Army Seeks Poison Gas Missiles

Need seen to balance Red weapons in chemical area; philosophy on gas is changing

by James Baar

High Army officials are pushing for the creation of a vast "deterrent" stockpile of poison gas warheads and missiles.

Sanction of the new Army proposals would entail a radical shift in U.S. strategic thinking. It also would call for a direct reversal of U.S. public opinion on the use of poison gas.

One of the first preliminary steps in the direction of the Army's chemical and biological warfare proposals already is under way. The Army is purchasing thousands of the new 115-mm *M-55* missile—a secret chemical agent-carrying rocket that can be fired on a battlefield in salvoes.

The next logical step would be a build-up of a stockpile of tactical-range missile warheads carrying chemical and biological agents rather than conventional or nuclear charges. The final step would be the stockpiling of similar warheads for IRBM's and ICBM's.

Behind the Army drive are arguments that:

• Russia already has a large capability of fighting with chemical and biological agents and the weapons are already in the hands of the Red Army in quantity along the Iron Curtain in Europe.

• The only way to prevent Russia from using these weapons in any future war is to have a similar arsenal.

MAJ. GEN. MARSHALL STUBBS

• In the age of the H-bomb, chemical and biological warfare has taken on a practical and almost humanitarian aspect.

The Defense Appropriations Bill as it recently cleared the House already has $35.5 million in it for the purchase of more than 100,000 *M-55's* along with multiple 45-tube launchers that fire the missiles in salvoes.

The *M-55*—formerly called the *T-238*—is manufactured by the Norris Thermador Co. of Los Angeles. No contracts have been let for the T-145 launchers.

The Administration asked for $32 million for the *M-55*. The House added $3.5 million more—enough to buy 13,000 *M-55's* alone, along with an undisclosed number of the launchers.

These would provide U.S. troops with a limited capability. However, to give U.S. troops anything matching Soviet capabilities of waging chemical and biological war, far larger funding will be needed in FY 1962 and the years following it.

• **Reds favor chemicals**—Army proponents of building up U.S. chemical and biological warfare capabilities stress that the Russians probably will never use nuclear weapons on Western Europe when they have so much more to gain by using chemical or biological warheads launched by missile.

Such an attack would enable Russia to:

• Capture intact the great Western European industrial centers.

• Temporarily incapacitate and then enslave Western European populations.

• Avoid the uncontrollable effects of nuclear fallout and residual radiation that would result from any all-out attack with nuclear weapons.

These same arguments can be applied to a great extent to the United States.

A Soviet ICBM launched against Pittsburgh could obliterate the city with a multi-megaton warhead. But the same ICBM if equipped with a warhead carrying chemical or biological agents could kill or incapacitate the entire population of Pittsburgh, leaving the city open for Soviet colonization or plunder.

Chemical and biological agents available today to both the United States and presumably Russia are capable of delivering a wide variety of blows to large population centers or military installations. These range from temporary paralysis and loss of ability to function rationally to temporarily

What Price 'Humanitarianism?'

Maj. Gen. William M. Creasy, former head of the Chemical Corps., on the "humanitarian" reasons for NOT using poison gas:

"Iwo Jima was defended by some 21,000 Japanese. In taking Iwo Jima we had some 25,000 casualties. I do not have these numbers reversed. Of these casualties, there were some 7000 deaths, American deaths. At that time, there was available to the military commander chemical agents which he had the logistical capability of using, against which the Japanese forces had no protection. Their masks at that time did not protect against these chemicals. He was denied, by the then existing policy, the use of these materials . . . Presumably this was not the thing for Americans to do.

"Let us see what the net result of all this humanitarian fervor of ours was, other than the 7000 dead marines, and the other 18,000 casualties. What happened to the 21,000 Japanese? Most were killed, most by white phosphorus and flame throwers."

C3(USA) 2-2-2

incapacitating illnesses and rapid death. Nor does this require great quantities of the agents.

Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs, chief of the Army Chemical Corps, recently told the House Military Appropriations Subcommittee:

"With 10 carriers (ICBM's or aircraft) dropping 10,000 pounds each, it would mean that with dry biological warfare material, a potential enemy would get at least 30% casualties in the total of the United States."

• **The gas "gap"**—Stubbs said the 10 carriers—preferably ICBM's to insure delivery—would drop their lethal charges into the atmosphere at about 30,000 feet. Obviously, a similar attack could be launched against the Soviet Union with more missiles because of the larger area.

However, U.S. strategic planning is not ready for this kind of war which calls for a large land army to occupy areas attacked by chemical or biological agents. On the other hand, Russia already has a large army that could be used for swift occupation of Western Europe or the United States through use of the growing Soviet fleet of air transports.

As for Russia's capability, Col. S. E. Baker, Stubbs' deputy assistant, testified: "We credit the Soviet with the ability to wage biological and chemical warfare on a large scale. He possesses a tremendous capability in chemical warfare."

Asked whether Russia had modern equipment to deliver CW and BW agents, Colonel Baker said: "They have very modern equipment. Throughout their Army there are a great number of rockets. Rockets are fine weapons for disseminating chemical agents."

Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, Army Chief of Research and Development, said "one sixth of the Soviet ground potential is chemical as far as weapons with their forces in Europe are concerned."

Asked if a chemical and biological warfare gap existed between Russia and United States military capabilities, Stubbs said: "That is my opinion."