Intelligence Systems

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SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Measurement and Signature Intelligence (Report No. PO 97-031)

We are providing this report for review and comment. Our evaluation looked at Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) within the Intelligence and other communities, but focused on the role MASINT plays in support to military operations. Management comments on a draft of this report were considered in preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. We request that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency provide to us a description of the effort and evidence of additional resources allocated to the Central MASINT Office to enable the Director, Central MASINT Office, to be fully operational in 18 of 18 responsibilities by May 30, 1998.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff. Questions on the evaluation should be directed to COL Jeff Cain, Program Director, at (703) 604-8895 (DSN 664-8895) or CDR Larry Stack, Project Manager, at (703) 604-8884 (DSN 664-8884). See Appendix E for report distribution. The evaluation team members are listed inside the back cover.

Russell A. Rau

Assistant Inspector General

Policy and Oversight

Report No. PO 97-031 June 30, 1997(Project No. 60s-3006)

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

Executive Summary

Introduction. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is a collective term bringing together disparate intelligence elements that do not fit within the definitions of Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, or Human Intelligence. These disparate elements consist of intelligence activities and technologies such as acoustic intelligence; radar intelligence; nuclear radiation detection; infrared intelligence; electro-optical intelligence; radio frequency, unintentional radiation; materials, effluent, and debris sampling; and electro optical and spectro-radiometric sources. MASINT also uses Signals Intelligence or Imagery Intelligence data and subjects the data to specialized processing, using data streams otherwise not used by traditional Signals Intelligence and Imagery Intelligence processing. The specialized Signals Intelligence and Imagery Intelligence processing turn otherwise unused data into MASINT, used to support military commanders and other users on a national or tactical scale. The Central MASINT Office is the single source of authority for MASINT.

Evaluation Objectives. Our objectives encompassed MASINT within the Intelligence and other communities, but concentrated on the role MASINT plays in support to military operations. We determined the extent to which the Central MASINT Office complied with its responsibilities for MASINT, determined the level of MASINT training and education in support to military operations, determined whether the requirements submission process is understood and supported, and whether MASINT is used in support to military operations.

Evaluation Results. Our evaluation found three conditions warranting management action:

- The Central MASINT Office was not fully operational in 16 of the 18 MASINT responsibilities assigned by DoD policy. Examples include: not establishing architectures for MASINT tasking, collection, processing, and dissemination in the DoD; not establishing standards and insuring compatibility of MASINT systems for which the DoD has responsibility; and not serving as the Functional Manager and advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). As a result,the Central MASINT Office was not effectively executing its mission (Finding A).

- MASINT is misunderstood by war fighters. Examples include not considering the MASINT capabilities of organic tactical assets, not being familiar with MASINT resources at their disposal, and not understanding the capabilities of national MASINT assets. As a result, MASINT may not be used effectively in vital strategic and tactical areas such as theater missile defense, battle damage assessment, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (Finding B).

- MASINT customers have difficulty in submitting and ascertaining the status of their MASINT requirements. As a result, MASINT is under-used (Finding C).

Until the Central MASINT Office has the resources to fulfill its MASINT responsibilities as the Functional Manager of MASINT, centralized management of the elements and assets comprising this discipline will be difficult and mission accomplishment for the Central MASINT Office will not be assured.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, grant the Director, Central MASINT Office, with responsibility solely for MASINT as the MASINT Functional Manager reporting directly to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; determine, resource, and fund minimum essential manning requirements for the Central MASINT Office; and upgrade the MASINT Requirements Data Base System from a stand-alone system to a multi-user, on-line system. We recommend the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) establish a MASINT sub-specialty or skill indicator to ensure continuity, tracking, and training of all MASINT personnel. We also recommend that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, direct establishment of MASINT training standards and either train current MASINT points of contact or assign trained MASINT personnel to each key activity.

Management Comments. We received comments from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence); Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army. We also received comments from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, who concurred with the overall findings and recommendations, but had classified comments. The unclassified management comments are contained in Part III of this report. The evaluation Program Director or Project Manager may be contacted in regards to the classified comments.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were generally responsive. We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,Communications and Intelligence) advise us on how it intends to correct the deficiencies identified in Recommendations B.2.a. and B.2.b. We ask that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, provide alternative corrective actions to remedy the deficiencies identified or revisit its position on Recommendation A.1. We request that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, provide a description of the effort and evidence of additional resources allocated to the Central MASINT Office to enable the Director, Central MASINT Office, to be fully operational in 18 of 18 responsibilities by May 30, 1998. We also request the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, direct the Director, Central MASINT Office, to submit evidence of MASINT training for each MASINT point of contact and evidence that standards have been applied and met by May 15, 1998; and, that the Central MASINT Office submit evidence by September 1, 1997, verifying that copies of the latest version of the "Measurement and Signature Intelligence Handbook for the Warfighter" have been sent to all units at the Commander-in-Chief level and below. Lastly, we request the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, submit evidence by November 1, 1997, verifying that an official manpower survey has been conducted or has been tasked to be conducted to determine the minimum essential manning requirements to fill MASINT positions at key activities such as the Unified Commands.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

PART I - EVALUATION RESULTS

Evaluation Background

The Intelligence Community classified Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) as a formal intelligence discipline in 1986 after recognizing the need to ensure proper exploitation of complex and technically derived data. At that time, the Intelligence Community Staff MASINT Committee was formed to oversee all MASINT activities. To further consolidate MASINT management, and as part of the 1992 reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense assigned the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to oversee National and Defense MASINT, resulting in the establishment of the Central MASINT Office (CMO) in 1993. Specific authorities and responsibilities are defined in:

- DCI Directive 2-11, "Management of National Measurement and Signature Intelligence, April 6, 1993;

- DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency, as Amended by Secretary of Defense [SECDEF] Memorandum, Assignment to the Defense Intelligence Agency of Responsibility for Central Management of Measurement and Signature Intelligence, August 25, 1992; and

- DoD Instruction 5105.58, "Management of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)," February 9, 1993.

DoD Instruction 5105.58 assigns responsibilities for the central management of MASINT within the DoD and formally directed the formation of the CMO within DIA. By these directives and instructions, the Director, DIA, exercises authority, direction, and control over the CMO.

MASINT is technically derived intelligence (excluding traditional imagery [IMINT] and signals intelligence [SIGINT]) that when collected, processed, and analyzed by dedicated MASINT systems, results in intelligence that detects, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources.

MASINT also includes the advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection sources. MASINT sensors include, but are not limited to, radar, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear, radiation detection, and seismic systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid material sampling systems. MASINT is the newest, most encompassing, and technically complex of the four intelligence disciplines comprising IMINT, SIGINT, and Human Intelligence.

The CMO was formed by the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1993, when it became evident an authoritative single source of information was required on high growth technology areas outside the traditional disciplines of SIGINT, IMINT, and Human Intelligence. A singular source of authority for MASINT could control management, policies, processes, and resources, including existing and programmed MASINT assets, planned modifications or improvements, and research and development activities. Thus, the CMO was formed and exists as the Functional Manager and single point of contact for MASINT. It consists of four divisions, a MASINT Committee Staff, and a detached technology coordination office. Additionally, subcommittees are active within differing technology fields that are responsible for keeping the Director, CMO, apprised of changes within each represented area. The CMO has special Directorate status within the Directorate for Intelligence Operations (formerly the National Military Intelligence Collection Center) to maintain its DCI and SECDEF-directed role as the National and Defense Functional Manager for MASINT. The four divisions within the CMO are:

- Plans, Policy, and Requirements Division, CMO-1. Develops National and Defense MASINT policy, long-range plans, architectures for collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination; develops the multi-discipline interface with other collection disciplines; implements/enforces DCI and SECDEF information management standards across the MASINT infrastructure; develops and maintains the MASINT requirements system; and reviews, validates, and tracks MASINT standing requirements.

- Functional Management Division, CMO-2. Resource management responsibility for all MASINT assets within the National Foreign Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and community research and development.

- Central MASINT Operations Center, CMO-3. Plans, coordinates, and executes MASINT collection operations. Also the focal point for reviewing, validating, and tasking time-sensitive requirements and quick turn-around, short duration ad-hoc requirements or amplifications to standing requirements.

- Advanced Concepts Division, CMO-4. Manages the National and Defense MASINT research, development, test, and evaluation activities to improve or develop new enabling technologies into collection systems.

Current MASINT collection data sources depend on science and technology research and development and are used to exploit the following phenomena that support the mission and information needs of policy makers, warfighters, weapons developers, and other intelligence users:

- nuclear, chemical, and biological features;

- emitted energy (e.g., nuclear, thermal, and electromagnetic);

- reflected (re-radiated) energy (e.g., radio frequency, light, and sound);

- mechanical sound (e.g., engine, propeller, or machinery noise);

- magnetic properties (e.g., magnetic flux and anomalies);

- motion (e.g., flight, vibration, or movement); and

- material composition.

Major MASINT community participants include the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence(ASD[C3I]); DIA; Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Energy;Department of State; National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency; Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; the Services; the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center; and the Unified Commands.

Evaluation Objectives

Our initial objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the MASINT end-to-end process used to provide intelligence to military commanders, the Intelligence Community, and other users. As our evaluation progressed, we determined that our original objective was too encompassing for a singular report and did not focus on the key problems facing the MASINT discipline. Therefore, we clarified and redefined our objectives to place more emphasis on the military vice non-military customer to:

- determine the extent to which the Central MASINT Office hascomplied with its responsibilities under its DoD charter to the Intelligence Community and the Services and the causes and results of non-compliance;

- determine the level of MASINT education and training within the Intelligence Community and Services and, if applicable, identify causes for training and education lapses;

- determine whether the MASINT requirements submission process is understood and supported by the Commanders-in-Chief(CINC) and military commanders and determine whether MASINT is used by the CINCs and military commanders supporting military operations.

See Appendix A for the evaluation scope and methodology andAppendix B for a summary of prior coverage related to the evaluation objectives.

Finding A. Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office Responsibilities

The CMO is not fully operational in 16 of the 18 MASINT responsibilities assigned by DoD Instruction 5105.58. Two major factors contribute to this lack of responsiveness: the lack of CMO resources to meet the terms of its charter and the organizational placement of the CMO. As a result, the CMO has been unable to accomplish its mission effectively and efficiently in providing MASINT to the Intelligence Community and military operations. The difficulties in achieving operational readiness to fulfill CMO responsibilities negatively affects the understanding and use of MASINT within the DoD. Not fully understanding or making use of the entire range of MASINT capabilities could adversely impact operational and national security issues by decreasing support for vital areas such as support to military operations.

MASINT Responsibilities

The charter and responsibilities of the CMO were modeled after those established for the Central Imagery Office and span national, theater, and tactical level programs. The CMO charter includes all phases of MASINT activities from initiation of requirements to collection, exploitation, and dissemination of MASINT and MASINT products. In all, the CMO is responsible for 18 areas assigned under DoD Instruction 5105.58. Of the 18 areas of responsibility assigned, only one was deemed to be "fully operational." Six were deemed "not operational";two were "25 percent operational"; five were "50 percent operational";and three were "75 percent operational." We did not ascertain why one area was not rated. As the MASINT Functional Manager, the CMO plays a central role in the MASINT process. In carrying out its duties, the ability of the CMO to successfully execute its day-to-day tasks and responsibilities is paramount to the successful integration of MASINT into the Intelligence Community, military operations, and other arenas. Figure 1 shows the six CMO responsibilities under DoD Instruction 5105.58 that the CMO considers not operational. "Not operational" means the CMO does not consider itself to be accomplishing the responsibility listed.

RESPONSIBILITIES	STATUS
"Establish the architectures for MASINT tasking, collection, processing, and dissemination in the Department of Defense, in coordination with the DoD Components and consistent to the maximum practical extent with the overall functional architectures of the Department of Defense. Also, to the extent authorized by the heads of other Departments or Agencies with MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions, establish the architectures for MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination in those other Departments and Agencies"	Not Operational
"Coordinate the use of MASINT systems that support military forces in exercises"	Not Operational
"Serve as the functional manager, an advisor to the ASD(C3I) and the DoD Components, for the MASINT programs in the budget aggregation known as the 'Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'"	Not Operational
"Evaluate the performance of MASINT components of the Department of Defense in meeting national and non-national intelligence requirements and, to the extent authorized by the heads of the other Departments or Agencies with MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions, evaluate the performance of the MASINT components of those other Departments or Agencies in meeting national and non-national intelligence requirements"	Not Operational
"In coordination with the appropriate DoD Components, establish standards Not Operational for training personnel performing MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions"	Not Operational
"Establish, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency and the DoD Components, as appropriate, standards for MASINT systems for which the Department of Defense has responsibility and ensure compatibility and interoperability for such systems, and, to the extent authorized by the heads of the other Departments or Agencies with MASINT systems, establish standards and ensure compatibility and interoperability for the systems of those other Departments or Agencies"	Not Operational

Figure 1. Responsibilities Not Fulfilled by the Central MASINT Office

Figures 2, 3, and 4 show responsibilities under DoD Instruction 5105.58 that the CMO considers 25, 50, and 75 percent operational, meaning that the CMO considers itself to be accomplishing at least 25, 50, or 75 percent, respectively, of the responsibilities listed.

RESPONSIBILITY	STATUS
"Serve as the functional manager for the MASINT programs in the NFIP consistent with applicable guidance received from the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the 'National Security Act of 1947' and E.O. 12333"	25 Percent Operational
"Advise the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on future needs for the MASINT systems"	25 Percent Operational

Figure 2. Responsibilities Partially Fulfilled by the Central MASINT Office

RESPONSIBILITY	STATUS
"Organize, direct, and manage the CMO and all assigned resources"	50 Percent Operational
"Manage the establishment of national MASINT collection requirements consistent with the guidance received from the Director of Central Operational Intelligence under E.O. 12333"	50 Percent Operational
"Provide responsible MASINT support to the Department of Defense, the CIA, and, as appropriate, other Federal Government Departments and Operational Agencies, including the coordination of MASINT collection tasking, collection processing, exploitation, and dissemination"	50 Percent Operational
"Develop and make recommendations on national and non-national MASINT policy, including relationships to international matters, for the Operational approval of appropriate Federal Government officials"	50 Percent Operational
"Make use of established facilities and services in the Department of Defense or other governmental Agencies, to the extent permitted by law, whenever Operational practicable, to achieve maximum efficiency and economy. Special emphasis will be made on maximizing the use of existing personnel, facilities and services of the Defense Intelligence Agency and other Departments or Agencies will be used to the extent authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government"	50 Percent Operational

Figure 3. Responsibilities Halfway Fulfilled by the Central MASINT Office

RESPONSIBILITY	STATUS
"Task MASINT collection elements of the Department of Defense to meet national intelligence requirements, including requirements established by the Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with the 'National Security Act of 1947' and E.O. 12333, except that the Director, CMO, shall advise MASINT collection elements on collection of MASINT to meet such national intelligence requirements when the collection element both (a) is assigned to, or under the operational control, of the Secretary of a Military Department or a commander of a unified or specified combatant command and (b) is not allocated by the Secretary of Defense to meet national intelligence requirements"	75 Percent Operational
"Advise MASINT collection elements of the Department of Defense on the collection of MASINT to meet non-national intelligence requirements"	75 Percent Operational
"In coordination with the appropriate DoD Components, support and conduct research, development, test, and evaluation activities related to MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination, consistent with applicable law and DoD Directives"	75 Percent Operational

Figure 4. Responsibilities Mostly Completed by the Central MASINT Office

Figures 5 and 6 show responsibilities rated by the CMO as "Fully Operational" and "Not Rated." The CMO reported that the responsibility listed in Figure 6 is "not rated" due to the non-specificity of the responsibility.

RESPONSIBILITY	STATUS
"Protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, in accordance with guidance received from the Director of Central Intelligence under the 'National Security Act of 1947' and E.O. 12333"	Fully Operational

Figure 5. Responsibility Fulfilled by the Central MASINT Office

RESPONSIBILITY	STATUS
"Perform such other functions related to MASINT as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence may Direct"	Not Rated

Figure 6. Responsibility Not Assessed by the Central MASINT Office

The effects of the CMO not fully meeting its responsibilities were clearly illustrated, for example, by the difficulties in promoting MASINT as an intelligence discipline that provides support to military operations and promoting the use of MASINT capabilities in military exercises. We interviewed more than 135 people with MASINT responsibilities at more than 60 organizations and commands. One of the questions asked was:" Is MASINT tactically useful?" Overall, 72 percent said that MASINT was tactically useful. The higher overall percentage regarding the tactical usefulness of MASINT was due to strong support from the science and technology communities. However, 55 percent of the "warfighters" (CINC and below tactical commands) MASINT representatives said that MASINT was not tactically useful. The remainder of the warfighters (45 percent) gave their answer as "unknown." The reason given at the war fighter levels for MASINT not being a tactically useful intelligence discipline was timeliness of data. Seventy-one (71) percent of the CINC respondents and 60 percent of tactical commanders believed that MASINT was not tactically useful due to untimely data.

In an opposing view, 75 percent of the science and technology respondents believed that MASINT data was timely. "Timely" was defined, in the shortest time frame, by one science and technology respondent, as data received within 1 month of tasking. The majority of war fighters viewed "timely" as data or products received within 24 to 48 hours of tasking. Further, 71 and 87 percent of the CINC and tactical command respondents, respectively, stated that they do not promote MASINT in military exercises. Conversely, 75 percent of the respondents in the science and technology communities stated they promote MASINT in military exercises. Our interviews indicated that if the war fighter does not promote the use of MASINT in exercises, MASINT will not be used during operations, regardless of the support from the science and technology communities.

The differences in responses between the science and technology communities and the war fighters might be attributed greater involvement by the science and technology community in MASINT and the CMO not fulfilling its responsibilities in areas that directly affect the war fighter and other users. Two examples of responsibilities not fulfilled include:

- establishing MASINT architectures for MASINT tasking, collection, processing, dissemination and

- establishing standards for training personnel performing MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination within the DoD. Both examples have a direct bearing on the usefulness of the MASINT end-to-end process for the military tactical,headquarters-level, or Intelligence Community customer.

CMO Organizational Placement

The current placement of the CMO hinders its ability to execute its functional manager responsibilities and compete favorably for resources. As a result of several DIA reorganizations, the CMO was moved to the Directorate for Intelligence Operations. When first created, the CMO worked (organizationally) directly for the Director, DIA, as the executive agent for MASINT with an administrative link to the National Military Intelligence Collection Center (currently reorganized as the DIA Directorate for Intelligence Operations). MASINT is presently managed by the Director, DIA, and not the Director, CMO. Figure 7 shows the current DIA organizational structure as of June 20, 1996:

For example, the Director, CMO, does not have direct control over MASINT General Defense Intelligence Program funding. Ultimately, the Defense Intelligence Agency's overall General Defense Intelligence Program manager makes the final decisions concerning MASINT General Defense Intelligence Program funding issues, not the Director, CMO. The result is the Director, CMO, cannot effectively manage MASINT under its current organizational placement. This condition adversely affects the Central MASINT Office's influence in areas such as establishing standards for MASINT systems and interoperability of these systems with systems of other Departments or Agencies. Further, the Director, DIA, not the Director, CMO, represents the MASINT discipline on many boards and forums where MASINT issues are vetted. The Military Intelligence Board, for example, is chaired by the Director, DIA, and is a decision making forum that formulates DoD intelligence policy and programming authorities. The Director, DIA, is the chief spokesman for MASINT on the Military Intelligence Board vice the Director, CMO. This lack of CMO representation on the Military Intelligence Board contrasts with the Director, National Security Agency, and the Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, who are the logical spokespersons for their technical disciplines.

A significant effect of relying on the Director, DIA, to represent MASINT rather than the Director, CMO, is that the Director, DIA, often delegates MASINT representation to other senior staff members. Although others in DIA have the responsibility to speak on MASINT issues, none have the responsibility to represent the broad MASINT community (national and Defense) perspective as does the CMO. For example, the Director, DIA, delegates his Intelligence Program Review Group and other functional management responsibilities to the Director, Military Intelligence Staff, and General Defense Intelligence Program Staff. Although both staffs have the mission to functionally manage Defense MASINT, they cannot recommend trade-offs between national and Defense MASINT systems simply because they do not have the requisite MASINT expertise. Also, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate for Operations-Functional Management Staff has the mission to represent General Defense Intelligence Program MASINT collection. However, because of a lack of expertise and experience, this staff can neither speak to the mix of MASINT collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources nor is it concerned with MASINT resources outside the collection area. Only by allowing the CMO to operate as the Functional Management Authority over all MASINT resources and having the Director, CMO, report directly to the Director, DIA, will the CMO be able to obtain resources and influence areas such as establishing standards for and effectively managing MASINT systems. On several instances, the CMO has been asked to assess the ability of MASINT to satisfy different missions, such as counter-terrorism, biological and chemical warfare, missile threat assessment, and proliferation support. As the overall functional manager of MASINT, the CMO can assess the ability of all MASINT sensors and missions, national and Defense. It is the only organizational element within the DIA that has the requisite MASINT expertise and perspective to accomplish such a tasking. Regardless of whether or not the CMO remains a subordinated DIA activity, the CMO needs to have Functional Management Authority over all MASINT matters.

The current placement of the CMO within the DIA organizational structure does not give the CMO the same status as the National Security Agency or the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in their respective intelligence disciplines. The Director of an organization with 38 billets, who must report to the Director, DIA, through the Director, DIA Operations Directorate, does not have the same influence or status as a Director of a DoD combat support agency such as the National Security Agency or the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Even though the CMO responsibilities and authorities are similar to those of the prior Central Imagery Office, the Central MASINT Office's placement within the DIA makes it much more difficult for its Director to oversee the MASINT community than it was for the Director, Central Imagery Office, to oversee the Imagery community. Besides not being able to represent MASINT as the overall Functional Manager on community wide boards, the Director, CMO, must obtain two levels of higher DIA concurrence on many matters, with the most notable being budgetary and programmatic matters that directly affect CMO resourcing. The result is an inconsistent chain of responsibility flowing from the Director, DIA, through his Director of Operations, to the Director, CMO, to the Services, Agencies, and users.

Throughout our evaluation, we asked: "Is the CMO effective?" At the science and technology communities, 50 percent of the respondents said "yes" and 50 percent said "no." At the CINC and tactical commands, respectively, the percentages were 54 percent and 26 percent "yes." The primary reason given (69 percent) in the science and technology communities for the lack of CMO effectiveness was "lack of manpower and budgetary control." Although we did not conduct a manpower survey, fully promoting an organization's capabilities and processes is difficult without resources. For example, MASINT has been operational for approximately 10 years and the CMO for approximately 4 years, yet only 43 percent of the war fighting military organizations visited had knowledge of the MASINT requirements submission process and only 13 percent of the war fighters promoted MASINT use in military exercises. Since the Director, DIA, exercises authority, direction, and control over the CMO, the Central MASINT Office's ineffectiveness in educating the war fighter can be partially attributed to the lack of effective DIA support. While other studies mention establishing the CMO as a separate agency or consolidating the CMO within the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency or ASD(C3I), in our opinion maintaining the CMO within the DIA organizational structure can be an effective arrangement if the Director, CMO, has responsibility solely for MASINT and reports directly to the Director, DIA. Also, the Director, CMO, should be solely responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense for all DoD and national MASINT needs. Also, the CMO should be the primary or permanent MASINT representative on all boards and panels requiring such representation. In summary, the CMO must be given the authority to exercise the responsibilities in its charter. While we consider action to relocate the CMO outside of the DIA premature, it should remain an option if the effectiveness of the CMO is not increased within the DIA organizational structure.

CMO Manpower

A major cause for the CMO not being able to fully execute its responsibilities as the DoD and National Executive Agent for MASINT is the lack of manning. To date, no formal manning surveys or other formal mechanisms have been used to validate or determine the Central MASINT Office's past or present minimum essential manning requirement. However, based on our interviews and the CMO self assessment of its inability to fully meet all responsibilities under DoD

Instruction 5105.58, the Inspector General, DoD, and others cognizant of the CMO feel that the CMO needs more than 38 manning authorizations to effectively execute its MASINT functional management and oversight mission.

The Central MASINT Office's manning shortfall was identified in two prior studies (See Appendix B). Both the 1994 DIA Scientific Advisory Board MASINT study and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report, "IC21-- Intelligence Community in the 21st Century," April 9, 1996, highlighted the problem of insufficient CMO manning. The CMO identified its manning needs and shortfalls in the MASINT 2010 planning document and Program Objective Memorandum documents for FYs 1998/1999 through 2003. However, the manning shortfalls in the Central MASINT Office's Program Objective Memorandum documents were not identified via formal manning surveys or other formal validation mechanisms that address manning shortfalls systematically.

The CMO has always been a small organization. Even though the first director and his senior managers estimated that the organization had a requirement for approximately 100 billets, the CMO has always been authorized fewer than half that amount. Since its inception in FY 1992,the CMO has been authorized no more than 42 billets. In FY 1997, it is authorized 38 personnel and has 30 individuals assigned. The CMO believes it needs at least 45 additional authorizations to effectively perform its mission over the next several years in training, education, program monitoring, representation, and MASINT curriculum evaluation. We determined that the CMO lacked operational readiness in all of those areas and that the primary cause was the lack of authorized manpower spaces and assigned staffing.

Although we have identified the lack of manpower and assigned staffing as the primary cause for CMO in effectiveness in several areas, we neither determined the minimum essential manning requirement needed for those areas nor validated the current manning in the other functional areas of CIAO responsibility. The Director, DIA, in coordination with the ASD(CI) and the CMO, needs to determine the minimum essential manning requirements for the CMO through an approved process. The Director, DIA, then needs to ensure those manning requirements are filled and funded. Without increased manning, the CMO will not become an effective organization.

Conclusion

Our evaluation and the Central MASINT Office's self-assessment indicate that it does not fully meet 16 of 18 responsibilities assigned.The ability of the CMO to effectively execute its responsibilities and,therefore, its mission is hampered by its organizational placement within the DIA and the lack of resources to adequately meet its responsibilities under DoD Instruction 5105.58. Fully meeting these responsibilities is paramount to the success of MASINT within all communities throughout the Intelligence Community and DoD. The effects of not meeting these responsibilities have been demonstrated by war fighters' negative perceptions of the tactical usefulness of MASINT and the lack of incorporation of MASINT into military exercises where critical warfighting and intelligence functions are blended. By not meeting its responsibilities regarding MASINT architectures, MASINT suffers from a perceived inability to provide data in a timely fashion to operational military commanders and the Commanders-in-Chief. This condition can lead to the possible misuse or non-use of MASINT capabilities and assets during time of conflict.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Evaluation Response

1. Grant the Director, Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office, responsibility solely for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and singular authority as the dedicated Measurement and Signature Intelligence Functional Manager,directly under Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Functional Manager responsibilities should include Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office membership on all applicable boards and panels with oversight of all Measurement and Signature Intelligence program builds within the DoD and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Management Comments. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with the finding and recommendation and said that

the CMO and its director have roles and responsibilities in the larger Intelligence Community (IC) as well as in DoD and DIA. Concur in rational for the recommendation with the understanding that political considerations may negatively impact the full implementation. MASINT's future programmatic operations and organizational structure are currently under review. This reexamination, part of the MASINT Winter Study, has not yet been completed and will feed into the IPRG (Intelligence Program Review Group) process.

The Director, DIA, concurred with the finding, but did not concur with the recommendation. However, no alternative recommendation for improvement was in the response. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that a lack of resources was the cause for the Director, Central MASINT Office, not being able to fully meet his responsibilities under DoD 5105.58.

Although required to comment, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, did not concur with the recommendation. No alternative recommendation for improvement in this area was in the response.

Also, the Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters United States Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendations.

Evaluation Response. Management comments, with the exception of the Director, DIA, were responsive. The management responses by the Director, DIA, did not address resolution of the finding with which DIA concurred. We ask that DIA provide alternative corrective actions to remedy the deficiencies identified or revisit its position on our recommendation.

2. Determine, resource, and fund minimum essential manning requirements for the Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Once to ensure it can execute all responsibilities assigned under DoD Instruction 5105.58.

Management Comments. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with the finding and stated

Concur that resource requirements should be reassessed. DLA should be responsible for conducting a manpower survey to determine requirements for reallocating internal resources, as well as drawing on personnel from Services,agencies, military intelligence Reserve forces and other DL/L elements. In an environment of constrained and shrinking resources any solutions that propose adding more personnel must be weighted against other approaches. More effective exploitation of the above resources, and others, should be explored thoroughly and vigorously before considering the costly last resort of reallocating personnel.

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurred with our recommendation and commented that, "The Army is concerned with how to staff and fund CMO beyond current support levels. Army has no additional resources to support this increase and recommends utilizing existing resources (i.e. Forest Green)."

The Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters United States Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendations.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. We agree with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) regarding the environment of constrained and shrinking resources and how any solutions that propose adding more personnel must be weighted against other approaches. Before any decision regarding the allocation or reallocation of personnel resources can be made, management must determine the extent of the problem. Only after the minimum essential manning requirements to accomplish responsibilities in accordance with DoD 5105.58 are determined, can logical decisions be made concerning personnel requirements, staffing availability, cost, and funding levels.

We request that the Director, DIA, submit his plan to determine, resource, and fund minimum essential manning requirements for the Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office to ensure it can execute all responsibilities assigned and a description of the effort and evidence of additional resources required or allocated to the Central MASINT Office to enable the Director, Central MASINT Office, to be fully operational in 18 of 18 responsibilities assigned by May 30, 1998.

Finding B. Measurement and Signature Intelligence Understanding

Measurement and Signature Intelligence is not fully understood by the war fighter. The primary cause is that intelligence professionals and users of intelligence are not being adequately trained in Measurement and Signature Intelligence. Without adequate training, these personnel may not fully understand MASINT capabilities. This condition has the potential to adversely impact operational and National security because Measurement and Signature Intelligence may not be used effectively in vital strategic and tactical areas such as theater missile defense, battle damage assessment, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

The War Fighters Understanding of MASINT

Of the 65 organizations visited, approximately 30 were at the warfighting level. Approximately 49 percent of the collection managers, MASINT representatives, and mission planners at the war fighting level did not have a good understanding of MASINT and the intelligence MASINT could provide. The primary cause is a lack of formal training and education in MASINT and lack of oversight of Service MASINT curriculum by the Central MASINT Office. This lack of understanding can lead individuals to misperceive what MASINT is and what MASINT assets are. For example, 57 percent of the war fighting organizations visited owned or had access to organic MASINT assets, such as inverse synthetic aperture radar capable aircraft; Aegis capable cruisers; and infrared, laser, electro-optic, acoustic, and radar intelligence capable air, land, and sea platforms. Generally, these platforms were not considered as MASINT-capable units or assets, but as organic tactical platforms used for targeting and local intelligence gathering.

The CMO realized several years ago that, in general, the war fighter was not familiar with MASINT and published the "MASINT Handbook for the Warfighter" in November 1994. The handbook was designed to demystify MASINT and provide focused information on how MASINT can support the war fighter. The handbook was to be distributed to all war fighting units. However, personnel at many units were not aware of the handbook, and theater and lower echelon elements were not familiar with MASINT resources or how MASINT could support the tactical environment. We determined whether an organization understood MASINT based on the activity having at least one individual (most likely within the intelligence cell) who could distinguish between MASINT and the other three primary intelligence disciplines, as well as determine when MASINT sensors should be tasked to satisfy an intelligence requirement. Minimally, collection managers must understand MASINT; otherwise, a customer may never receive the MASINT support needed to fulfill a requirement. Of all war fighter respondents with MASINT responsibilities, 51 percent indicated that they had not received formal MASINT training. Proper training and education in MASINT is critical to an organization's understanding and use of MASINT. We visited seven of nine Unified Commands. Two of the seven Unified Command representatives reported that they had not received formal MASINT training, that they did not know what a MASINT product was, and that MASINT has no tactical value.

MASINT Training and Education

The MASINT discipline is not understood primarily because the training of MASINT personnel is not being effectively accomplished. We define MASINT training as setting standards, providing career tracking,certifying competency, and having a sufficient number of MASINT trained and knowledgeable individuals at each key activity to adequately accomplish the mission. None of the above, however, is being fully accomplished.

One reason why training is not being effectively accomplished is because the CMO has not been able to make training a major priority. The lesser priority for training resulted because a lack of resources necessitated a management decision to trade off training in favor of establishing the MASINT Requirements Data Base System. The lack of CMO resources, both manning and budgetary, has also affected its ability to set training standards and coordinate with responsible DoD organizations to review and certify Service MASINT component course materials. For example, the majority of collection managers we interviewed had little formal MASINT training. This lack precipitated their perception of MASINT as an intelligence discipline with a narrow scientific and technical niche, rather than a valuable contributor to a broad range of missions important to senior policy makers and the war fighter.

Table 1 indicates organizations with the intelligence training mission. It does not include organizations such as the National Air Intelligence Center, which does not have an intelligence training mission, but instituted a MASINT training program for its own personnel. The categories of "Collection Manager" and "General MASINT Knowledge" have a total of seven and five courses, respectively, taught at five different organizations. Currently, there is no way to ensure that the contents of each MASINT course cover the MASINT discipline in a standardized manner, so as to adequately assure commanders that the person trained has received a standard level of MASINT knowledge as approved by the CMO.

Table 1. Number of Courses Containing MASINT Material by Organization and Type Training

Number of Courses Taught in Each Category

Organization	Total MASINT Courses Taught	Technical and Scientific	Collection Manager	General MASINT Knowledge
JMIC	1	None	None	1
JMITC	5	None	5	None
USA Intel Center	4	2	None	2
315th TS, 17th TG, 17th TW	2	None	2	None
USN/USMC Intel Training Ctr	2	None	None	2

Note: Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC). United States Army (USA), Training Squadron (TS), Training Group (TG), Training Wing (TW), United States Navy (USN), and United States Marine Corps (USMC).

The responsibility for setting training standards for MASINT personnel performing MASINT tasking, collecting, processing, exploiting, and disseminating functions was delegated to the CMO. The responsibility and oversight of general intelligence training rests with ASD(C3I) and DIA.

While DoD has no Department-wide standards for MASINT training, some formal MASINT training standards exist at a number of organizations that oversee intelligence training. The Services have been working on the paucity of MASINT training; however, coordination of the training function between the Service schools and the CMO is weak to non-existent. Even though the formalized education and training structure for the Service schools has not been created, at least two Service Components (U.S. Army and Air Force) are working to establish training plans for their MASINT personnel. The CMO is not providing coordination or review of Service Component MASINT course materials, which can affect the level of expertise and standardization of MASINT personnel. Service training personnel stated that once MASINT standards are in place and the requirements developed, they will train to those requirements.

The lack of community-wide MASINT training and education standards affects the capabilities of Collection Managers tasked with providing their commands with tailored MASINT products. This lack of standards is reflected in the low levels of formal MASINT training and the perception of MASINT as narrowly focused in the scientific and technical world. The CMO is developing MASINT curriculum that should alleviate some of the shortfalls in this area. The CMO has recently requested two personnel from the DIA for curriculum development as part of a larger personnel request; however, the overall request was denied. DIA sponsored the first MASINT General Intelligence Training Advisory Committee meeting on November 7, 1996, to provide a forum for MASINT training, focus, and continuity. Actions from that meeting should assist in establishing a robust MASINT training plan.

MASINT Career Path and Certification

No career path and certification standards exist for MASINT personnel. Part of the education, training, and certification standards process presumes a career path for MASINT personnel, so that training and education received is effectively used. At this time, only one Air Force unit, Forest Green, has a career path. The lack of MASINT specialty codes makes it difficult to track personnel with MASINT training, because specialty codes, such as those identifying personnel with intelligence or electronic warfare training, do not exist. Currently, the Services must track their MASINT personnel under a functional area, such as physics, rather than the intelligence career track. In general, no method tracks MASINT personnel by individual military occupational specialty or specialty code as is the case for IMINT or SIGINT personnel. In conjunction with a MASINT designation is a MASINT certification process. Unlike IMINT, MASINT has no certification process. A certification process assures commanders and supervisors that personnel assigned as MASINT professionals have the requisite background and training for the jobs to be performed. Some collection management personnel indicated that a certification process for MASINT personnel should be considered so that standards would be implemented and specific course structure set.

The combined effects of the lack of training and education standards for MASINT, the lack of a career path and certification process, the lack of a MASINT experience identifier, and the lack of oversight of MASINT training courses result in a non-standardized process and difficulty identifying trained personnel. These personnel can assist the tactical commander and other users to employ MASINT capabilities in an efficient and effective manner.

MASINT Representation

The CMO is not manned at levels that permit it to provide full-time MASINT representatives for all commands. While MASINT points of contact are at the nine Unified Commands, few are fully and formally trained in MASINT. The lack of adequate manning has resulted in the CMO, through the Central MASINT Technical Coordination Office, staffing the Central Command and the Special Operations Command with a contractor representative who splits his time working for each command.

Recently, the Central Command established a MASINT office, which allows the contractor to spend more time at Special Operations Command. A contractor representative is also at the U.S. Forces Korea.The CMO indicated that the staffing these positions with contractors is a short-term solution and that it fully plans to have Government personnel on board in MASINT positions. The time frame for completely staffing all positions with Government personnel has not been determined, but, in our opinion, this requirement needs to be ascertained within 120 days of final report publication. Once Government personnel fill the requisite MASINT positions and become skilled in their MASINT functions at a particular activity, any contractor support used to train those individuals or perform MASINT functions now performed by a Government employee should be eliminated under appropriate contracting procedures.

A dedicated MASINT representative, like IMINT, SIGINT, and Human Intelligence counterparts, could improve MASINT effectiveness at the Unified Command and lower echelon levels. The representatives could be the single point of contact for MASINT; assist with the requirements process; provide training for Commander-in-Chief staff members and lower echelon personnel; assist the Unified Command staffs in requirements determination; and provide research and development liaisons between the Unified Commands, the CMO, and the MASINT Committee. Having representatives also fulfills one of the chief objectives of the CMO: support to military operations.

Conclusion

Because MASINT is not totally understood by 49 percept of the collection managers and tactical mission planners, MASINT may not be fully responsive to user needs, particularly the needs of the operational and tactical user. This non-responsiveness to the needs of users is illustrated by the Unified Commands submitting less than 10 percent of the total MASINT requirements. When all war fighters are considered, they account for only 15 percent of the total MASINT requirement submissions, yet support to military operations is the number one priority of the CMO. As the Central MASINT Office's number one priority, one would expect that military users would account for the majority of submissions. Finally, Collection Managers, who should understand all intelligence disciplines, do not understand MASINT. As a result, they could not effectively recognize or develop a MASINT requirement.

When key individuals such as collection managers do not understand MASINT, MASINT may not be used to the fullest as an intelligence discipline. Not maximizing the full potential of MASINT could adversely affect such vital military areas as Theater Missile Defense, Battle Damage Assessment, Chemical and Biological Warfare, and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. In the Theater Missile Defense area, this condition could adversely affect launch detection, missile type identification, and launch point location accuracy. In the Battle Damage Assessment arena, MASINT underuse could negatively impact confirming weapon detonation, particularly penetrating weapons not discernible by imagery; assessing the actual damage inflicted; and assessing reconstruction activity. In the Chemical and Biological Warfare arena, this situation could adversely impact detecting, identifying, and locating the use of Chemical and Biological Warfare agents and tracking the movement and spread of Chemical and Biological Warfare agents (e.g. velocity and size of a Chemical or Biological cloud). In the area of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, this lack of understanding could negatively affect characterizing enemy weapon systems and forces capabilities and vulnerabilities, estimating harbor and channel depths; determining surface composition, ascertaining the presence of operational equipment under all types of camouflage, identifying quantities and types of fuels in fuel stooge areas, and determining locations of minefields to include characterizing the types of mines. Finally, in tactical applications, the condition could affect real time operations. For example, one MASINT group said that operational combat commanders did not have a timely process to identify new types of infrared missiles based upon signature data. In such cases, countermeasures equipment may not be responsive against a changed threat environment. No operationally deployed method allows MASINT professionals to feed new infrared signature or measurement data through the "systems so that "black boxes" can be reprogrammed to meet the newly identified threat in a timely (within 24to 48 hours) manner.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Evaluation Responses

B.1. We recommend that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, direct the Director, Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office to expeditiously:

a. Train current Measurement and Signature Intelligence points of contact at each key activity to the standards developed in Recommendation B.2.b. or assign trained Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office personnel or contractor representatives to each key activity.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred without finding and recommendation and commented, in part, that

Concur that appropriate training is crucial.... The report indicates that there are personnel at these locations whose jobs include responsibility for MASINT. The report concludes that their understanding of MASINT and the mechanisms for submitting requirements for MASINT are often poor. The best course would seem to be to address the lack of understanding through training and more information and to improve the requirements mechanism....More active involvement in MASINT issues by the existing representation and leveraging DIA training resources could go far toward addressing these concerns.

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurred with recommendation and commented that

The Director, DIA, through DoD, should appoint an Executive Agent, from the Services, for MASINT training. DIA (CMO) in concert with the Services should develop MASINT training program(s) to satisfy national and Service MASINT training requirements. MASINT will not achieve its maximum utility to Army Warfighters until personnel assigned in Unified Commands can apply current and future MASINT capabilities against intelligence requirements and essential elements of information.

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. We request the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, direct the Director, Central MASINT Office, to submit evidence of MASINT training for each MASINT point of contact and evidence that standards have been applied and met by May 15, 1998.

b. Distribute copies of the latest version of the "Measurement and Signature Intelligence Handbook for the Warfighter" to all units at the Commander-in-Chief level and below.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation and commented, "Strongly concur. This is an important step in addressing the knowledgability and training issue."

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurred with our recommendation.

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. We request the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, direct the Director, Central MASINT Office, to submit evidence by September 1, 1997, verifying that copies of the latest version of the "Measurement and Signature Intelligence Handbook for the Warfighter" have been sent to all units at the Commander-in-Chief level and below.

c. Determine within 120 days of final report publication, the minimum essential manning requirement for Government personnel needed to fill Measurement and Signature Intelligence positions at key activities such as the Unified Commands.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurred with our recommendation.

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. We request the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, submit evidence by November 1, 1997, verifying that an official manpower survey has been conducted or has been tasked to be conducted to determine the minimum essential manning requirements to fill MASINT positions at key activities such as the Unified Commands.

d. Eliminate associated Measurement and Signature Intelligence contractor support once Measurement and Signature Intelligence positions at key activities are filled by Government personnel and the individuals appropriately trained.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurred with our recommendation.

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were fully responsive.

B.2. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency:

a. Establish a sub-specialty or additional skill indicator to ensure continuity, tracking, and training of Military Department personnel in the Measurement and Signature Intelligence community and review the feasibility of a career path for personnel in Measurement and Signature Intelligence.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation, but commented in part, that

MASINT embraces a large and diverse collection of technical skills, few of which are specific to MASINT although some are platform specific. The establishment of new indicators would add more complexity to already complex systems and is of questionable utility as a solution to problems that could be better addressed by more attention to previous assignments by personnel selection officials and the incorporation MASINT content in the training of existing specialties such as collection manager, intelligence analyst, or intelligence officer. We do not agree with this recommendation if it results in establishing a new career field requiring costly training and/or administration or an expensive career tracking system. However, a virtually no cost mechanism or process to identify service personnel with particular MASINT training or experience is a worth while initiative for consideration.

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, non-concurred with our recommendations and commented that, "Army disagrees with the establishment of a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or an Additional Skill Indicator (ASI). This is a Service Prerogative."

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were generally responsive, except for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

We agree with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command,Control, Communications and Intelligence) concerning not adding unnecessarily to the complexity of the personnel assignment process.However, we disagree that our finding can be better addressed by "more attention to previous assignments by personnel selection officials,"because it assumes that a methodology exists by which personnel selection officials can keep track of previous assignments that involved MASINT or a MASINT skill. With the exception of one United States Air Force unit, no method exists by which selection officials can track personnel with MASINT skills through their various assignments. Since selection officials are themselves subject to reassignment every few years, the selection process is vulnerable to discontinuity if no official methodology exists to track personnel with MASINT skills or experience. Additionally, we also disagree that few technical skills are specific to MASINT; a great many skills are specific to MASINT since these skills are not related to traditional intelligence areas. For example, engineering and scientific skills relating to material and effluent analysis is not related to any other intelligence discipline except MASINT and is not a skill that can be readily passed on to a collection manager, intelligence analyst or intelligence officer except in the most generic sense, or by specific training at the undergraduate or graduate level.

We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), advise us how it intends to correct the deficiency identified.

b. Establish DoD-wide Measurement and Signature Intelligence training standards and require certification by responsible DoD organizations of all Measurement and Signature Intelligence curricula within the DoD.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation, with the understanding that it does not agree with this recommendation if it requires establishing a new career field requiring costly training, administration, or an expensive career tracking system, with the comment that, "Additionally, the current review of future MASINT programs and operations, and the corresponding organizational framework proposed to accomplish those missions, will impact on the future need for training standards and certification. "

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendations.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, neither concurred nor non-concurred with the finding. It nonconcurred with the recommendation but stated in part that, "however, the Army supports the ongoing General Intelligence Training Advisory Council review of DoD MASINT training."

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management responses, with the exception of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, were responsive. The Army's response was considered nonresponsive as it non-concurred with the two-part recommendation, but addressed only the first part of the recommendation (Recommendation B.2.a). Its response contained no alternative recommendation to solve the problem identified in the finding and it was unclear if Army concurred or non-concurred with the finding.

We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,Communications and Intelligence), advise us how it intends to correct the deficiency identified.

Finding C. Measurement and Signature Intelligence Requirements System

Measurement and Signature Intelligence customers have difficulty in submitting and ascertaining the status of their requirements. An automated multi-user, on-line Measurement and Signature Intelligence requirements data base system has not been developed to assist the intelligence community and other users to efficiently establish their requirements and monitor their requirements status. Because the Measurement and Signature Intelligence requirements submission process is complex and cumbersome, war fighters have deemed the process too difficult to use. As a result, Measurement and Signature Intelligence is under-used.

MASINT Requirements Processing System

The majority of MASINT customers are frustrated by their inability to ascertain the status of a MASINT requirement. Eight (8) of 11 war fighting organizations who responded to the question, "What is the greatest hindrance to the effectiveness of MASINT, "cited the MASINT requirements process. Specifically, customers were frustrated by a lack of feedback on the status of their requirements. MASINT customers at the war fighting level also perceive that the processing of MASINT requirements is neither effective nor efficient. We attributed the customer frustration with the MASINT requirements process to the inability of the CMO to implement an automated MASINT requirements system that is electronically connected to consumers, collectors, processors, and exploiters of MASINT.

As a MASINT requirement is received, either by message traffic or phone, the data is typed or manually entered into the MASINT Requirements Data Base System (MRDBS) by personnel at the CMO.The information can only be accessed by one or two people at CMO; processing MASINT requirements is lengthy, labor-intensive, and does not adhere to the information resource management practice of entering data once. Multiple entries of the same data results in redundant data entries and a greater likelihood of conflicting information and human error. For example, after data entries are made into the MRDBS, validated production requirements are printed and mailed or faxed to a production center where data is re-entered to complete the tasking process. Processing requirements must take place during regular business hours of the CMO. Because the MRDBS is a stand-alone system and not available to customers via a secure wide area network, users cannot track the status of their requirements. Customers are not able to determine whether a MASINT requirement already in the system might satisfy their MASINT needs. MASINT requirement number SN-MD-007-93 provides the reader with an appreciation of the nature of the MASINT requirements system. This MASINT requirement was submitted by a single requester and was manually input into the MRDBS. The requirement involved manual coordination among five separate subdisciplines and used 11 different resources to obtain intelligence on 59 separate missile launches in 17 different countries. Ultimately, eight consumers of intelligence benefited from this single MASINT request from only one requester.

Prior to the formation of the CMO, DLt did not believe an automated MASINT process was necessary for MASINT requirements. Once the CMO organized, it had the responsibility, by instruction, to develop a MASINT requirements system, but was not given the resources (manpower or budgetary capability) to execute the task. The CMO transferred a MRDBS prototype from the old Intelligence Community Staff and began to automate the MRDBS, developing a stand-alone data base system that operated physically within the CMO. In FYs 1993 and1994, the CMO spent $602,000 attempting to interface its MRDBS into the Requirements Management System without success. A Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum (dated October 13, 1993) entitled, "Selection of Migration Systems," required the selection of migration systems within 6 months, followed by DoD-wide transition to the selected systems over a period not to exceed 3 years. The MRDBS was subsequently selected by ASD(C3I) as a migration system on October 28,1994. In February 1995, the Intelligence Systems Board evaluated,consolidated, and integrated the inputs for all intelligence systems and determined that the MRDBS was a migration collection operations system. Another migration system, the Joint Collection Management Tool, was to include a MASINT module, but a MASINT module has yet to be developed. The MRDBS upgrade is to include Joint Collection Management Tool compatibility, but the Joint Collection Management Tool system is still in the Beta test phase and will not reach initial operating capability until after 2000. The CMO has awarded a contract to improve MRDBS Phase I from a stand-alone to a multi-user, on-line system compatible with the Joint Collection Management Tool and available on the DoD Intelligence Information System and Intelink. The CMO currently has MRDBS scheduled for delivery and connected to the DoD Intelligence Information System by February 2, 1997. However, we were informed that out-year funding for the MRDBS has been offered for reprogramming within DIA.

The major impact affecting MASINT customers using the requirements process is the inability to readily determine the status of their requirements. The previous example indicates the complex interaction of MASINT requirements with other intelligence disciplines or subdisciplines. The combination of manual and computer tracking methods exacerbates the perception among users that the process is cumbersome and complex. Besides not being able to access the current MRDBS to determine a requirement's status, vital information on collection, analysis, and dissemination is not available on-line to users. For example, the Army Materiel Command program managers were not able to determine the status of signature data essential for the development of smart weapon systems. Further, the lack of an automated on-line requirements data base affects the ability of users to track the status of validated requirements.

MASINT Requirements Submission

Collection Managers in the Unified Commands said the requirements format was too complex and cumbersome to be useful. The format maybe a causal factor; however, the primary reason for this belief may be lack of training in the MASINT requirements process. The format for submitting a MASINT requirement is prescribed in Chapter 5 of DIA Manual 58-8. It states users are not expected to be conversant with all technical aspects of MASINT and that requests for CMO assistance in technical data fields are acceptable. CMO representatives stated that many fields in the requirement format are free text fields, meaning that if the originator simply describes what is wanted, the CMO will determine the best way to satisfy the customer. One senior CMO official stated that any experienced Collection Manager should easily be able to follow the guidance in DIA Manual 58-5 and submit a MASINT request without having specific MASINT knowledge. The perceived unfriendly nature of the requirements submission process may account for Table 2 results, which indicate that the Unified Commands originated only 9.7 percent of all types of MASINT requests. Table 3 indicates the MASINT submission rate for each Unified Command as a percentage of the total.

Table 2
MASINT Submission Rate

Type of MASINT Request	Originated by Unified Command
Ad Hoc	18 of 215 (8.4%)
Amplification	16 of 176 (9.1%)
Standing	15 of 120 (12%)
Time Sensitive	02 of 16 (12.5%)
Total	51 of 527 (9.7%)

Table 3
MASINT Submission for Unified Commands

COMMAND	ORIGINATED
USACOM	02 OF 527 (0.4%)
USCENTCOM	13 OF 527 (2.5%)
USEUCOM	05 OF 527 (0.9%)
USPACOM	15 OF 527 (2.8%)
USSOCOM	02 OF 527 (0.4%)
USSOUTHCOM	00 OF 527 (0.0%)
USSPACECOM	12 OF 527 (2.3%)
USSTRATCOM	02 OF 527 (0.4%)
USTRANSCOM	00 OF 527 (0.0%)

The rest of the MASINT inputs are made up of Policymakers (0.2%), Force Modernizer (1.1%), Defense Intelligence (48.2%), National Intelligence (34%), Civilian (1.7%), and Undetermined (5.1%). "Ad Hoc" collection starts within 72 hours to 6 weeks, "amplification" amplifies an existing requirement with collection starting within 72 hours to 6 weeks, "standing" is a permanent requirement validated every 3 years, "time sensitive" collection starts immediately to within 72 hours.

Although the low submission rates for the Unified Command Collection Managers may be explained in part because Scientific and Technical centers are submitting requirements in support of the Commands, the low submission rates suggest the Commands' unawareness of MASINT capabilities. Even when the combined war fighter submission rate is considered, the submissions account for only 78 out of 527 total requirements. However, the war fighter is the greatest consumer of MASINT, accounting for 739 of 2,354 actual MASINT tasks within 1 year. MASINT tasks are the number of requests that originate from the CMO in response to a MASINT requirement. The actual number of separate tasks required to fill 527 MASINT requirements is 2,354. Because intelligence sources are usually transparent to the consumer, the war fighters, who make up the majority of MASINT consumers, may not realize the contributions MASINT makes to the overall intelligence effort. For example, data broadcast by the Tactical Intelligence Broadcast System is "non-attributional," meaning the data presented on a Tactical Intelligence Broadcast terminal could have been obtained by a soldier on a hill with binoculars (Human Intelligence), by a satellite photograph (IMINT), through intercepted electronic or communications (SIGINT), or by any number of MASINT sensors, or a combination of all four intelligence disciplines. To the consumer, the source and means of that intelligence is transparent. As a result, MASINT is not gaining the recognition and support of its consumers for the intelligence support it is providing the community. This lack of recognition could result in operational commanders not asking for and receiving full MASINT support for their missions. Since support to military operations is the stated priority of the CMO, any lack of awareness regarding the MASINT requirements process could inadvertently decrease the Central MASINT Office's support to military operations.

Conclusion

War fighters find the present requirements submission process complex and cumbersome and are frustrated by the lack of feed back concerning their requirement requests. The MRDBS is not integrated with other global intelligence management systems, although the CMO is in the process of bringing MRDBS Phase I on-line and upgrading the MRDBS to create an interface to the Joint Collection Management Tool, Intelink, and other systems. While funding has been programmed and is reflected in the Congressional Budget Justification Book, we were informed that out-year funds for the MRDBS have been offered for reprogramming. The loss of funding for the MRDBS will delay system development and integration and further continue frustrations for MASINT customers.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Evaluation Responses

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation but commented in part that

an on-line requirements database is needed. Implementation should take into account the results of the current IPRG issues on Integrated Collection management now underway. Creation of any new on-line collection management system must take into account not only DoD-wide requirements such as Joint Technical Architecture compliance, but should also fit well with projected and planned cross-discipline efforts lest resources be expended in producing a legacy system that would have to migrate into a new architectures. It is not clear from the report that the MRDBS as originally conceived would be compliant, and would be a good fit into ongoing integration efforts (though this may be the case). It is also not stated what rationale might lie behind the reported DLA-internal decision to offer up on-line MRDBS funding for reprogramming. It should be determined if these funds are indeed being reprogrammed and, if so, why, before further considering this recommendation.

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army,concurred with the recommendation and commented that, "The MASINT Requirements Data Base System needs to be integrated into a common collection management tool."

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. Request the Director, DIA, provide by October 1, 1997, milestones and plans to upgrade the Measurement and Signature Intelligence Requirements Data Base System from a stand-alone to a multi-user, on-line system.

2. Require the Director, Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence Office, to streamline the requirements submission process to make it more user-friendly and to educate users on the streamlined requirements submissions process.

Management Comments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) concurred with our finding and recommendation but commented in that, "The value of more user-friendly collection management systems is unquestionable. Integrated Collection Management is a current Intelligence Program Review Group issue being led by the Deputy Assistant Security of Defense (Intelligence and Security)."

The Director, DIA, concurred with our finding and recommendation.

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurred with the recommendation and comment that, "The MASINT Requirements Data Base System needs to be integrated into a common collection management tool."

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Department of the Air Force, concurred with the finding and recommendation.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. Request the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, direct the Director, Central MASINT office, to provide by October 1, 1997, a streamlined requirements submission process and the plans and timetable to educate users on the streamlined reqirements submissions process.

PART II - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

Scope

Our initial scope was to determine and evaluate the MASINT end-to-end process, from requirements justification to product delivery for operational military commanders and other users. Since MASINT is made of many intelligence sub-disciplines, the scope of that task proved to be too large for the assigned resources. We narrowed the focus of our evaluation to concentrate on MASINT responsibilities of the CMO as outlined in DoD Instruction 5105.58, the lack of understanding of MASINT among the war fighters, and the reasons for the under-use of the MASINT requirements submission system. Our evaluation looked a tall MASINT customers, however concentration focused primarily on the war fighter, defined as the Commander-in-Chief level and tactical commands below.

Methodology

We attended a MASINT course provided by the Joint Military Intelligence College and attended briefings conducted by the CMO to identify key organizations and individuals in the MASINT community and the MASINT community and customer base. Subsequently, we traveled to each organization, examined documentation, and conducted interviews with personnel assigned. We also interviewed consumers of MASINT products.

We traveled to more than 65 organizations and conducted interviews of approximately 131 people. Organizations were comprised of national, Service, and technical facilities as well as civilian organizations involved in base realignment issues and military-civilian community relations. Personnel interviewed included MASINT scientists, engineers, program managers, program directors, directorate heads, intelligence collection managers, targeteers, strike tacticians/planners, intelligence officers, and non-MASINT civilian personnel involved in military asset relocation issues.

Our goal in evaluating customer use and support of MASINT was to compare the "top level" intelligence discipline viewpoint with the reality of the "bottom level" customers to see whether the product received was the product requested. As part of our original effort, we also reviewed the processes the CMO used to develop, implement, evaluate,communicate, and disseminate MASINT policies throughout the MASINT community. We also reviewed the Central MASINT Office's goals, objectives, and responsibilities and evaluated progress made toward achieving them. No past or current project overlaps the scope of this evaluation effort. See Appendix D for a list of organizations we visited or contacted.

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Reports and Other Renews

During the past 5 years, the DIA Scientific Advisory Board, the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, and the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reviewed MASINT.

DIA Scientific Advisory Board

In 1994, the DIA Scientific Advisory Board (the Board) reviewed the MASINT community, architecture, requirements process, and the CMO. Although the panel did not issue a draft or final report, the Director, DIA, was briefed on the findings and recommendations in December 1994. The Board's major findings were that MASINT is not understood throughout the community, the requirements process suffers from a lack of resources and architecture, only nominal requirements are received from the war fighters, the functional manager role for MASINT has not been fulfilled, and the current CMO placement under DIA Collection dilutes its authority and effectiveness.

The Board recommended that the DIA direct the CMO to develop a master plan for user education, congressional liaison, and cooperation within the MASINT community; the CMO accelerate on-going development of an automated MASINT requirements system with increased access at the user commands; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) oversee the development of an end-to-end MASINT architecture; and the DIA delegate functional management to include programming and budgeting functions for MASINT to a CMO organization reporting directly to the Director, DIA.

Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community

The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (the Commission) issued its report on March 1,1996. The Commission, which was authorized by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, was charged with reviewing U.S. intelligence activities in the wake of the Cold War. In general, the Commission concluded that important roles remain for intelligence agencies, but the intelligence community needed to be more efficient and improve its performance substantially. Although there is no separate section on MASINT, the MASINT community is affected by some of the Commission's recommendations. One recommendation specifically applicable to MASINT is in the budget arena. The Commission recommended that the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program be substantially realigned by creating new discipline-oriented programs for each separate intelligence discipline to include MASINT, with each discipline being managed by a single program manager.

U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study

The U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence published a staff study entitled "IC21--The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century," April 9, 1996. The study reviewed the roles, function, and structure of the U.S. Intelligence Community and included a section on MASINT. The study proposed that SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT be consolidated into a single agency called the Technical Collection Agency. Other significant conclusions regarding MASINT was that MASINT is difficult to identify as a separate discipline although it may be the "intelligence discipline of the future"; MASINT is perceived as a "strategic" discipline with limited"tactical" support capabilities; MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well understood by the Intelligence Community as a whole; funding levels and funding flexibility for current and future MASINT systems are not reflective of the importance of MASINT; and, although the CMO has the necessary legal authorities, it is not properly staffed commensurate with its responsibilities.

Appendix C. Summary of Potential Benefits Resulting From Evaluation

Appendix D. Organizations Visited or Contacted

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

U.S. Marine Corps

Other Defense Organizations

Non-Defense Federal Organizations

Appendix E. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

Other Defense Organizations

Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

PART III - MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

Evaluation Team Members

CDR Larry Stack, USN
Mr. Pete Schroeder
Mrs. Judith Heck
Ms. Eleanor Thompson
Mr. Mike Flynn
Ms. Alice Clair Calligan
Mr. Andre Medlin