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CONTINGENCY PLANNING
In a world where all diplomatic personnel face some degree of threat, vulnerability is partly a function of numbers. There is a need for a timely and orderly mechanism for the reduction of functions and staff levels at posts faced with serious threat to life and limb. This is not to suggest that the Department of State simply close shop at the first sign of hazard, but there are situations in which serious consideration must be given to whether the U.S. Government's best overall interests are really well served by continuing Business as usual. In evaluating the functions at any given post at risk, consideration should be given to those that can be suspended temporarily or transferred to a nearby post or even to the United States.
The Department of State and the posts abroad, with the cooperation of affected agencies, have developed guidelines and specific post plans to cope with various contingencies. These plans enable Washington to understand how the post intends to react in certain situations and, in an actual crisis, provide specific information needed to guide and to support the post's responses. A primary benefit of the post plan is that it requires responsible officials to anticipate the kinds of problems they might experience, from natural disasters to political violence, that might pose a hazard to the safety of American citizens or facilities. They then work through the options available to them, noting logistical or procedural requirements, and eventually reduce their operational plans to paper. These plans are excellent jumping off points for post drills and simulation exercises.
The Panel has voiced concern that there is no existing formal mechanism for monitoring conditions at our overseas posts and determining, based on a set of objective criteria or "tripwires", when a personnel drawdown or evacuation should be started. The Panel believes that in all crisis situations where a post is considering a drawdown or an evacuation, including the decision on when the post shall return to normal status, the Secretary of State should participate directly in the decision making process. The Panel also believes that only the Secretary should authorize a post to return to normal staffing when the crisis is considered past.
Tripwire Mechanisms
The decision on reducing staff and functions at a U.S. mission is easily reached when the threat is real and perceived by all elements. Unfortunately, danger is not always obvious and resistance to reductions can be formidable when the crisis may appear to some observers to be some time in the future. The Panel sought to identify "tripwires" which could be used to trigger automatic actions to reduce functions at a post in times of severe threat. Conditions vary so much in each situation that it is not possible to establish universally valid "crisis points" for each country. Instead, the Panel recommends that several current Washington based programs be straightened in order to improve post preparedness and responsiveness to crisis situations.
There are two extremely useful programs now consolidated in the Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning (M/CTP) that enable posts to plan for and practice their specific responses to crises, including personnel reductions. These are the emergency action plans (EAPs) and the crisis management exercises. Under the EAP program, each post is required to complete a post-specific emergency action plan that describes in detail how post personnel will respond in the event of a threatening incident whether security-related or a natural disaster and the responsibilities of each major participant. Each EAP also includes detailed guidance on how to undertake a personnel drawdown or evacuation from that post. M/CTP reviews and approves all new and revised EAPs, assuring that they conform to the central guidelines included in the Emergency Action Manual, and maintains a file in Washington of all post EAPs. This is a valuable program since the EAP is the basic document for preparing post personnel for their specific roles and activities during a life threatening incident.
As was discussed previously, the Panel has concluded that developing a standard list of "tripwires" for application at all posts is impractical. Conditions vary too widely from country to country, and events that may be ominous or threatening in one country may simply be part of daily life in other countries. However, the EAP process presents a definite opportunity for developing post-specific tripwires. The EAP could be modified to include the listing of a series of such locally derived tripwires that represent the post's best judgment of the possible local events that could signal the need to consider defensive actions, including a personnel drawdown or evacuation.
Under the Crisis Management Exercise Program, a control team from M/CTP visits a post, develops a post specific sequence of hypothetical events leading to an emergency situation, and presents a two day simulation of these events to the post emergency action committee. The primary goal of this exercise is to test the ability of post personnel to implement the EAP effectively in a simulated crisis situation. The control team closely monitors the decisions and actions of the committee and prepares a detailed debriefing on the results. Participants have universally found this program to be a valuable means of testing their abilities to respond to crisis situations and of discovering and correcting weaknesses in their preparations, including the EAP .
The combination of Emergency Action Plans and the Crisis Management Exercise Program has the potential to improve the effectiveness and raise the consciousness of foreign affairs community personnel in the area of security. Over a period of time, Foreign Service employees would become familiar with the EAP and simulation processes at more than one post. Thus, at a given post, the staff would eventually be composed of officers who had experienced the EAP and gaming process in a wide variety of environments. As it undergoes repeated testing, the mission would be able to refine the EAP and its responses to the situations covered in the simulation process.
Each post will establish a list of functions to be suspended and numbers of personnel to be drawn down in an emergency. This list will be formally accepted by all agencies represented at the post. Such a list will enable the mission and the Department to consider the possible reduction of functions and personnel at the post on a phased basis before a crisis actually erupts. The Panel wishes to emphasize that, while either the Secretary or the Ambassador can initiate a drawdown of personnel, only the Secretary should authorize a post to return to normal staffing.
Drawdown Decision-Making
The decision on whether to conduct a personnel reduction at a threatened post has traditionally been left primarily to the post and its regional bureau in Washington. This is in keeping with the general Department of State precept of leaving most decision-making that directly affects individual posts to the substantive offices and bureaus most directly involved in the day-to-day operations of those posts. As a consequence, there is no central office charged with responsibility for monitoring the specific situation at overseas posts for the purpose of assuring that defensive actions are taken, or at least considered, when a serious threat develops, and for reporting such situations to the Secretary of State for his review.
The security threat confronting us now is so serious and potentially deadly that all resources, technical as well as analytical, must be used. To guarantee that any dispute among bureaus and offices will receive immediate high-level review and resolution, the monitoring function should be lodged in the Office of the undersecretary for Management. Finally, Chiefs of Mission or regional bureaus may not be in the best position to weigh all the elements in a situation, particularly when security is directly involved. A formal means of raising the issue to a higher level would assure that the question is not ignored.
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