Table of Contents


1. Section II discusses the specific issues identified for further explanation and/or analysis.

2. The first three issues–Command and Control of HUMINT Service Personnel; Intelligence Assets at Wing Level; and Rules of Engagement in Countries Without a Status of Forces Agreement–were part of the recommendations made by Lieutenant General Record in Part of A of his Report. The discussion below explains the rationale for these recommendations.

3. The remaining five issues–Training, Equipping, and Manning the Security Force; Convoy and Personnel Transportation Procedures; Defense Against Stand-off Attack; Evacuation Planning, Practice and Evaluation; and Communications–answer specific questions resulting from Part B of Lieutenant General Record’s Report.



a. HUMINT. The importance of timely, responsive human resource intelligence (HUMINT) collection and reporting to operationally deployed forces was underscored by the Khobar Towers bombing. Although intelligence furnished a good picture of the broad threat facing US forces in Southwest Asia, neither HUMINT nor counterintelligence provided specific tactical details on the threat which might have enabled the wing commander to better prepare his force and facilities to prevent or blunt the effectiveness of the terrorist attack.

b. Purpose. This section provides an expanded explanation and analysis of the observations and recommendations made in Part A of the Record Report concerning command and control of HUMINT assets in Southwest Asia. Two issues are involved in this area. One is the establishment of a focal point for formulating requirements, coordinating collection activities and assessing collection results in response to theater needs. The second is establishing the authority to control the activities of collectors. As discussed below, the Air Force supports on-going actions for assigning a focal point for collection requirements management and analysis. [Classified material omitted].

c. Downing Assessment.

(1) [Classified material omitted]

(2) [Classified material omitted]

(3) [Classified material omitted]

d. Record Report.

(1) The Record Report supported the Downing Assessment findings and further specified the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) as the single focal point for counterintelligence and HUMINT in USCENTCOM’s AOR. Lieutenant General Record’s rationale was to promote a closer relationship between intelligence and operations. The JRAC Director is the CINC’s representative in the AOR for coordination of force protection issues. [Classified material omitted] Through the JRAC, intelligence information relevant to theater issues would be more readily accessible to operations. [Classified material omitted]

(2) [Classified material omitted] According to Lieutenant General Record’s proposal, the CINC, through the JRAC, should have the authority to task Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) and military counter intelligence personnel to collect HUMINT information. [Classified material omitted]

(3) [Classified material omitted]

e. Definition. HUMINT is the intelligence discipline which uses human beings as both the primary collection instrument and the source of information. It focuses on acquiring information relating to capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, including terrorists. [Classified material omitted] HUMINT's unique contribution is the ability to put eyes and ears on the ground, get inside the mind of the target, and provide direct knowledge of the target's plans and intentions. It is this characteristic of HUMINT that can make it more suitable against terrorist targets than other methods of intelligence collection. However, the close-in, face-to-face aspect of HUMINT also carries with it varying degrees of risk, not only to US government foreign policy interests, but also to the personal safety of the agent and the agent's case officer. In addition, there is no guarantee that the potential intelligence source will actually have that one vital piece of information needed to complete the intelligence puzzle.

f. Organization. In 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the consolidation of the separate General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)-funded HUMINT elements of the Services into a single, joint field operating agency subordinate to the DIA. In this new DoD HUMINT structure, the Services were only authorized to maintain carefully focused, overt, non-sensitive HUMINT activities to support Service-unique requirements. This capability was sourced from the Services' Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funds, which are used to support capabilities designed chiefly to respond to operational commanders' needs for tactical, time-sensitive intelligence.

g. Mission. [Classified material omitted].

h. DHS in SWA. [Classified material omitted].

i. Air Force HUMINT and Counterintelligence. [Classified material omitted] The Air Force had no TIARA HUMINT capability prior to the 1993 consolidation, [Classified material omitted]. Today, apart from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations’ counterintelligence (CI) capability (see Part II-B of this review), the Air Force has no organic capability to collect information using HUMINT sources and methods, but rather levies requirements on the DHS to respond to its strategic and operational intelligence needs. [Classified material omitted].

j. The Tasking Process. There are four mechanisms for tasking the HUMINT system.

(1) [Classified material omitted].

(2) [Classified material omitted].

(3) The requirements tasking process is shown below:



k. Command and Control of HUMINT Operations. [Classified material omitted]

l. The J-2X Concept. [Classified material omitted] The following diagram demonstrates the J-2X organization.

m. HUMINT Information Dissemination. HUMINT Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) are entered in two databases–INTELINK and the DIA Support to Analysts File Environment (SAFE) system–for intelligence users in the field. The unified command Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) is responsible for disseminating HUMINT-derived intelligence up and down echelons of command. [Classified material omitted]


a. DIA Manual 58-12, DoD HUMINT Management System (U), 31 Jan 97. Outlines authorities and responsibilities for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, as the DoD HUMINT manager. The policies and procedures in this manual regulate Defense HUMINT Service and other DoD HUMINT collection management activities, to include the intelligence requirements system, the intelligence reporting process, and the HUMINT evaluation system.

b. DIA Manual 58-11, DoD HUMINT Policies and Procedures (U), Mar 97 (Draft). Outlines authorities, responsibilities and procedures for the conduct of HUMINT collection activities by the Defense HUMINT Service and the TIARA collectors of the Military Departments.

c. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Consolidation of Defense HUMINT," 2 Nov 93, directs the consolidation of all GDIP HUMINT activities into a single HUMINT agency.

d. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Transfer of Operational Control and Civilian Oversight of USAF HUMINT," 16 Mar 95, transfers this responsibility to DIA.

e. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Transfer of Operational Control and Civilian Oversight of USAF Overt Human Intelligence Responsibilities," 25 Sep 95, transfers this responsibility to DIA.

f. OASD Memorandum, "Activation of Defense HUMINT Service," 4 Oct 95, marks the stand-up of the DHS.

g. Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, Appendix C, Intelligence Disciplines, Annex A, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Draft, Nov 96, defines HUMINT roles and missions in support of joint operations.


a. Personnel. [Classified material omitted]

b. Operational Environment in SWA. Few military personnel have Arabic language capability or are familiar with Arab culture. [Classified material omitted]

c. Assignment Policy and Operational Restrictions. [Classified material omitted].


a. [Classified material omitted].

b. [Classified material omitted]

c. General Downing recommended empowering a single authority to coordinate and direct all military counterintelligence and HUMINT in the USCENTCOM AOR. Lieutenant General Record agreed and further recommended designating the USCENTCOM JRAC to perform this function. His vision of the JRAC included a J-2 representative and a Joint Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA) to coordinate and direct these activities. However, USCENTCOM rejected this approach, and Operations Order 97-01, which established the JRAC, did not realign responsibilities for directing and coordinating HUMINT in the AOR. [Classified material omitted].


a. Both Lieutenant General Record and General Downing recognized that military commanders’ needs for tailored HUMINT and counterintelligence in Southwest Asia were not satisfied by existing capabilities. Lieutenant General Record’s proposed methodology for improving intelligence support was through the JRAC concept. He viewed the JRAC as the most efficient and effective locus to serve as the single authority for coordinating and directing these activities.

b. [Classified material omitted]. The JRAC is a staff element of USCENTCOM with responsibility for providing policy guidance on force protection issues in the AOR. [Classified material omitted].



a. Purpose.

(1) Finding 11 of the Downing Assessment states, "the lack of an organic intelligence support capability in the Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission." The Record Report states, "the lack of organic intelligence capability did not inhibit the 4404th WG (P) internal base defense mission."

(2) This section provides expanded explanation and analysis for the basis of several Record Report, Part A, recommendations regarding the need for organic intelligence assets at the Wing level. Lieutenant General Record recognized that US Army assets may not be available to provide ground order of battle expertise or protection outside Air Force installations overseas. Therefore, he recommended intelligence personnel be assigned to Security Police units to support force protection activities in contingency operations. He also recommended that Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) counterintelligence special agents be under the operational control of the installation commander to act as liaison among AFOSI, Security Police (SP), and US and foreign security/police agencies charged with antiterrorism missions. This section provides the rationale and additional relevant information and analysis regarding these recommendations.

(3) In response to the two previous reports, the Air Force established the Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center (SFC). The SFC will be the first ever integrated Air Force force protection staff, combining the expertise of the Air Staff Security Force Division, 820th Security Forces Group (SFG), and the Force Protection Battle Lab under a single director. This center will have a multi-functional staff comprised of experts from AFOSI, intelligence and security with a dedicated mission of enhancing the protection of Air Force personnel and resources when deployed and at home station. Force Protection Cells were also established and are deployed to support force protection efforts at the 4404th Wing (P), Prince Sultan Air Base and JTF SWA, Riyadh.

(4) The USAF Security Force Division, 820th Security Forces Group, the Battle Lab and Force Protection Cells will have intelligence and AFOSI counterintelligence personnel assigned. AFOSI personnel supporting contingency operations will be under direct control of the deployed wing commander and be attached to the SP unit. These individuals will be responsible for integrating intelligence and counterintelligence functions with force protection operations. They will also ensure the timely flow of intelligence and counterintelligence data in support of force protection. A strong intelligence and counterintelligence presence in these organizations will fortify and institutionalize relationships between security, intelligence and counterintelligence disciplines.

(5) Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) are the first line of defense in an antiterrorism program. A well-planned, systematic, all-source intelligence and CI program is essential to combating terrorism. Following the normal structure for Air Force wings, the 4404th Wing (P)’s organic intelligence was provided by the wing’s intelligence flight and CI was provided by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Detachment 241 at Dhahran. However, Lieutenant General Record recognized this relationship was not institutionalized.

b. Wing Intelligence Structure.

(1) In the Air Force, intelligence is organic to wings and organized, manned and equipped to accomplish its objective. At wing level, the objective of all intelligence wartime functions is to provide combat intelligence support to the operational mission. Threat assessment is the most common intelligence function conducted in support of tactical operations. Wing intelligence also aids the commander and battlestaff members controlling those defensive resources or forces that ensure air base operability and other combat support functions, including force protection.

(2) Combat intelligence provides current assessment, penetration analysis and target intelligence support to aircrews performing combat or combat-support missions. Accurate, timely and tailored intelligence support to the commander and key decision-makers is also vital to maintain threat warning and situational awareness. Intelligence personnel apply their skills, knowledge and training to accomplish these tasks. They also use a variety of automated systems to receive, analyze, display and communicate threat information for use in mission planning and situational awareness.

c. Automated Data Systems. The wing intelligence flight had access to various intelligence databases through a variety of automated systems. The flight was equipped with three different communication/computer systems. The systems were the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), the Combat Intelligence System (CIS), and elements of the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG). The JDISS operates at the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level, permitting retrieval of SCI information and access to INTELINK, the SCI-level world-wide-web. The CIS operates at the Secret level, permitting retrieval and transmission of collateral information and electronic connectivity to subordinate units operating in the region. The CSG element operates at the SCI level, permitting direct connectivity to CSG counterparts at JTF SWA.

d. Wing Intelligence Support for Force Protection.

(1) The wing intelligence flight performed several roles in support of force protection. First, as a 24-hour operation, it established written procedures to notify AFOSI and Security Police following receipt of a CI message. This checklist of required actions, points of contact and phone numbers was to be used by intelligence personnel any time a CI message was received in the flight’s Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). AFOSI was contacted immediately when "hot" messages were received. Other applicable messages were flagged for distribution to AFOSI. However, the intelligence flight relied almost exclusively on the AFOSI agent to pass information to security police representatives. The Chief of Security Police (CSP) indicated his primary source of intelligence was AFOSI, not wing intelligence.

(2) Second, the intelligence flight published and disseminated a daily Situation Summary (SITSUM) of enemy military activity, terrorist information (when applicable) and items of interest to intelligence operations. These reports were distributed in writing to the wing commander and AFOSI, and electronically to subordinate units. In addition, sanitized versions of SITSUMs were passed to Multinational Forces (MNF)–British, French and Saudi–intelligence counterparts collocated on King Abdul Aziz Air Base. From February-June 1996, the intelligence flight published 30 articles on terrorist issues in its SITSUMs. Ten of these articles featured comments by wing intelligence analysts.

(3) Third, the intelligence flight commander (IFC) participated in the wing’s weekly Security Review Meeting. The wing commander established this forum to enhance the exchange of information between his key force protection personnel. The IFC presented a general view of military and terrorist threats in the region. AFOSI talked specifics, while focusing on the aspect of antiterrorism. The CSP would then discuss actions to improve force protection. The intent was to examine the threat from a wide field of view, provided by wing intelligence, and narrow the field of view with information provided by AFOSI.

e. AFOSI DET 241 Structure. On 25 June 1996, AFOSI Detachment 241, Dhahran, had three Special Agents assigned–two on 179 day rotations and one on a 90 day rotation–and one information manager also on a 90 day rotation. The detachment commander, Special Agent (SA) Richard Reddecliff arrived in Saudi Arabia on 8 February 1996. AFOSI Det 241 provided counterintelligence and force protection support to the wing commander; however, the detachment falls under the command of the 24th Field Investigations Squadron at Shaw AFB, South Carolina. The AFOSI 2nd Field Investigations Region commander at Langley AFB, VA is responsible for all AFOSI Southwest Asia detachments.

f. AFOSI Responsibilities. AFOSI Detachment 241 was responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating threat information. They were also responsible for coordinating with US and host nation security and law enforcement agencies concerning threats to the security of the 4404th Wing (P). AFOSI Det 241 conducted vulnerability surveys to identify security weaknesses and recommend improvements.

g. Counterintelligence Process.

(1) Counterintelligence is a unique discipline bridging intelligence, law enforcement and security countermeasures. AFOSI is responsible for CI in the Air Force. The role of CI in antiterrorism is to identify the threat. Additionally, CI provides warning of potential terrorist attacks and information for counterterrorism operations.

(2) Certain elements of the intelligence cycle have particular importance in a viable antiterrorism program. Effective CI support requires effort, planning and direction; collection and analysis; and production, investigations and dissemination. The entire process is important to providing commanders with information and timely warning upon which to recommend antiterrorism actions.

(3) The primary sources of CI for the antiterrorism program are open source information, criminal information, government intelligence, CI and local information.

h. Collecting, Analyzing and Disseminating of Threat Information. AFOSI agents at Dhahran were responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating threat information.

(1) Collecting.

(a) AFOSI Det 241 collected information through various sources in Saudi Arabia to include weekly meetings at the Consulate and the US Embassy Riyadh. [Classified material omitted].

(b) From March through June 1996, AFOSI Det 241 prepared over 35 Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) or CI Collection Reports (CICR) . Reported information covered a gamut of suspicious activity, information on suspected surveillances, [Classified material omitted] and request for assistance. SA Reddecliff reported he briefed the information contained in the IIRs and CICRs either in person to the wing staff or at the weekly threat meetings.

(c) [Classified material omitted].

(d) They were also visited by AFOSI Investigations Operations Center (IOC), Bolling AFB, DC, personnel who provided classified briefings [Classified material omitted]. Some highly classified information could not be discussed at Dhahran because there were no facilities certified for the level of the information being briefed. Detachment members would go to Riyadh to receive these briefings.

(2) Analysis. The detachment did not conduct in-depth analysis of threat information. Deployed AFOSI members relied on AFOSI IOC for analysis. AFOSI IOC provided oversight, guidance, and assistance to AFOSI Det 241. The IOC Antiterrorism Operations Division provided threat assessment information to the detachment. [Classified material omitted].

(3) Dissemination. Most AFOSI collected information was briefed verbally, telephonically or sent by message. AFOSI disseminated reports either via IIR or CICR. General threat information was sent via IIR. [Classified material omitted]. The Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority at JTF SWA was also on distribution for most of the CICRs. AFOSI Det 241 personnel opined AFOSI Investigations Operations Center would inform them if the CICR required additional dissemination.

i. Customers. AFOSI briefed threat information to the wing commander, the chief of security police and the intelligence flight commander. They also briefed other CI organizations in country including US Army Military Intelligence, Naval Criminal Investigation Service in Bahrain, JTF SWA/J-2 and the National Intelligence Support Team. Threat information was then passed to the appropriate headquarters. All IIRs went to DIA and HQ AFOSI. Most reports went to USCENTCOM as well. In addition, threat information was circulated throughout the intelligence community in Washington DC. For example, the Military Intelligence Digest published by DIA on 17 May 1996 echoed AFOSI IIRs.

j. US Coordination with Host Nation Security and Law Enforcement Agencies - On and Off Base.

(1) [Classified material omitted].

(2) [Classified material omitted].

k. Sourcing. [Classified material omitted].

l. Vulnerability Surveys.

(1) Vulnerability surveys are an integral part of preventive security measures taken to counter terrorist activity. Vulnerability surveys provide commanders with a critical examination of airfield and support facilities from an adversarial viewpoint. Surveys do not guarantee absolute safety; however they can reduce the probability of a successful attack. Surveys provide Air Force personnel with a viable tool for decreasing the potential for attack. Vulnerability surveys are purpose specific. They consider factors such as local threat, terrorist capabilities and available resources. The "requester" retains the discretion to implement or alter recommendations.

(2) The AFOSI detachment conducted a vulnerability survey in June 1995. This was underway when Brig Gen Schwalier arrived at Dhahran. Brig Gen Schwalier received the vulnerability survey in September 1995 and began working the recommendations contained in the report. The wing was still in the process of working the recommendations when the bomb exploded at Office of Program Management, Saudi Arabia National Guard (OPM SANG) Headquarters, Riyadh in November 1995.

(3) A new vulnerability survey of Khobar Towers was started by AFOSI based on heightened security concerns resulting from the OPM SANG bombing. Both surveys were conducted prior to SA Reddecliff’s arrival.

(4) The wing commander received and reviewed the second vulnerability survey of Khobar Towers in January 1996. The survey recommended 39 security measures. The wing had completed 36 of the recommendations by the time the bomb exploded on 25 June 1996.

m. Wing Intelligence and AFOSI Detachment Interface. The wing’s intelligence and CI assets complied with Air Force principles separating these two disciplines and were arranged to focus on their areas of expertise. Wing intelligence was energized to support Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) air operations. AFOSI, with assistance from wing intelligence, was active in collecting and assessing CI information. Testimony reveals a consistent, close association between wing intelligence and AFOSI. Open communication and information comparison were routine. Key individuals declared their satisfaction with this arrangement. The commander indicated he was happy with this scheme. Others agreed it was an effectively structured, albeit informal, way of doing business. However, the chief of security police and the support group commander believed they did not get all intelligence needed to posture against a ground threat. While the dissemination of some information may have been controlled by the originator, pertinent facts of all available information, regardless of its sensitivity, were provided to the wing commander as a minimum. Other information, sanitized or unrestricted by caveats, was provided in daily SITSUMs or briefed to key staff members, including the CSP.


a. Intelligence. The guidance provided in DoD Directives, Joint Publications (JP), Air Force Instructions (AFI) and other directives outline requirements for unit intelligence support to air operations, force protection and antiterrorism activities.

(1) Air Operations Support.

(a) JP 2.0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support To Operations, 5 May 1995, provides instruction for coordination of intelligence production at all echelons, including unit level. It also requires military services provide trained personnel and interoperable command, control, communication and intelligence (C4I) equipment per the command intelligence architecture plan (CIAP).

(b) USCENTCOM Command Intelligence Architecture/Planning Program (CIAP), 23 February 1996, requires dissemination of intelligence information by the fastest means possible, at the lowest level possible and to the units who need it. It states intelligence officers will strive to produce at a level that is releasable to the allies and coalition partners.

(c) Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations, 1 October 1995, states Air Force intelligence readiness will be sustained by developing and maintaining a force structure with the proper rank and specialty allocations of military and civilian personnel, training and educating mission-ready professionals, regularly exercising wartime system capabilities and by equipping and maintaining an infrastructure capable of supporting high operating tempo levels. In addition, Air Force intelligence will foster strong relationships with allied partners to maximize the exchange of intelligence information in support of mutual interests.

(d) AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, 1 July 1995, states the wing/group senior intelligence officer (SIO) is responsible for the planning and execution of intelligence support during all phases of operations. It also states, wing/group SIO’s are also responsible for providing the commander with information regarding enemy capabilities and the ongoing threat situation.

(2) Force Protection Support. AFI 14-105 states wing intelligence will provide support to the commander and staff through current and relevant intelligence information and products. This includes support to air base operability (as applicable), intelligence inputs to unit exercise, and answering intelligence-related questions. In addition, AFI 14-105 requires units provide intelligence support to base agencies, tenant organizations and transient units, as required.

(3) Antiterrorism Support.

(a) Joint Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 23 June 1993, requires intelligence staff elements at all echelons to report actual or suspected terrorist activities, maintain liaison with security police and CI offices, and, in cooperation with CI offices, develop and present terrorism threat awareness briefings.

(b) AFI 71-101V1, Criminal Investigations, Counterintelligence, and Protective Service Matters, 22 Jul 94, directs Air Force personnel to immediately report to AFOSI all information regarding the intentions of terrorist organizations.

(c) AFI 31-210, The Air Force Antiterrorism Program, 1 Jul 95, states the installation commander’s responsibility is to ensure active intelligence support.

b. Counterintelligence.

(1) DODI 2000.14, DOD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures, 15 June 1994, states "The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall: Ensure the capability exists to receive, evaluate from a Services perspective and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends and indicators of imminent attack."

(2) JP 2-01.2, Definition of CI Activities, Collections Investigations and Operations, 5 April 1994, [Classified material omitted]

(3) JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 25 June 1993, states that in DoD Directive 2000.12 the Secretaries of the Military Departments were responsible for ensuring that a capability exists to receive, evaluate, from a Service perspective, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends, and indicators of imminent attack. To accomplish this, the Secretary of the Air Force appointed AFOSI to conduct intelligence and CI activities directed against terrorists and to detect, neutralize, or deter terrorist acts.

(4) USCENTAF, Regulation 208-1, 17 November 1988, establishes the authority for and defines the USCENTAF antiterrorism program. It outlines AFOSI District 21 OL-C (now 24th FIS) responsibilities.

(5) USCENTAFI 10-105, Air Operations Center Organization and Functions, 8 February 1996, states Security Police is responsible for developing/coordinating air base defense, law enforcement and antiterrorism requirements within the AOR. They will work closely with the AOR AFOSI representative monitoring terrorist activities within the AOR.

(6) AFMD 39, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 1 November 1995, designates AFOSI to conduct CI activities according to EO 12333. The AFOSI provides CI, force protection and antiterrorism services for the Air Force.

(7) AFI 31-301, Air Base Defense,1 June 1996, states AFOSI provides CI activities to include collection/production of information concerning foreign intelligence, investigations of terrorism, sabotage and related acts, offensive operations against foreign intelligence services, and antiterrorism services to the defense force commander (DFC) as well as establishing an effective liaison with host nation intelligence, security, and law enforcement sources.

(8) AFI 71-101, Vol 1, Criminal Investigations, Counterintelligence and Protective Service Matters, 22 July 1994, requires AFOSI to initiate and conduct all CI investigations, operations, collections and related CI activities in the Air Force. Outside the CONUS the AFOSI is responsible for coordinating these activities with the CIA. AFOSI conducts installation level training for CI awareness briefings and informs individuals they are required to report any information received about the intentions of terrorist organizations to the AFOSI.

(9) AFOSII 71-104, Vol 1, Counterintelligence and Security Services, 1 March 1995, directs AFOSI to support Air Force and DoD antiterrorism programs by gathering information; providing briefings, specialized services and equipment; and by making recommendations to command officials. AFOSI should have a thorough knowledge of the capability and method of operation of the terrorist groups in their AOR.


a. Intelligence Operations.

(1) Directives and instructions governing the conduct of wing intelligence operations mandate those actions necessary to provide support to the flying mission, CI and antiterrorism (AT). These directives codify military service requirements for intelligence, the wing intelligence infrastructure and relationships with allied partners. This guidance also describes how wing intelligence will support air base operability, base agencies, tenant organizations and transient units. Furthermore, this guidance requires intelligence staff elements at all echelons to report actual or suspected terrorist activities and maintain liaison with security police and CI offices.

(2) The 4404th Wing (P) intelligence flight was organized to support air operations and the wing staff. It possessed several automated systems to receive, analyze and disseminate intelligence products. For example, the flight used JDISS to retrieve SCI message traffic. It also used JDISS to access INTELINK, retrieving items of interest from intelligence producers world-wide. The flight also operated the CIS to augment receipt of collateral message traffic and to electronically disseminate the SITSUM to subordinate units.

(3) The flight’s performance focused primarily on support to coalition air forces. It concentrated its resources to ensure up-to-date intelligence was available to coalition aircrews and the wing staff. It sustained the wing commander’s situational awareness with weekly briefings and daily SITSUMs. In addition, the flight maintained a partnership with Saudi intelligence counterparts and cultivated this relationship with twice weekly meetings. It also provided releasable versions of the SITSUM to other MNF counterparts. Accordingly, the wing commander expressed his satisfaction with his intelligence support.

(4) Counterintelligence and antiterrorism support were realized through close association with the AFOSI detachment. Relevant information was regularly passed from the intelligence flight to AFOSI. Flight personnel flagged messages of interest for AFOSI, immediately notifying AFOSI when critical information was received. In addition, wing intelligence and AFOSI maintained open channels of communication permitting continuous information exchange. Information comparison prior to weekly meetings crystallized the available regional and local threat situation for presentation to the wing staff. However, the intelligence flight did not have a similar relationship with the wing’s SP forces. The flight relied predominantly on AFOSI to pass CI and AT information to the SP. There were occasions when the intelligence flight notified SP regarding CI or AT information, but this practice was not entrenched in the flight’s procedures. Likewise, the CSP stated he did not view the intelligence flight as a CI or AT resource. His data came from AFOSI.

b. Counterintelligence Operations. AFOSI Det 241was conducting their mission in accordance with applicable Directives and Instructions. [Classified material omitted]. AFOSI provided commanders timely information and had a solid working relationship with the security police and worked closely with the intelligence flight chief.

c. Analytical Summary. AFOSI and intelligence were conducting separate, but related missions. While AFOSI and intelligence maintained close association with one another, relationships with the CSP appeared to be somewhat personality driven. As such, AFOSI had a closer working relationship with the CSP then did the intelligence flight commander. This may also be true because AFOSI and the CSP were heavily focused on the ground terrorist threat and base vulnerabilities while the intelligence flight commander focused on support to air operations.


a. Lieutenant General Record’s Rationale. Lieutenant General Record’s rationale was to not "dictate" assignment of intelligence and AFOSI personnel to security police units. He did not see the need to permanently assign intelligence and AFOSI assets to security police units. However, he recognized the need to assign these personnel to security police units in certain situations, such as when the US Army was unavailable to provide protection of Air Force installations overseas. Therefore, he recommended intelligence personnel and AFOSI assets be assigned to SP units during contingencies to support force protection activities.

b. Air Force Response. The recommendations from the two previous reports, led the Chief of Staff to establish the Headquarters Security Forces Center, Force Protection Battle Lab, 820th Security Forces Group, and Force Protection cells now operating in South West Asia. These organizations are comprised of experts from AFOSI, intelligence and security forces with a dedicated mission of enhancing the protection of Air Force personnel and resources when deployed and at home station. This should ensure the timely flow of intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as fortify and institutionalize relationships between security forces, intelligence, and counterintelligence disciplines.




a. Purpose.

(1) Lieutenant General Record recommended that for future deployments in contingencies a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) be obtained before the deployment whenever possible. If a SOFA could not be obtained, Lieutenant General Record recommended that the JCS and CINC provide specific guidance through Rules of Engagement (ROE), including exceptions to the Standing ROE, concerning operations and particularly force protection. This specific guidance would then be provided to individual military members. In the Executive Summary, this recommendation was described as "expanding" the ROE for force protection.

(2) The Record Report recommendation was part of his response to Finding Five in the Downing Assessment and one of the recommendations under that finding. The finding was that force protection practices were inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region. The Downing Assessment recommendation was that antiterrorism measures be closely coordinated with host country agencies.

(3) The Record Report found that key officials from the 4404th Wing (P) made major efforts over the 7-month time frame preceding the bombing to coordinate antiterrorism measures with Saudi officials. In this coordination process, Saudi officials made it clear that installation security was primarily a Saudi responsibility and US personnel could not extend force protection measures beyond the perimeter fence line. At the time of the bombing, US and Saudi officials had worked out their coordination process; there was a common understanding on force protection measures US military personnel were authorized to take and the restrictions placed on them by Saudi officials.

(4) The Record Report recommendation was focused on future deployments and the importance of establishing the coordination process and a common understanding of authorized force protection measures before the deployment. He recognized that a SOFA was the best solution, but if no SOFA could be obtained, he recommended other avenues be pursued to obtain as much general agreement between the US and the host nation in advance.

(5) This review provides an expanded explanation of the rationale for these recommendations with supporting background, standards, analysis, and conclusions.

b. Status of Forces Agreements Provide Important Protections for US Forces. SOFAs provide protections concerning status, rights, privileges, and immunities to US forces stationed in a host country. It is the policy of the DoD "to protect to the maximum extent possible the rights of US personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons;" this is done by obtaining a SOFA when practical. The Department of State is responsible for negotiating a SOFA with a host country in which US forces are stationed.

c. No Status of Forces Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Although the United States has attempted since 1991 to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement with Saudi Arabia, there is still no comprehensive agreement to protect military members stationed there. For various other countries in Southwest Asia hosting US forces, the US has negotiated SOFAs.

d. Rules of Engagement. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement, "A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate action to defend his unit and other US forces in the vicinity. These rules and supplemental measures … do not limit that inherent right. Judgment, necessity, and proportionality must prevail … as to what is an appropriate response…." The purpose of ROE is to "implement the inherent right of self-defense and provide guidance for the application of force for mission accomplishment." These rules guide military personnel in different situations when they must decide the type and level of response to a potentially harmful or hostile act.


a. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Guidance on ROE. The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) "establish the fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US force commanders during all military operations, contingencies, and prolonged conflict" regarding the application of force. These SROE are to be used by commanders at all levels as the "fundamental guidance" for training and directing troops. The SROE state that "Commanders of US forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) are not relieved of the obligation to use all necessary means and take appropriate action for unit self-defense."

b. Available Options to Expand ROE.

(1) The SROE annexes have supplemental measures. To activate any of these measures requires a command decision, sometimes at higher levels. A subordinate commander who believes existing guidance is insufficient, may request supplemental measures be authorized. In addition, if a situation develops that does not appear to be covered by any of the supplemental measures, a commander may request a special measure to fit the situational needs.

(2) ROE guidance for the Southwest Asia region from USCENTCOM dated 4 February 1995, stated, "If operationally required, subordinate commanders will promulgate specific ROE applicable to units under their command and will submit them to the appropriate component or Joint Task Force Commander and USCINCCENT." Commanders are directed to ensure modified and supplemental ROE remain compatible with the intent of the ROE, result in more definitive guidance to subordinate commanders, and do not impair the commander’s inherent right to self defense.

(3) Under the 4404th Wing’s Installation Security Plan, commanders of personnel bearing firearms were directed to review the ROE and guidance on use of deadly force during hostilities or increased THREATCONs. If the ROE needed to be altered, commanders were tasked to coordinate with the Staff Judge Advocate and the Installation Commander.

(4) The US Army, with knowledge of the 25 June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, added the following specific guidance to its ARCENT Supplemental Rules of Engagement. "Terrorist attacks are usually undertaken by civilian or paramilitary organizations or by individuals under circumstances in which a determination of hostile intent may be difficult. However, any attempt to abandon a vehicle (mini-van or larger) near the perimeter and hastily depart, whether on foot or in another vehicle, is deemed hostile intent." The rules also state, "When a hostile act or hostile intent is recognized, deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of persons fleeing from a hastily abandoned vehicle, as follows: (1) to disable any visible getaway vehicle, or (2) to halt anyone fleeing on foot."

c. Self-Defense Must Be Based On An Imminent Attack. A commander and US military personnel are authorized and obligated to use force in self-defense. Self-defense requires two elements: proportionality and necessity. Necessity consists of either a hostile act or hostile intent. A hostile act is defined as an attack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit against US people or property. Hostile intent is defined as the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force, terrorist unit, or others against US people or property. When the use of armed force is imminent against US interests, the "right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat." US land forces will not respond unless there is clear evidence of hostile intent. The JCS ROE provides examples of hostile intent. Hostile intent "is considered to exist when a foreign force or terrorist unit is clearly detected to maneuver into a weapon launch position, and/or prepares to fire, launch, or release weapons" against US personnel or assets.

d. Other Higher Headquarters Guidance on ROE.

(1) AFI 31-207, Arming and the Use of Force by Air Force Personnel, provides requirements for arming Air Force personnel and the use of deadly force. Commanders must insure that all armed personnel understand the rules of engagement, and when feasible, these rules should be published in a local contingency plan. Use of deadly force is a last resort when (1) one reasonably believes they or others to be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, (2) to prevent serious violent offenses that could result in death or critical bodily harm, or (3) to protect priority resources.

(2) AFI 31-209, The Air Force Resource Protection Program, states that US policy is to avoid any confrontation between US military forces and host-nation demonstrators or other dissidents posing a potential treat to Air Force resources. Local plans to counter such events must include provisions to require host-nation civil military support as quickly as possible.

e. Local Guidance. The wing installation security plan, specifically the section titled Rules of Engagement, also provided guidance about the use of deadly force for the security police. The security forces may use force only when "absolutely necessary." "The application of an excessive amount of force is detrimental to the maintenance of law and order and may subject the one who applies it to disciplinary action." Deadly force is justified "only under conditions of extreme necessity as a last resort, when all lesser means of force have failed or cannot be reasonably used…." Deadly force can be used for self-defense and defense of others "when it reasonably appears necessary" to protect themselves or when there is a reasonable belief that they are in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, in accordance with Air Force Instruction 31-207. The security police commander understood that the rules of engagement needed to be clear for his troops, ages 18-24 who might have to make decisions in 3-4 seconds about using deadly force. Security police supervisors would routinely give local threat scenarios to the security forces as further training on the above listed ROE.

f. Unique Rules For Saudi Arabia. The Air Force rules were adapted to local conditions in the following ways. The order to "HALT" had to be given in English and Arabic. Warning shots were not authorized at King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Khobar Towers, or anywhere in the area of responsibility of the wing. The guidance stated that Saudi Arabia law did not recognize the use of deadly force to protect property, including priority resources; thus for Saudi Arabia, deadly force could not be used, except for the protection of human life.

g. US Army and British Rules Of Engagement Similar. The US Army security force at Dhahran used ROE that were similar to Air Force ROE. Their Guard Force Standard Operating Procedures provide almost identical rules for the use of deadly force. The British ROE for their security forces at Khobar Towers was similar to US ROE. Firearms were to be used as a last resort. A challenge had to be made in English and Arabic unless to do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury. Security force personnel are permitted to open fire only if a person "is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger life, and there is no way to prevent the danger." The guidance to the security force provides several examples of such acts, including the following: "(1) firing or being about to fire on a person, (2) planting, detonating or throwing an explosive devise (including any mortar or other improvised explosive devise)."


a. ROE In Place Permitted Response To Attack From Outside Fence.

(1) The ROE that was in place before the 25 June bombing provided the authority and flexibility for security forces to respond to an imminent threat outside the fence directed at US Air Force personnel inside the fence. The written guidance given to the security forces on post gave short, clear instructions on when to use force or deadly force. They could use such force to protect their life or others. These rules are taught Air Force wide so that when security policemen from different bases deploy to support an overseas unit for a short 90-day period, all are trained on the same procedures. The Army and the British have almost the identical guidance and rules about the use of force.

(2) The rules of engagement should be kept as short, clear, and straightforward as possible–just as they are presently. As viewed by the security police commander, his troops–ages 18-24–could have to make decisions to engage a potential threat in 3-4 seconds. The security police supervisors provided extra local training and discussed threat scenarios, but the critical rules about use of deadly force are ingrained in security police by Air Force standardized procedures.

b. Procedures Currently Available to Expand ROE. The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement provide the necessary flexibility to commanders to adapt or expand ROE for specific circumstances or threats. The wing, once it believed it possessed reliable, specific intelligence information about a potential threat, could have requested supplemental ROE to address that threat if existing guidance was insufficient.

c. Status of Forces Agreements and Expanding the SROE. With or without a SOFA, US forces face the uncertainty of potential host nation legal action after the use of force or deadly force. If the ROE is expanded–for example as explained above with the Army directing deadly force against people outside the fence line who park a vehicle and flee – the host nation may not approve of US use of force in the host’s area of responsibility and seek to claim jurisdiction for any legal action. The Saudis have been quite emphatic in stating they are responsible for the area beyond the fence. They have professed a willingness and ability to protect the perimeter; thus it is unlikely the Saudis would welcome an expanded ROE that infers they are unable to protect US forces in their country. However, if a US member uses force in accordance with their ROE, including expanded ROE, US authorities would be in a better position to advise Saudi authorities that the use of force was authorized under US law of self-defense.


a. Lieutenant General Record found that agreement to a SOFA in advance of a deployment best protects US military personnel and assures authorities they will have the widest latitude to accomplish and exercise the right of self-defense. In the absence of agreement on a SOFA, he recommended that other avenues should be pursued to obtain as much general agreement between the US and host nation in advance. One area for agreement would be the circumstances authorizing the use of force by US military personnel.

b. With or without a SOFA, commanders maintain the inherent responsibility and authority to defend their forces and assets. Under the standard SOFA, US authorities will often decide the lawfulness of the use of force by US military personnel arising from the performance of their official duty. Commanders should ensure their personnel–who may need to extend US deadly force beyond the fence line in accordance with ROE–know US authorities will take all possible action to insure such military actions will not result in Air Force personnel being subjected to a foreign nation’s criminal process.



a. Purpose. This section develops the facts and circumstances surrounding the training, equipping and manning of security forces in the 4404th Wing (P). specifically, it addresses these questions: Were ammunition stores adequate? How were weapons assigned and maintained? What were the policies and practices regarding weapons proficiency?

b. Facts.

(1) Training the Security Force. The security police squadron did not provide formal training to its members because the unit was not staffed to perform this function. Security police deploying from stateside units were expected to arrive trained. Despite the lack of training personnel, the security police commander conducted scenario-based training with his personnel. Training conducted from April to June 1996 included a response exercise to test patrols, an M-60 machine gun exercise at the Main Gate, and an exercise with vehicles to secure the Main Gate. Air Force guidance requires a training program and does not differentiate between permanent and provisional units. The chief of security police establishes and directs the unit training program; there are no delineated exceptions for deployed units.

(2) Security Force Equipment. Before the bombing, there were 181 M-16 rifles with 79,418 rounds of ammunition; 35 M9 9mm handguns with 3,760 rounds; eight M203 grenade launchers with 252 40mm rounds; and seven M-60 machine guns with 20,395 rounds. The total number of people to be armed determines the amount of ammunition required. Using THREATCON CHARLIE as a baseline, the unit required 134 weapons to be issued with ammunition. The unit armed each person with a single weapon.

(a) Weapons and Ammunition Available. In THREATCON CHARLIE, the basic load of ammunition for each person armed with an M-16 rifle is 210 rounds. Given this baseline and assuming each armed individual were armed with an M-16, 28,140 rounds of M-16 ammunition (134 X 210) were required. After allocating the 28,140 rounds, 51,278 would remain. However, not all posts required the issuance of an M-16 rifle. Some required the 9mm semi-automatic pistol, which used 9mm ammunition (basic load = 30 rounds) or the M-60 machine gun, which used 7.62mm ammunition (basic load = 800 rounds). The wing had 35 M9 9mm handguns and 3760 rounds of ammunition. If all 9mm handguns were issued with the requisite basic load 1050 rounds (35 X 30) were required, leaving 2710 rounds. The wing had 7 M-60 machine guns with 20,395 rounds of ammunition. If all 7 M-60 machine guns were issued with their basic load, 5600 rounds were required (7 X 800), leaving 14,795 rounds.

(b) Weapons Assignment. The security police used two methods to assign weapons. M16s were assigned to an individual for the duration of their 90-day temporary duty. That individual was then responsible for cleaning the assigned weapon. 9mm handguns, on the other hand were rotated among different individuals because the wing did not have enough to issue individually.

(c) Weapons Cleaning. Handguns were cleaned by the armory staff and M-16s by the individuals to whom they were assigned. Surface rust was discovered on approximately 10-25 of the weapons (M-16s and M-60) that had been in theater the longest. Two M-60 machine guns were continuously kept in an air-conditioned static machine gun bunker. The end of the barrel near the flash suppresser stuck out of the bunker into the heat and humidity while the rest of the weapon was in the bunker. Surface rust accumulated as a result, and the weapons had to be rotated weekly to remove the surface rust. Other weapons at times had loose dirt on them from being on post and sometimes dust down the barrel. Rust problems were typical of the environment and were kept under control by Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) inspections and weapons cleaning within the squadron. Until early June 1996, the squadron policy required that all weapons be cleaned at a minimum of every fifth cycle. Every fifth cycle equated to once each 15 days. The cycle for SPs was to work two days and then have one day off. In early June 1996, prior to the bombing the chief of security police changed the weapons cleaning policy to require cleaning once a week.

(d) Weapons Maintenance. The CATM technician oversaw the maintenance of the wing’s weapons. Weapons in daily use required a semi-annual functional inspection. During the inspection, the weapon was function-checked to determine if it will operate without actually firing it. Although assigned in Dhahran, the CATM technician was responsible for maintaining the weapons at all sites in the AOR. This was accomplished by trips to the sites once every six months. According to the CATM technician, one six-month weapons inspection at a site may not have been completed as required. With the exception of this site, all weapons in Southwest Asia were inspected as required by a CATM technician. At the time of the bombing, all weapons assigned to the 4404th Wing were functional.

(3) Manning.

(a) Air Force requirements and local commanders determine how many posts security police must work daily. The chief of security police identified 39 24-hour posts to be manned in THREATCON BRAVO. Posts included stationary sentries, vehicle patrols and supervisors. In THREATCON CHARLIE, the unit was required to man 67 posts.

(b) There were 169 personnel assigned to the security police squadron at Dhahran before the bombing. They worked rotating 12 hour shifts in order to provide 24-hour coverage of posts dispersed throughout the King Abdul Aziz Air Base flight line and Khobar Towers complex. At THREATCON BRAVO, a minimum of 78 security police (39 X 2) were required. At THREATCON CHARLIE, a minimum of 134 (67 X 2) security police personnel were needed. For extended THREATCON CHARLIE, the unit needed 44 additional personnel. Preliminary coordination had been accomplished in the event this became necessary.

(c) At the time of the bombing, the security police manned the 39 posts required by THREATCON BRAVO. The wing had been in THREATCON BRAVO since the OPM SANG bombing in November 1995.

(d) The formula for peacetime security police shift manning is 5.340 persons for each 24-hour post. However, peacetime manning assumes an 8 hour workday, a six day workweek with three days off, and normal rates of leave, TDY, training and illness. In this deployed location, the security police worked 12 hour shifts (two days on duty and one day off) to man the required posts. It was not uncommon for individuals to work more hours in the 4404th Wing (P).

(e) Sentries on static posts during 12-hour shifts were periodically rotated to other duties to shield them from the elements and keep them alert.

(4) Policies and Practices Regarding Weapons Proficiency.

(a) Individual Proficiency. The security police squadron did not routinely provide proficiency (weapons qualification) training for its TDY members. Weapons proficiency training for deploying security forces was conducted at their home base. Therefore, like formal training, deployed security police were expected to arrive in Dhahran proficient in their weapons from their home base. The security police squadron had set up procedures to check the weapons cards of incoming personnel to make sure they were proficient. There was no firing range readily available for security police personnel to fire their weapons. Even without a firing range, the unit coordinated with the French to provide weapons training to one newly arrived airman whose proficiency was overlooked. The French range was approximately 30 miles from Khobar Towers. The US Army also used the French range for their weapons training.

(b) Sighting of Weapons. The evidence shows that Air Force M-16 rifles and M-60 machine guns throughout Southwest Asia had not been fired since the Gulf War. Without being fired, a weapon cannot be battle sighted to zero. All weapons at Dhahran were mechanically zeroed when they were inspected semiannually by the CATM Technician.


a. Instructions Affecting Training.

(1) AFI 36-2225, Security Police Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs, 1 March 1996. This instruction explains procedures and establishes requirements and guidelines for the security police unit training and standardization evaluation programs. Mandatory standards for the chief of security police:

(a) Establish the unit training program with guidance from the major command.

(b) Schedules and conducts orientation and initial training.

(c) Determine contingency training requirements.

(d) Conduct job certification and standardization evaluation.

(e) Insure training records are maintained.

(2) AFI 36-2226, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Program, 16 June 1994. This instruction describes how to plan, conduct, administer, evaluate, and manage the CATM Program, which develops individual ground-weapon skills. Key standards:

(a) It requires CATM technicians to supervise and perform maintenance and inspections on all weapons assigned.

(b) The Installation Commander funds ranges and ensure support facilities, weapons maintenance facilities, and an adequate number of qualified combat arms personnel are available to the installation's CATM program.

(c) The chief of security police appoints a CATM Superintendent or NCOIC who is at least a 7-skill level.

(d) Exempts personnel serving short overseas tours from firearms training until they complete their original tours, not to exceed 24 months. However, commanders at these overseas locations are encouraged to provide firearms training to meet normal firearms training requirements whenever possible.

(3) AFM 36-2227, Volume 1, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Training Management and Range Operations, 1 February 1996. This manual provides procedures and guidance for managing the CATM section. It includes procedures on firearms training programs, range operation and management, and weapons maintenance. It requires weapons to be inspected semiannually for cleanliness, lubrication, and proper function.

b. Instructions Applicable to Manning. HQ USAF/SFX Memorandum, 18 March 1996 with attachments provides security police post manning factors to compute manpower requirements per authorized position. In addition, it provides an outline of the objective wing security police squadron manpower requirements.

c. Instructions Applicable to Equipment. Air Force Catalog (AFCAT) 21-209, Ground Munitions, 28 October 1994. This catalog lists who has operational and training munitions authorization and explains how these authorizations are established, reviewed and changed. USCENTAF minimum requirements include:

(1) 168 rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition for each M-16.

(2) 800 rounds of 7.62mm ball ammunition for each M-60.

(3) 30 rounds of 9mm ball ammunition for each M9 handgun.

(4) Various amounts of different types of rounds for the M203 Grenade Launcher depending upon the type of ammunition.


a. Manning. All members of the security police squadron were on 90-day temporary duty rotations. Constant rotation complicated continuity and stability. It also degraded the unit’s ability to establish substantive professional relationships with Saudi police and security agencies.

b. Environment. The climate at Khobar Towers was hot, humid and characterized by blowing dust and sand.


a. Was training provided the security force adequate? Yes. The actions of the chief of security police regarding formal training are consistent with the standard in AFI 36-2225, Security Police Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs. There were no resources provided to conduct formal training and the chief of security police had the discretionary authority to determine his contingency training requirements. While the unit did not provide formal training to it’s members, the commander provided situational training to acquaint them with the threat and appropriate responses. The security police squadron did not have a responsibility to provide weapons training to deploying members. Deployed personnel were expected to be trained when they arrived. In addition, the unit had no routine access to a firing range or training munitions to conduct this training. In recognition of this situation, the current Air Force standard in AFI 26-2226, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance, exempts persons on short tour from firearms training for up to 24 months. While the routine 90-day temporary duty to Southwest Asia is not classified as a short tour, the duration is much shorter–which is why it is more appropriate for the stateside unit to provide this training. In one reported case where a member deployed and was not current in weapons training, the unit received approval to use the French firing range to provide the training.

b. Equipment. Were ammunition stores adequate? Yes. The unit had more than sufficient weapons and ammunition for each person they would have armed - even under THREATCON CHARLIE. The number of weapons and ammunition is consistent with the Air Force standard outlined in Air Force Catalog 21-209, Ground Munitions. There were 134 people needed to fulfill THREATCON CHARLIE requirements. With 181 M-16 rifles and over 79000 rounds of ammunition the unit was properly equipped. Only 28,140 M-16 rounds were actually required to arm all assigned personnel. Also, not everyone would have been armed with an M-16 rifle as the posting chart illustrates. There were also posts that required either the 9mm handgun or the M-60 Machine Gun.

(1) How were weapons maintained? A CATM specialist oversaw the weapons maintenance program. He used a prescribed inspection and maintenance program, which includes physically checking the operational parts to ensure the weapon would fire. Operators were also charged with the care of their weapons. With one exception, the weapons maintenance program is in compliance with AFI 36-2226, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance, and AFH 36-2227 volume 1, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Training Management and Range operations. There is no Air Force standard for how often a weapon carried and not fired must be cleaned. On average, most security police units clean their unfired weapons weekly. Thus, the new practice of cleaning weapons weekly implemented by security police commander is acceptable. Despite the fact that surface rust and loose dirt were observed on several weapons, the ability of the weapons to fire was not in question.

(2) What were the policies and practices regarding weapons proficiency?

(a) Individual Proficiency. Air Force policy cited in AFI 36-2226, Combat Arms Training and Maintenance, exempts personnel serving in short overseas tours from weapons training for up to 24 months. For troops deployed to Southwest Asia, training must be completed stateside. This is the same philosophy used since the Gulf War and is consistent with the reality that ranges are not available. In addition, the short 90-day duration far exceeds the 24-month standard specified for other overseas locations.

(b) Sighting of Weapons. There is no Air Force standard for sighting weapons. Battle sighting is a normal part of annual qualification training; it is done when the individual fires his or her assigned weapon. The Air Force decision to centralize weapons in the AOR and deploy security police without their assigned weapons prevented the weapons from being battle sighted. The unit was mechanically zeroing the sight as an alternative because they did not have routine access to a firing range. This is not the preferred method to ensure the accuracy of weapons. The Air Force is currently examining its policy on battle sighting of assigned weapons.

c. Manning. Was the manning adequate?

(1) Yes. There were 169 personnel assigned to the security police squadron and the unit required only 134 to support THREATCON CHARLIE. As the posting chart illustrates there were 67 posts to be manned. Using 12-hour shifts the unit needed two flights of 67 people to cover 24 hours for a total of 134. There is no Air Force standard for manning a provisional security police squadron. The unit manning is otherwise consistent with an objective security police squadron with the exception of training and other administrative functions. The chief of security police realized he could not sustain THREATCON CHARLIE and appropriately made arrangements to get more personnel should the need arise. As cited earlier, no Air Force unit is expected to sustain THREATCON CHARLIE indefinitely with organic resources.

(2) As the evidence indicate, the wing was in 12-hour shifts at the time because of the bombing. In addition, the operations tempo of the wing was such that 12-hour shifts were not unusual. Finally, security police used post rotations and extended breaks to keep sentries alert. Security police worked 12 hour shifts for two days followed by a day off. Security police units worldwide work 12-hour shifts often to support contingencies and train for them.

5. CONCLUSIONS. The 4404th Wing (P) was in compliance with standards regarding training, equipment and manning for the security force, although one CATM inspection at a different location may not have occurred.

a. A formal training program did not exist in the security police squadron, because the unit was not manned for it. Despite not having a formal program, the security police squadron commander provided scenario, roll call and exercise training to keep the force prepared. Regarding weapons proficiency, security police deploying to Southwest Asia were exempt from weapons training in theater by Air Force standard. Security police forces received weapons training at their stateside bases before deploying.

b. Weapons and ammunition stores were adequate. The unit had sufficient weapons and ammunition for each type of weapon in its arsenal.

c. Weapons were assigned in one of two ways depending on the type of weapon. M-16s were assigned to each security force member who used that particular weapon for the duration of his or her stay. The 9mm handguns were rotated among different people because the wing did not have enough to issue to each SP.

d. Weapons maintenance was provided by the CATM specialist through functional inspections every six months. In addition, security police cleaned and lubricated the weapons they carried. There are no Air Force standards for cleaning weapons that are carried but not fired. The weekly cleaning policy implemented by the security police commander in early June 1996 is consistent with the practices of most units worldwide. While weapons assigned to the wing were not battle sight zeroed, they were all mechanical zeroed. Again, there is no Air Force standard for zeroing weapons. The weapons were functional because the CATM specialist inspected them.

e. With respect to manpower, the security police squadron had sufficient people to accommodate any emergency requirement up to THREATCON CHARLIE for a limited time. This is consistent with security police units worldwide. In addition, the chief of security police had arranged for more forces if necessary.



a. Purpose. This section develops the facts and circumstances surrounding the "inconsistent" travel security for US service members between housing and work areas observed by members of the Downing Assessment while in USCENTCOM’s Southwest Asia areas of responsibility (AOR). These observations illustrated the absence of published standards with regard to force protection. This section reviews the guidance for convoy and personnel transportation at the 4404th Wing (P) and examines the facts surrounding the employment of that guidance.

b. Facts. In Finding Five of the Downing Assessment, it was observed that force protection practices were inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf Region. This finding was consistent with Finding One of the Downing Assessment: "There are no published DoD physical security standards for force protection of fixed facilities" Elaborating on this the Report went on to say, "Because … no directive provides formal force protection standards with which the service components must comply, commanders are left to a subjective determination of what is safe or unsafe." Relevant to the 4404th Wing (P), the Report said, "Security for travel of US service members between housing and work areas was inconsistent." The specific observations follow:

1. [Classified material omitted]

2. "In Dhahran, unarmed pilots and other key persons traveled to and from King Abdul Aziz Air Base and Khobar Towers in commercial vehicles."

3. [Classified material omitted]

(1) From gate to gate, the trip from Khobar Towers to King Abdul Aziz Air Base was approximately one kilometer (6/10ths of a mile) and took about three minutes. Alternate routes would have taken up to 30 minutes through populated sections of the suburbs of Dhahran. The roadway between Khobar Towers and the airfield was heavily traveled with security police. There was some concern that the overpass on the route to King Abdul Aziz Air Base might be a target for attack, and vigilance was raised with an increase of security police presence on the road after the OPM SANG bombing. Other travel security precautions at Khobar Towers included route surveillance provided by security police in an "overwatch" capacity. Posted on top of a building in the Khobar Towers complex, security police personnel were able to visually observe the route between Khobar Towers and King Abdul Aziz Air Base. Equipped with radios, these rooftop personnel were required to monitor traffic movement and sound the alarm with Central Security Control (CSC) if or when necessary. Rooftop security personnel did not have radio contact with transportation drivers. The wing commander had never considered arming pilots or key personnel on the trip between Khobar Towers and the airfield.

(2) The trip between Eskan Village and King Fahd Air Base in Riyadh took approximately 30 minutes. The procedures for force protection there included varying the routes and staggering the times of trips between the housing area and the air base. The Downing Assessment stated that they saw no evidence that the routes were varied. Armed security police were either in the buses or followed the buses. Passengers in the buses wore civilian clothes. The trip from Abu Dhabi to Al Dhafra Air Base took 30 or more minutes and involved a choice of any of six routes immediately before the trip.

(3) The only guidance on transportation security was in the installation security plan and consisted of the following recommendations: "advise all base personnel to limit all travel to the installation except for mission essential and emergency situations" during THREATCON CHARLIE, and, "consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and buildings that might make sites vulnerable to terrorist attacks" during THREATCON DELTA. Other wing travel precautions and restrictions were addressed in various wing commander Battle Staff Directives (BSDs), published between November 1995 and June 1996. The emphasis of the BSDs was on limiting and/or prohibiting the movement of wing members off base, decreasing their visibility and avoiding their concentration. At times, off base travel to specific areas was prohibited (Bahrain, Qatif and Hofuf), travel was required in groups of at least two but no more than four, and travel was required to be by "low profile" vehicles, use of other than chartered buses was prohibited and travel was to be in civilian clothing, or overshirts, except when on official business and at specified locations.


a. Regulations in force at the time of the Khobar Towers bombing included: Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.12, DoD Combating Terrorism Program, August 27, 1990; Headquarters United States Central Command (HQ USCENTCOM) Regulation 190-2, USCENTCOM Antiterrorism Measures, July 12, 1995; Headquarters US Central Command Air Forces (HQ USCENTAF) Regulation 208-1, USCENTAF Antiterrorism Program, November 17, 1988; Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-210, The Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Program, July 1, 1995; Air Combat Command Supplement 1 (ACC - Sup 1), The Antiterrorism (AT) Program, July 25, 1995; 4404th Wing (Provisional) Installation Security Plan, King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, May 24, 1995; 4404th Wing (P) Instruction 31-101, Security Police, June 1, 1996; and 4404th Wing (P)/CC Battle Staff Directives (various dates).

b. Most of these publications touch on transportation of personnel. None, however, set out requirements or mandate the use of specific force protection measures, with the exception of the wing commander’s own Battle Staff Directives (BSDs), as described earlier. For example, DoDD 2000.12 refers to "suggested" security measures associated with various THREATCONs. Specific references to transportation considerations are found under Measure 24 of THREATCON BRAVO and Measure 49 of THREATCON CHARLIE. They read, respectively: "Protect off-base military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of checking before they enter and drive a car." And, "Minimize all administrative journeys and visits." References to transportation security in the wing’s "prepared plan"–the 4404th WG(P) Installation Security Plan – consisted of two suggested measures in THREATCONs CHARLIE and DELTA.

c. DoD 0-2000.12-H, Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, lists a number of suggested ways to increase the security of transportation of personnel. The general guidance includes such measures as avoiding dangerous areas, avoiding the establishment of regular patterns of movement, never traveling in a single vehicle, avoiding travel at night, using vehicles that do not stand out, planning alternate routes, planning communications requirements, planning in advance, and, a catchall, providing adequate security.

d. AFI 31-210 refers to DoDD 2000.12 for "guidance" in implementing threat condition measures, while ACC Supplement 1 makes recommendations on steps Americans could take to lower their profile while traveling. USCENTCOM Regulation 190-2 repeats measures listed in DoDD 2000.12, but adds a measure in THREATCON DELTA to, "provide armed escort for school children or keep them at home. Hardened or armored vehicles should be used to transport children going to school." This requirement was not a factor at Khobar Towers.

e. Wing Operating Instruction 31-101 identified the wing chief, security police as the single focal point for security issues within the AOR and required all security police supporting the wing to functionally report to him. The "chief, security police" is also the 4404th security police squadron commander.

3. KNOWN LIMITATIONS. The wing did not have armored vehicles for enhanced transportation security operations. Neither the Air Force nor the wing’s local plans required use of such vehicles.


a. There were no regulatory requirements to have "consistent" force protection measures among the different sites in the AOR. Nothing required the specific measures that had been implemented at the sites to have been implemented or required that any given measure of protection implemented at one site be applied at all sites. No written guidance required armed guards on buses, travel in civilian clothing, altering routes of travel, altering times of travel, the use of scout or trailer cars with armed guards or the use of rooftop sentinels. These types of measures were all suggested by the DoD Handbook, but not required. It is evident that various sites took a slightly different approach to protecting its personnel in transit.

b. At Khobar Towers, the route to be traveled between the housing area and the air base was very short, about a kilometer; frequently traveled by security police; and overseen by a sentry assigned to a roof top overlooking the route. Armed guards did not accompany each vehicle. The commander, in spite of showing no reluctance to imposing conditions and absolute restrictions on off base travel in his Battle Staff Directives, didn’t consider it necessary to arm pilots or other key officials for this short trip. Alternate routes would have exposed personnel to travel for considerably longer times and taken vehicles through the adjoining urban area. Longer trips made at other sites within the AOR used a combination of armed guards, alternate routes, alternate times, civilian vehicles and civilian dress to enhance transportation security.

c. Based on different threat conditions at the various sites located in different areas of Saudi Arabia and other countries, it is not surprising that the Downing Assessment would observe different degrees of force protection. As the Downing Assessment observes, in the absence of guidance, such decisions are left to the discretion of individual commanders, based on their exercise of discretion to match resources against the local threat. At Khobar Towers, the wing commander’s frequent and explicit Battle Staff Directives show a continuing and frequent response to the ever changing local threat. They show he was concerned and interested in protection of his forces while off-base or in transit from one facility to another.

5. CONCLUSION. The absence of standard regulatory or directive guidance for force protection contributed to differences in travel security measures observed by the Downing Assessment. The recommendations of the Downing Assessment simply add additional degrees of force protection to those that existed. It does not follow that just because the force protection measures in practice were not consistent among sites in the AOR, that the practices were necessarily deficient. Similarly, it does not follow that because more force protection was recommended after the Khobar Towers bombing, that the force protection measures taken prior to the bombing were inadequate or unreasonable. As the threat varies from time to time and place to place, so should force protection.