Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Plan in 1994 the purpose of which was to establish affordable, cost-effective priorities among a variety of proposed programs and to coordinate research and development activities at the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and at the Office of Naval Research (ONR).

Four priorities were articulated:

Develop a near-term UUV system to provide the theater commander with a

limited capability for conducting clandestine minefield reconnaissance from a submarine;

Develop a long-term UUV system with a greatly improved capacity to conduct clandestine minefield reconnaissance and avoidance;
Develop UUV systems to meet the Navy's requirements for surveillance,

intelligence collection and tactical oceanography; and

Explore advanced UUV designs for the future.

Coordination between ARPA and ONR UUV projects was reaffirmed and a summary provided covering five basic research areas: (1) vehicles, (2) energy, (3) sensors, (4) navigation and control, (5) and communications.

II. Update.

Congressional response to the plan has been generally favorable. The Senate Appropriations Committee stated that,

"The committee compliments the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense for responding to its concerns by creating a more realistic and

prioritized UUV master plan."

The HNSC (former HASC) stated that,

"The committee endorses the restructured near-term mine reconnaissance

system (NMRS) because it promises to provide an early operational capability

at a reduced cost."

However, funding for continuation of planned UUV activities at ARPA was denied by Congress and overall Navy budget limitations constrained UUV efforts to the top two priorities, the near- and long-term clandestine reconnaissance systems.

Within the above limitations, the Navy is fully executing its 1994 plan:

Priority 1 A contract was awarded to Westinghouse (Oceanic Division, Annapolis,

MD) for the Near-Term Reconnaissance System (NMRS) in August

1994 with funds specifically earmarked by Congress to initiate near-

term activities. This contract will deliver the near-term UUV system to

the theater commander with a limited capability for conducting

clandestine minefield reconnaissance from a submarine at the end of calendar year 1997, a little over three years from date of award. This program is currently on schedule and cost.

Priority 2 The Navy UUV plan called for a contract award of the long-term

clandestine reconnaissance system, designated the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS), in FY96. This remains the Navy's

goal. Cost effectiveness analysis, detailed requirements definition, and acquisition streamlining initiatives are all underway to support this date.

Like NMRS, the LMRS will be a submarine launched and recovered

clandestine UUV system.

Priorities The Office of Naval Research continues to support research and

3 and 4 development activities which will immediately impact on the

performance options available to LMRS and, in the long term, will

support the acquisitions of UUV systems supporting surveillance, intelligence collection and tactical oceanography.

This update reaffirms the Navy's priorities established last year and notes its progress

in executing the two highest priority programs. Note, however, that this update focuses on

the range of UUV activities described in the original plan. This update briefly describes the Remote Minehunting System (RMS) program which is an organic offboard system being developed to meet surface ship mine reconnaissance requirements. Also attached is a copy of

the "Organic Offboard Mine Reconnaissance Concept of Operations" which places UUV mine reconnaissance programs, e.g. NMRS and LMRS, in the context of other planned off-board systems, e.g. RMS, supporting the mine reconnaissance mission. The key requirements niche into which UUV programs (NMRS, LMRS) fit in this Concept of Operations, which none of the other systems provide, is the capability to conduct its operations clandestinely.

1995 Addendum

to the

Navy

Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

Plan

I. Background

The FY 1994 Defense Appropriations Bill requested"...that the Director of the Navy's Expeditionary Warfare Division (N85) be assigned the responsibility for establishing the

Navy's Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) program priorities." Furthermore, the Congress directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A))

to certify that the UUV efforts of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) are part of

the Navy's overall plan and meet the priorities established for UUVs.

Navy completed a UUV strategic plan in April 1994 which was (1) concurred in by ARPA, (2) approved by the ASN(RD&A), and (3) endorsed and forwarded by USD(A&T) to

the Chairmen, and ranking minority members, of the four authorization and appropriations subcommittees with jurisdiction in this matter. Language in the FY95 Appropriations Bill complimented the Navy's efforts and generally supported its execution.

Since then, the Navy has moved rapidly to implement the plan.

II. Reaffirmation of Priorities

The 1994 UUV Plan listed four priorities:

Develop a near-term UUV system to provide the theater commander with a limited capability for conducting clandestine minefield reconnaissance from a

submarine;

Develop a long-term UUV system with a greatly improved capacity to conduct clandestine minefield reconnaissance and avoidance;
Develop UUV systems to meet the Navy's requirements for surveillance, intelligence collection and tactical oceanography; and
Explore advanced UUV designs for the future.

The FY 94/95 Navy Mine Warfare Plan listed "key priorities" critical to the future of

mine warfare. Top priority was given to the development of a "clandestine mine surveillance, reconnaissance and detection capability." Such a capability would be derived from a wide

variety of systems and provide the theater commander with the knowledge of the full

dimensions of the mine threat without exposing reconnaissance platforms. The top two UUV priorities directly support this requirement. The 1995 update to the second edition of the Mine Warfare Plan and this UUV Plan Addendum reaffirm these requirements and priorities.

The President's Budget request to the Congress for FY96 clearly emphasizes the importance of these programs. With continued declining budgets, and tough choices in many programs being made, the President has requested full funding to continue these high priority efforts.

III. Development of a Concept of Operations for Off-Board Reconnaissance Systems

Recognizing the need to put Navy mine countermeasure UUV efforts into a broader context, this year OPNAV (N85 and N87) jointly developed an Organic Offboard Mine Reconnaissance Concept of Operations encompassing air, surface and undersea assets and

how they are projected to be fully integrated into the battle group. It reaffirms the importance

of clandestine mine reconnaissance and the role of UUVs. This concept of operations is

included as TAB B to this Addendum.

IV. Research and Development Activities

The Office of Naval Research has continued to examine its programs to ensure their relevance to UUV needs. A series of Science and Technology Working Groups met

throughout the year to review each program. Members from the acquisition community, the

Fleet and the resource sponsors all participated in order to give full voice and debate to technology issues. This successful process has reaffirmed that ONR is achieving a successful balance within its UUV project area. A listing of ONR UUV projects and funding is

provided as part of the budget updates provided in TAB C of this Addendum.

V. Procurement Activities

The two highest UUV priorities, the Near-Term and Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance Systems (NMRS/LMRS) are at the forefront of acquisition reform and streamlining. The

number one priority, NMRS, has been placed in a "special" category by the ASN(RD&A) in

order to remove any impediments to taking full advantage of commercial and non-

developmental capabilities and standards. It is focused on bringing an effective clandestine

mine reconnaissance capability to the Fleet at the earliest possible date. Within the next 2

years, this system is scheduled to begin at-sea testing and achieve IOC three months later.

The FY94 UUV Plan described both an NMRS at-sea demonstration, which was scheduled for late FY96, and an Operational Prototype to be delivered to the Fleet in FY98. Concurrency between the "demonstration" and "operational prototype" phases was previously

a Congressional concern. The concurrency has been eliminated, with ASN(RD&A)

agreement, by canceling an early at-sea demonstration and folding all requirements into a

single integrated program which preserves IOC.

The contract for NMRS was awarded to Westinghouse Corporation (Oceanic Division, Annapolis, MD) in late August 1994, four months after completion of the Navy UUV plan.

The contract is structured as a partnership between Westinghouse and the Navy emphasizing product delivery within a cost and schedule dominated framework. The program is on

schedule and on cost. Detail Design reviews will be completed at the end of this calendar

year, fabrication and builds will take place within 1996 followed by factory testing, at-sea

testing and Fleet delivery at the end of calendar year 1997. TAB A includes a graphic

showing the various elements of the NMRS, a schedule to completion, and funding line.

The number two priority, LMRS, is also on a fast track. Concept of Operations, Cost

and Effectiveness Analysis and detailed operational requirements are currently being

developed. These will culminate in a FY96 Milestone decision and planned competitive procurement. LMRS will replace the interim NMRS and provide the Fleet with multiple,

robust systems capable of reaching areas over-the-horizon, and providing timely, accurate, and thorough clandestine minefield reconnaissance well into the next century. IOC is planned for 2003.

After further analysis conducted as part of the Organic Offboard Mine Reconnaissance Concept of Operations (TAB B), the operational requirement to launch and recover LMRS

from submarines or surface ships, which was documented in the FY94 UUV Plan, has been refined to only require submarine launch and recovery to reflect the clandestine requirement.

The surface ship requirement, characterized in the subject Concept of Operations, will be addressed by the Remote Minehunting System (RMS).

RMS will provide the surface Fleet with an organic offboard mine reconnaissance capability. The RMS concept calls for the use of remotely operated, diesel powered, semi-submersible (vice UUVs) launched and recovered from surface ships, towing mine

reconnaissance sensors on a retractable tow cable. RMS will support over-the-horizon,

timely, accurate, and thorough minefield reconnaissance for current and future surface ships. Although IOC is 2005, the RMS program will deliver contingency systems to the Fleet in

limited numbers as vehicle, C41, and sensor system technologies mature.

Delivered in October 1994, the Remote Minehunting Operational Prototype (RMOP) represents the first such contingency system. RMOP combines commercial and Navy off-the-

shelf systems to provide limited mine reconnaissance at line-of-sight ranges from the host

ship. Efforts are currently in progress to improve RMOP through development of a surface

ship launch and recovery system, of over-the-horizon command and control systems, and of improved integration with the host ship C41 systems.

Since LMRS and RMS will operate in the same environment (deep to very shallow

water) against the same threat (bottom and moored mines), the mine reconnaissance sensor requirements for both systems are similar. The use of common sensor systems for both

LMRS and RMS offers the Navy a potential for life cycle cost savings. Sensor design and development will be coordinated and, as possible, shared between the two programs.

VII. Budget Updates

The FY95 UUV budget derived from the FY95 Appropriations Act and the FY96 President's Budget are attached as TAB C.

VIII. Conclusion

The Navy worked with members of the Congressional staff throughout 1994 to

develop a plan that was both responsive to Navy warfighting needs as well as fiscally

responsible. This addendum reinforces that plan, characterizes the Navy's success at

executing the plan, and emphasizes the need to stay the course.

With continued Congressional support, this plan will yield cost effective undersea

vehicle systems to meet the mine threat of the next century and to improve our chance of

success in littoral waters.

(TAB A)

ELEMENTS OF THE NMRS AND SCHEDULE TO COMPLETION

(TAB B)

Organic Offboard Mine Reconnaissance

Concept of Operations
Background

The overarching tenet of "operational maneuver from the sea" is to use

mobility, flexibility, and modern technology to project strength against weakness.

To this end, Naval and Amphibious operations will be conducted where the enemy's

coastal defenses are weakest. Critical to the planning phase for these operations is

the characterization of the battle field, specifically, determining the extent and

nature of the enemy's coastal defenses. These defenses, especially sea mines,

can pose a significant threat to Naval and Amphibious forces and to their ability to

achieve battlespace dominance.

To sustain its operations in the littorals, the Naval Expeditionary Force,

which includes elements of both Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready

Groups, and other Naval forces must possess an organic capability to assess and

monitor the extent of the sea mine threat, including the location of and gaps around

suspected minefields. Additionally, once operating in-theater, Naval forces must

respond to the dynamic evolution of a regional contingency, whether it be motivated

by conditions ashore or at sea. Thus, these Naval forces must be equipped with

capabilities to assess quickly the sea mine threat in other potential operating areas.

At times, the reconnaissance required must be obtained clandestinely to prevent

enemy alertment and to maximize the success of Naval and Amphibious operations.

The focus for this concept of operations is on organic offboard mine

reconnaissance. These operations fit into a larger set of set of organic mine

countermeasures (MCM) operations that include the following five primary

components:

Anti-mining surveillance. Aggressive, early observation of enemy

mining activities and assets is key to littoral dominance. Various surveillance

methods along with intelligence must provide indications and warning of adversary

mining efforts. If rules of engagement permit, it is better to take proactive measures

to prevent mining, using this surveillance as target data, than to react to mines after

they are laid.

Offboard mine reconnaissance. Based on intelligence and

surveillance indications, organic offboard mine reconnaissance efforts will be

focused to support Naval and Amphibious operations. In the absence of dedicated

MCM forces, accurate and timely mine reconnaissance, provided by offboard

systems, will be essential for avoidance of mined areas or exploiting gaps within

mined areas.

Ship Signature Reduction and Control. To minimize the ship's

vulnerability to mines, warships will be designed and maintained with various

signature reduction and control techniques. Acoustic quieting, degaussing systems

and magnetic silencing are some of the techniques included in ship signature

reduction.

Organic Mine Clearance Systems. In some tactical situations, it

may be necessary to conduct clearance operations to gain tactical use of potentially

mined waters, but conventional MCM forces may not be available to conduct the

operations. A limited organic mine clearance capability may meet this mission.

Onboard Detection Systems. All MCM operations provide only a

probability or percent certainty that mines are no longer a threat. Onboard

detection capabilities may provide the last level of defense against mine threats by

detecting objects in the water, which are potentially mines.

Definitions

The following definitions will be used throughout this document:

Organic. Capability that is carried in forward deployed forces to

allow early MCM operations and in the Naval Expeditionary Force or other Naval

forces to enable them to conduct MCM operations enroute.

Clandestine. An operation is considered clandestine if it is

sponsored by a government agency in such a way as to assure concealment. A

clandestine operation conceals the intent of the sponsor so as to prevent enemy

exploitation.

Mine Reconnaissance. MCM operation that encompasses some or

all of the following:

(1) Detection - Process of determining that an object is present.

(2) Classification - Process of determining if the object that has

been detected is mine-like or nonmine-like.

(3) Identification - Process of determining if a mine-like object is actually a mine.

Exploratory Mine Reconnaissance. MCM operation with the

objective of determining if mine-like objects are present. If mine-like objects are

present, the second objective of exploratory mine reconnaissance is to determine

safe routes or operating areas around the potential minefields. Exploratory mine

reconnaissance encompasses the detection and classification processes of mine

reconnaissance.

Threat

Sea mines have become an inexpensive means for less-developed

countries to hinder Naval operations and to embarrass superior forces. Recent

analysis of the World mine threat reveals that, since 1991, there has been a 40%

increase in the number of countries that produce mines and a 50% increase in the

number of countries that export mines. These countries include recent and

potential adversaries. Of special concern are advanced technology mines that are

becoming increasingly more difficult to counter and were recently encountered in

the Persian Gulf.

Sea mines are produced in a wide range of explosive weights and may be

fitted with a variety of actuation mechanisms (simple contact horns to sophisticated computer logic employing multiple sensors). In addition, sea mines can be

deployed by airborne, surface, and subsurface platforms. Although the majority of mines are bottom influence and moored, mines may be located essentially

anywhere in the water column (from the surface down to the sea floor) and may be buried in the bottom.

Environment and Tactical Situations

The natural environment and inherent limitations of current mine detection

methods and technology preclude a single concept that can determine the presence

of sea mines over the entire range of the threat. At present, the principal means for

mine-like object detection uses acoustic technology (sonar). However, acoustic

wave propagation becomes difficult to predict in proximity of the air-water interface

(i.e., near the surface) and in the very shallow (40 to 10 feet) region, and

penetration of the sea floor is limited; therefore, non-acoustic methods may also be

required to determine the presence of mine-like objects.

Additionally, a multitude of tactical situations, each with a different mine

reconnaissance requirement, precludes the use of a single mine reconnaissance

system. These tactical situations include, but are not limited to:

- Early reconnaissance of navigation choke points;

- Early reconnaissance of Naval Operating Areas;

- Early reconnaissance of Amphibious Objective Areas; and

- Early reconnaissance of areas to support dynamic (changing)

Naval and Marine Corps operations.

Each of the above can be modified with the requirements to be clandestine, to

support single ship or multiple ship operations, to meet varying levels of confidence

of the mine reconnaissance data (probability of mine detection, classification, and

identification), and to meet varying demands for timeliness (hours versus days

versus weeks).

Concept of Operations

Well in advance of the arrival of other Naval forces, forward deployed

surface ships and submarines will provide an assessment of environmental and

threat conditions. Starting with previously gathered surveillance and intelligence

data, these forces will focus their organic offboard mine reconnaissance capabilities

to determine the extent and size of the mine threat and to determine safe

anticipated operating areas. To provide protected transit for Naval forces or

individual ships, these assets will conduct mine reconnaissance to determine low

risk transit lanes in navigation choke points. Additionally, organic mine

reconnaissance systems will be used to locate operating areas that have a low risk

for mine threats. For each of the above cases, clandestine mine reconnaissance

systems will be used as required by the tactical situation.

In each situation, the commander will employ organic offboard mine

reconnaissance assets to determine the location/density of mine-like objects to an

acceptable level of confidence. The commander will either accept the risk or

continue reconnaissance in order to increase the confidence level (i.e., reduce risk).

If a suitable gap cannot be located, a decision will be made to either continue mine

reconnaissance in other areas or commence mine clearance using conventional or

organic MCM forces. As tactical mine data becomes available, the location of mine

danger areas and low risk areas will be fused into a comprehensive tactical picture

and communicated to other Naval forces.

INSERT FIG1

As part of the advance forces, surface ships will employ offboard systems

to meet the demand for mine reconnaissance of anticipated operating areas.

Remotely operated, offboard systems, employing mine reconnaissance sensors, will

be launched and operated from surface ships to conduct mine reconnaissance

operations. Its sensor suite will be used against bottom and moored mines for mine reconnaissance in deep water (greater than 200 feet) to a portion of the very

shallow water (40 to 10 feet) regions (see Figure 1). In some cases, the mine

reconnaissance will be conducted by the offboard system to enable the ship to

accomplish its singular mission. In other cases, the offboard systems will conduct

mine reconnaissance to evaluate anticipated operating areas prior to the arrival of

other Naval forces and/or the conduct of Amphibious operations (e.g. Amphibious

assault). Mine reconnaissance data will either be stored on the offboard system for

future analysis or communicated back to the host ship as timeliness dictates. In

both cases, the system will be capable of over-the horizon operations. Although the

offboard systems may expose masts and antennas, its low profile and/or extent of

distribution in several different locations within the littoral region may provide

adequate concealment of intentions.

To meet the floating and near-surface mine threats, electro-optic systems

will be carried onboard the ship's aircraft. These systems will be capable of

reconnaissance of mines on the surface and to a limited depth below the surface

(see Figure 1). The mine reconnaissance data gathered by these systems will

either be stored for future analysis on the aircraft or communicated back to the host ship as timeliness dictates. The system will be capable of over-the-horizon

operations. As the tactical situation permits, this mine reconnaissance data will

permit the localization of enemy minefields in support of Amphibious operations.

When clandestine operations are critical, forward positioned submarines,

operating offboard mine reconnaissance systems, will be used to provide timely,

clandestine mine reconnaissance data. The sensor suite employed by these

offboard systems will be used against bottom and moored mines for mine

reconnaissance in deep water (greater than 200 feet) to a portion of the very

shallow water (40 to 10 feet) regions (see Figure 1). In some cases, the mine

reconnaissance will be conducted by the offboard system to enable the submarine

to accomplish its singular mission. In other cases, the offboard systems will conduct

clandestine mine reconnaissance to evaluate anticipated operating areas prior to

the arrival of other Naval forces and/or the conduct of other operations (e.g.

Amphibious assault). Mine reconnaissance data will either be stored on the

offboard system for future analysis onboard the submarine or communicated back to

the host submarine as timeliness dictates. In both cases, the offboard system will

be capable of long range operations.

Additionally, sufficient small offboard systems will be employed by Special

Warfare forces to meet the requirements in the very shallow water (40 to 10 feet)

regions (see Figure 1). These offboard systems will assist in confirming low risk

approaches in preparation for the Amphibious assault.

Summary

No one system is effective within the entire water volume, against the full

scope of mine threats, and for all tactical situations. Several complementary organic offboard mine reconnaissance capabilities, using a variety of employment methods and sensors, will provide the necessary mine reconnaissance (see Figure

2). The combination of these capabilities, each with unique mine reconnaissance attributes, and joined by a common, over-the-horizon C4I system, is required to

support early and sustained Naval and Marine Corps operations.

Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Program