Given what we have seen about the nature of this problem as we have considered the different areas of the threat topology, it should be clear that any attempt to try to manage IW-D using a centralized approach is doomed to failure. If one has any doubt, they should be reminded of the weak threat to organizational mapping which prevents effective delegation of the problem with clean "chains of command" and the considerable limits on the ability of the Government or any single organization to control significant relevant variables.
Given the urgency and importance of this problem, a proactive stance is required. Therefore, it should be equally obvious that a laissez-faire approach is also doomed to failure.
A form of collective orchestration is needed to develop the degree of awareness and understanding of the threat and to develop the necessary defenses. The Government needs to lead by establishing what I have called a "framework for progress." The specific roles and responsibilities of the private and public sectors will vary as a function of the threat as we have seen in our brief look at each of the three major regions of the threat topology. While this discussion has focused on the roles, responsibilities and need for collaboration among U.S. players, the problem of IW-D transcends national boundaries. Without appropriate international agreements and cooperation among nations and international organizations, our collective ability to handle threats will be severely hampered.