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Original:  English


                  Draft Special Report

            Mr. Robert BANKS (United Kingdom)
                   Special Rapporteur*

International Secretariat                  November 1994
*  Until this document has been approved by the
Scientific and Technical Committee, it represents only
the views of the Rapporteur.

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                         TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                                      ii

INTRODUCTION                                            1


      A.   The Middle East                              1
           1.    Israel                                 2
           2.    Iraq                                   2
           3.    Iran                                   3
           4.    Syria                                  4
           5.    Libya                                  5
           6.    Algeria                                5
      B.   South Asia                                   5
           1.    India                                  6
           2.    Pakistan                               6
      C.   East Asia                                    8
           1.    North Korea                            8
           2.    Other East Asian Nations               9
      D.   South America                               10
      E.   The Former Soviet Union                     10
           1.    Russia                                11
           2.    Ukraine                               12
           3.    Kazakhstan                            13
           4.    Belarus                               14
           5.    Nuclear Smuggling                     14

II.   THE 1995 NPT RENEWAL CONFERENCE                  17

      A.   NPT Achievement and Failures                18
      B.   Towards Renewal                             19
      C.   Beyond 1995                                 22

III.  CONCLUSION                                       23

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Nuclear proliferation is one of the principal threats to
international security.  Nuclear weapons technology, once
only available to the most technologically advanced
nations, is now within reach of virtually any nation with
a modest or relatively modest scientific and industrial
base, provided it has the determination and the

Events in North Korea and recent reports of nuclear
smuggling from the former Soviet Union have highlighted
this problem at a critical time.  Next year, the 164
signatories of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
must meet to decide whether to renew the Treaty.
Indefinite and unconditional renewal is the goal of most
industrialized nations but this outcome is far from being
assured.  The last Review Conference, in 1990,
finished without producing an agreed text due to disputes
in several important areas.

One central dispute was whether the nuclear weapons
nations had done enough to reduce their own nuclear
arsenals.  This issue could still raise substantial
disagreements, despite the remarkable progress in arms
control since 1990.  Progress towards a complete ban on
nuclear testing will be one key issue, and it remains to
be seen whether enough progress will be made to satisfy
some NPT parties who see this as the "yardstick"
for assessing progress in nuclear disarmament.  Other
arms control initiatives will clearly influence the
outcome of the NPT conference, including the proposal to
cap the production of fissile material for weapons
purposes and to place surplus military stocks of fissile
material under international safeguards.

Other factors might include the nuclear weapons nations
agreeing to provide stronger security assurances to the
non-nuclear weapons states. Whatever the outcome of the
Renewal Conference, efforts to curb nuclear proliferation
must continue.  Since the war to liberate Kuwait from
Iraqi occupation, the International Atomic Energy Agency
has shown itself to be far more than a "toothless tiger",
but it must be given the resources and the freedom to
strengthen its work in preventing nuclear proliferation.
And the international community must show that it has the
resolve to deal firmly with nations outside the
Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as those nations that
violate the Treaty.


1.    Nuclear proliferation is one of the gravest threats
to international security in the post-Cold War world.  A
nation acquiring nuclear weapons could menace
neighbouring nations and - by acquiring suitable missile
technology - could pose a far more widespread threat.
During 1994, the dangers of nuclear proliferation have
been vividly highlighted by three particular

-     North Korean nuclear activities and the crisis
arising from North Korea's refusal to permit
international inspection of its nuclear facilities.
-     Evidence of "leakage" of nuclear-related materials
from Russia and other former Soviet states.
-     The assertion by Pakistan's former Prime Minister,
Mr. Nava Sharif that his country had indeed created and
deployed nuclear weapons.

2.    Events of this kind have underlined the importance
of dealing with nuclear proliferation and have focused
even more attention on the Non- Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Renewal Conference which will take place in
New York in April and May 1995.  At the last NPT Review
Conference in 1990, many differences emerged among the
participants to the extent that the conference closed
without producing an agreed text.  Although several of
the sources of disagreement in 1990 have subsided,
renewal of the NPT is certainly not assured.  And failure
to renew the NPT would be a major blow to efforts to curb
nuclear weapons proliferation.

3.    The purpose of this Report is to survey recent
regional developments in nuclear proliferation and to
assess the challenges to the non-proliferation regime.
The Report concludes with recommendations for
improving the likelihood of NPT renewal and for
strengthening the non-proliferation regime.


A.    The Middle East

4.    The Middle East has long been regarded as a key
problem area for the non-proliferation regime.  The
region's volatile combination of tension, hostility and
activity related to weapons of mass destruction poses
many serious challenges.

*     The Rapporteur would like to thank Dmitry Evstafiev
for his assistance in preparing this Report.

1.    Israel

5.    Israel is thought to have begun developing nuclear
weapons in the early 1970s, allegedly in co-operation
with South Africa.  According to some estimates, Israel
could very rapidly make up to 100 nuclear warheads
operational.  Israel maintains that it will not be the
first state in the region to introduce nuclear weapons.
This is usually taken to mean that weapons are held one
step short of final assembly.  The military nuclear
programme is centred on the Dimona nuclear research
centre in the Negevdesert.

6.    Israel has not admitted that it has a military
nuclear programme since this would no doubt lead to an
adverse international political reaction.  On the other
hand, it has not sought to deny its existence too
vigorously, thereby making any potential aggressor
cautious about military confrontation.

7.    Pressure is mounting on Israel to renounce its
military nuclear activities and accede to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Its military nuclear potential
is seen as a key motive for other nations in the region
to maintain an interest in nuclear weapons technology and
other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical arms.
In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution sponsored by Egypt which
called upon Israel to forswear ownership of nuclear
weapons and to become a signatory to the NPT.  The Middle
East peace process might lead to movement in this
direction and Israel's prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin,
has expressed willingness to make bilateral agreements
with neighbouring states on creating a nuclear-free
zone.(1) Israeli opinion seems divided over United States
President Bill Clinton's proposal for a global ban on
fissile material production.(2) Some government officials
have expressed support for the proposal while others have
expressed reservations, arguing that Israel's future
defence options should not be limited by any agreement.

2.    Iraq

8.    The Iraqi nuclear programme, uncovered by United
Nations inspectors after the war to liberate Kuwait from
Iraqi occupation, showed the inadequacy of existing
international measures to control nuclear proliferation.
Iraq's progress towards building nuclear weapons
surprised the international community and was one of the
main reasons for reappraisals of proliferation controls.

9.    The dismantlement of Iraq's military nuclear
potential is still in progress, and it was recently
reported that three shipments of nuclear fuel (enough to
produce one or two crude nuclear weapons) were
transferred from Iraq to Russia for reprocessing.  This
was believed to be the last nuclear material in Iraq.
According to Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA,
as a result of 21 inspection missions in Iraq, the
IAEA has concluded that "in all essential aspects, the
nuclear weapons programme is mapped and is either
destroyed or neutralized".(3) Even so, the search
continues for some important equipment and documents.

10.   In late 1993, Iraq agreed to the permanent
monitoring of facilities related to the development and
production of weapons of mass destruction in accordance
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 715.
This monitoring system is now in place, but the raising
of economic sanctions is not likely to be discussed by
the Security Council until these have operated
satisfactorily for some time.  Iraq now poses no imminent
threat to the non-proliferation regime but, without
external monitoring of relevant facilities, it could make
rapid progress in military nuclear technology.  At
present, it seems that the international community will
have to maintain a watchful eye over Iraq.

3.    Iran

11.   Despite acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1970, Iran is believed to have pursued a limited military
nuclear programme since the 1970s, with only a brief lull
after the 1979 Islamic revolution.  There were reports in
1993 about Iranian efforts to recruit nuclear weapons
scientists and purchase nuclear weapons from the former
Soviet Union but these allegations remain

12.   In 1985, Iran purchased a nuclear reactor from
China and plans to buy two additional 300 MW reactors
from the same source.  Iran is trying to complete
construction of a nuclear reactor which was being built
by Siemens of Germany but which Siemens will not complete
due to the German government's concern about Iranian
nuclear activities.  In addition, negotiations are taking
place between Iran and Russia over the construction of a
nuclear power plant.  Financial problems, however, have
essentially frozen these projects for the time being.
Iran's interest in nuclear power, despite its large
reserves of fossil fuels, naturally raises questions
about Iranian motives.

13.   Iran's military nuclear facilities are reportedly
located in Isfahan, Karaj, and Mohalem Kalayah.  Iran's
technical co-operation with nations such as Pakistan,
China, and India is viewed with suspicion and Iran is
often cited as one of the possible customers for nuclear
materials smuggled out of the former Soviet Union.  IAEA
inspections at declared nuclear facilities and have found
nothing untoward, but visits have not taken place at
undeclared sites.  Iranian government officials
vehemently deny military nuclear activities.  In January
1993, for instance, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani declared that Iran "cannot afford
to purchase [and] will never try to purchase" nuclear
weapons.(4) That declaration was reinforced by Iran's
Vice-President of Iran and head of its nuclear programme,
Reza Amrollahi, who stated that Iran would promote the
idea of the nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

14.   The CIA has been quoted as believing that Iran
could acquire nuclear weapons in about a decade.  The
International Institute of Strategic Studies has stated
that if Iran does have a military nuclear programme, it
is still in its early stages and Iran cannot hope to
produce its own nuclear weapons before the end of the

4.    Syria

15.   Syria has long been cited as posing a proliferation
risk.  It allegedly began a military nuclear programme in
1979 and has not provided the IAEA with full information
on its nuclear activities.  In 1991, China reported to
the IAEA the potential sale of a 30 KW research reactor
to Syria.  The IAEA blocked the sale and Syria
subsequently reduced its nuclear activities.  Economic
difficulties also seem to have played a part in the
scaling down of Syria's nuclear programme.

5.    Libya

16.   Libya operates a small Soviet-built research
reactor at Tadzhura about 25 kilometres from Tripoli.
Since 1980, Libyan nuclear activities have been under
IAEA safeguards.  Concern about Libya, however, does
not centre on its small indigenous programme but rather
on its alleged desire to obtain a complete nuclear weapon
and to fund the development of an "Islamic bomb" by other
nations.   Over the years, Libya is rumoured to have
approached China, Pakistan and India with offers to
purchase nuclear weapons.  More recently, there have been
indications that Libya has been behind efforts to obtain
nuclear weapons material from the former Soviet Union.

6.    Algeria

17.   Algeria's nuclear activities were under suspicion
for a long time due to its refusal to accede to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and these suspicions were
further reinforced in 1991 by American intelligence
reports which provided details of the Ain Oussera nuclear
research complex which included a power reactor purchased
from China.  Some reports suggested that, once complete,
this facility would produce enough fissile material to
manufacture one bomb per year.  In January 1992, Algeria
succumbed to international pressure and declared that it
would accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Although
it has not yet done so, it has signed an inspection and
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy

B.    South Asia

18.   India and Pakistan jointly pose one of the most
serious and immediate proliferation threats.  Their
nuclear activities combined with political and
territorial disputes give rise to grave concern.  In
testimony before the American Congress, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey said that
the arms race between India and Pakistan represents "the
most probable prospect for the future use of weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons".(5) Both
India and Pakistan are believed to have the capacity to
build nuclear weapons in a very short space of time.  As
with Israel, their denials of actual possession of
weapons are probably based on the weapons being held just
short of final assembly.

1.    India

19.   India detonated a "peaceful" nuclear explosive
device in 1974 but maintains that it does not have and
does not plan to develop nuclear weapons.  According to
proliferation specialists, however, India probably
possesses between 50 and 100 nuclear weapons.

20.   The politics and tensions in the region - notably
past and potential confrontations with China and Pakistan
- are seen as India's motives for pursuing a clandestine
military nuclear programme.  India is not a party
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the grounds that it
should be "universal and non-discriminating".  In other
words, India sees the Non-Proliferation Treaty as
legitimizing the status of the declared nuclear weapons
states while placing other nations in a position of
permanent inferiority.  Some Indian nuclear facilities
are under IAEA safeguards, and negotiations are
continuing to extend these.  In 1993, India, for the
first time, reported information on uranium resources to
the IAEA.  Even so, there seems little prospect of India
accepting safeguards on all its nuclear activities.
India has refused to accept a United States-sponsored
agreement with Pakistan for a joint cap on military
nuclear activities, but some progress has been made in
recent years to defuse the covert nuclear arms race in
the region.  India and Pakistan do exchange lists of
nuclear sites - which are not revealed to any other
nations - as part of a non-aggression agreement regarding
nuclear facilities and India has proposed a
"no-first-use" agreement with Pakistan along with the
establishment of a communications "hot line".

21.   These actions, however, have done little to lessen
fears that a large-scale conflict between India and
Pakistan could escalate into a nuclear confrontation.
Another factor fuelling concerns about nuclear
proliferation and regional stability is India's programme
to develop ballistic missiles with ranges between 250 and
2,500 kilometres which could be used to carry nuclear

2.    Pakistan

22.   Pakistan's military nuclear programme is believed
to have begun in 1962 at the Kahuta uranium enrichment
facility.   It is now thought able to assemble 5 to 10
nuclear devices, which would make it the third largest
unofficial nuclear power after Israel and India.
Pakistan claims that it has the ability to manufacture
nuclear weapons but it has made the political
decision not to do so.  Shortly after her election in
1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto confirmed that
Pakistan would continue with its nuclear programme but
later issued a directive banning all public statements on
nuclear power.

23.   In August 1994, Navaz Sharif, who was the Prime
Minister of Pakistan for 30 months until July 1993,
declared that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapons
capability.  He was quoted as saying "I confirm Pakistan
possesses an atomic bomb" at a rally in the disputed area
of Kashmir.  He declared that any attack against Kashmir
could trigger a nuclear holocaust.(6)  Pakistan's present
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, denounced this assertion
as a "highly irresponsible statement" but declined to
elaborate further.(7)  Other Pakistani officials then
restated the position that Pakistan had acquired the
ability to manufacture nuclear weapons but had taken a
policy decision not to do so and that the use of
nuclear technology was confined to peaceful purposes.

24.   The end of the Cold War had a substantial effect on
Pakistan's relations with nations outside South Asia.
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan combined
with heightened international concern about nuclear
proliferation led to increased pressure on Pakistan to
abandon its military nuclear programme and join the
Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.  One
important factor in this process was American legislation
known as the Pressler amendment.  This blocked
American military and economic assistance unless the
President certified that Pakistan did not possess nuclear
weapons.  In 1990, president Bush was unable to certify
this so aid was cut off, the most significant effect
being the freezing of a delivery of F-16 aircraft which
Pakistan has partly paid for.  This block is still in

25.   Regarding international agreements on
non-proliferation such as acceding to the NPT or
supporting prohibitions on the production of fissile
material, Pakistan's position is that it will only
support such moves if India does likewise.

C.    East Asia

1.    North Korea

26.   On 12 March 1993, North Korea announced that it
would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Having
acceded to the NPT in 1985, North Korea cited Article X
of the Treaty which allows a party to withdraw at three
months notice if extraordinary events jeopardize a
party's supreme national interests.  That decision
followed an IAEA demand to mount a special inspection at
the Yongbyon nuclear complex that was suspected of -
among other things - housing an undeclared reprocessing
plant from which nuclear materials were being diverted
for military uses.

27.   For the following three months, negotiations took
place to try to resolve the issue.  After a great deal of
diplomatic effort mainly involving the United States, on
11 June 1993, one day before North Korea's withdrawal
would have come into effect, North Korea agreed to
suspend its withdrawal and announced that it would permit
IAEA inspectors to apply safeguards at declared sites
(though not at the facilities at the centre of the

28.   There is no need to provide a detailed chronology
of subsequent events.  Essentially, the United States led
diplomatic efforts to make North Korea comply with IAEA
demands to establish the precise status of North Korea's
nuclear programme.  Economic sanctions by the United
Nations were frequently mooted but there was resistance
to this idea mainly from China which is North Korea's
main trading partner.  The stakes in negotiations were
high, with North Korea maintaining that sanctions would
be sufficient cause for "pitiless" war with South Korea
and its allies.

29.   The situation became even more tense when North
Korea decided to remove fuel pins from a nuclear reactor
and did so in such a way that it became impossible for
IAEA inspectors to determine their history.  The
reactor in question had been shut down for a time in 1989
and North Korea may then have replaced some of the fuel
pins and removed plutonium from the original ones.  When
the fuel pins were removed in May 1994, North Korea
allowed IAEA inspectors to watch the process but would
not allow them to mark some pins for subsequent study.
After removal, the 8,000 pins were also mixed up at
random thus preventing their history from being
established by later analysis.

30.   In May and June 1994, there was much discussion of
the types of sanctions that might be applied to North
Korea, and it seemed that the United States, Japan, and
South Korea would phase in sanctions in the absence of
more comprehensive United Nations sanctions.  Then, in
mid-June, former American President Jimmy Carter visited
North Korea on what was described as a "private visit",
although he appeared to be acting as an unofficial
emissary for the United States.  Whatever the precise
status of his visit and the agreements he reached with
President Kim Il Sun, the net effect was that North Korea
and the United States returned to the negotiating table.
North Korea apparently agreed to freeze its nuclear
programme while negotiations took place.  On 8 July,
after only one day of negotiations, Kim Il Sung died and
negotiations were suspended until August.

31.   The negotiations in August 1994 made remarkable
progress.  North Korea agreed to replace its
graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with light-water
reactors which produce less plutonium.  It also agreed to
freeze the construction of new reactors, cease nuclear
reprocessing, and close the laboratory at the centre of
the dispute.  North Korea further agreed to remain party
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to allow the
implementation of IAEA safeguards.  For its part, the
United States agreed to provide replacement reactors and
to make arrangements for interim energy alternatives.
Fulfilling its side of the agreement will probably cost
the United States about $10 billion.

32.    Several issues must still be resolved - whether,
for instance, the 8,000 fuel pins now in storage will
remain in North Korea or be shipped to a third country
for reprocessing - but the crisis appears to have now

2.    Other East Asian Nations

33.   The crisis over North Korea could have led to a far
larger nuclear proliferation problem.  Other nations in
the region such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have
advanced civil nuclear industries and the presence
of a nuclear-armed North Korea could have led them to
reappraise their commitment to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.  In July 1993, for instance, Japan had voiced
reservations about the indefinite extension of the NPT
and although it subsequently adopted the goal of
indefinite extension, this position could understandably
have been undermined by the presence of an unpredictable
nuclear threat on its doorstep.  In the past, South
Korea and Taiwan have had to be persuaded to redirect
their nuclear programmes to allay proliferation concerns
and they too might have reconsidered their options if
faced by a clear failure of the non-proliferation regime
in the region.

D.    South America

34.   Until the early 1980s, Brazil and Argentina were
often cited as substantial proliferation threats.  Both
had nuclear programmes thought capable of producing
nuclear arms by the end of the century, and the
rivalry between the two nations suggested that they might
pursue military nuclear options.  By 1985, however,
civilian governments had come to power in both Brazil and
Argentina.  Although certain disturbing nuclear
activities remained outside international safeguards,
relations between the two nations improved and they
introduced bilateral monitoring schemes.

35.   In recent years, further progress has been made as
tensions have continued to diminish.  Both nations have
signed safeguards agreements with the IAEA and have
become party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which creates a
nuclear-weapons free zone in Latin America.  They have
also ratified the Quadripartite Agreement involving the
IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting
and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) which
essentially introduces proliferation controls equivalent
to full-scope safeguards.  Argentina has also decided to
accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty irrespective of
Brazil's position.

E.    The Former Soviet Union (8)

36.   The break-up of the Soviet Union posed several
extremely important problems related to the fate of its
nuclear arsenals and extensive nuclear infrastructure.
Although only Russia among the new republics can sustain
a military nuclear weapons programme, the transition to
non-nuclear weapons status by the other republics is not

37.   Following the break-up of the Soviet Union at the
end of 1991, former Soviet nuclear weapons remained in
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.  In May 1992,
these republics signed the Lisbon Protocol which was
added to START I, the nuclear weapons reduction agreement
reached by the United States and the Soviet Union in July
1991.  Under the Lisbon Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine agreed to transfer all former Soviet nuclear
weapons to Russia.  These republics also agreed accede to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons
states "in the shortest possible time".

38.   The transfer of tactical nuclear weapons was
completed by the middle of 1992 despite disagreements
between Ukraine and Russia.  It rapidly became evident
that dealing with the former Soviet Union's nuclear
legacy would severely strain the resources of the new
republics, so several Western nations began to provide
assistance.  The most significant assistance is that
provided by the United States which, under its "Nunn-
Lugar" programme, allocates $400 million per year to
assist with demilitarization of all kinds.  So far, $1.2
billion has been allocated.  In addition, the United
States agreed to purchase the highly enriched uranium
from dismantled nuclear warheads.  The proceeds of this
sale - possibly $12 billion over 20 years - are to be
distributed among the former republics according to a
formula agreed among themselves.

1.    Russia

39.   Russia, as the successor state to the former Soviet
Union, is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as
nuclear weapons state.  Russia and the United States are
implementing START I and START II which will reduce their
strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 each by the year
2003.  While Russia has an impressive nuclear weapons
infrastructure, it was never intended to cope with
nuclear disarmament on the present scale.  Storage
facilities for nuclear warheads and fissile material are
stretched and coping with plutonium will be especially
difficult.  A Russian-American joint venture is
investigating a plutonium-burning nuclear reactor and
Japan has offered to help in this area too but such
projects will not come to fruition quickly enough to
circumvent the need for large-scale plutonium storage.

40.   In deciding how to deal with Russia's plutonium
stockpile, a central problem is that Russia tends to
regard plutonium as an asset which has been expensive to
develop and which should therefore be used in some
way.  The United States, on the other hand, tends to view
it as a liability which should be rendered unusable and
disposed of as soon and as safely as possible.  In June
1994, Russia and the United States signed an
agreement on plutonium production whereby Russia agreed
to close its "dual-use" plutonium manufacturing reactors
(located in Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26) by the year 2000.
Both nations also agreed that their military reactors
which have already been closed - this covers all
American weapons reactors - will not resume operations at
any time.  The United States also agreed to help Russia
develop alternatives for producing the heat and
electricity now generated by its plutonium producing

2.    Ukraine

41.   Ukraine inherited 1,800 nuclear warheads from the
former Soviet Union.  The arsenal included 176 strategic
nuclear missiles (130 obsolescent SS-19s and 46 modern
SS-24s) along with about 50 strategic bombers equipped
with about 500 cruise missiles and gravity bombs.
Following Ukraine's emergence as an independent state, a
heated debate arose about its nuclear status.  This
multifaceted debate was fuelled by tensions with Russia,
the absence of a clear security framework for the
nation, severe economic problems, and the feeling that
nuclear weapons were being renounced without any
compensation or adequate international recognition.  Some
felt that nuclear weapons could provide a security
guarantee against potential Russian aggression while
others felt that the key issue was obtaining proper
compensation for the fissile materials extracted from the
warheads which were perceived as rightfully owned by
Ukraine.  A number of Ukrainian experts proposed that the
warheads should be dismantled at Ukrainian facilities
rather than in Russia.

42.   In November 1993, the Ukrainian parliament ratified
START I, but attached 13 reservations limiting its
implementation and omitting Article V of the Lisbon
Protocol which stipulated that Ukraine should join the
NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.  This led to a
political deadlock at the trilateral negotiations between
Russia, the United States, and Ukraine that was partly
overcome on 14 January 1994 when the three countries
signed a statement that confirmed Ukraine's obligation to
become a non-nuclear state.  In the subsequent joint
communique, the American and Russian presidents declared
that after the implementation of START I and Ukrainian
accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the two
countries would "reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine ...
to respect the independence and sovereignty of the
existing borders" of the country.

43.   The agreement also provided for compensation to
Ukraine.  In return for the fissile material in the
warheads concerned, Russia agreed to provide nuclear fuel
for Ukrainian power reactors and wrote off some of
Ukraine's debt.  The United States agreed to provide $177
million to assist with weapons dismantlement, and Ukraine
stands to gain about $1 billion over the next 20 years
for its share of the proceeds of the sale of former
Soviet fissile material to the United States.  All this
prompted a new vote in the Ukrainian parliament which
dropped the earlier reservations attached to START I
ratification and the Lisbon Protocol.

44.   In March 1994, United States Defense Secretary
William Perry pledged to contribute an additional $100
million to assist Ukrainian nuclear disarmament.  The
withdrawal of strategic nuclear warheads from Ukraine
began in March 1994, when 60 warheads were transported to
Russia in exchange for 120 nuclear fuel assemblies for
the Chernobyl power station.

45.   In July, shortly after his election as Ukrainian
president, Mr. Leonid Kuchma confirmed that his country
will respect its previous obligations to remove all
nuclear weapons and to join the NPT as a non-
nuclear-state.  During a visit to Kiev in August 1994,
United States Vice-President Al Gore received a firm
commitment that Ukraine would join the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in the near future.  While all this gives grounds
for optimism that Ukraine will shortly accede to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and will transfer nuclear
weapons based there to Russia, there is
still some prospect that further difficulties could
arise.  Factions within parliament could still try to
obstruct NPT accession and the dismantlement of weapons
on Ukrainian soil.  Even so, for the moment, it appears
that Ukraine might well be a party to the NPT before the
1995 Review Conference.  In this context, it should be
noted that Ukraine is negotiating a full-scope safeguards
agreement with the IAEA which would permit inspections of
all Ukrainian nuclear activities except those associated
with nuclear weapons still based on its soil.

3.    Kazakhstan

46.   Kazakhstan inherited a substantial part of the
Soviet strategic nuclear infrastructure including 104
ten-warheaded SS-18 missiles and 40 Tu-95MS "Bear-H"
bombers armed with AS-15 cruise missiles.  In
addition, Semipalatinsk, the former Soviet Union's main
nuclear weapons testing site, is in Kazakhstan.  Although
the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia has been less
troublesome than from Ukraine, problems have emerged.
For instance, serious doubts were raised over the safety
of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan following reports that
Russian personnel had been prevented from performing
maintenance on some nuclear warheads.  According to an
agreement signed in March 1994, all nuclear weapons will
be transferred to Russia within fourteen months.

47.   In 1993 Kazakhstan applied for IAEA membership and,
like Ukraine, is negotiating a full-scope safeguards
agreement.  On 14 February 1994 Kazakhstan acceded to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  This followed agreements with
Russia and the United States on security guarantees and
the provision of assistance for nuclear weapons

4.    Belarus

48.   Belarus inherited 72 mobile SS-25 missiles which it
quickly pledged to transfer to Russia for dismantlement.
With commendable speed and no political wrangling,
Belarus ratified START I in April 1993, and transfers
of strategic systems began in mid-1993.  This process is
expected to be complete by 1995.  Belarus joined the
Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1993 as a non-nuclear

5.    Nuclear Smuggling

49.   In recent months, nuclear smuggling from the former
Soviet Union has caused great concern.  For several
years, there have been warnings that nuclear materials
might be smuggled out of the former Soviet Union.
Declining living standards combined with instances of lax
security provided motives and opportunities for criminal
sales of nuclear materials.  In 1992, for instance, Mr.
Gennadi Novikov, head of the nuclear safety service at
the Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear plant, warned of the declining
security standards.  In addition, the Russian media have
provided accounts of breaches in security at military and
civil nuclear installations.  For example, the Russian
press reported in March 1993 that eleven kilograms of
uranium 238 were stolen from the Arzamas-16 nuclear
research and development centre and that local law
enforcement authorities were investigating "dozens" of
similar cases.(9)  Police in St.Petersburg reportedly
recovered several kilograms of highly enriched uranium
and several journalistic investigations left little doubt
about the existence of a nuclear black market.(10)

50.   Russian authorities have long been aware of
attempts to penetrate security at nuclear installations
but, until recently, seemed confident none had succeeded.
Several contradictory accounts appeared in early
1994.  According to one press story Russia reported that
11 attempts had been made in 1993 to steal uranium from
power plants compared with three attempts in 1993.  All
attempts were reported to have failed.(11) Other reports
suggested that there were 900 attempts of illegal
penetration into nuclear plants and 700 attempts to steal
secret documents while some suggest materials rather than
documents were involved.(12)

51.   During 1994, accounts of nuclear smuggling became
more frequent and more widespread.  In the early months
of 1994, Interpol was reported to be investigating 30
serious cases of nuclear smuggling, including the
theft of 250 kilograms of uranium from a plant in Glazov
and 123 grams of uranium stolen from the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant.  Then several particularly
disturbing cases were uncovered by police in Germany.  In
May 1994, police discovered 6 grams of extremely pure
plutonium in a garage in Tengen-Weichs near Stuttgart
(13) and in June they seized 0.8 grams of highly enriched
uranium in Landshut, Bavaria.  At the beginning of
August, German police arrested a Columbian and two
Spaniards who arrived in Munich on a flight from Moscow
carrying about
350 grams of 87 per cent pure plutonium in the form of a
powdered oxide.  It transpired that this was supposedly
part of a four-kilogram deal worth $250 million.  Only a
few days later, German police arrested a man in Bremen
who was trying to sell a much smaller quantity of

52.  At first, Russia denied that any of the materials
originated there.  The spokesman for the Russia's Federal
Counter-Intelligence Service, Sergei Vasilyev, claimed
that "not a single gram of plutonium-239 has gone missing
from storage in Russia".(14)  Analysis of the materials,
however, pinned down its origin to military production
centres in Russia.  High-level intelligence meetings took
place between Germany and Russia with the result that
President Yeltsin gave an assurance that nuclear
security would be tightened and that co-operation in
dealing with nuclear smuggling would be "broader and

53.   The latest cases in Germany seem to represent only
the tip of a growing nuclear smuggling iceberg.  In 1991,
there were 41 cases of nuclear smuggling; in 1992, 158
cases; and in 1993, 241 cases.(15)  Incidents are not
confined to Germany.  Bulgarian police have in one
operation seized 19 containers of radioactive material
including a quantity of plutonium, although the amount
and its purity were not revealed.  The Bulgarian
Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful
Purposes said that an investigation in 1993 had found 75
unregistered establishments where radioactive material
was being used.(16)  Hungarian police arrested two
Hungarians who were trying to sell radioactive material
believed to come from Russian nuclear fuel rods.
Furthermore, at the end of August 1994, Russia reported
that it had arrested two men who had been trying to steal
11 kilograms of low-grade nuclear fuel from the
Arzamas-16 nuclear complex east of Moscow.(17)

54.   As regards the potential customers for nuclear
materials, suspicion has centred on Iran, Pakistan and
North Korea.

55.   It is important to place incidents of nuclear
smuggling into context.  Many cases reportedly involve
bogus material or radioactive material with no nuclear
weapons applications.  Furthermore, many - although not
all - of the seizures of weapons-related material involve
extremely small quantities.  This does not mean that
there is any cause for complacency but nor does it mean
that security at weapons-related sites has been seriously
compromised.  The six grams of plutonium found in a
German garage, for instance, was indeed manufactured at
the weapons facility Arzamas-16, but material from there
was subsequently distributed to non-weapons laboratories
which could have been the source of the leak.(18)
Similarly, some highly enriched uranium and plutonium
probably came
from laboratory instruments, naval reactors or
experimental research reactors.  Dangerous as these
materials are, they are not as dangerous as weapons-grade

56.   All that said, there are serious threats to
proliferation through nuclear smuggling from the former
Soviet Union.  International experts from the IAEA, who
have visited Ukraine and Kazakhstan in recent
months to prepare for safeguards agreements on civil
nuclear facilities, have been greatly alarmed by
instances of lax security: weapons grade material held in
low-security civilian laboratories, highly enriched
uranium lying in open-access storage rooms etc..  There
is no reason to assume that conditions are any different
in other former Soviet republics, several of which
possess nuclear material and facilities which could raise
proliferation concerns.


57.   The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the foundation upon
which all other efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons are based.  It was opened for signature on 1 July
1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970.  So far, 164
nations have acceded to the Treaty and only 28 have not
done so.(19)  The NPT is reinforced by a variety of
regional arrangements such as Euratom, the Antarctic
Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone.  There are also bilateral agreements
such as those between Argentina and Brazil, and India and
There is also the Nuclear Suppliers Group - also known as
the London Club - which has harmonized export controls on
nuclear materials and technologies.  Finally, there is
the International Atomic Energy Agency which operates
safeguards on the use of nuclear material and technology
to which parties to the NPT are committed.

58.   IAEA safeguards include:  an accounting system to
reveal, within a conversion period (i.e. before the state
concerned has had time to assemble a nuclear weapon), any
diversion of "significant quantities" of nuclear
materials; a containment system for sensitive materials
to limit the possibility of access; and a monitoring
system, comprising cameras, radiation detectors and
closed-circuit television able to detect illegal
traffic in materials, equipment or technologies.
Safeguards can be applied in two ways.  Non-nuclear
weapons states who are party to the NPT have a
"full-scope" or comprehensive safeguards agreement with
the IAEA.  This means that all nuclear material in the
nation concerned is monitored by the IAEA.  Nations who
are not party to the NPT can purchase materials and
technologies from other nations who are party to
the NPT, but these items must be placed under IAEA

59.   Since the Gulf war, the IAEA has been given the
freedom to act on information supplied by outside sources
such as national intelligence agencies.  It has also
determined, after a legal reappraisal of its rules,
that it can mount special inspections in nations which
have signed full-scope (also known as comprehensive)
safeguards agreements with the IAEA.  These inspections
can take place at locations chosen by the IAEA,
whether or not the inspected state has declared them to
the IAEA.  Essentially, full-scope safeguards give the
IAEA the right to verify all nuclear material in the
relevant state and to apply safeguards to all
nuclear activities within the state.  The inspected state
has the right to be consulted but, in the final analysis,
it is obliged to permit an inspection to take place.  If
the objection is maintained or if inspections are
frustrated, the IAEA can refer the matter to the United
Nations Security Council, as happened with North Korea.

60.   Another development which should enhance
non-proliferation efforts is that the Nuclear Suppliers
Group agreed in 1992 that all significant new transfers
to non-nuclear weapons states would be conditional on the
recipient having a full-scope safeguards agreement with
the IAEA.(20)  The only exceptions would be cases where
the transfer is deemed essential for the safe operation
of existing facilities and even then safeguards must be
applied to the facilities in question.

61.   The NPT specifies that it must be reviewed every
five years and that after 25 years, a Renewal Conference
should be held to decide whether the NPT will remain in
force "indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods".  Preparatory
meetings have already taken place for this Renewal
Conference and, so far, it appears that the indefinite
renewal sought by many nations is by no means a
foregone conclusion.  Before looking further at the
prospects for renewing the NPT, it is useful to summarize
what are seen as the achievements and failures of the

A.    NPT Achievements and Failures

62.   The NPT has been neither a complete success nor a
complete failure.  On the positive side, it has made
nuclear weapons proliferation more difficult for would-be
proliferators.  In the late 1960s, it was feared
that dozens of nuclear weapons states might emerge over
the next few decades.  In fact, there are now probably
only three additional de facto nuclear weapons nations;
Israel, India and Pakistan.  Another nation - South
Africa - actually did produce nuclear weapons but has now
abandoned them and has committed itself to full-scope
IAEA safeguards.  In addition, the NPT has successfully
promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy by allowing
nations to develop nuclear energy under IAEA monitoring
and with IAEA and other international assistance.  It has
also provided motivation for the nuclear weapons nations
to work towards nuclear disarmament, as they are obliged
to do under the NPT.  Whether they have done enough has
been a subject of acrimonious debate at previous review
conferences, but the prospect of regular scrutiny at
these conferences has provided some impetus for
disarmament.  Another NPT strength is that it provides
the legal basis for dealing with nations conducting
questionable nuclear activities.

63.   On the negative side, experience with Iraq showed
that even a party to the NPT can make great progress
towards building nuclear weapons with only modest
scientific and industrial resources provided it has the
will, the ingenuity and the resources.  Another problem
is that the Treaty is discriminatory in that it enshrines
the nuclear weapons status quo and places different
obligations on nuclear weapons nations and non-nuclear
weapons nations.  Its crisis management and enforcement
provisions are open to criticism in that sanctions or
actions to be taken against violations are not mandatory
but instead are at the discretion of the United Nations
Security Council.  Some of Treaty's definitions are
unclear.  These include the definition of "manufacture"
of a nuclear weapon, so that a nation could assemble all
the key components of a nuclear weapon but would not be
deemed to have manufactured a nuclear weapon unless these
components were brought together.  The definition of a
"significant quantity" of fissile material is also open
to question as are the allowable margins of error in
accounting for fissile material.(21)

B.    Towards Renewal

64.   There is general agreement that modifying the NPT
is likely to be too cumbersome and attempts to do so are
likely to result in deadlock and, perhaps, a failure to
renew the Treaty.  Similarly, replacing the NPT with
a new treaty has been ruled out since a new treaty is
unlikely to attract the nearly universal membership of
the NPT.  The broad goal of all the NATO nations, Russia
and many other nations is therefore to seek indefinite,
unconditional renewal and to enhance non-proliferation
efforts.  Not all participants are likely to support
these goals.  Mexico, for instance, has proposed a
five-year extension followed by indefinite renewal only
if an agreement has been reached on banning all nuclear
weapons testing.  Only Iran has declared its opposition
to indefinite renewal, but other nations are known to
feel that extension for fixed periods would be an
effective way of applying pressure on the nuclear weapons
states to disarm. (22)

65.   A key issue for the non-nuclear weapons states is
whether the nuclear weapons states have fulfilled their
NPT obligation to "pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to the cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament".  At the last Review Conference in 1990,
this was among the principal areas of disagreement.
Since then, of course, dramatic reductions in nuclear
weapons have occurred and - as noted earlier - nuclear
disarmament is proceeding so rapidly that it is
stretching the resources available for safe dismantlement
and storage of nuclear weapons and material.  Even so,
many non-nuclear weapons nations have identified a
complete ban on nuclear testing as the "yardstick" for
deciding whether the nuclear weapons states are living up
to their commitments.  This linkage is hotly contested by
the nuclear weapons nations, and indeed there is no
formal link between a test ban and the NPT.

66.   Without going into the details, a complete test ban
is being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva, but there is very little prospect that an
agreement can be reached before the NPT Renewal
Conference.  The latest round of negotiations finished in
early September without agreement.  France and China
apparently opposed an early agreement, arguing that this
would "freeze" a Russian and American technical
advantage, and China also insisted on the right to
conduct "peaceful nuclear tests", a distinction not
recognized by other nations.(23) China's continued
nuclear testing - the latest was on 9 June 1994 - is
distinctly unhelpful, particularly when the other nuclear
weapons states have imposed moratoria on their nuclear
tests.  With only two months of negotiating time before
the NPT Renewal Conference, the Chairman of the
negotiations has said that "It would take a minor miracle
for us to complete [a nuclear test ban treaty] in time
for next year's non-proliferation conference.  There are
many non-aligned countries who believe that without a
comprehensive test ban there can be no non-proliferation

67.   It remains to be seen whether sufficient progress
will be made towards a test ban treaty to mollify the
non-aligned nations.  It might be that other actions will
strengthen the case for indefinite renewal.  Foremost
among these has been the Clinton Administration's
proposal to cease producing fissile material for weapons
purposes and to place surplus material under
international safeguards.  This arrangement would apply
equally to the nuclear weapons states as well as the
threshold states, so it should not be seen as
discriminatory.  It would limit weapons production and
would move material from dismantled weapons out of the
military domain, so that it would be politically more
difficult to reclaim the material for weapons purposes in
the future.  Russia has declared its support for
this proposal - most recently in President Yeltsin's
speech at the United Nations on 26 September 1994 - and,
as noted earlier in this Report, has agreed to close its
plants which produce fissile material for military

68.  On 23 March 1994, the United States announced the
transfer of seven tons of plutonium and fifteen tons of
HEU from national to IAEA authority.  Further transfers
are planned for fissile materials "no longer needed for
United States defence programmes".  At present, none of
the other declared nuclear weapons states is believed to
be producing new fissile material for weapons, so the
threshold states are probably the key obstacle to an
international agreement.  In any event, support for this
initiative by the nuclear weapons states might increase
the likelihood of NPT renewal, bearing in mind that the
key threshold states - Israel, India and Pakistan - are
not party to the NPT.

69.  Other actions to aid renewal could involve positive
and negative security assurances by the declared nuclear
weapons nations.  Positive assurances are pledges to come
to the aid of non-nuclear weapons nations if they are
threatened by nuclear weapons.  Negative assurances are
declarations that the nuclear weapons nations will not
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons states.  Assurances along these lines
were given during the Cold War but they were qualified
because both sides wished to reserve the right to use
nuclear weapons against each other's allies under certain
circumstances.(25)  The changed security environment
after the end of the Cold War should make it possible to
issue less cautious assurances.

70.  Finally, the NPT Renewal Conference will take place
against a background of increasing concern about the
divisions between the developed and the developing world.
The developing world is increasingly dissatisfied with
what it views as lukewarm commitments to development
assistance.  The NPT provides an undertaking to assist
with the development of nuclear energy but this form of
assistance is not as attractive as it once was.  A more
solid commitment to development assistance by the
developed world would greatly improve the atmosphere at
the NPT conference.  Possibilities include the developed
nations setting a date for meeting their goal of
providing 0.7 per cent of GDP in development aid and
providing adequate funds for the Rio agreements.(26)

C.   Beyond 1995

71.  The most likely outcome of the NPT Renewal
Conference seems to be renewal indefinitely or for a
fixed period.  The least likely outcome is complete
rejection of the NPT.  Another possibility, however, is
that the conference will fail to agree on renewal.
Experts are divided about what this would mean in
practice.  One view is that since the conference is
supposed to address the duration of renewal, a hung
conference would not terminate the Treaty.  On the other
hand, the absence of a decision does not mean that it
would be automatically extended indefinitely.  The
prevailing view seems to be that "while the conference is
still in session or has been adjourned for a further
session to be convened, the NPT continues

72.  No matter what the outcome, efforts will continue to
strengthen non-proliferation efforts.  These will
certainly include further enhancement of IAEA safeguards.
Since the Gulf War, the IAEA safeguards approach has
certainly become more robust, and the new provisions for
Special Inspections played an important role in dealing
with North Korea.  Even so, the Director General of the
IAEA, Dr. Hans Blix, has noted that the Chemical Weapons
Convention indicates that there is less reluctance to
accept a more intrusive inspection regime than was
possible when IAEA safeguards were established.(28)
There is support for movement in that direction, but
other problems of a much more fundamental nature must be
addressed to bring it about.

73.  At present, the frequency of inspections is related
to the amount of fissile material a nation possesses.  On
that basis, Japan and Germany absorb about 60 per cent of
the IAEA's safeguards budget and Canada accounts for a
further 10 per cent.(29) Although this principle is non-
discriminatory, it is difficult to see this as an
appropriate use of scarce resources.  Furthermore, IAEA
safeguards resources are indeed scarce.  Despite the
additional burdens of new responsibilities in Iraq, North
Korea, Argentina and Brazil, the safeguards budget has
been more or less static at $65 million for 8 years.
Activities also had to be cut by about 12 per cent when
Russia and other CIS nations were unable to pay their
contributions, although payments have now resumed.(30)
It certainly seems appropriate that the IAEA be given
additional resources to deal more effectively with its
new burdens.  And it should be noted that reducing the
definitions of "significant quantities" and "material
unaccounted for" would make safeguards more complex and

74.  One option for lightening the IAEA's burden would be
to create regional safeguards organizations, such as
EURATOM, to operate in the Middle East, South Asia and

75.  Another action could be to develop mandatory United
Nations sanctions on nations which are not party to the
NPT or which violate its provisions.  This would
certainly be controversial but would indicate that the
international community takes nuclear proliferation
seriously and insists upon the universal application of
the NPT.


76.  In sum, there are many actions which would help
achieve NPT renewal and which would enhance efforts to
prevent nuclear proliferation.  The achievement of a
complete ban on nuclear tests would clearly increase the
chances of indefinite renewal but renewal probably does
depend on this factor alone.  Progress in that direction
along with a good record of success in other aspects of
nuclear arms control might suffice.  The cessation of
fissile material production for weapons purposes and the
placing of surplus weapons material under IAEA authority
is one such measure which was not even on the horizon at
the last NPT Conference.

77.  It seems that there is scope for positive and
negative security assurances and these should be examined
by the declared nuclear weapons states.  Collective
declarations by these nations could even be considered.

78.  Regarding efforts to enhance non-proliferation,
there is clearly scope for co-operation between East and
West as a means of curbing nuclear leakage from the
former Soviet Union.  A great deal is already being done
in this context in the form of assistance for weapons
dismantlement, security of nuclear facilities and
materials, and research funding for weapons scientists to
work in non-military areas.  These programmes deserve
support and should be supplemented by additional
assistance in export control implementation.

79.  Regarding nuclear safeguards, there is clearly much
scope for redirecting resources so that they reflect
proliferation risk rather than simply the scale of
national nuclear programmes.  An extremely strong case
can also be made for increasing the IAEA's safeguards
budget.  At the same time, inspection arrangements should
be studied further to see if it is possible to provide
the IAEA with the same sort of inspection rights that are
associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

80.  There should also be detailed consideration of the
sanctions which should be imposed on nations which are
not party to the NPT and which have nuclear programmes.
At the very least, these should be excluded from
international nuclear trade unless they submit to full-
scope IAEA safeguards.  For nations which violate the
NPT, a clear decision to impose specific sanctions should
be agreed.  Nations who intend to violate the Treaty
should be left in do doubt that their actions will have
clear consequences.


(1) Another factor which may influence Israel is that the
Dimona nuclear facility is said to be approaching the
point where large investments will be necessary to
continue operations.

(2) This proposal is discussed later in this Report.

(3) Cited in The Non-proliferation Review, Program for
Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 1, No.3,

(4) Washington Post, January 2, 1993, cited in The Non-
proliferation Review, Program for Non-proliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
Winter 1994, vol. 1, No.2, p. 104

(5) Mitchell Reiss, "South Asia and Nuclear
Proliferation: a Future Unlike the Past" RUSI Journal,
December 1993, pp.63-67, and Christopher Bellamy,
"Islamabad Races Secretly to Build Nuclear Arsenal", The
Independent, 19 August 1994

(6) Tim McGirk, "Pakistan Has Bomb, ex-PM Admits", The
Independent, 24 August 1994.

(7) "Bhutto Denounces A-Arms Warning", International
Herald Tribune, 25 August 1994.

(8) Previous Reports have addressed nuclear dismantlement
issues in some detail, so this section concentrates on
the specific issues related to nuclear proliferation.

(9) Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 5 March 1993, p. 1

(10) Kirill Belyaninov, "Nuclear Nonsense, Black-Market
Bombs, and Fissile Flim-Flam", The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March/April 1994, pp.44-50

(11) "Uranium Trail Hots Up", Financial Times, 10
February 1994

(12) "Russian Nuclear Theft Increases", The Daily
Telegraph, 10 February 1994, and "Europe Alert Over
Threat of Nuclear Terrorism", The European, 18 March 1994

(13) The plutonium in this case was 99.7 per cent pure.
Weapons-grade plutonium is believed to be 96 per cent

(14) "From Russia with Love", Financial Times, 22 August

(15) "Split on How to Stop Nuclear Smugglers", The
Independent, 8 September 1994

(16) "Sofia Police Raid Nets Nuclear Haul", The Guardian
15 September 1994

(17) "New Russian Nuclear Theft", The Daily Telegraph, 25
August 1994

(18) "The Plutonium Racket", The Economist, 20 August

(19) Of the latter, Algeria, Argentina, Chile and Ukraine
have declared their intention to accede; Kyrgyzstan and
Moldova have ratified the Treaty but not yet deposited
their letters of accession; Andorra and Monaco are
principalities whose foreign policies are controlled by
other nations; Micronesia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
are considering accession; Serbia and Montenegro claim
membership as the sole successor states to Yugoslavia but
this is in dispute; Brazil and Vanuatu have taken no
action on the NPT but are participating in regional non-
proliferation arrangements; India has rejected accession
on the grounds that the Treaty is discriminatory;
Pakistan has stated its willingness to accede at the same
time as India; Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Macedonia, the Marshall
Islands, and Palau have taken no action regarding the
NPT; Oman and the United Arab Emirates have cited Israeli
nuclear capabilities as the reason for not acceding; and
Cuba has taken no action on the NPT, although it has
declared that it would participate in the Latin American
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone when other Latin American
parties brought it into force, which they have now done.
("Non-Signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty", Arms Control Today, July/August 1994, p.28.

(20) Inventory of International Non-proliferation
Organizations and Regimes.  1994 Edition.  Programme for
Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies.

(21) The significant quantity of highly enriched uranium
235 is 25 kilograms; uranium 233, 8 kilograms; and
plutonium, 8 kilograms.  In fact, some experts have
argued that these quantities are eight times larger than
that needed in a sophisticated weapon.  The allowable
quantities of "material unaccounted for" in large
facilities can exceed the amounts required to make
several nuclear weapons, even using current definitions
of significant quantities.

(22) Edward Mortimer, "Terms Still to Be Decided",
Financial Times, 12 September 1994.

(23) "Nuclear Testing Set to Continue", The Guardian, 8
September 1994

(24) ibid.

(25) Edward Mortimer, "Terms Still to Be Decided",
Financial Times, 12 September 1994

(26) This topic is addressed in the Scientific and
Technical Committee's Draft General Report [AL 232 STC
(94) 7]

(27) John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, "The NPT Renewal
Conference: Stumbling Towards 1995", International
Security, Summer 1994, pp.41-71

(28) Dr. Hans Blix, "The Dual Challenge of a Nuclear
Age", IAEA Bulletin, January 1993, pp. 33-39

(29) David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Scheinman, and
George Bunn, "A New Nuclear Triad.  The Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the
International Atomic Energy Agency", Programme for
Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Mountbatten Centre
for International Studies, University of Southampton,
September 1992, p.28.  These nations, incidentally, make
great efforts to reduce the burdens that the safeguards
impose on the IAEA.

(30) Zachary Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "The
International Atomic Energy Agency: Strengthen
Verification Authority?" CRS Issue Brief, Congressional
Research Service, 3 November 1993.

For further information and reports in French contact:

Carolyn BUTLER
North Atlantic Assembly

3 Place du Petit Sablon                   Tel (32-2) 513.28.65
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