The U-2 in Desert Storm Chapter 4 Command and Control

The Dragon Lady Meets the Challenge
The U-2 in Desert Storm

Chapter 4 Command and Control

Unlike other major air commands, Strategic Air Command (SAC) had never automatically changed operational control (CHOPed) of deployed assets to the theater commander. Because of his responsibility for the nuclear response or single integrated operational plan (SIOP), the Commander in Chief SAC (CINCSAC) retained operational control (OPCON) over his forces so he could readily recall them to respond to any perceived nuclear threat. In an attempt to expand SAC's conventional warfare role and allay theater CINCs' fears that they could not rely on SAC assets during a contingency, in 1989 CINCSAC General John T. Chain, Jr. signed agreements with the CINCs of U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Central Command agreeing to CHOP 47 conventionally-dedicated B-52s to the theater commanders during regional crises.1
For the first time, CINCSAC CHOPed assets to a theater commander during Desert Shield/Storm. Operational control for both B-52s and tankers changed to the U.S. Central Command commander. To help CENTCOM use the SAC assets most effectively, General Chain sent Brigadier General Patrick P. Caruana and a Strategic Forces advisory team to serve on the U. S. Central Air Force staff.* Brigadier General Caruana would be "dual-hatted" and act as Commander, 1700 Strategic Wing (Provisional), which included the 1704th Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional), the U-2 unit at Taif**. He would exercise tactical control (TACON) for reconnaissance aircraft within the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR)***. General Chain, however, retained OPCON of his strategic reconnaissance forces, including the U-2/TR-1. His staff convinced him that for maximum utility, he should retain operational control over these "small-fleet, high-value" assets. Reconnaissance mission tasking would be "accomplished through established procedures with the Strategic Reconnaissance Center (SRC) at Headquarters SAC as the SAC focal point.2 This decision would complicate command and control of the U-2 during Desert Shield.
*General Schwarzkopf and the USCENTCOM staff did not deploy until December. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Horner served as Commander USCENTCOM (Forward).
**On 21 September 90, OL-CH was redesignated as 1704 RS(P).
***Operational control [OPCON] provided "full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned tasks." Tactical control [TACON] provided authority to schedule, task, and execute missions locally.

Considered a "national asset" and designed for strategic reconnaissance, the U-2 required national command authority approval of peacetime tasking. To avoid repetition of the embarrassing Gary Powers shootdown in 1960, "established procedures" for U-2 peacetime tasking became involved and complicated. A theater CINC directed his request for U-2 coverage to Pentagon's Joint Reconnaissance Center. There the "book officer" analyzed the request to find out if Air Force assets were already covering the target and if the request was appropriate for the U-2. If satisfied, he then coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency to ensure there was no redundant coverage by sources outside the Air Force. If the agency "passed" on the request, then the book officer briefed the request through the chain of command to representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the president's national security advisor, who could approve the request in the name of the president. This process normally took about two weeks.3
The Joint Reconnaissance Center then notified the Strategic Reconnaissance Center (SRC) at Offutt AFB, Nebraska of the requirement. The SRC evaluated possible threats to the aircraft, coordinated the movement of aircraft, sensors, and support staff and equipment, and scheduled the sortie. Wing mission planners prepared the flight track, planned the mission, and briefed the pilot. The pilot then flew the sortie under peacetime applications of reconnaissance programs (PARPRO) rules. Such flights were in international or friendly airspace. The pilot flew only under VFR (visual flight rules) conditions, gave regular radio checks, and avoided threats or denied territory. If, for any reason, the pilot could not maintain the PARPRO restrictions, he/she aborted the mission and returned to base. If there was no photography processing element in theater, photographs might reach the commander, who had requested the mission, from seven-ten days after the sortie. This long processing and dissemination time caused most commanders to opt for electro-optical or radar imagery, which the SENIOR YEAR Electro-Optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS) and Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) could provide near-real-time.4
To make the system more responsive to General Schwarzkopf's needs, the Strategic Reconnaissance Center requested the 17th Reconnaissance Wing at RAF Alconbury, Great Britain to deploy Lieutenant Colonel G. Ashton Lafferty to Brigadier Caruana's staff as the U-2 advisor. Lieutenant Colonel Lafferty arrived at CENTAF Headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 19 August 1990. Initially, he aided the "bed-down" of the U-2 detachment at Taif. For example, he helped the unit get a new refueler truck to replace the dilapidated model they had been using. His primary responsibility, however, was simplifying the U-2 requesting and scheduling process.5
Since the U-2 began flying operational sorties the day Lieutenant Colonel Lafferty arrived, he immediately began coordinating the flying schedule between CENTAF, SRC, and the 1704th. Throughout Desert Shield, the U-2 flew under PARPRO restrictions. Flight tracks were in approved "boxes," normally along the Saudi-Iraqi border or along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. These tracks had already been through the "book process." Lieutenant Colonel Lafferty worked with CENTAF planners and relayed their requirements to SRC to ensure theater commanders were getting the reconnaissance coverage they needed. The Strategic Reconnaissance Center then issued the tasking and execution orders directly to the 1704th. When the air war began and the operational control for reconnaissance changed to the theater on 16 January 1991, Lieutenant Colonel Lafferty's responsibilities increased dramatically.6
Notes for Chapter 4
l.Msg (S/OADR), CINCSAC to OAF/CC, et al, "Command Relationships of SAC Forces Supporting Desert Shield (U)," 241900Z Aug 90; hist (S/NF/SY), SAC, "History of Second Air Force, Sep-Dec 1991 (U)," vol 1, 10-11, info used (U) per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.
2.Ibid.
3.Intw (S/NF), Dr C. F. Cross II, 9RW/HO, with Lt Col (ret) M. S. Spencer, 30 Aug 94, info used (U) per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.
4.Ibid, intvw (S/NF), Cross with Cal Lafferty, info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.
5.Ibid.
6.Ibid.

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The U-2 in Desert Storm