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The Dragon Lady Meets the Challenge The U-2 in Desert Storm

Chapter 2 The Wing Responds

 

American President George Bush reacted quickly to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. On 4 August he met with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, and Lieutenant General Charles A. Homer, Central Air Command (CENTAF) Commander to discuss the situation. The generals explained to the president the only Air Force assets in the area were two KC-135s operating in the United Arab Emirates since 24 July and fourteen F-lllEs and four F-16s in Turkey. No one knew if Turkey would allow air attacks on Iraq from Turkish soil. There were no other American forces in the area and the nearest two aircraft carriers were days away. There was little the United States could do, unless Saudi Arabia or another nation in the area allowed America to base troops there. The president dispatched Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Schwarzkopf, and Horner to Saudi Arabia to talk with King Fahd. Armed with satellite photos showing the Iraqi deployment along the Saudi border, the three persuaded King Fahd of the imminent danger to his country. On 6 August the king asked the United States to send forces to Saudi Arabia to help defend his nation from possible attack.1

By 6 August the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB, California had already been alerted for possible deployment to the Middle East. Colonel Randall A. Juracek, Deputy Commander Maintenance (DCM), and his staff started gathering the necessary assets. Unfortunately, world events had overtaken Air Force reconnaissance plans, which had been directed toward a major war in Europe against the Soviet Union. There were no Middle Eastern contingency plans and no unit type codes (UTC) for such a deployment. Wing planners also knew very little about possible operating locations in Saudi Arabia and the surrounding countries. Colonel William P. Morton, Jr., Colonel Juracek's assistant, recalled sitting around the battle staff table studying old Central Intelligence Agency guides and aeronautical maps of the Middle East to learn which runways would support the U-2. 2

Coincidentally, just before the Iraqi invasion, the wing had prepared to open Detachment 4 at Howard AFB, Panama. The plan for Detachment 4 became the starting point for the Middle Eastern deployment support package. Chief Master Sergeant Robert E. Hickey, Jr. and other senior maintenance noncommissioned officers (NCO) took the list for Detachment 4 and went through it "line-by- line" asking, "Do we need this item? If so, are the quantities okay?3 They covered all the parts, spares, and equipment needed to sustain the U-2. Hickey and his team received conflicting information on how many aircraft would deploy and how long they would stay. First, there would be two aircraft for sixty days, then four aircraft, then two. Hickey finally decided to assemble a kit to support four aircraft for six months. When the DCM's deployment planners met at 1000 hours on 6 August, the equipment and spares list was ready.4

Although the list was complete, many items on it were not readily available. The deployment to Panama had taken spares that the supply system had not had time to replace. Hickey checked the war reserve spares kit (WRSK) and found 30-40 items missing, including several high-value ones. He located several items he needed in the Phase Inspection bench stock. Detachment 8, 2762 Logistics Squadron (Special), Robins AFB, Georgia, which manages the U-2 program, supplied other parts. Lockheed Corporation at Palmdale, California, furnished some items. Hickey cannibalized parts not readily available anywhere else from aircraft in maintenance for repair or undergoing phase inspection. He then turned the parts into supply and had them reissued to fill the WRSK kits. Within 48 hours of initial notification, the WRSK kits were 99% complete, with no critical items missing. As additional items came in, crews loaded them on pallets ready for airlift. Detachment 8 and other sources shipped some parts directly to Saudi Arabia.5

But, the U-2s could not deploy without airlift for their support staff and equipment. Reconnaissance airlift priority was 1-B-1, the same as every other important CENTCOM component. This meant that there was essentially no priority. So after the deployment package, people, and aircraft were ready to depart, they sat, waiting for airlift. On 11 August, MAC C-5s, supplemented by SAC KC-lOs, arrived.6

Meanwhile, an eight-person advance site survey team, led by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce L. Liebman, departed for Saudi Arabia on 8 August, arriving 11 August. The team first considered Jeddah on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, but the base's proximity to Islam's Holy City of Mecca apparently caused the Saudis to suggest King Fahad Royal Saudi Air Base, at Taif, instead. Located in the plateau region approximately 400 miles southwest of Riyadh, Taif's climate is more moderate than most of Saudi Arabia. The site survey team flew to Taif on 13 August, in time to meet the first KC-10 carrying Lieutenant Colonel James H. Lloyd III, the commander of the unit designated OL-CH, and a load of people and equipment from Beale. A stream of C-5s and KC-lOs followed over the next two days, containing the remainder of the cargo and the rest of the 21 officers, 120 enlisted, and 25 civilians that would make up the initial detachment. The civilians, from Lockheed and other contractors, were a critical part of the U-2 support team.7 The U-2 operation would share a maintenance hangar with Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) F-5s. Office space was in an education building a short distance away. Everyone, including civilians, initially billeted in Al Gaim, the McDonald-Douglas compound about 20 miles from the base. When the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing arrived at Taif two weeks later, however, the commander forced Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd to move the enlisted people from Al Gaim to make room for the F-111 personnel.8

Colonel Juracek and his staff, meanwhile, considered a fuel supply for the U-2. Unlike most Air Force aircraft, the U-2 uses jet propellant thermally stable (JPTS) fuel and there was none available in Saudi Arabia. The nearest JPTS was at RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus, and Torrejon AB, Spain. Air Force officials flew in 50,000-gallon storage bladders and KC-lOs and C-141s carried 55- gallon drums from Torrejon and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, while C-141s with area bulk fuel delivery systems and KC-135Qs moved bulk fuel from RAF Akrotiri. By the time the U-2s arrived on 17 August, there was a three-week supply of JPTS stored in bladders at Taif. Later, after airlift had built up a 60-day supply, ships carried JPTS from Spain to Jeddah, and trucks hauled it on to Taif.9 Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd recalled that when he arrived on 13 August, the site survey team had already begun receiving fuel and cargo. Since there were no Air Force aerial port or transportation people at Taif, everyone had to pitch in and unload the aircraft. The volume of cargo and only two supply people on hand made it virtually impossible to adequately document and maintain records of the incoming supplies. It would be several months before there would be enough trained supply technicians to properly sort, catalogue, and warehouse spare parts and supplies. But initially people worked around the clock to make sure they were ready to receive the first two U-2s on 17 August. 10  

Notes for Chapter 2

1.(S/NFJ Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol ii, "Operations and Effects and Effectiveness," 12-14, info used (U) per SAF/PAS security review, 95-1070.

2.Ibid., intvw (S/NF), Dr C. F. Cross II, 9RW/HO, with Col W. P. Morton, Jr., Det 1, 12th AOG/LG, 7 Sep 94, info used (U) per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.

3.Intvw (S/NF), Dr. C. F. Cross II, 9RW/HO, with CMSgt R. E. Hickey, Jr., SIMS/MA, 30 Sep 94, info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.

4.Ibid.

5.Ibid.

6.Intvw (S/NF), Cross with Col Morton; intvw (S/NF), Cross with CMSgt Hickey; hist (S/NF/SAR/SY/WNINTEL), SAC, "9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Jan-Jun 1991 (U)," vol i, 33-34, info used (S/NF/LD), info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070. 7.Ibid.; hist (S/SY/SAR/NF/LD), CENTCOM, "Review of 1990 with the 1704th Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional (U)," 3 Feb 91, 1, info used (S/OADR); intvw- (S/NF), Dr C. F. Cross II, 9RW/HO, with Lt. Col J. H. Lloyd III, 26 Jan 94, info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.

8.Intvw (S/NF), Cross with Col Morton; intvw (S/NF), Cross with Lt. Col Lloyd, info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.

9.Theodore R. Jamison, (S) SAC Logistics Support of Operation Desert Storm: The First Thirty Days (UJ, (SAC: Offutt AFB, NE, 1 Apr 91), 23; intvw (S/NF), Cross with Col Morton, info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.

10.Hist (S/SY/SAR/NF/LD), CENTCOM, "1704th RSP (U)," 3 Feb 91, 1, info used (S/OADR); intvw (S/NF), Cross with Lt. Col Lloyd, info used (U), per SAF/PAS security review 95-1070.

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The Dragon Lady Meets the Challenge The U-2 in Desert Storm