computer model to help the Russian Ministry of Defense assess nuclear weapons storage sites and guard force vulnerabilities. DoD and the Ministry of Defense have held meetings to share information on personnel reliability program concepts and screening training methods. This assistance has included over 4,000 armored blankets, 115 modification kits for weapons transportation railcars, supercontainers for transporting nuclear weapons, and emergency response training and equipment in the event of a nuclear weapons transportation incident. In addition, CTR is providing comprehensive physical security enhancements for up to 50 nuclear weapons storage sites. A joint U.S.-Russian contractor team will establish a technical training base that will be used to install, test, and evaluate security equipment.

To support Russian chemical weapons destruction, the CTR Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) program validated the Russian neutralization technology that will be used in the CWD facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia. This neutralization technology will destroy Russia’s declared chemical weapons stockpile, consisting of 40,000 metric tons (MT) stored at seven sites. U.S. CWD support focuses on elimination of the 32,000 MT nerve agent stockpile because that stockpile is fully weaponized, meaning that the nerve agent sits in projectiles, bombs, and rocket and missile warheads ready for immediate use. In addition, the CTR Program provided a concept design for a central chemical analytical laboratory; procured and delivered over $5.4 million worth of analytical instrumentation, laboratory and office equipment, and supplies; and provided three mobile laboratories to support on-site monitoring during storage and CWD operations.

In Ukraine, CTR assistance enabled the early deactivation (removal of warheads) of all 46 deployed SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (460 nuclear warheads) and of all 130 SS-19 ICBMs (780 nuclear warheads). CTR assistance also enabled nearly 2,000 ICBM and air launched cruise missile (ALCM) warheads from Ukraine to be returned to Russia for dismantlement.

CTR assistance provided safe and secure storage of approximately 3,500 MT of fuel resulting from defueling the 130 SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine. The CTR Program also helped construct an SS-19 ICBM neutralization and dismantlement facility at Dnipropetrovsk for cleaning missile propellant tanks, thereby allowing the missiles to be eliminated in accordance with START I procedures. As of September 1997, 55 of the 130 SS-19 missiles have been eliminated. Plans for eliminating additional nuclear weapon infrastructure include demilitarizing four nuclear weapon storage areas, as well as two unified fill facilities (one at each SS-19 division in Ukraine) used to store temporarily SS-19 fuel and oxidizer and to maintain the equipment necessary to load/unload propellant into missiles. Elimination of all SS-24 silos and missiles is also planned.

In Kazakhstan, the CTR Program is helping to eliminate 120 SS-18 launchers and launch control silos and 28 test launchers. CTR also aided the return of 104 SS-18 missiles to Russia. Another CTR project has closed and sealed the first 59 tunnels of 181 nuclear test tunnels at the Degelen Mountain Test Site Complex, where more than 220 nuclear tests were conducted between 1963 and 1989. The CTR Program will also assist in the dismantlement of the former Soviet Biological Weapons (BW) Production Facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.

In Belarus, the CTR Program assisted in the removal of the 81 SS-25 ICBM missiles, their launchers, and their nuclear payloads from Belarus to Russia. The CTR Program plans to provide assistance to destroy launch facilities, equipment storage facilities, former command posts, fueling storage facilities, and nuclear weapons maintenance support structures at the three former missile bases. DoD has contracted with an American firm to eliminate the 81 launch pads that provide the foundation for SS-25 missile launchers in Belarus, although the contractor has had difficulties with the government of Belarus in obtaining site access. Finally, DoD plans to provide Belarus with the support necessary to dispose of its 1,000 MT supply of liquid rocket fuel.

Congress provided authority in the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization Act for up to $10 million in reprogrammed DoD funds to develop a joint program with the FBI to expand and improve efforts to deter, prevent, and investigate incidents involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related material. The result is the Department of Defense/FBI Counterproliferation Program. This program trains and equips the community of officials responsible for NBC interdiction in Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the former Soviet Union.

The program consists of three basic elements: policy consultations and assessments; training and technical assistance; and equipment procurement. Initially, the program will provide assistance to the community of officials responsible for NBC interdiction in the southern tier of the former Soviet Union, particularly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Program activities include a two-week basic course for officials responsible for NBC interdiction. Mid-senior-level Kazakhstani officials completed this course in June 1997 at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. In August 1997, Uzbek officials completed a similar course. Also planned are specialized courses, practical exercises, and legislative seminars in the participating countries.

The International Border Security counterproliferation program authorized by the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act is operated by DoD in consultation with the U.S. Customs Service. Its purpose is to train and equip customs officers and border guard officials in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states to prevent, deter, and investigate incidents involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related materials.

This three-year DoD/Customs program will focus initially on Southeastern Europe, including Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova and will support temporary duty customs advisors in several nations. Bringing the program into these nations complements work carried out by U.S. Customs and other agencies elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It also complements activities under the DoD/FBI Counterproliferation Program. In future years, the program may expand to other nations in the region.

The DoD/Office of the Secretary of Defense Critical Technology Program develops and publishes the congressionally mandated Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). The MCTL is a detailed compendium of the technologies that DoD assesses as critical to maintaining superior U.S. military capabilities. It applies to all mission areas, especially counterproliferation. The MCTL is used as a technical foundation for U.S. export control proposals, especially the Wassenaar Arrangement, for licensing and export control officials and for intelligence collection. The MCTL has been divided into three parts for easier handling:

Technologies that a proliferant might use and might need to be countered are addressed in Part II of the MCTL. Parts I and III cover those technologies that U.S. forces could use to thwart a WMD program or fight in an NBC environment. The MCTL is updated regularly to ensure key technologies are included, thus capturing new technologies applicable to counterproliferation.

Denial involves carefully targeted export controls and the disruption of weapons and technology trade which would assist the potential proliferant in obtaining NBC weapons and delivery systems. U.S. export control policy has two principal objectives. First, stop—or at least retard—the transfer of those technologies that could permit potential proliferant states to design, manufacture, or acquire NBC weapons, their delivery systems, and other dangerous armaments. Second, monitor the flow of dual-use technologies that have legitimate commercial applications, but which if diverted or applied to military end uses could have a negative impact on U.S. national security interests.

DoD’s security-related activities in the area of international technology transfer are coordinated by DoD’s primary agent, the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). These efforts are intended to prevent the acquisition of dangerous and sensitive technologies by countries that pose threats to regional or global security. When technology is transferred to a country which does not pose a threat, DoD ensures the transfer is done in a manner that does not endanger U.S. interests or compromise U.S. national security. In addition to controlling transfers of destabilizing conventional weapons and associated dual-use technologies, DoD’s technology security activities support the Department’s Counterproliferation Initiative. These activities also help preserve critical U.S. military technological advantages while supporting legitimate defense cooperation with U.S. allies and friends.

DoD and other U.S. government agencies develop export control lists that take full account of chokepoints (goods and technologies important at critical stages of manufacture and application of military and dual-use items). The MCTL, which is developed by DoD in consultation with other agencies, is used to help identify those products and technologies which must be subject to export controls. DoD and the U.S. Intelligence Community actively support the export review process by identifying the key technologies that enable NBC proliferation.

Intelligence provides critical information on how proliferants acquire technologies and materials through the use of complicated covert procurement networks. Because many of these networks include maritime transport, the U.S. Navy is deploying the Specific Emitter Identification System to improve DoD’s capabilities to identify and track ships at sea suspected of transporting NBC weapons, delivery systems, and NBC related materials. Intelligence provides important information on pending or ongoing foreign shipments of critical materials, including technical assessments of materials and whether they are intended for legitimate civilian use or for military applications.

These and other intelligence capabilities will help the United States maintain and strengthen controls on critical technologies. Such controls can have a dramatic effect on slowing the pace of proliferants’ programs and on raising their costs. Intelligence capabilities also contribute to ongoing efforts to focus and strengthen key international export control regimes, as well as support diplomatic communications and international inspections. Accurate and timely information on a proliferant’s activities and intentions can be used to build a global consensus that international norms have been violated.

DoD also plays a leadership role in the implementation of many arms control and nonproliferation regimes. For example, the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) conducts research to identify technologies that will ensure verification technologies used to implement arms control agreements meet stringent DoD safety and operational requirements. DoD’s On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is responsible for implementing inspection, escort, and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of several U.S. treaties and agreements.

The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) enables the U.S. government to require an export license for all items, even those not on the control list in the Export Administration Regulations, if the exporter knows, has reason to know, or has been informed that the item will be used directly or indirectly in a nuclear, missile, chemical or biological weapons project. This year, the United States continued to strengthen this catch-all control by adding to the published list of entities involved in such projects, thereby informing exporters that they are required to seek licenses for exports of all dual-use items to these end-users.

This action was prompted, in part, by information that a limited number of more capable computers had been exported to Russian nuclear weapons laboratories without a U.S. license. These cases are currently under investigation by the Departments of Justice and Commerce and they underscore the importance of the catch-all control provision. (Indeed, the United States strongly supports and is encouraging other like-minded states to institute similar catch-all provisions tailored appropriately to their national laws and regulations.) Current export controls on computers require a license beginning at 2,000 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second) to end-users involved in military work in nonallied countries that either possess or have active programs to develop nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, or that do not have a sufficiently developed export control capability, or that raise other national security concerns. The EPCI regulations supplement these tight controls on computers, since they provide the capability to require a license for any computer, irrespective of its performance level, to any country, if destined for an end-user involved in NBC weapons and/or missile development activities. Additionally, the U.S. government requires a license beginning at six MTOPS—and in fact, maintains a virtual embargo on exports—for all computers to pariah states like as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

Following nearly three years of international negotiations, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies received final approval from 33 co-founding states in July 1996. The principal objectives of the new regime are to promote transparency, responsibility and, where appropriate, restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, particularly to countries and regions of concern. These regions include areas where U.S. and allied forces might face hostile military action. Wassenaar, comprised of 33 member nations, including Russia and several other former Warsaw Pact states, represents the first-ever global effort to control transfers of conventional armaments and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

Often compared to its predecessor, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), Wassenaar differs in that it does not formally target any particular country or group of countries. However, members agree to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-use if the situation in a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern to the participating states. States considered to be in this category are Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

Wassenaar’s Initial Elements constitute the building blocks of the new regime. They include:

DoD played a key role in the negotiations leading up to the establishment of Wassenaar and continues to figure prominently in the consultation sessions where problematic transfers and trends are discussed. DoD believes that Wassenaar is destined to fill a significant gap in multilateral export controls. As such, it will complement—not duplicate— nonproliferation regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The MTCR is a voluntary nonproliferation arrangement of 29 states, including the United States, Canada, NATO and European Union countries, Russia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, and Hungary. Member states undertake to establish controls on exports of equipment and technology—both military and dual-use—that are relevant to long range missile development, production, and operation. DoD provides intelligence and operational expertise for the national-level decisions that are made, on a case-by-case basis, concerning implementation of this regime’s controls.

The Australia Group is an informal arrangement among 30 countries that have developed harmonized export controls over materials and equipment that can be used to produce chemical or biological weapons. The Australia Group includes the United States, Canada, most of Western and Eastern Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Argentina. The group meets once a year to exchange information on the status of national export controls; to share enforcement experiences; to discuss attempts to obtain export controlled commodities; to share information on the status of worldwide chemical and biological weapons programs; to discuss additions to the harmonized export control list on such items as chemical precurors, microorganisms, and related equipment; to conduct regional outreach seminars; and to consider the addition of new members.

The NSG, comprised of 30 countries, seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both nuclear-specific and dual-use. Russia is a member of this group. Other former Soviet republics—notably Belarus and Kazakhstan —are not. China, a major potential supplier of nuclear resources, is also not a member. The United States’ position is that observance of NSG guidelines for nuclear exports by all potential suppliers, irrespective of their decision to join the group, is crucial for controlling the flow of nuclear materials and technologies.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), signed in 1972, entered into force in 1975; it prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological weapons. The United States was an original State Party to the BWC. The BWC has no provisions for verification or enforcement, but now States Parties are engaged in a multilateral effort to develop a legally binding protocol to strengthen the treaty. The United States is promoting measures that provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to deter violations of and enhance compliance with the BWC. DoD participates in BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations, the multilateral forum in which the protocol is being developed.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force on April 29, 1997, outlaws an entire class of weapons by banning their use, development, production, acquisition, stockpile, and transfer. The Convention’s verification regime requires declarations and systematic and short notice challenge inspections of chemical weapons (CW) related facilities.

The nonproliferation aspects of the Convention restrict trade in CW precursor chemicals outside of member states. The Department’s views have been influential in developing the verification procedures being implemented by the international Inspectorate charged with ensuring compliance. As of October 28, 1997, declarations have been made by 69 member states, and 86 inspections have been conducted at CW-related facilities in the United States, India, the United Kingdom, and 17 other member states. The CWC was instrumental in getting India to publicly declare its CW stockpile and subject it to verification and eventual destruction. Through its arms control and nonproliferation aspects, the CWC generates international pressure for those states, not yet parties to the treaty, to ratify the Convention and to declare and destroy their chemical weapons. The eradication of these weapons stocks will lower the probability that the military of the United States or its allies will face this threat on a future battlefield.

DoD recognizes that a country determined to obtain NBC weapons and their delivery systems, and willing to violate global nonproliferation norms, might succeed despite the strongest prevention efforts. Because experience has shown that countries armed with NBC weapons can use these weapons to challenge U.S. security interests, U.S. forces must be fully prepared to deal with the military threats posed by NBC proliferation.

Protection against chemical and biological agents must provide an effective defense against the complete spectrum of new or novel agents in gaseous, liquid, or solid aerosolized form that may be produced or acquired by potential enemies. This would include any agents that circumvent the provisions of the CWC.

The May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted that DoD has made substantial progress in preparing to deal with an adversary’s use of NBC weapons. The QDR underscored two key challenges that DoD must meet to ensure future preparedness:

To advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation concepts, DoD is developing an integrated counter-NBC weapons strategy that includes both offensive and defensive measures, as well as regular individual, unit, joint, and combined training and exercises that incorporate realistic NBC threats. Such training and exercises are the best means for evaluating operational concepts and doctrine, assessing readiness, and fostering innovation and adaptation.

In addition to changes in planning and procedures, the Secretary of Defense has directed an increase in planned spending on counterproliferation by approximately $1 billion over the FY l998-2003 program period, particularly for protective measures against chemical weapons. This additional investment will allow DoD to acquire new equipment and protective systems that will significantly enhance existing U.S. capabilities for dealing with chemical and biological weapons threats.

Given the likelihood that U.S. forces will fight in coalition with others in the future, DoD also is encouraging allies and friends to make similar adaptations, because combined readiness is a key concern. Unless allies and future coalition partners are properly prepared to deal with NBC threats or attacks, they could present vulnerabilities for a U.S.-led coalition. As noted elsewhere in this report, to minimize such vulnerabilities, DoD has initiated bilateral counterproliferation dialogues with many key friends and allies around the world, as well as through the NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation, to explore opportunities for cooperative counterproliferation planning and program activities.

DoD has made substantial progress toward fully integrating the counterproliferation mission into its military planning, acquisition, intelligence, and international cooperation activities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has been assigned responsibility for the development and implementation of DoD’s counterproliferation policy.

One of the most important activities toward fully integrating counterproliferation into the functions of the Department has been the implementation of the 1995 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Missions and Functions Study. The study concluded that the regional commanders in chief (CINC) should be responsible for implementing DoD counterproliferation policy within their respective areas of responsibility. This study led to two more significant documents regarding counterproliferation policy. The first was the CJCS Counterproliferation Charter, an instruction providing overarching strategic-level policy and guidance for the employment of U.S. forces to counter the proliferation of NBC weapons. The second, a CJCS Counterproliferation Concept Plan, tasked the regional CINCs to prepare for and to develop plans for counterproliferation operations.

The Counterproliferation Council (CPC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, monitors DoD-wide efforts to train, exercise, and equip U.S. forces for the counterproliferation mission. It also oversees DoD counterproliferation activities in interagency and international fora. The CPC meets on a regular basis, focusing on the potential impact of NBC/M proliferation on DoD’s strategic requirement to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars; on joint and service counterproliferation doctrine; and on exercising and training for integrated operations in an NBC environment. In this connection, the CPC identified the importance of understanding the likely NBC employment concepts and plans of proliferants. It also took steps to ensure that focused intelligence assessments in these areas affect the development of regional military plans, doctrine, and exercising policies. Future meetings will address specific issues within the broad areas of adversary use concepts, counterproliferation doctrine, training and exercising, and allied counterproliferation issues.

Since U.S. forces are likely to fight in coalition with other nations’ forces when faced with a future combat situation, combined readiness of the coalition to deal with NBC threats or use is of utmost importance. Allies and friends who are not prepared to confront NBC threats or attacks may increase the vulnerability of a U.S.-led coalition. Furthermore, potential coalition partners cannot depend on U.S. forces to provide passive and active defense capabilities against NBC threats or attacks.

The Department is continuing to work with America’s long-standing allies in Europe and elsewhere to develop common approaches on counterproliferation. Notably, DoD played the leading role in moving counterproliferation to the top of NATO’s agenda.

The NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), co-chaired by the United States and a European ally (currently Germany), was established in 1994 to prioritize Alliance and national capabilities and to recommend improvements for NATO’s defense posture to counter emerging threats from NBC/M. NATO’s counterproliferation initiative is an integral part of the Alliance’s adaptation to the post-Cold War environment. As part of NATO’s strategic reorientation toward greater security responsibilities beyond Europe, the DGP has recommended ways of improving the protection of deployed allied forces, which may operate beyond NATO’s periphery where the military dangers posed by NBC proliferation are greatest. The DGP has recommended steps to accelerate the development of critical defenses and response capabilities for countering chemical and biological weapons. In June 1996, the DGP presented recommendations to NATO defense and foreign ministers for improving Alliance capabilities. It stressed the importance of developing a core, integrative set of capabilities that will provide a basis for continuing capability enhancements and force improvements as proliferation risks evolve. This core set of capabilities includes:

In many of these areas, NATO already has, or is developing, the requisite capabilities. DGP findings are intended to give impetus and added rationale for fielding such capabilities, as well as to demonstrate how supplementing this nucleus of capabilities with other means—including layered defenses against TBM attack, special munitions for NBC agent defeat and hardened NBC targets, computer modeling and simulation, and medical countermeasures—would strengthen the Alliance’s overall ability to discourage NBC proliferation, deter the threat of use of NBC weapons, and protect against NBC attacks.

In June 1996—for the first time in 12 years— NATO’s defense ministers launched a special out-of-cycle force planning process focusing on counterproliferation, through which allies are making resource commitments to develop and field needed capabilities. Defense ministers approved new counterproliferation force planning targets in December 1996. This extraordinary effort demonstrates how counterproliferation has become a top priority for NATO in the post-Cold War era.

However, capability improvements alone are not enough. NATO is also taking steps to improve other aspects of its defense posture. It is reorienting NATO and national intelligence collection and analysis toward emerging NBC weapons threats. The Alliance is incorporating NBC weapons risks into its exercises and training. Recently, the DGP provided recommendations to NATO defense ministers to adapt NATO’s operational doctrine, plans, training standards, and exercises and thereby ensure effective military operations despite the presence, threat, or use of NBC weapons.

NATO’s counterproliferation initiative has also provided context for discussions with Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries, including Russia, on security challenges of mutual concern. Through these consultations and the PFP Planning and Review Process, NATO is working to ensure interoperability and coalition effectiveness in future operations that include Partner countries.

Countries outside NATO have also recognized the growing security risks posed by proliferation. The United States has bilateral or collective defense arrangements with many nations and conducts combined operations with their military forces. Many countries also have participated, and likely will continue to participate, in international coalition operations in which the presence of NBC weapons has been a factor. For these reasons, DoD has held discussions with long-time friends and allies to forge common approaches for improving military capabilities in the face of NBC risks. The Technical Cooperation Program with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom pursues defense research collaboration to facilitate cooperation in R&D in several technology areas, including chemical defense. In addition, the Tri-Partite Memorandum of Understanding with Canada and the United Kingdom seeks to enhance cooperation in research, development, testing, and evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs.

DoD counterproliferation efforts in the Asia-Pacific region focus on the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia. These efforts are aimed at establishing an ongoing dialogue with each of these allies to discuss proliferation concerns in the region, improve military capabilities in the face of NBC threats, and identify areas for cooperation in counterproliferation programs and activities. DoD places a high priority on counterproliferation cooperation with the Republic of Korea, in particular, since it faces the greatest military threat of NBC use in the form of North Korea’s considerable inventory of chemical weapons and means of delivery.

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions, DoD has held discussions with long-time friends and allies, including Israel and Kuwait. DoD hopes to expand these bilateral discussions to include other friends and potential coalition partners in the region.

The objective of the DoD chemical/biological (CB) defense program is to ensure that U.S. forces are equipped to survive, fight, and win in CB warfare environments. Numerous rapidly changing factors influence the program and its management.

DoD’s acquisition strategy develops and accelerates programs that field military systems and capabilities to meet the CINCs’ requirements, redress operational capability shortfalls, and sponsor research and development (R&D) activities providing enhanced capabilities that cannot be met with current systems and technologies.

DoD has budgeted nearly $4.9 billion in FY 1998 for R&D and acquisition activities and programs directly related to countering proliferation. These investments are focused in seven key functional areas: proliferation prevention; strategic and tactical intelligence; battlefield surveillance; passive defense; active defense; counterforce; and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats.

At the heart of the Counterproliferation Initiative is the Counterproliferation Support Program, established in 1994 specifically to address DoD shortfalls in counterproliferation capabilities. This program uses its budget to leverage ongoing R&D and acquisition programs to meet the counterproliferation priorities of the CINCs and to accelerate the deployment of enhanced capabilities to the field. The program also conducts technology development activities with the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, the Intelligence Community, and several DoD agencies and organizations. Approximately 80 percent of the Counterproliferation Support Program’s budget is invested in two key areas: the detection, identification, and characterization of biological warfare agents; and the detection, characterization, and defeat (with minimal collateral effects) of NBC weapon support facilities and hardened underground facilities. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) are under way in each of these critical mission areas and are described later in this section.

The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) was established by the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to review and coordinate R&D and acquisition efforts within DoD, DOE, and the Intelligence Community. The Secretary of Defense is the designated chair of the CPRC. It is chartered to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental activities and programs addressing shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities. It also ensures the coordinated development and fielding of technologies and capabilities to counter both NBC/M proliferation and NBC terrorism. Congress recently extended the authority of the CPRC until the year 2000.

In 1996, the CPRC established the CPRC Standing Committee, which meets regularly and which implements the recommendations of the CPRC. The findings and recommendations of the CPRC’s 1997 annual program review are presented in the Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, its fourth annual report to Congress, publicly released in May 1997.

For additional information on DoD R&D and acquisition activities and programs, consult the reports and websites listed in the section on Further Reading.

Within DoD, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is responsible for managing, directing, and executing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program. The program focuses on three areas: Theater Missile Defense (TMD), National Missile Defense (NMD), and advanced ballistic missile defense technologies.

The requirement for BMD flows from a strategy that requires the United States to maintain a credible overseas presence and the capability to respond to major theater wars despite the increasing danger posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. In a world of regional threats, BMD affords the United States greater freedom of action to protect its interests and uphold its security commitments without fear of coercion. BMD can bolster the solidarity of coalitions and alliances (as it did in Desert Storm in 1991). It can also provide a response to crises without having to resort to offensive measures. Finally, BMD can strengthen the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces and provide an essential hedge against the failure of deterrence.

TMD is designed to protect deployed troops, allies, and friends. TMD systems must be able to deploy rapidly and move with the troops. Since the TMD threat is diverse with respect to range and capability, no single system can perform the entire TMD mission. This leads to a family of systems approach to defeat successfully the theater missile threat. The family of systems approach will ensure a defense in depth, utilizing both lower-tier systems—those that intercept at relatively low altitudes within the atmosphere, and upper-tier systems—those that intercept missile targets outside the atmosphere and at longer ranges. TMD programs include:

The Department is continuing to explore concepts, such as the Air Force airborne laser for intercepting theater ballistic missiles in the boost phase.

Some BMD activities, specifically Joint Theater Missile Defense Programs, provide direct support to many separate programs. They introduce greater efficiency by accomplishing efforts that otherwise would have to be achieved separately by each program. These include interoperability in Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (BM/C3I), which is essential for joint TMD operations.

BMDO takes an aggressive approach to establishing an architecture upon which all the Services can build. This includes improving early warning and dissemination, ensuring communications interoperability, and upgrading command and control centers. In addition to BM/C3I, the other activities include test and evaluation, modeling and simulation support, CINC’s TMD Assessment program, the U.S.-Israeli Arrow Deployability Project, and Cooperative Engagement Capability analysis. These activities are critical to the success of the overall U.S. TMD system. They are the glue that holds the architecture together and will ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The primary goal is to provide the warfighter with an integrated TMD capability by building in the interoperability and flexibility to satisfy a wide range of threat scenarios. From its joint perspective, BMDO oversees the various independent weapon systems development efforts and provides guidance, standards, equipment and system integration, and analysis to integrate the multitude of sensors, interceptors, and tactical command centers into a joint theater-wide TMD architecture.

The National Missile Defense 3-plus-3 program is designed to conduct three years of development and test activities, leading to an integrated system test of the NMD elements in FY 1999. If the threat at the time warrants, a decision to deploy could be made in 2000 to achieve operational capability in another three years (by the end of 2003). If the threat has not emerged, the United States would not need to deploy an NMD system in the near term. Therefore, DoD could continue to enhance the technology of each element and the concomitant capability of the NMD system that could be fielded on a later deployment schedule. The overarching goal of the 3-plus-3 program is to remain within a three-year window of deployment so the United States can respond effectively to an emerging threat. DoD is pursuing a fixed, land-based architecture for the NMD program. The NMD system DoD is developing includes six fundamental building blocks: the ground-based interceptor; ground-based radar; upgraded early warning radars; forward-based X-band radars; Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS); and BM/C3.

BMDO’s technology investment strategy is straightforward, anticipating the future missile threat and pushing technologies in response. DoD leverages other federal and industry R&D investments where appropriate to aid missile defense and integrates emerging technologies in modest systems demonstrations that seek to identify their merits. With this approach, DoD ensures that BMD technology thrusts help develop near-term improvements or technology insertions to current acquisition programs, or provide an advanced BMD capability to address evolving missile threats. BMDO’s technology efforts include:

As the 1997 National Security Strategy notes, while building coalitions of allies and friends to defend against NBC threats is important, these efforts are not sufficient by themselves. Accordingly, DoD continues to strengthen the capabilities of U.S. forces to defend against and counter NBC threats or use, whether as part of an international coalition of forces or whether the United States is compelled to act on its own.

Following Operation Desert Storm, DoD identified many issues and shortfalls in supporting operations in a CB warfare environment. In its 1992 report, Conduct of the Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, DoD identified the following requirements related to CB defense capabilities:

The ability of U.S. equipment to survive and operate in an NBC environment on future battlefields continues to be a major item of concern. DoD regulation 5000.2-R requires all mission essential systems to be survivable to those threat levels anticipated in their operating environment. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the use of NBC weapons on a future battlefield will not disarm U.S. forces. All force modernization efforts should continue to incorporate NBC survivability in equipment designs. Failure to field NBC survivable equipment would significantly impact the ability to fight and win future conflicts. U.S. forces must be able to continue their assigned missions even in the event of a contaminated battlefield.

In March 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued its assessment of DoD’s readiness to operate in a CB warfare environment. GAO found that DoD had taken steps to improve the readiness of U.S. forces to operate in CB contaminated environments, but that equipment, training, and medical shortcomings persisted and could cause needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. combat capability. There has been significant progress in addressing the issues identified by DoD and GAO. A review of accomplishments, existing shortfalls, and initiatives follows.

Chemical and biological defenses are conducted within the framework of three operational concepts: avoidance, protection, and decontamination. These concepts provide the basis for an integrated and balanced CW/BW defense program. Contamination avoidance consists of capabilities and procedures to detect, identify, and warn forces of CW/BW threats so commanders may determine the appropriate protective posture to assume and provide the necessary information to avoid contamination. When contamination cannot be avoided, protection provides capabilities to survive, fight, and win in an NBC contaminated environment. Protection consists of individual protection, collective protection, and medical programs. Finally, decontamination provides critical capabilities to allow the sustainment of operations in a contaminated environment. Detailed descriptions of the capabilities described in the following sections are provided in the DoD NBC Defense Annual Report to Congress.

Multiple systems are in development, production, or in the field for early warning or point detection of CW/BW threats. Since 1991, there have been several critical technological and operational advances. The Army and Marine Corps have fielded the M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) to provide standoff detection of nerve and blister agents. The hand-held Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) provides all deployable units with a rapid and easy-to-use chemical agent monitoring and identification capability for nerve and blister agents. In October 1996, the Army fielded its first-ever biological defense unit equipped with state-of-the-art biological detection capabilities, including the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS). In addition, the Army has fielded the Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LR-BSDS), used for remote detection of aerosols and particulates. Also, the Interim Biological Agent Detector has been installed on selected Navy ships to provide a mobile biological point detection capability.

The M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance System is a fast, highly-mobile armored carrier with sophisticated equipment for detecting, sampling, and warning of radiological and chemical contamination.

The M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS), used by the Army and the Marine Corps, is a dedicated system for NBC detection, warning, and sampling equipment integrated into a high-speed, high-mobility armored carrier capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary, or cross-country routes throughout the battlefield. The NBCRS can find and mark chemical and nuclear contamination. Its crew is protected by an on-board overpressure system. It also can detect chemical contamination vapors within 5 kilometers using the M21 RSCAAL standoff detector. The NBCRS automatically will integrate contamination information from sensors with input from on-board navigation and meteorological systems. It then rapidly transmits hazard warnings via a central data processor and integrated digital jam-resistant communications.

Several new technologies that enhance CB detection and warning have been demonstrated and are in the final stages of development. Key programs include:

A number of procurement activities are planned within the contamination avoidance mission area:

Several new technologies have been demonstrated to enhance CB protection and are in the final stages of development. The most significant recent accomplishment has been the demonstration of a lightweight chemical protective garment. The Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) is a joint Service program to field a common chemical protective ensemble (suit, boots, and gloves). This garment uses a selectively permeable membrane technology, eliminating the bulkiness inherent with using superactivated charcoal. This will allow the integration of chemical protective clothing as part of the standard duty uniform rather than requiring a separate overgarment. Procurement of JSLIST is scheduled to begin in FY 1998.

The Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology individual protective garment provides protection from chemical agents as well as ease of movement.

A number of procurement activities are also planned using FY 1998 funding within the individual protection mission area. They include:

Within collective protection, funding supports continued procurement of the Chemical Biological Protective Shelter, a highly mobile, self-contained collective protection system that can provide a contamination-free working area for medical and other units. The Navy has retrofitted the Selected Area Collective Protective System into several ships and has designed collective protection into new construction in four classes of new ships. The Advanced Integrated Collective Protective System (AICPS) is a modular system that will integrate new NBC filtration technologies with environmental controls and power source components for tactical and combat systems. AICPS provides reduced weight, size, and cost, as well as improved maintainability over current capabilities.

Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in the development of medical countermeasures against CW/BW agents. Medical countermeasures fall into three basic categories: prophylactic (preventative), therapeutic (post-exposure), and diagnostic. Key accomplishments of prophylactic countermeasures include the continued development of advanced vaccines for anthrax, botulinum, ricin, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and plague; studies of biological scavengers for nerve agents; and cyanide pretreatment. Key accomplishments of therapeutic countermeasures include further development of a reactive topical skin protectant for protection against nerve and mustard agents; development of a nerve agent multichambered auto-injector (to replace the multiple injections currently required); and conduction of animal toxicology studies for cyanide pretreatment. Key accomplishments for diagnostic countermeasures include the continued development of a forward deployable diagnostic kit (including a hand-held polymerase chain reaction diagnostic and agent identification capability) that will allow immediate diagnosis of BW-related casualties in the field. This kit will include technologies still in development that will provide rapid identification of BW agents.

BW Threat Agents
Anthrax	Mycotoxins
Bioregulators	Neurotoxins
Botulinum toxins	Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B
Brucellosis	Plague
Cholera	Q-fever
Clostridium perfringens	Ricin
Encephalomyelitis viruses	Smallpox
Glanders	Tularemia
Hemorrhagic Fever viruses	Typhus

DoD has made significant progress in the acquisition of biological defense vaccines and related medical products. After the Gulf War, the U.S. Army conducted several studies on different approaches for ensuring an adequate industrial base for the production of biological defense vaccines. Based on industry responses and government studies, a solid acquisition approach was developed—the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JVAP). The JVAP will use a prime systems contract to manage and execute the advanced development, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensure, production, storage, and testing of 18 new vaccines that have been discovered through DoD-sponsored basic research.

An FDA-licensed anthrax vaccine is commercially available. Procurement of this vaccine has been ongoing since the Gulf War, and the DoD-prescribed stockpile level will be completed during FY 1997. A follow-on initiative is underway to ensure continued procurement of the anthrax vaccine to fully support U.S. biological defense vaccination policies.

Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in decontamination development programs. Procurement is underway or planned for a lightweight decontamination system and a modular decontamination system that will reduce the logistics burden compared to existing systems. Critical shortfalls remain, however, to replace the current decontamination solution with one that is nonaqueous, noncorrosive, and environmentally safe. There have been successful demonstrations of a nonaqueous sorbent decontaminant. Efforts also are being pursued to develop a decontaminant for sensitive equipment (e.g., electronics). New concepts and technologies are being investigated for decontamination of large areas such as ports or airfields. Also, measurable decontamination standards/ levels are being developed for strategic lift aircraft and ship decontamination.

DoD needs a spectrum of capabilities to accomplish its counterproliferation mission. No single system or set of systems, current or proposed, can provide all of the operational capabilities needed for the complete counterproliferation mission. Just as counterproliferation has been integrated into planning for military operations, technology development directed at improving counterproliferation capabilities has been integrated into DoD’s R&D and other acquisition activities. Most development efforts involve the adaptation of existing systems and technologies to respond to counterproliferation mission requirements.

DoD has established procedures to ensure that its science and technology investments are directed at priority requirements identified by warfighters. To this end, DoD has designated a set of Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOs) that focus on critical joint warfighting capabilities. Technology development in support of counterforce/counterproliferation and for chemical-biological defense are two of the ten JWCOs. For additional information on these JWCOs and on DoD technology development responsive to counterproliferation, consult the reports and websites listed in the section on Further Reading.

The Counterterror Technical Support (CTTS) Program develops technology and prototype equipment that address requirements having direct operational application in the national effort to combat terrorism, to include terrorist use of NBC weapons. It integrates Defense advanced development efforts with government-wide and international efforts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict executes the CTTS Program, which addresses requirements identified by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), an interagency forum for combating terrorism. The TSWG was established as a working group of the National Security Council’s Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism and acts as its technology development component. The CTTS and TSWG focus on the rapid development of equipment to address critical multiagency and future threat counter- and anti-terrorism requirements. A significant portion of the CTTS funding and development efforts and TSWG’s technology requirements are directly related to countering NBC weapons.

The combat air forces have issued a standing mission need statement, in response to urgent warfighting CINC requirements, to detect, characterize, and defeat NBC/M facilities with minimal collateral effects. U.S. forces must be able to interdict an adversary’s biological and chemical capability during each stage of the agent’s employment. Counterforce operations include (but are not limited to) attacking agent production facilities, storage complexes, and deployed mobile weapon platforms.

The U.S. Air Force is conducting the Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) program to develop the capability to destroy, neutralize, immobilize, or deny an adversary access to biological and chemical agents with little or no collateral damage. The effort is currently in concept exploration. Studies are being performed to identify and evaluate concepts to satisfy the mission need, with the goal of fielding an NBC specific strike capability. All concepts must comply with relevant arms control treaties. Analysis tools being developed to support ADW include Agent Release models, Internal Dispersion and Venting models, and a Lethality model to evaluate inventory and conceptual weapon effectiveness against NBC/M targets.

ACTDs, a component of acquisition reform, are programs that focus mature technology on high priority operational needs. From the inception of any ACTD, technologists work closely with warfighters to demonstrate technologies, evaluate military utility, and transition new military capabilities. ACTDs also allow the warfighter to develop and refine operational concepts to take full advantage of the new capability. They are deliberately designed to develop limited numbers of weapons and other systems that are given to the warfighting command partner at the conclusion of the effort. This delivers initial products to customers in months to a few years, as opposed to the decade-long periods required for some Cold War era system acquisition programs.

The Counterproliferation ACTD develops, demonstrates, and delivers improved counterforce capabilities. DSWA serves as the lead for technology development, coordinating the contributions of multiple DoD components, and the United States European Command serves as the primary operational sponsor. Priorities include improved capabilities for characterization and defeat of NBC targets; enhanced capabilities for forecasting and limiting collateral effects that might be associated with such attacks; and assisting the warfighter in the development of operational concepts.

In a conventional attack against an NBC facility, collateral effects may be due primarily to the response of the target, not the direct effects produced by the weapon, e.g., as might occur if a conventional bomb hits a chemical weapon storage bunker. Using the best experimental data available, plus lessons learned during the Gulf War, DSWA developed the munitions effectiveness assessment tool for weapons employment and combat assessments, and the hazard prediction assessment capability for prediction of collateral effects. These products have been transferred to multiple warfighting commands. The Joint Staff has recommended that they be accepted as the NATO standard for planning and assessing NBC facility attacks.

A hard target smart fuze is being evaluated which will optimize weapon detonation location to maximize lethality with minimum collateral effects. The fuze has had several successful tests of varying types, including live drops from both Air Force and Navy aircraft against surrogate targets. An advanced unitary penetrator is also being demonstrated that will increase the penetration capability of a joint Service weapon by two to three times.

Additional development and evaluation efforts involve a new inertial terrain-aided guidance capability, a weapon-borne sensor, and tactical unattended ground sensors. Improved sensors and guidance are important as enabling conditions for better characterization of targets and more effective and discriminate attacks against NBC facilities.

There also are non-ACTD demonstrations that are part of the chemical and biological defense program. Some focus on specific technological needs, and others are open-ended and seek to evaluate any new or emerging technology for potential CB defense application, such as the Annual Joint Field Trials at Dugway Proving Ground.

Hardened targets are facilities that have been designed and constructed to make them difficult to defeat using current conventional weapons. Such facilities increasingly are being used to house NBC weapons, materials, and production capabilities. In some cases, these facilities might be used for other related support activities, e.g., command and control centers.

Hardened, fixed targets fall into two broad categories. Many are hardened by using soil, concrete, and rock boulders atop the structure once it has been built. These cut and cover facilities are often built into an excavation and then covered. The second category includes tunnels and deep shafts, where the protection is provided by existing rock and soil. There is a depth threshold at which it becomes more economical to tunnel rather than to excavate and cover. Below this threshold, costs generally are constant regardless of the depth of the tunnel below the surface, so tunneled facilities can achieve function depths of hundreds of meters. For this reason, tunnels often are referred to as deeply buried facilities.

The limitations of weapon capabilities during the Gulf War, as well as the increasing availability of advanced tunneling technologies, has brought about a clear worldwide trend in tunneling to protect facilities. Hardened surface and cut and cover facilities may be vulnerable to current air-to-surface conventional penetrators, but remain a substantial challenge when standoff attack is desired. Facilities housed in tunnels, however, are nearly invulnerable to direct attack by conventional means. For most tunneled targets, disruption must come by means other than direct weapon penetration into the facility.

Responding to mission need statements by Air Combat Command and U.S. Strategic Command, DoD is conducting the Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) Acquisition activity to develop strike concepts. The effort of concept exploration is supported by Intelligence Community resources directed at finding and characterizing these facilities worldwide. The objective of the HDBTDC effort is to develop new or modified intelligence and conventional weapon systems capable of denying access to, disrupting operations of, or destroying defended hard and deeply buried facilities. Attaining this objective requires the organized efforts of the Services, DoD agencies, the Intelligence Community, and the National Laboratories.

DSWA’s Hard Target Defeat projects are a key component of DoD’s capability acquisition efforts and are an example of ongoing national technical efforts to develop the capability to defeat hard and deeply buried targets Examples of research efforts within these DSWA projects include:

DSWA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are embarking on a comprehensive Tunnel Defeat Demonstration Program. The program seeks to develop, assess, and demonstrate end-to-end targeting capabilities (from detecting, identifying, and characterizing facilities to targeting, attacking, and performing damage assessment) across all warfighting options. A series of tunnel facilities, of varying design and function, will be constructed and operated at the Nevada Test Site as demonstration beds. The program will include the evaluation and demonstration of current and near-term capabilities and longer-term research initiatives.

As pointed out in the National Security Strategy, the end of the Cold War has seen the rise of various transnational threats, including the danger that a transnational terrorist group might seek to acquire NBC weapons. Combating this danger requires far-reaching cooperation within the U.S. government and with other nations, as discussed earlier in this report. However, it also requires that DoD develop the capability to prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they can carry out a threat to use NBC weapons, as well as the capability to respond overwhelmingly if an actual NBC terrorist attack should occur.

A Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), titled U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, was signed on June 21, 1995. It states that "The United States shall give the highest priority to developing capabilities to . . . manage the consequences of nuclear, biological, or chemical material or weapons used by a terrorist." This PDD reinforces the interagency process for combating terrorism, and it directs lead agency responsibilities and support requirements for response to both domestic and overseas terrorist incidents. A significant new requirement identified in this PDD calls for coordination between crisis and consequence management agencies in resolving a terrorist incident involving NBC materials or weapons.

The Department of State is the lead agency for both crisis and consequence management in overseas terrorism incidents. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is made responsible for ensuring the Federal Response Plan is adequate for responding to the consequences of terrorism, including terrorism involving NBC materials or weapons. DoD possesses significant assets that, at the onset of a domestic NBC terrorism incident, will be integrated into a coordinated federal resolution effort. This includes assistance to the FBI for crisis response and to FEMA for consequence management.

DoD support of a federal response to a domestic terrorism incident will be personally managed by the Secretary of Defense, with the assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. The DoD crisis management response will be provided through the national interagency terrorism response system. DoD response forces will be employed either under the operational control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force or a Response Task Force assigned to the appropriate Unified Combatant Commander.

The Department has specially trained and equipped units capable of operating in an NBC environment and tasked to respond to a terrorist crisis. Several DoD elements have expertise which can be tasked. A 24-hour, on-call emergency response capability to respond to biological or chemical incidents with personnel trained in biological, chemical, and explosive ordnance disposal operations is available within DoD. The personnel perform render-safe procedures; provide damage limitation, reconnaissance, recovery, sampling, mitigation, decontamination, and transportation; and perform or recommend final disposition of weaponized and non-weaponized CW/BW materials.

The U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) develops technological countermeasures and equipment that provide rapid warning and facilitate quick response in the event of a chemical or biological incident. Under CBDCOM, the Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center also maintains a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring and technical assessment system, the Mobile Analytical Response System. This system provides state-of-the-art analytical assessment of chemical or biological hazards at an incident site.

Also under CBDCOM is the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, which is a specialized army unit with missions of escorting the movement of chemical or biological material, and finding and destroying chemical or biological munitions. This unit maintains a 24-hour, on-call alert team that will be tailored specifically to a current situation for both the crisis and consequence management responses.

Under the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) develops strategies, products, information, procedures, and training for medical defense against agents of biological origin and naturally occurring infectious diseases of military importance that require special containment. USAMRIID has many existing capabilities which can be employed directly for evaluating terrorist incidents from the initial communication of the threat or incident to its resolution. These capabilities include:

A key capability of the Institute is its staff of physicians, who are experienced clinicians and also understand the unique diagnostic and therapeutic challenges posed by biological warfare agents— information with which most physicians are not familiar.

The Naval Medical Research Institute provides basic and applied research competence in infectious diseases, immunobiology/tissue transplantation, diving and environmental medicine, blood research, and human factors directly related to military requirements and operational needs. The Biological Defense Research Program has designed reagents, assays, and procedures for agents classically identified as biological threats, as well as for nonclassical threat agents, in environmental and clinical specimens. This program has developed rapid, hand-held screening assays and immunoassays for clinical and environmental samples that can be deployed globally.

The Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) is a deployable force capable of performing chemical or biological consequence management following a terrorist attack. CBIRF is most effective when forward deployed in response to a credible threat to domestic or overseas installations, or to protect events of national significance from the consequences of chemical-biological incidents. CBIRF is supported by a panel of military and civilian experts in chemical and biological agents. These experts assist in the training and development of CBIRF and are linked with CBIRF operationally through electronic communications. CBIRF is capable of deploying on short notice as an element of the Response Task Force to support the Federal Response. CBIRF’s capabilities include being able to decontaminate victims into treatable patients, stabilize patients, and treat chemical and biological casualties.

The Air Force is drastically altering the way it thinks about, prepares for, and defends against threats to the safety of its forces. It is building an integrated, well-planned Force Protection program designed to protect its people and warfighting capabilities in any situation. To execute this program, it is standing up a dedicated rapid response unit capable of being the first in to hostile contingencies, including an ability to assess NBC defense requirements for follow-on forces. This unit, under the 820th Security Forces Group, will be trained in NBC defense measures and collocated with a new Force Protection Battlelab, where it will have access to the latest fielded chemical-biological technology improvements and ground tactical intelligence information. Collocated with these units will be the Air Force Security Forces Center, where other experts from the Office of Special Investigation, Intelligence, medical, and security forces staffs are immediately available to provide force protection policy and guidance.

The United States will do everything in its power to prevent NBC use from endangering its citizens. However, should an NBC weapon be used against U.S. citizens, the United States must be prepared to respond effectively to protect lives and property, as well as to ensure the survival of its institutions and national infrastructure. National security emergency preparedness is imperative, and it requires a comprehensive preparation and planning effort by federal, state, and local departments and agencies. DoD plays an important role in these efforts.

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, authored by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici, calls for a program to provide federal resources, training, and technical assistance to federal, state, and local emergency management personnel who would respond to a terrorist incident. The act was passed in response to a growing concern that NBC weapons could be used in terrorist attacks. The cornerstone of the program is the training and exercising of local first responders (fire, law enforcement, and medical) to enhance their response capabilities.

The training program includes two parallel and concurrent efforts. One is the program to train responders in the nation’s largest 120 cities. The second program is to develop training modules and establish mechanisms to provide federal expertise to every community in the nation. The training program for the cities begins with interagency teams who meet with city emergency management personnel and responders. The city, in coordination with the interagency team, defines the scope and requirements of its training program. The city’s resource commitment depends on the tailored training program worked out in partnership with the interagency assessment team. The training that follows will come from those federal agencies with the required expertise. The training program is based upon a train-the-trainer concept, wherein a small number of federally trained local responders become the trainers for the remainder of the city’s responders. The city training program began in April 1997 and the interagency team initiated the program in 27 cities during FY 1997. Concurrently, DoD is developing an exercise program that will evaluate and enhance the responder training program.

The second thrust of the Domestic Preparedness Program includes the development of training modules available through mass media technology, making federal expertise available to every community in the country to assist in improving their response capability against a terrorist incident involving a nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapon. DoD is designing low-cost training packages for wide dissemination via mass media formats, which may include the Internet, distance learning, video, and CD-ROM. This training initiative will make training packages available to state and local agencies as rapidly and inexpensively as possible. DoD is supporting FEMA in the development of a database that will provide a source of information on chemical and biological agents, munitions characteristics, and safety precautions for civilian use. Concurrently, DoD is also developing a help-line and a hot-line to give local responders immediate access to federal experts with nuclear, chemical, and biological expertise.

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and their delivery means is not a hypothetical threat. More than 25 countries have—or may be developing—NBC weapons and the means to deliver them; a larger number are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice. In addition, the NBC proliferation threat has become transnational and now has the potential to come from terrorist organizations or organized crime groups. Proliferation of NBC/M presents a daunting challenge. The United States will need perseverance, patience, and imagination to combat this threat. There has been a dramatic reduction in the threat from the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely. Since the beginning of the decade, six countries that might have been nuclear powers—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, North Korea, South Africa, and Iraq—have been turned away from that path.

This section of the report has described in detail the three components of DoD’s response to NBC proliferation—preventing proliferation from occurring, protecting U.S. forces and citizens against NBC weapons, and being able to respond against those who would use NBC weapons against the United States. Prevention of proliferation is the first priority. DoD provides critical support to national and international prevention efforts. However, DoD understands that the United States will not be successful in preventing proliferation all the time and in all places. When proliferation occurs and U.S. interests and commitments are threatened, the United States must be in a position to prevail on the battlefield, even against opponents who possess NBC weapons. DoD has unique responsibilities for the military responses needed if prevention fails: active defense, passive defense, counterforce, and response to paramilitary/covert threats.

Development of a coherent, effective national response has required policy initiatives, adaptation of military planning and operations, acquisition of new capabilities, new intelligence community programs, and international cooperation. Much progress has been made and more remains to be done.