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GUARD FORCES
International law and custom hold the host government responsible for the protection of diplomatic missions. However, the United States and other nations often supplement security forces provided by the host government. The United States uses Marine Security Guards and local contract guards for this purpose. This program is particularly important in those numerous cases where the host is unable, or unwilling, to provide our overseas posts with adequate security. In this section of the report, the Panel provides comments and recommendations concerning local guard forces and Marine Security Guard Detachments.
The Panel studied individual post assessments of the foreign contract guard forces that are assigned to perimeter security duties at missions overseas. The picture that emerged from the post assessments is that the Department of State's guard force program is lacking in several areas. There is no consistency in the quality of the local guard force programs from post to post, even within the same country. The Panel found no correlation between the quality, training and preparedness of the guard force at a post and the level of threat.
The Department of State's Regional Bureaus allocate varying sums for contract guard forces to the posts. Also, widely varying pay scales for contract guards exist. Regional or post security officers are responsible for supervising the contract guard force. However, the level of training they receive does not appear to be adequate. Many of the problems cited by the posts, including illiteracy, lack of standardized equipment, and inadequate training, can be attributed in part to the fact that the Department of State has not published a guard force manual establishing minimum but precise standards. It is increasingly important, considering some of our posts in highly threatened environs, that the Department explore new and aggressive means of upgrading and standardizing the guard force program. In summary, the Panel believes that broad reforms are necessary in the guard force program.
Local Guard Forces
The local guard forces or contract guards at each mission are supervised by either a professional security officer (RSO) or by the Post Security Officer (usually an administrative officer), who, among his other duties, is responsible for the security of the post. The functions of the guards vary. Some are used as unarmed 'watchmen, gatekeepers or receptionists while others are armed police or military officials who are expected to deter unauthorized entry. The local guard forces are used for perimeter control at missions and residences, sometimes for internal control of our buildings, and sometimes for personal protection of the key members of the missions. By and large, the local guard forces serve as the first line of defense in the protection of our missions and personnel. Inadequacies in the guard forces can translate quickly into casualties in the event of an attack.
The Panel has seen the Department's 1983 Latin American Contract Guard Force Survey Report and believes that this report is a comprehensive and useful document that should be used as a guide for similar studies. The Panel also notes that the Department has entered into a contract to conduct a study of the guard forces and to prepare a procedural manual. It recommends that the 1983 Latin American Contract Guard Force Survey Report be provided to the contractors as a means of expediting their work in establishing a professional worldwide local guard force program. The Panel believes that the study should include a breakdown by geographical region of the types and use of guards, the cost, the trends, the contractual arrangements, the training, the equipment used, and the effectiveness of the guards.
The Panel recognizes the difficulty in standardizing guard forces world wide. The Department's Bureau of African Affairs stated Due to variations in local, political, economic and social conditions, we tend to believe that standardization may be feasible only on a geographic bureau basis.. The Panel agrees with this assessment, yet encourages a policy of professionalizing -- as much as possible -- all guard forces.
The Panel believes that the Department and its contractors should publish a procedural guard force manual that establishes policies and procedures for local guard forces on a regional bureau basis. The appropriate version of this manual should be distributed to all posts as well as to all concerned foreign affairs agencies. It should a) address standards for selection, background checks and training of the guard forces, b) address equipment to be used such as firearms, uniforms, and vehicles, c) identify the contractual arrangements that should be standardized as much as possible, d) outline legal ramifications of the use of force or liability for negligence on the part of the guards, e) clarify the funding as well as the types and levels of supervision to be exercised, and most importantly, f) clearly outline procedural guidelines and management techniques to be used by the security officer in charge of the supervision of the guard forces.
The largest contingent under the RSO's supervision is usually the contract guard force. Indeed, the annual cost to the Department of State to fund contract guard forces is estimated to be 50 to 60 million dollars. Yet, the training given to Regional Security Officers for the management of the contract guard forces appears to be inadequate. The Panel recommends that the Department of State provide comprehensive training to special agents in the Regional Security Officer training course on the subject of managing the guard forces. The instruction and detailed briefings should be provided on a regional basis with emphasis given to the unique aspects of particular posts. Similar training should also be given to Post Security Officers before they are sent to posts with local guard forces.
The Office of Security teas placed renewed emphasis on the training of guard forces. This involves sending Mobile Training Teams to various posts for the purpose of training post personnel, host government forces assigned to the mission and contract guard forces. The Mobile Training Teams are comprised of special agents who have received extensive training in the United States. A limited number of teams are now scheduled to travel to some posts. It would appear beneficial for the Department of State to continue expanding the Mobile Training Team concept so that guard force training can be provided both routinely and on an emergency basis to all posts. Continuous, updated training for guard forces will improve their competence and thus improve the safety of our personnel.
Some posts have employed unsuitable or incompetent guard forces partly because of the perception that there is no other alternative available within a specific country. Yet, other posts imaginatively have hired -- where permitted -- third country nationals to fulfill guard duties. The Panel recommends that the Department of State immediately seek alternatives to the use of local contract guard companies who do not meet even minimal standards necessary for the protection of our personnel or facilities. The use of American private guard companies or third country nationals must be pursued when the host government and legality permit.
Different terms sometimes are used to describe a guard. The term "watchman" commonly refers to a contract employee who is unarmed and fulfills a passive security role. The term "guard" normally refers to an armed individual who possesses training and skills similar to those of a police officer. Posts employ watchmen because of host government regulations prohibiting arming contract guards, because of cost and competency considerations, or because post personnel neither want nor see the need for armed guards. However, the employment of unarmed watchmen who cannot effectively repel criminals, terrorists or unauthorized persons from entry to an American facility or residential compound, is neither serious nor effective physical deterrence. In addition, at several posts there have been recent instances of our unarmed watchmen being seriously injured or killed by armed robbers. Thus, the Panel recommends that the Department train and appropriately arm all guards who serve in the role of providing physical deterrence, particularly at threatened posts. In those countries where the host government is unwilling to permit the use of armed contract guards, the host should be persuaded to supply its own forces for the protection of our missions and personnel.
The Panel has been advised that the Department has moved to consolidate funding for guard forces within the Office of Security. As stated earlier, this funding was included in the regional bureaus' budgets. Completion of the consolidation of the funding for contract guard forces within the Diplomatic Security Service will ensure it centralized management of the world-wide guard force program.
The 1983 Contract Guard Survey of Latin America recommends, for cost reasons, that the post request resources from the host government for personal bodyguard services prior to hiring their own guards. The Panel readily agrees that the United States Government should not relieve the host government of responsibility to protect diplomats under international law; however, the requests should be fully coordinated with the Department of State. The United States provides bodyguard coverage to only a few resident foreign diplomats in the United States, yet we are increasingly demanding more coverage from foreign governments for our personnel. Foreign Chiefs of Mission accredited to this country are senior officials and often have very strong ties to the leaders of their countries. Thus, reciprocity is becoming a political issue with some nations. The issue of cost must be considered in totality; in other words, although it may cost the post less to have host government guard forces protect the mission and residences, the United States Government will be required to pay reciprocally for the protective services that are afforded the foreign government in the United States. Thus, the Department of State should weigh carefully its requests to host governments for protection on a case by case basis, particularly when those requests require a large number of resources and when the United States Governmert is unwilling or unable to provide reciprocal measures. If political concerns and reciprocity are serious issues, the Department should provide its own funding for contract guards when warranted.
Technical surveillance systems that can be used to supplement a post's guard force, such as closed circuit television with motion detection and time lapse recording options, are available today. These systems are particularly useful where sufficient numbers of qualified personnel are not available. For example, a technical observation system, operated by a well trained person who can initiate appropriate response measures, can contribute towards cost-effective and efficient building and perimeter security. The Department of State should continue to acquire the most cost-effective and efficient state-of-the-art systems which can be used to supplement guard force operations and contribute towards a reduction in long-term recurring guard costs.
Marine Security Guard Detachments
The use of Marine Security Guard Detachments (MSG) at some United States overseas missions is a long-standing tradition. The Department of State appreciates the positive role that the Marines perform while the Marine Corps finds the program equally rewarding. There is a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Unites States Marine Corps which outlines MSG duties, utilization and support, and the limitations on their use outside of official premises.
The primary mission of the Marine Security Guard is to provide internal security guard services to diplomatic and consular missions. Marine Guards are also used to protect some offices of other agencies such as U.S.I.A. and A.I.D. These services include protection of personnel, property, and classified and administratively controlled material and equipment within these premises. The scope of their responsibility is generally considered to include only the interior of the premises including the area contained between the outer perimeter wall and the buildings. MSG's are not normally posted near, on or outside of the premise perimeter. This is because the protection of the mission is primarily the responsibility of the host government. Further, many countries would object to the posting of military personnel on their soil.
The MSG's carry out their primary mission by a) operating access controls and stationary and patrol coverage of classified facilities and operations, b) conducting inspections and patrols to ensure proper procedures for handling and storage of classified material within the premises, c) writing notices of security violations as Department of State security regulations direct, d) effecting and supervising destruction of classified waste, e) providing control of buildings and portions of buildings during construction or renovation of areas, f) providing special guard services for U.S. delegation offices for regional or international conferences at which classified information is kept, g) assisting in guarding the temporary overseas residences of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and other ranking dignitaries as required, and h) providing internal security guard coverage on a temporary basis of the Principal Officer's residence when the life or safety of the protected official is in danger. The latter duty is rarely conducted by the Marines and it is subject to written orders and approval. Further, the assignment must be in response to a threat situation, and the MSG's must be armed and in uniform. The MSG's may also provide special guard services in the execution of interagency plans for dealing with emergency situations.
The MSG Detachments are operationally supervised by the Regional Security Officer (RSO) or the Post Security Officer (PSO). The RSO or PSO provides the guard orders, directions and instructions for the operations of the Marines at the post and ensures that they are properly housed and supported. The Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) is the senior member of the MSG Detachment and he supervises and administratively controls the Marines. He reports through the RSO or PSO to the Chief of Mission.
As described above, the MSG role is essentially defensive in nature. They serve as an in-house deterrent to limited acts of violence, as well as a defense mechanism to large scale riots. The Marines are expected to delay entry by hostile elements long enough to permit destruction of classified material and to assist in protecting lives of the mission staff until host government forces arrive. They are authorized, under the command of the senior Foreign Service officer present, to use weapons to protect their own lives or mission staff from direct and immediate danger. The specific use of force is outlined in the MSG post guard orders.
The Company Commanders (Regional Marine Officers or RMO's), who are appointed by Headquarters Marine Corps to major geographical areas receive little or no training in Department of State security programs. The Panel believes that this can result in misunderstandings and confusion on the part of the RHO as to his mission to be performed, the Department of State role, and his relationship to the posts in his region. Further, there is a lack of training for Post Security Officers (vis-a-vis Regional Security Officers) about managing the MSG Detachments. This is equally undesirable.
Not all embassies or consulates are assigned Marine Guards; in fact, less than one-half or only 126 of our foreign posts are protected internally by the U.S. Marines. The Department of State has requested substantially more Marines over the next three years. The Panel urges the Department to consider an MSG Detachment at most foreign posts throughout the world. At those very small posts with few Americans, and where it is not practical to supplement the post with at least six Marines, the Panel recommends that the Department reduce or eliminate the amount of classified or sensitive equipment and material at these posts. Further, the Panel believes that the Marines should be used only for purposes approved in the Memorandum of Understanding and all MSGs should be armed.
The Panel understands that the Department of State's increasing demands place a substantial strain on the Marine Corps for manpower resources. The Panel recommends that the Department of State cooperate with the Marine Corps in supporting its manpower needs and it should ensure that professional security officers provide regular guidance to the detachments, particularly at those posts where there is no resident RSO.
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