



CHAPTER 4

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VENONA

Introduction

In 1943 the Army Signal Intelligence Service, the forerunner to the National Security Agency (NSA), started a project codenamed “VENONA,” which concentrated on cracking the Soviet Diplomatic code. Ultimately, after a series of cryptographic breakthroughs over a period of several years, a number of KGB espionage messages were broken, read, and discovered to reveal details of widespread KGB-inspired espionage efforts, including those of the atomic bomb spies.

The counterintelligence payoff from VENONA was significant. It was instrumental in providing the FBI with investigative leads that contributed to the identification of the Rosenberg atomic espionage ring and a number of other agents spying on the atomic bomb program.

In a ceremony at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, on 11 July 1995, Director of Central Intelligence John M. Deutch announced the release of the VENONA translations of the encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications. In October 1996 a conference on VENONA, cosponsored by CIA, NSA, and the Center for Democracy was held in Washington, D.C. For the conference, CIA and NSA collaborated on producing a publication, called *VENONA, Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957*, as a handbook for scholars interested in VENONA. Anyone interested in this chapter of American counterintelligence should also use the VENONA volume as well as look at the 2,900 Soviet messages on the Internet.

Short History of VENONA

On 1 February 1943, the US Army's Signal Intelligence Service, a forerunner of the National Service Agency, began a small, very secret program, later codenamed VENONA. The object of the VENONA program was to examine, and possibly exploit, encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications. These messages had been accumulated by the Signal Intelligence Service (later renamed the US Army Signal Security Agency and commonly called "Arlington Hall" after the Virginia location of its headquarters) since 1939 but had not been studied previously. Miss Gene Grabeel, a young Signal Intelligence Service employee who had been a school teacher only weeks earlier, started the project.

The accumulated message traffic comprised an unsorted collection of thousands of Soviet diplomatic telegrams that had been sent from Moscow to certain of its diplomatic missions and from those missions to Moscow. During the first months of the project, Arlington Hall analysts sorted the traffic by diplomatic missions and by cryptographic system or subscriber.

Initial analysis indicated that five cryptographic systems, later determined to be employed by different subscribers, were in use between Moscow and a number of Soviet overseas missions. It also became apparent that one system involved trade matters, especially Lend-Lease. The other four systems appeared to involve the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow in communication with its missions abroad.

Further analysis showed that each one of the five systems was used exclusively by one of the following subscribers (listed in descending order according to the volume of message traffic, which had been collected):

1. Trade representatives—Lend-Lease, AMTORG, and the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.
2. Diplomats—That is members of the diplomatic corps in the conduct of legitimate Soviet Embassy and consular business.

3. KGB—the Soviet espionage agency, headquarters in Moscow and Residencies (stations) abroad.

4. GRU—the Soviet Army General Staff Intelligence Directorate and attaches abroad.

5. GRU—Naval-Soviet Naval Intelligence Staff.

The VENONA Breakthroughs

From the very beginning in February 1943, the analysis of the traffic proved slow and difficult. Then in October 1943, Lt. Richard Hallock, a Signal Corps reserve officer who had been a peacetime archaeologist at the University of Chicago, discovered a weakness in the cryptographic system of the Soviet trade traffic. This discovery provided a tool for further analytic progress on the other four cryptographic systems.

During 1944, the skills of other expert cryptanalysts were brought to bear on this Soviet message traffic to see if any of the encryption systems of the messages could be broken. One of these cryptanalysts, Cecil Phillips, made observations, which led to a fundamental break into the cipher system used by the KGB, although he did not know at the time who used the system. The messages were double-encrypted and of enormous difficulty. In spite of Arlington Hall's extraordinary cryptanalytic breakthroughs, it was to take almost two more years before parts of any of these KGB messages could be read or even be recognized as KGB rather than standard diplomatic communications.

Three closely spaced counterintelligence events occurred in 1945 that VENONA decrypts were able to amplify. First, the FBI carefully questioned Whittaker Chambers, whose earlier efforts to disclose details about Soviet espionage in the United States in the 1930s had gone unheeded. Second, Igor Gouzenko, a GRU code clerk, defected in Ottawa. Third, in late 1945 Elizabeth Bentley, a veteran KGB courier and auxiliary agent handler, went to the FBI and named names. While Gouzenko's revelations were important to Allied counterintelligence efforts,

they had no bearing on the VENONA breakthroughs. Strong cryptographic systems like those in the VENONA family of systems do not fall easily.

The VENONA decrypts were, however, to show the accuracy of Chambers' and Bentley's disclosures.

In the summer of 1946, Meredith Gardener, an Arlington Hall analyst, began to read portions of KGB messages that had been sent between the KGB Residency in New York and Moscow Center. On 31 July 1946, he extracted a phrase from a KGB New York message that had been sent to Moscow on 10 August 1944. This message, on later analysis, proved to be a discussion of clandestine KGB activity in Latin America. On 13 December, Gardner was able to read a KGB message that discussed the US presidential election campaign of 1944. A week later, on 20 December 1946, he broke into another KGB message that had been sent to Moscow Center two years earlier which contained a list of names of the leading scientists working on the Manhattan Project—the atomic bomb!

In late April or early May 1947, Gardner was able to read two KGB messages sent in December 1944 that show that someone inside the War Department General Staff was providing highly classified information to the Soviets.

US Army intelligence, G-2, became alarmed at the information that was coming out of Arlington Hall. An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel."

Gen. Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the United States.

In October 1948, FBI special agent Robert Lamphere joined the VENONA Project full-time as the FBI's liaison and case controller for the VENONA espionage material. Also, by 1948 the British joined

the VENONA effort, in particular, their signal intelligence service assigned full-time analysts to Arlington Hall. There was excellent cooperation between the two US agencies and the UK over the many years of VENONA, in large measure a result of the early efforts of Robert Lamphere and Meredith Gardner.

Covernames in VENONA

The VENONA messages are filled with hundreds of covernames (designations used in place of the real names to hide identities of Soviet intelligence officers and agents—that is, spies or cooperating sources—as well as organizations, people, or places discussed in the encrypted messages). A number of public figures were also designated by covernames, while others in that category appear in the text of the messages by their names. The following are examples of covernames recovered from the VENONA corpus:

<u>Covername</u>	<u>True Name</u>
KAPITAN	President Roosevelt
ANTENNA, (later LIBERAL)	Julius Rosenberg
BABYLON	San Francisco
ARSENAL	U.S. War Department
THE BANK	U.S. Department of State
ENORMOZ	Manhattan Project/A-bomb
ANTON	Leonid Kvasnikov, KGB

Arlington Hall and the FBI studied the covernames for leads to identities, grouping them into families of covernames. Some covernames came from mythology, some were Russian given names, and other were names of fish, etc. KAPITAN was easily identified from the context as a good covername for President Roosevelt, but his covername was, nevertheless, outranked by those of persons of lower station, including KGB operatives covernamed PRINCE, DUKE, and GOD. Other KGB assets were just plain BOB, TOM, and JOHN, while Elizabeth Bentley had the covername GOOD GIRL. Very rarely, the KGB was careless in choosing a covername. For example, the covername FROST was used for KGB agent Boris Moros. The Russian word for "frost" is Moroz."

The VENONA Translations

There were about 2,200 VENONA messages translated. The VENONA translations released to the public often show an unexpectedly recent date of translation because the breaking of strong cryptographic systems is an iterative process requiring trial and error and reapplication of new discoveries leading to additional ones. Consequently, a message may have been reworked many times over the years as new discoveries enabled progress in the decryption and understanding of more and more of the text. Partial information was available from many messages as early as 1947 and later that year was provided to the FBI. Almost all of the KGB messages between Moscow and New York and Moscow and Washington of 1944 and 1945 that could be broken at all were broken, to a greater or lesser degree, between 1947 and 1952.

There are still unreadable gaps in the translated messages. These are indicated as a number of code groups “unrecovered” or “unrecoverable.” This means that the cryptanalysts were unable to break those portions of the messages.

Success Rate

The serial number of the VENONA messages indicate that the KGB and GRU sent thousands of messages between Moscow and the overseas recipients. Only a fraction of the total messages sent and received were available to the cryptanalysts. The messages, which have been exploited were never exploited in real time. In 1946, Meredith Gardner was working on KGB messages of 1944.

Arlington Hall’s ability to read the VENONA messages was spotty, being a function of the underlying code, key changes, and the lack of volume.



Gen. Carter W. Clarke

Of the message traffic from the KGB New York office to Moscow, 49 percent of the 1944 messages and 15 percent of the 1943 messages were readable, but this was true of only 1.8 percent of the 1942 messages. For the 1945 KGB Washington office to Moscow messages, only 1.5 percent was readable. About 50 percent of the 1943 GRU-Naval Washington to Moscow messages were read, but none from any other year.

VENONA Myths and Misunderstandings

In spite of what has been written in a number of books and articles, Arlington Hall made the VENONA breakthroughs purely through sweat-of-the-brow analysis. There was no cryptanalytic assistance for Lt. Richard Hallock, Cecil Phillips, or Meredith Gardner and their colleagues from lost, discovered, or battlefield-recovered Soviet codebooks during the years in which the main analytic breakthroughs were made. It was not until 1953 that a photocopy of a partially burned codebook (recovered by US Military Intelligence in 1945) was discovered to be related to the VENONA cryptographic systems after another cryptanalytic breakthrough. The successful decryption of the VENONA messages was a triumph of analysis by a small group of intelligent and dedicated women and men working long hours in their cramped offices at Arlington Hall.

Messages from the KGB New York Residency to Moscow Center

Although KGB and GRU communications between New York and Moscow during 1939-1941 were in cryptographic systems that could not be broken, a comparison of the New York–Moscow KGB, and GRU message counts between these years indicates that, at least in the United States, the GRU may have been the more active Soviet intelligence agency up until that time. For example, in 1940, the NY GRU sent an estimated 992 messages to Moscow while the KGB sent only an estimated 335 messages. Furthermore, later translations of 1944 and 1945 messages show that a number of KGB espionage personalities had previously been GRU assets (or possibly COMINTERN agents under GRU control). In 1942 there were nearly 1,300 KGB New York–Moscow messages, but only 23 were successfully decrypted and translated. In 1943, however, there

were a little over 1,300 messages with over 200 decrypted and translated.

The COMINTERN and the Soviet Intelligence Services

The COMINTERN (Communist International) was a Soviet-controlled organization that conducted liaison with the national communist parties of various countries, including the United States, in order to further the cause of revolution. Moscow issued guidance, support, and orders to the parties through the apparatus of the COMINTERN. Nevertheless, Stalin publicly disbanded the COMINTERN in 1943. A Moscow message to all stations on 12 September 1943, message number 142, relating to this event is one of the most interesting and historically important messages in the enter corpus of VENONA translations. This message clearly discloses the KGB's connection to the COMINTERN and to the national Communist parties. The message details instructions for handling intelligence sources within the Communist Party after the disestablishment of the COMINTERN. The translation of the Moscow-Canberra message was the only message of those sent to all the Residencies that was successfully decrypted.

KGB Organization in the United States

During the VENONA period, the KGB had US Residencies in New York, Washington, and San Francisco—the latter residency was not established (or possibly reestablished) until December 1941. There was also a geographic Subresidency in Los Angeles.

The translations show that the KGB New York Residency operated under three official institutional cover arrangements—the Soviet Consulate, the trade



Robert Lamphere

mission (AMTORG/Soviet Government Purchasing Commission), and TASS, the Soviet news agency. Other KGB officers worked at various locations around the United States under Purchasing Commission cover, often as factory inspectors working on Lend-Lease matters.

During 1942, Gen. Vassili M. Zubilin (true name: Zarubin) was the KGB Resident (chief) in New York. Zubilin, known in VENONA by the covername MAXIM, signed many KGB telegrams. His wife, Elizabeth, was a KGB colonel who had the covername VARDO. There are indications that Zubilin/MAXIM was the senior KGB officer in the United States. For example, the KGB Residency in Washington did not send messages until late 1943 after Zubilin arrived there. Before that, New York sent the Washington espionage messages.

All KGB Residencies abroad came under the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the Moscow Center. Lt. Gen. Pavel Fitin, covername VICTOR, ran the First Chief Directorate, and most VENONA messages from the Residencies are addressed to him.

Although most or all KGB officers in New York worked for the First Chief Directorate, their day-to-day operations were defined by what the KGB called a "Line." A Line worked against a specific target set or carried out some specialized function. A number of Lines are mentioned in the VENONA translations, and their specialization can be either identified or easily inferred. Some, not all, of these may be seen in the 1942-43 messages:

Line Target or Function

KhU Line: High-tech targets, including the Manhattan Project, jet engines, rocket engines, radar (Julius Rosenberg's group worked under this Line).

White Line: Probably worked against the White Russians.

Fifth Line: Security of the Soviet Merchant Fleet (probably connected to the Second Chief Directorate—internal counterintelligence—at Moscow Center).

Second Line: Watching nationalist or minority groups of interest to the Soviet state (for example, the Ukrainians).

Technical Line “A”: Special work such as document forgery.

Fellow Countryman Line: Liaison with the American Communist Party.

Line of Cover: The institutional or personal cover of the KGB officer.

Other organizations referenced in the VENONA materials include the Eighth Department at Moscow Center, which evaluated political intelligence; the special cipher office, which encrypted and decrypted the telegrams; the Center-KGB headquarters; and the “House” or “Big House,” which probably meant the COMINTERN headquarters in Moscow (although it sometimes appears to be used interchangeably for Moscow Center).

Telegrams sent by the KGB Residency in New York were usually signed by the Resident (MAXIM, LUKA, or MAJ) and were addressed to VIKTOR, head of the First Chief Directorate. Sometimes telegrams were signed with the covername ANTON, head of the KhU Line, since Moscow Center gave him special authority to do so in 1944. In special circumstances, telegrams were addressed to or received from PETROV, believed to have been L.P. Beria, head of the Soviet security apparatus; however, PETROV might also have been V.N. Merkulov, a principal deputy of Beria, who probably headed KGB operations from the latter part of 1943.

At least in the case of the New York Residency, we see what probably was the KGB in transition-trying to organize its espionage activities better while sorting out the impact of the dissolution of the COMINTERN. We also see considerable KGB interest in European and Latin American Communists, which presented opportunities for subversion, a classic COMINTERN methodology, rather than espionage. Nonetheless, the New York Residency had many espionage assets during this period and was aggressive, even reckless, and imaginative in trying to recruit or place people in sensitive positions.

The activities of a Soviet Illegal: MER/ALBERT (covername for KGB officer Iskak Akhmerov, who operated as a clothier) is seen in VENONA, which also provides some insight into Illegals used by Soviet intelligence. Although only the activities of Akhmerov and a GRU-naval operation involving an illegal are presented in some detail, there is a small number of other cases of illegals mentioned. An Illegal was usually a Soviet citizen, a KGB or GRU officer, who operated under an alias with no visible connection to official Soviet establishments. Illegals had no diplomatic immunity, usually entering the country illegally-hence the term.

The Washington KGB Residency

Except for its agents working against high-tech targets such as the atomic bomb project, the most important KGB sources were in Washington, D.C. Nonetheless, VENONA shows that the New York Residency apparently ran these Washington-based espionage nets. In late 1943 the Washington Residency began to run some of its agents but it was not until 1945 that they finally took charge of most of its agents. Vassili Zubilin, who was the KGB Resident in New York, moved to Washington during 1943 and became Resident. After his move, the Washington Residency began sending messages in increasing volume. When Zubilin was recalled to Moscow in 1944, Anatoliy Gromov, covername VADIM, replaced him in Washington. Gromov (actual last name Gorsky) was also a senior officer, in his late thirties, who had served for the preceding four years as the KGB Resident in London. American spymaster and courier for the KGB, Elizabeth Bentley, knew him only as “Al.”

New York Espionage Operations—The New KGB

In 1944, covername MAJ, believed to have been Stepan Apresyan, became the KGB Resident in New York. According to a complaint to Moscow Center by his co-Resident or subordinate, covername SERGEJ, MAJ was a young, inexperienced officer who had not previously been posted abroad. Apresyan was about 28 years old; he operated in New York under the cover of vice consul. While we do not know why MAJ was elevated early to senior KGB rank, there were other major changes in KGB espionage operations.

Moscow Center and the New York Residency intended to take a more direct control of some existing espionage nets that had been run for the KGB by American Communists such as Jacob Golos (covername ZVUK) and Greg Silverman (covernames PEL and ROBERT). And, as MAJ reported to Moscow, the time might come when the KGB would need to have espionage nets not recruited from within the Communist Party.

All of this relates to the dissolution of the COMNINTERN. The transition was resisted by American spies, Greg Silverman and Elizabeth Bentley, as well as by some of their agents. They complained that Moscow did not trust them and that, as a practical matter, the KGB would be less successful in running espionage operations if they put their officers in direct contact with the agents, bypassing the old guard Communist Party controllers. Perhaps mindful of this, the KGB introduced the Illegal Albert into their espionage operations. Silvermaster, Elizabeth Bentley, some of their individual agents, and members of the “new network” were now to fall under Albert’s control.

KGB Operations

Information in the VENONA materials reveals KGB tradecraft (that is, the practical means and methods of espionage and counterespionage) of the time in great detail. Most VENONA messages concern operational/tradecraft matters. The sheer volume of data collected by KGB stations abroad was too great to be reported by telegram; instead the VENONA messages indicated that photocopies of classified documents went to Moscow by courier. In one translation, KGB in New York informed Moscow that it had 56 rolls of film from their agent, covernamed ROBERT, and that this trove of classified material was to be sent off by courier to Moscow Center.

Information in VENONA translations describes the KGB’s modus operandi in arranging meetings with their agents, with much attention given to the security of these secret meetings. Other messages describe KGB countermeasures against FBI—counter-surveillance, detection of bugging devices, and ensuring the loyalty of Soviet personnel in the United States. A particularly fascinating set of VENONA

messages describes the KGB’s efforts to locate Soviet sailors who had deserted from merchant ships in San Francisco and other US ports. Some of the most interesting messages detail KGB assessment and recruitment of American Communists for espionage work.

KGB and GRU Spies and Assets in the United States

Over 200 named or covernamed persons found in the VENONA translations, persons then present in the United States, are claimed by the KGB and the GRU in their messages as their clandestine assets or contacts. Many of these persons have been identified, many have not been. These approximately 200 persons are separate from the many KGB and GRU officers who also appear in VENONA. One such asset, ROBERT, is found in VENONA translations several dozen times. Other covernamed persons were found only few times. The majority of unidentified covernames in the New York KGB traffic appear three or less times

KGB Espionage Against the VENONA Program

A number of sources outside of signals intelligence reveal that the KGB learned early on that the United States had begun to study Soviet communications. In late 1945, KGB agent Elizabeth Bentley told the FBI that the KGB had acquired some limited information about the US effort during 1944. Kim Philby, while assigned to Washington, D.C., 1949-1951, occasionally visited Arlington Hall for discussions about VENONA; furthermore, he regularly received copies of summaries of VENONA translations as part of his official duties. Although the Soviets knew what Arlington Hall was accomplishing, they could not, at any rate, get the message back.

The Rosenberg/Atomic Bomb Espionage Messages

All but two of the 49 VENONA translations, that have been identified as associated with atomic bomb espionage messages, are KGB traffic; one is a GRU and one a Soviet diplomatic messages.

These messages disclose some of the clandestine activities of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold,

Klaus Fuchs, David and Ruth Greenglass, and others. The role played by the person covernamed PERS associated with the atomic bomb espionage remains unidentified to this day.

VENONA messages show that KGB officer Leonid Kvasnikov, covername ANTON, headed atomic bomb espionage in the United States, but that he, like the Rosenbergs who came under his control, had many other high-tech espionage targets such as the US jet aircraft program, developments in radar and rockets, etc. As with most VENONA messages, the Rosenberg messages contain much information relating to KGB net control and tradecraft matters.

Elizabeth Bentley



In 1945, Elizabeth Bentley, a KGB agent who also ran a network of spies and served as courier, went to the FBI to describe Soviet espionage in the United States and her part in it. She gave a 100-page statement, in which she provided many names—persons in positions of trust who, she told the FBI, were secretly supplying information to the KGB. However, she

brought no documentary proof. No espionage prosecutions resulted directly from her accusations. Over the years she testified before Congress and in court and also published a book about her espionage career. Elizabeth Bentley was a controversial figure, and there were many who discounted her information. Ms. Bentley appears in the VENONA translations (covernames UMNITSA, GOOD GIRL, and MYRNA) as do dozens of KGB agents and officers whom she named to the FBI. VENONA confirms much of the information about Soviet espionage that Ms. Bentley provided the FBI.

Boris Morros

Boris Morros was, like Ms. Bentley, another controversial figure of the Cold War. In 1959 he wrote an often criticized book, *My Ten Years as a Counterspy*, in which he described his long association with the KGB and his decision to go to the FBI with the story of KGB operations in the United States. In the book he wrote about various personalities who are referred to in VENONA,

including Zubilin and Jack Soble. Morros appears in VENONA as covername FROST. In his book, Morros described how KGB agent Alfred Stern provided his own money to fund a musical company, managed by Morros, as a KGB front and a cover for international intelligence operations. This operation is confirmed in VENONA-Stern (covername LUI) is quoted as saying his “130,000 dollar investment is exhausted” but also that “I want to reaffirm my desire to be helpful. My resources are sufficient for any solid constructive purpose.”

Donald Maclean

Longtime KGB agent Donald Maclean, covername HOMER, a senior British diplomat posted to Washington during the 1940s, is found in several VENONA messages all sent during 1944. He was neutralized because of information from VENONA. Because only a small body of the Washington messages from a limited window were read, there is only a glimpse of Maclean’s involvement, but ample opportunity to see the type of important information he was providing to the Soviets.

HOMER is the English rendition of the Russian covername spelling GOMER. (The Cyrillic alphabet used in Russian has no letter representing the sound “h” of the Roman alphabet, and foreign words are regularly spelled with the Cyrillic equivalent of “g.”)

Meredith Gardner, Arlington Hall’s principal VENONA analyst in the early days, began to break HOMER messages as early as 1947/48, but the story did not come together immediately as the covername was variously represented in the messages as GOMMER (a KGB misspelling), GOMER, G, and “Material G.” Initially, it was not apparent that these were all references to the same person, particularly as both New York and Washington traffic was involved, and Gardner worked the NYC traffic first.

Perspective

The VENONA program concerned KGB and GRU messages that were available to Arlington Hall codebreakers. Most of the messages which were collected were not successfully decrypted, and, short of a release of the KGB and GRU archives from the period, we may never know more about the KGB and GRU activities represented in the VENONA corpus of messages.

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CI in World War II End Notes

1. This is a continuation of the article by S/A Wayne Goldstein, the first part appeared in Volume I.
2. Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies and Scholars*, Washington, 1976, p. 9.
3. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., *The U.S. Intelligence Community; Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities*, New York, 1973, p. 9.
4. Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Cambridge, 1959, pp. 106-108.
5. See Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA; Japanese-Americans and World War II* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971); Stetson Conn., et al., *The United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere: Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*: (1964).
6. Cited in memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/16/40.
7. Memorandum from Stimson to the Attorney General, 8/26/40.
8. It is not clear whether Hoover may have had in mind the secret arrangements with British intelligence established at that time at President Roosevelt's instructions. These arrangements have recently been made public in a book based on previously classified British records. (William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).
9. Memorandum from Hoover to L. M. C. Smith, Chief Neutrality Laws Unit, 11/28/40.
10. Memorandum from M. F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney General, to Hoover and L. M. C. Smith, 4/21/41.
11. Memorandum from McGuire to Hoover, 4/17/41.
12. Memorandum from McGuire to Hoover, 4/17/41.
13. Memorandum from McGuire to Hoover, and L. M. C. Smith, 4/21/41.
14. Memorandum from Hoover to Field Offices, 4/30/41.
15. Memorandum from Ladd to the Director, 2/27/46.
16. Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1942, p. 209.
17. Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1944, pp. 17, 234-247. From 1940 to 1943, a National Defense Section on the Criminal Division had supervised espionage and Selective Service prosecutions. It was renamed the Internal Security Section in 1943.
18. Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Cox and Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/6/43.
19. Director Hoover interpreted the Attorney General's order as applying only to the list maintained by the Justice Department's special unit. (Memorandum from Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification, 8/14/43.
20. Memorandum from Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification, 8/14/43.
21. Bureau Bulletin No. 55, Series 1945, 9/12/45.
22. In early 1946 there were 10,763 Security Index cards on "communists and members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico." (Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to the Director, re: *Investigations of Communists*, 2/27/46.
23. Memorandum from Ladd to the Director, 8/30/45.
24. Bureau Bulletin No. 55, Series 1945, 9/12/45.
25. Although censorship is often regarded as being solely a counterintelligence step, it also constitutes a fruitful source of information in connection with intelligence production. For example, see: H.R. Rept. 1229, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., *The Shameful Years*, 30 Dec. 1951, p. 50. Described therein is an Office of Censorship intercept of ciphered messages written in invisible ink on letters between Mexico City and New York City concerning a conspiracy to free Trotsky's assassin from prison.

26. See: Letter, TAG, 6 June 1941, AG 324.71 (2-25-41). RA-A, sub: Assignment of Potentially Subversive Personnel.
27. Letter, TAG to all CG's, AG 230 (6-18-41) MC-B-M, 24 June 1941, sub: Control of Subversive Civil Service Personnel. DRB, TAG.
28. Letter, G-2 WDGS to all G-2's Corps Areas and Departments, 25 June 1941, MID 200.3, 25 June 1941 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.
29. Annex to Organizational Chart, General Staff (G-2), 5 December 1941, MID 321.19 G-2. ACSI Rec Sec. Chief of the CI Branch in MID on 7 December 1941 was Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) John T. Bissell. Censorship planning at that time was still being conducted by a small Information Control Branch under Maj. (later Maj. Gen.) W. Preston Corderman.
30. Letter Hoover to General Lee, 1 February 1942, MID 310.11 (5 August 1941). ACSI Rec Sec. The JAG seems to have agreed in general with Hoover's interpretation of this complicated subject, except for a belief that the FBI chief should formally direct his Honolulu office to continue performing its usual duties under the designated Military Governor. See: Directive, G-2 WD to G-2's all Corps Areas and Departments and PMG, 19 February 1942, MID 310.11 (5 August 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.
31. Letter, G-2 WDC to Chief CI Branch, MID, 10 January 1942, MID 323.3, 10 January 1942 (20 December 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.
32. Agreement for Coordination of the FBI, ONI, and MID, 9 February 1942, MID 310.11 (5 August 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.
33. *Ibid.* Note that the FBI reserved primary investigative responsibility for the more populous regions of Alaska and MID was not given any specific mission in respect to uncovering Japanese espionage, counter espionage, subversion or sabotage. This latter function, long a bone of contention between ONI and FBI, was now accepted as being a joint responsibility for these two agencies to share.
34. *A Report on the Office of Censorship*, "United States Government History Reports on War Administration," Series I, Washington, 1945, pp. 3-4.
35. Issued 15 February 1940, this BFM prescribed military censorship procedures largely as utilized by the AEF during WWI. The AEF, in turn, had copied most of these same procedures from the British.
36. Executive Order 8985, 19 December 1941. Following the establishment of OWI in June 1942, the Director of OWI replaced the Directors of the Office of Government Reports and the Office of Facts and Figures on this policy board.
37. File of Documents, "Org of G-2 MIS," MID 321.10 G-2, undated (19 September 1918), tab CPI to G-2. ACSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as "MIS Documents."
38. Letter TAG to major commanders, 14 June 1942, AG 381 (6-12-42) MS-B-M, copy in; G-2 350.092, 14 June 1942 (f/w 6 November 1943). ACSI Rec Sec.
39. *Ibid.*
40. MIS Documents, tab CPI to G-2.
41. *Ibid.*, Memo, Chief CIG to Chief MIS, 2 June 1942.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Memo (Immediate Action), Bissell for Kroner, 30 July 1942, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 30 July 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.
44. Letter, L. W. Hoelscher, Asst. Chief, Division of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget to Chief, MIS, 17 October 1942, reproduced in "MIS Study, CI Group," pt. II, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 25 November 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec. This survey was accomplished under the personal direction of George F. Schwarzwalder, Bureau of the Budget.
45. Memo, Bissell for Kroner, 26 November 1942, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 26 November 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.
46. Memo, Deputy CofS for ACofS G-2 and PMG (thru CG, SOS), 26 November 1942, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 26 November 1942, (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.
47. Memo, Strong for Deputy CofS, 30 November 1942, MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 30 November 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.
48. MID 321.19 G-2 CI, 2 December 19442 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec. In later reporting on the results

of this 26 November 1942 directive, Gen. Kroner estimated that it did achieve an initial economy of 8 officers and 59 civilians.

49. "Special Information Branch," MID 020. G-2 Spec Inf Br, pt. 1. ACSI Rec Sec. Many of these telephone conversations had to be monitored in a foreign language.
50. Memo, Chief Visa and Passport Branch to Chief Counterintelligence Group, MIS, 5 May 1942, MID 321.19 MIS CI, 5 May 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.
51. MIS Documents. Letter from Secretary of War to the Attorney General, 17 August 1942, tab Visa and Passport Branch. ACSI Rec Sec.
52. Memo, Exec to Personnel Sect., MIS, 21 August 1942, MID 321.19 MIS CI, 21 August 1942 (24 January 1942). ACSI Rec Sec.
53. MIS Documents, tab Visa and Passport Branch. ACSI Rec Sec.
54. *Ibid.*, tab CPI to G-2.
55. MIS Documents, tab Evaluation Branch, ACSI Rec Sec.
56. Headquarters AGF had organized a Military Intelligence Section but, in respect to military security, it remained mostly concerned with checking on unit counterintelligence training. See MID 020 AGF, 8 July 1942 (9 March 1942). DRB, TAG. On the other hand, Headquarters AAF formed a large Counterintelligence Division under the ACofS A-2, which became increasingly active in such operations as the war progressed. See: Chart, Training and Intelligence Organizations Army Air Forces, 30 November 1942, in Report of Intelligence Conference at Camp Richie, Md., undated, G-2 Sec AGF Files, and Memo, CofS Air Staff to CofS (Attn: ACofS), 28 March 1943, 350.09 CI, 28 March 1943 (14 Apr 1942). DRB, TAG.
57. Hist ASF, ch. II, pp. 1-3. The Security Control Group was mainly an inspection element for internal security purposes.
58. Col. Forney assumed charge of the Counterintelligence Group on 29 March 1943 but was formally designated to be Group Chief until 20 April 1943, the effective date of Col. Bissell's departure.
59. See MID 321.19, Wash Field Office, 8-25 June 1943 (8 June 1943) and Memo, 300.6, 7 July 1943,

Administration Memos 1943. ACSI Rec Sec.

60. Although the true subversive nature of the international Communist conspiracy had long been understood by the military intelligence authorities, it was not until 19 March 1943, that Communists were actually mentioned as such by name in official War Department instructions. See: File, Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, Tab "D", G-2 000.24, December 1944 (f/w 16 December 1946). ACSI Rec Sec.
61. One of these special units was the 620th Eng Gen Serv Co, constituted at Ft. Meade, South Dakota, on 1 November 1942 but subsequently moved to Camp Hale, Colorado, which also served as an interment center for POW's. A disaffected member of this special Co named Dale Maple, of wealthy parents and a Harvard graduate, aided the successful escape of two German POW's from their nearby barracks and then joined them in fleeing to Mexico. Apprehended by the Mexican authorities and returned to U.S. control early in 1944, he was convicted of violating both the 58th and 81st Articles of War and sentenced to be hanged. Although his conviction was confirmed under Presidential review, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. See: 201 Maple, Dale, cent Rec Off, Ft. Holabird, Md.
62. Letter TAG to major commanders, 19 May 1942, sub: Military Personnel Suspected of Disloyalty or Subversive Activity, AGO 014.311 (5-14-42) MC-B-M, copy in: CI File MID 200.3, 19 May 1942 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.
63. Memo, Lansdale to Crist, 14 October 1942, MID 200.3, 14 October 1942 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec. Also being handled in this same manner were the commissions awarded at Aviation Cadet Schools and certain others directly approved by the Surgeon General for the Medical or Medical Administrative Corps.
64. Letter, G-2 to DI's all Service Commands and ACofS G-2 WDC and Fourth Army, 10 November 1942, MID 200.31, 10 November 1942 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec.
65. Memo, ACofS G-2 for ACofS G-3, 13 February 1943, sub: Disposition of Communists, Enlisted Men, MID 200.3, 13 February 1943 (28 May 1941). ACSI Rec Sec. By this time about 100 Communists had been disposed of under the segregation policy, while it was estimated that not more than another 150 would be so-classified in the future.

66. Memo, Bissell for Strong, 29 January 1943, MID 200.3, 29 January 1943 (28 May 1941), ACSI Rec Sec.
67. File, Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, Tab D, copy of Letter, ACofS G-2 to D/I's and ACofS G-2's all major commands, G-2 000.24, December 1944 (f/w 16 December 1946). ACSI Rec Sec.
68. History of the Communist Question in the Army, initials L.R.F. (Col. Forney), undated 44, ACSI 000.244 (15 April 1943). ACSI Rec Sec.
69. Hearings before the Special Committee on Subversive Influences in the Army of the Committee on Military Affairs, H.R. 79th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to H. Res 20, 18 July 1945, p. 7.
70. File, Communists in the Army, Tab A, copy of Memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff, signed Malin Craig, 12 August 1943, ACSI 000.244, undated March 1944 (15 April 1943). ACSI Rec Sec. Two of the three individuals involved in this particular refusal had served in Spain with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
71. Memo, IG to Deputy CofS, 6 November 1943, MID 350.092, 6 November 1943 (6 November 1943). DRB, TAG.
72. *Ibid.*
73. This distinct emphasis on CIC activities at the expense of other specified phases of the investigation did not escape notice by the CIC officials at that time. See: Comments on Chapters II and VIII, Part V, 10 October 1957, Lt. Col. Franklin E. Jordan, USAIB. Author's file.
74. Memo, IG to Deputy CofS, 6 November 1943, MID 350.092, 6 November 1943 (6 November 1943). DRB, TAG. The CIC Branch of MIS, which was actually functioning as a CIC Headquarters, had been transferred to Baltimore in February 1943.
75. *Ibid.* According to the then Chief of the CI Group, only an incomplete copy of the IG's report was forwarded to MID after its approval. With much of the body of the report missing, there was still enough data remaining to indicate that the IG may have held a serious misconception of the real state of affairs in regard to G-2 control over service command counterintelligence operations. See Specific Comments on Chapter II, attached to letter from Col. L.R. Forney, USA Ret. to Maj. Gen. R.W. Stephens, Chief Mil Hist, 14 October 1957. Author's file.
76. WD Cir 324, 14 December 1943. The indicated changes were to become effective on 1 January 1944.
77. See CIC School Text, WWII, pp. 7-8.
78. As actually implemented the entire CIC establishment at Fort Holabird, including an extensive training center and the preparatory CIC school in Chicago were eliminated.
79. Memo, IG to Deputy CofS, 6 November 1943, MID 350.092, 6 November 1943. DRB, TAG.
80. MID Memo No. 43-M, 3 June 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
81. Hist MIS, War History of Source Control, Part III, p. 3. ACSI Rec Sec.
82. History of the Security Branch G-2, MID 314.7, undated (30 October 1942), pp. 1-2. ACSI Rec Sec.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-7.
84. History MID, WWII, pp. 242-43.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*
87. Memo, ACofS G-2 for the Deputy CofS, 17 April 1944, G-2 000.244, 17 April 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
88. Memo, Forney to Chief CI Div AAF, 27 April 1944, MID 200.3, 27 April 1944 and Memo for the Record, signed by L.R. Forney, 19 June 1944, G-2 000.244, 19 June 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
89. Memo for the CofS, prepared during May 1944 for General Bissell's signature, G-2 000.244, 1 May 1944, Tab B. ACSI Rec Sec.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 2. This bow to expediency was occasioned mostly by the fact that a heated political campaign devoted to gaining an unprecedented fourth term for President Roosevelt was already in full swing.
91. Memo for the Record, signed by L.R. Forney, 19 June 1944, G-2 000.244, 19 June 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
92. *Ibid.*
93. See Inter-Office Memo, Chief Policy Staff to ACofS G-2, 16 November 1944, MID 000.244, 16 November 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.

94. Memo, Bissell to McCloy, 23 November 1944, sub: Communism in the Army, MID 000.244, 23 November 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
95. Memo, McCloy to ACofS G-2, 28 November 1944, MID 000.244, 28 November 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
96. Memo, Bissell for McCloy, 5 December 1944, MID 000.244, 5 December 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
97. Memo, McCloy for ACofS G-2, 23 December 1944, MID 000.244, 23 December 1944, in comparison with para 2b, Letter, AG 014.311 (28 December 1944) OB-S-B-M, 30 December 1944, to all major commanders, sub: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel, copy in; CI File, G-2 200.3, 30 December 1944. ACSI Rec Sec.
98. H.R. Rpt. 839, 79th Cong., 1st sess., "Communist Activities Directed Toward United States Armed Forces," 29 June 1945, p. 2.
99. *Ibid.* and "History of the Communist Question in the Army," initialed L.R.F., ACSI 000.244, undated 44. ACSI Rec Sec.
100. Roosevelt to Jackson, 5/21/40. See Report on Warrantless FBI Electronic Surveillance.
101. Whitehead, *The FBI Story*, p. 225.
102. David Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (New York: Signet Books, 1973) (pb), pp. 11-16.
103. See Report on CIA and FBI Mail Opening; Memorandum From FBI to Select Committee, 9/23/75.
104. Sixth Corps Area, Emergency Plan—White, December 1936. AG No. 386, cited in *Military Surveillance*, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), p. 174.
105. Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President, 10/20/38.
106. Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division, 2/9/42.
107. Memorandum from Colonel Churchill, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID, to E.A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39, and enclosure, "Subject: Essential Items of Domestic Intelligence Information."
108. Victor J. Johnson, "The Role of the Army in the Civilian Arena, 1920-1970." U.S. Army Intelligence Command Study (1971). The scope of wartime Army intelligence has been summarized as follows: "It reported on radical labor groups, communists, Nazi sympathizers, and 'semi-radical' groups concerned with civil liberties and pacifism. The latter, well intentioned but impractical groups as one corps area intelligence officer labeled them, were playing into the hands of the more extreme and realistic radical elements, G-2 still believed that it had a right to investigate 'semi-radicals' because they undermined adherence to the established order by propaganda through newspapers, periodicals, schools, and churches." (Joan M. Jensen, "Military Surveillance of Civilians, 1917-1967," in *Military Intelligence*, 1974 Hearings, pp. 174-175).
109. Whitehead, *The FBI Story*, pp. 266,456.
110. Downes, *The Scarlet Thread*, pp. 87-97, cited in Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, p. 20.
111. Smith, *OSS*, P. 277.
112. *Ibid*, p. 21.
113. Whitehead, *The FBI Story*, pp. 277-278.
114. Smith, *OSS*, pp. 10-11.
115. Whitehead, *The FBI Story*, pp. 279-280; Smith, *OSS*, p. 366.
116. Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 2/27/46.
117. Personal and Confidential Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/8/46.
118. Memorandum from Ladd to Hoover, 2/27/46.
119. Executive Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 3/21/47.
120. Executive Order 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
121. *Report of the Royal Commission*, 6/27/46, pp. 82-83, 686-689. The report described how "a number of young Canadian, public servants and others who begin with a desire to advance causes which they consider worthy, have been inducted into joining study groups of the Communist Party. They are persuaded to keep this

adherence secret. They have then been led step by step along the ingenious psychological development course . . . until under the influence of sophisticated and unscrupulous leaders they have been persuaded to engage in illegal activities directed against the safety and interests of their own society.”

122. Eleanor Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 22.
123. Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 7/25/46 (Harry S. Truman Library.)
124. Minutes of the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/17/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
125. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Mr. Vaneck, Chairman, President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 2/14/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
126. Memorandum from S. J. Spingarn to Mr. Foley, 1/19/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
127. Memorandum from the FBI Director to the President’s Temporary Commission, 1/3/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
128. President’s Commission on Civil Rights, *To Secure These Rights* (1947), p. 52.
129. Executive Order 9835, part I, section 2; cf. Executive Order 10450, section 8(a) (5).
130. In 1960, for instance, the Justice Department advised the FBI to continue investigating an organization not on the Attorney General’s list in order to secure “additional information . . . relative to the criteria” of the employee security order. (Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Hoover, 5/17/60.)
131. Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, Re: President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/29/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
132. Report of the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 2/20/47, pp. 31-32.
133. Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/19/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
134. Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/31/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
135. Memorandum of George M. Eelsey, 5/2/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
136. Clifford advised, “Insomuch as ‘undercover’ and ‘infiltration’ tactics may become necessary, duplication will be costly and would jeopardize the success of both the FBI and Civil Service.” He added that the FBI “has a highly trained, efficiently organized corps of investigators. There are approximately 4,800 FBI agents now, 1,600 of whom are investigating Atomic Energy Commission employees. FBI expects to begin releasing these 1,600 shortly. . . . Civil Service, on the other hand, has few than 100 investigators, none of whom is especially trained in the techniques required in loyalty investigations. . . . It is precisely because of the dangers that I believe the FBI is a better agency than Civil Service to conduct loyalty investigations for new employees; the more highly trained, organized and administered an agency is, the higher should be its standards.” (Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/7/47.) (Harry S. Truman Library.)
137. Memorandum from Clifford to the President, 5/8/47. Letter from President Truman to H. B. Mitchell, United States Civil Service Commission, 5/9/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
138. Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, Re: Executive Order 9835, 5/12/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
139. Memorandum from Clifford to the President, 5/23/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
140. Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program*, pp. 33-34.
141. Memorandum from J. R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, to the Attorney General, 11/3/47.
142. FBI “name checks” are authorized as one of the “national agencies checks” required by Executive Order 10450, section 3(a).
143. FBI monograph, “The Menace of Communism in the United States Today” (1955), pp. iv-v; testimony of former FBI liaison with CIA, 9/22/75, P. 32.
144. The FBI official in charge of the Internal Security Section of the Intelligence Division in the fifties and early sixties testified that the primary purpose of FBI

investigations of Communist “infiltration” was to advise the Attorney General so that he could determine whether a group should go on the “Attorney General’s list,” and that investigations for this purpose continued after the Attorney General ceased adding names of groups to the list. (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 48, 49.)

^{145.} Memoranda from the Attorney General to Heads of Departments and agencies, 4/29/53; 7/15/73; 9/28/53; 1/22/54.

^{146.} Executive Order 10450, section 8 (a) (5).

^{147.} The FBI’s field offices were supplied with such “thumbnail sketches” or characterizations to supplement the Attorney General’s list and the reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. e.g., SAC Letter No. 60-34, 7/12/60. (The SAC Letter is a formal regular communication from the FBI Director to all Bureau field offices.)

^{148.} FBI Statutory Charter, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 95th Congress, Hearings June-September, 1978.

^{149.} This article was taken from the series, *United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*, written by Vincent C. Jones. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1985.

^{150.} Knowledge of the progress of the Germans, or the other Axis states, in atomic research and development was not based upon precise and accurate intelligence information, for such was not available to the Allies. Nevertheless, because the Allies lacked specific information to the contrary, they had to assume that at least Germany would make a serious attempt to develop atomic weapons. See Rpt to President, sub: Status of the tube Alloys Development, 9 Mar 42, Incl to Ltr, Bush to President, same date, HB Files, Fldr 58, MDR; DSM Chronology, 26 Sep42, Se. 2(e), OROO; MDH, Bk.1, Vol. 14, “Intelligence & Security,” p. .1, DASA; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, 140-41; MPCrpt, 7 Aug 44, Incl to Memo, Groves to Chief of Staff, same date, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab K, MDR.

^{151.} Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War*; pp. 27-31 and 246-55.

^{152.} *Ibid.* pp. 246-47; Ltr Compton to Conant 8 Dec 42 Admir1 Files Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Rpts) MAR. Compton’s letter to Conant complained that the security-inspired policy of compartmentalization was delaying determination of the purify standards that must be met for the plutonium to be employed in an atomic weapon. This well illustrates the recurring conflict in the Manhattan Project between the demands of the program and the requirements of security.

^{153.} 5 MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14 p. 71 DASA, OCE Cir 1070, sub: Org for Protective Scty Svc in OCE Constr Div and in Office of Div and Area Engrs, 15 Jun 42, CE 025.1 CXP, Engrs Library, Fort Belvoir, Va.; Ms, Capt C. J. Bernardo, “Counterintelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II” (Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Md.: CIC School, n.d.) p. 4 and 13, NARS; Ms, Army Service Forces, Intelligence Division,” 4 vols. (Army Service Forces, ca. 1946), 1(2):13-14, 1(9):10-11, NARS; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 138.

^{154.} An organization formerly called a corps area, serving as a field agency of the Army Service Forces in a specified area. Under the reorganization of the War Department on 9 Mar 42, there were nine geographical service commands throughout the United States, each providing services (including administrative, financial, legal, statistical, medical, welfare, etc., for Army elements), constructing facilities, furnishing fixed communication services, and procuring, storing, maintaining, and distributing supplies and equipment for Army use. See WD ‘I’M 20-205, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 1944, p. 249.

^{155.} MDH, Bk. 1, vol. 14, p. 7.1-7.2, DASA; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 138-39; Marshall Diary, 20 July 42, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, Groves Files, Misc Tecs Sec, behind Fldr 5, MDR; Ltr. Lansdale to Col. R.W. Argo Jr. (Dep Chief of Mil Hist), 3 Jan 75, CMH.

^{156.} MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, p 7.2, DASA; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 138-39.

^{157.} MDH, Bk. 1, Vol 14, pp. 7.2-7.4, DASA.

^{158.} Org Charts, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, 15 Aug and 1 Nov 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 020 (MED-Org), MDR; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 139.

159. Ms. ASF, "Hist Intel Div," I(9):10-11; Ms, Bernardo, "CIC Hist," pp. 14-15. Both in NARS. WD Cir 324 sub: Transfer of Ci Functions within the ZI, 14 dec 43. Memos, CG OIG (Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson) to Dep Chief of Staff (Lt Gen Joeseeph T. McNarmey), sub: Intel Activities in Svc Cmds, 6 Nov 43, and Col O. L. Nelson (Asst to McNarney) to CG ASF and to ACS G-2, same sub, 25 Nov 43, reproduced in Monograph, Office of the Provost Marshal General, "The Loyalty Investigations Program," Tab 45, CM (see also pp. 52-58 for details on the elimination of unnecessary investigations). Millett, Army Services Forces, pp. 358-59. Ltr, strong to CG 4th Svc Cmc, sub: Personel on DSM Proj. 27 Dec 43, reproduced in MDH, Bk 1, Voll. 14, App. A2, DASA. *Ibid.*, Pp 7.5-7.7, DASA. WD Bur of Pub Rels, sub: Script for Radio Broadcasts, 12 Aug 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Radio Broadcasts), MDR.
160. Ltr. Lansdale to Argo, 3 Jan 75, CMH, Testimony of Lansdale in Oppenheimer Hearing, pp. 259-60.
161. Org Carts, U.S. Enrs Office, MD, 15 Feb 44, MDR: MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14 pp.7.7-7.8, DASA; Memo Strong to G ASF, sub: CIC Detachment for MD, 18 Dec 43, reproduced in *Ibid.*, App. B3, DASA; Ltr, Col Donald E. Antes (Spec Insp for Fiscal Procedures) to Groves, sub: Investigation of Promotions, MD/NTEL Br, 13 July 45, Admin Files, General Corresp. 319.1 (Recs/ Nsp: Hanford, 1945-46), MDR.
162. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol.14, pp.7.2-7.13 and Aoo, A7 (Org Chart), DASA; Memo, Col Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (Dep Dist Engr) to Groves, sub: Insp of Intel Div,Oak Ridge, 15 Dec 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 319.1 (Insp of Intel Div), MDR.
163. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp141-42. See also MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp.2.1-2.2, DASA.
164. Discussion of Oppenheimer security clearance based on Oppenheimer Hearing, especially testimony of Oppenheimer, Groves, Pash, and Bush; Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: Loyalty Clearance of J.R. Oppenheimer, 24 Mar 47, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 333.5 (Clearance Ltrs), MDR; Groves, Comments on Draft Ms "Now It Can Be Told," LRG; Interv, British writer Hailey with creoves, 13 Dec 57, LRG.
165. See Rpt, MID, sub: Investigations of Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians, Local 25,13 Aug 43, Incl to Memo, Groves to Bundy, 17 Aug 43, HB Files, Fldr 61, MDR.
166. Memo, Pash to Lansdale, sub: J.R. Oppenheimer, 29 Jun 43, reproduced in *Oppenheimer Hearing*, pp.821-22.
167. Memo, Groves to Secy War, sub: Loyalty Clearance of J. R. Oppenheimer, 24 Mar47, MDR.
168. Details on appointment of special agents and surveillance squads based on MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 2.3-2.4, DASA; Ltr,Lansdale to Agro, 3 Jan 75, CMH; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 139; MPC rpt, 21 Aug 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab E, MDR. The section on Russian activities, which deals with espionage incidents at Berkeley, provides a good example of Grove's reports to the Top Policy Group on intelligence developments.
169. Ms, ASF, "Hist Intel Div," 1(7):8-10, NARS.
170. MPC Rpt, 21 Aug 43, MDR; MPC Min, 29 Dec 44, Exhibit F (summary of U.S.-based counterintelligence developments affecting the Manhattan Proj), OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files,Flldr 23, Tab A, MDR; Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Secy State James F.Byrnes, 13 May 45, OCG Files,Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 12, Tab D, MDR.
171. In 1954, Oppenheimer testified before the AEC's Personnel Security Board, which was holding hearings to consider serious charges against the former director of the Los Alamos Laboratory that would lead ultimately to the withdrawl of his government security clearance. Oppenheimer admitted that he had fabricated the story about Chevalier's espionage activities; however, he never adequately explained why he had done so. Oppenheimer's testimony in 1954 and documents relating to it are in Oppenheimer Hearing, passim. For fuller accounts of the Oppenheimer case see Strauss, *Men and Decisions*, pp. 267-95, and Phillip M. Stern, *The Openheimer Case: Security on Trial* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). For further details on espionage activities at the Radiation Laboratory and the Oppenheimer case see MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 25, Tab C, MDR; Mpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR; Interv, Author with Lt Col Peer de Silva (former CIC staff member, G-2, West Def Cmd, with special assistant to Rad Lab), 8Apr 75, CMH; Diary of Lt Col E.H. Mardsen (hereafter cited as Mardsen Diary), 20 July 43, OROO. Mardsen was the District's executive officer.

- ¹⁷² MPC Min, 10 May 44, MDR; MPC Rpt, 7 Aug 44, MDR; Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groves to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR.
- ¹⁷³ Rpt, sub: Summary [of] Russian Situation, Incl to Memo, Groes to Byrnes, 13 May 45, MDR.
- ¹⁷⁴ Postwar revelations of espionage activities at Los Alamos during World War II may be traced in Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 143-45, and in Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947-1952, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, Vol. 2 (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), pp. 312-14, 415, 472.
- ¹⁷⁵ MPC Rpt, 4 Feb 44, MDR.
- ¹⁷⁶ MDH, Bk. 1 Vol. 14, pp. 2.5-2.6, DASA. For a detailed discussion of typical measures undertaken to provide for the physical and personnel security of a specific project installation—in this instance, the gaseous diffusion project at Clinton—see MDH, Bk. 2, Vol. 1, “General Features,” pp. 6.2-6.3, Vol. 2 “Research,” pp. 9.2-9.4, Vol. 3, “Design,” pp. 16.2-16.6, Vol. 4, “Construction,” p. 4.2, and Vol. 5, “Operation,” pp. 9.2-9.10, DASA.
- ¹⁷⁷ Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 104-05; MDH, Bk. 5, Vol. 3, “Design,” p. 4.6 and Vol. 5, “Construction,” pp. 3.0-3.11, DASA.
- ¹⁷⁸ Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, 112-13; Completion Rpt, M. W. Kellogg Co. and Kellogg Corp., sub: K-25 Plant, Contract W-7405-eng-23, 31 Oct 45, p. 12 OROO.
- ¹⁷⁹ MPC Min, 24 Feb 45, MDR; Memo, Matthias to Groves, sub: 10 Mar 45 Power Outage, 29 Mar 45, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 675, MDR; Matthias Diary, 25 Feb and 10-11 Mar 45, OROO.
- ¹⁸⁰ MDH, Bk. 1 Vol. 14, pp. 2, 10-2.11, DASA; Mardsen Diary, 20 Jul 43, OROO; Nichols, Comments on Draft Hist “Manhattan,” Incl to Ltr, Nichols to Chief of Mil Hist, 25 Mar 74, CMH; Compton, *Atomic Quest*, pp. 183-84.
- ¹⁸¹ AR 380-5, 28 Sep 42. The War Department issued a substantially revised version of AR 380-5 on 15 Mar 44, adding the category Top Secret to the previously existing categories Secret, Confidential, and Restricted.
- ¹⁸² *Ibid.*, Sec 1, Par. 9.
- ¹⁸³ Quotations from MD, Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Infr Regs, 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, App. B7, DASA.
- ¹⁸⁴ Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 80 and 140; Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy*, p. 150; Talk, Groves to Women’s Patriotic Conf on Natl Def (25-27 Jan 46), sub: “The Atomic Bomb,” Admin Files, gen Corresp, 337 (Women’s Patriotic Conf on Nat’l Def), MDR; Memo, Marshall to Only Those Concerned, sub: DSM Proj-Clinton Engr Works, 18 May 43, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 28, Tab A, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 6.3-6.4, DASA.
- ¹⁸⁵ Memo, Grove to Compton and Oenheimer, sub: Interchange of Infor Between Chicago and Los Alamos, 17 Jun 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Tolman), MDR.
- ¹⁸⁶ Excerpts from Szilard’s statements before Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy given in memo, Nichols to Groves, 12 Jan 46, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 201 (Szilard), MDR.
- ¹⁸⁷ Memo for File, William S. Shurcliff, sub: Transcript of Notes Taken on 8-11 Oct 44 trip to Chicago, 14 Oct 44, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (mtgs), MDR. Shurcliff, a liaison official with the OSRD, talked to Szilard about security measures and recorded his comments in this memorandum.
- ¹⁸⁸ Ltr, Condon to Oppenheimer, 26 Apr 43, Investigation Files, Gen Corresp, Personnel Scty Investigations (Condon), MDR.
- ¹⁸⁹ Ltr, Compton to Conant, 8 Dec 42, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 719.1, MDR.
- ¹⁹⁰ Ltr, Tolman to Groves, 11 Jun 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 00.71 (Releasing Info), MDR. See also Ltr, Teller to Urey, Incl to Memo, Nichols to Groves, 11 Aug 43, and Ltr, Oppenheimer to Groves, sub: Liason With Site X, 4 Oct 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001, MDR.
- ¹⁹¹ Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy*, pp. 150-51. See Ch. X.
- ¹⁹² As quoted by Alice Kimball Smith in *A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement and America, 1945-47* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 95.

- ^{193.} Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 140.
- ^{194.} *Ibid.* (source of first quotation), p. 360; MD, Intel Bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs (source of second quotation), 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, DASA.
- ^{195.} MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, "Auxiliary Activities," Ch. 1, pp. 2.4-2.5, DASA. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 360-62; Stimson Diary, 14-15 Feb 44, HLS.
- ^{196.} Memo, Bush to Bundy, 24 Feb 44, OCG Files, Gen corresp, MP Files, Fldr14, Tab A, MDR; Stimson Diary, 18 Feb 44, HLS.
- ^{197.} Stimson Diary (source of quotation), 10 Jun 44, HLS; Memo for File, Bus, 10 Jun 44, OCG Files, Gen Corresp, MP Files, Fldr 14, tab A, MDR; MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch.1, pp.2.8-2.11, DASA.
- ^{198.} Stimson Diary, 26 (source of quoted words) and 28 Feb 45, HLS; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p.363; MDH, Bk.1, Vol. 4, Ch 1 pp. 2.5-2.6, DASA.
- ^{199.} Stimson Diary, 31 Mar 45, HLS.
- ^{200.} *Ibid.*, 15 Mar, 2, 6-11, and 25 Apr, 4 and 30 May 45, HLS. Groves Diary, 22-24 May 45, LRG. Notes on Trip to Knoxville, Tenn., 10 Apr 45, Incl to Memo, Kyle to Bundy, 11 Apr 45; Stimson to Bush, 31 Mar 45, and Bush to Stimson, 2 Apr 45. All in HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR. MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 1, pp. .12-2.13, DASA. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 363-65. Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp.302 and 339-40.
- ^{201.} WD, U.S. Engrs Office, MD, Protective Scty Manual, 1 Feb 43, reproduced in MDH, Bk. 1 Vol. 14, App. C5, DASA.
- ^{202.} MD, Intel bull 5, Safeguarding Mil Info Regs, 27 Nov 43 (revised 1 Sep 44), Sec. 3, DASA.
- ^{203.} Mdh, BK. 1. Vol.14, pp. 6.3-6.5, DASA; Memo, Marshall to Only Those Concerned, sub: [Use of Cover Names], 2 Nov 43, Admin files, Gen Corresp. 680.2 (Visits), MDR; compton, *Atomic Quest*, p. 182.
- ^{204.} MDH, Bk. 1, Vol. 14, p. 6.7-6.8, DASA.
- ^{205.} Memo, Matthias to Grove, sub: Public Mtgs in Which Du Pont Participated, 23 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 001 (Mtgs), MDR: Matthias Diary, 20 and 28 Apr 43, OROO.
- ^{206.} *Ibid.*, pp. 6.10-6.11, DASA.
- ^{207.} *Ibid.*, pp. 6.12-6.15, and Bk. 5, Vol. 6, "Operation," p. 6.1 and App. B1, DASA; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 146.
- ^{208.} Strong's Reaction to the Proposal during a discussion with general Styer, who later reported the discussion to Groves in Memo, Styer to Groves, 18 Feb 43, AG 1.3 (22 Aug 47), copy in CMH. See also Memo, Bush to Styer, 13 Feb 43, Admin files, Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 146.
- ^{209.} Price, sub: Note to Editors and Broadcasters-Confidential-Not for Publication, 28 Jun 43, Incl to Ltr, Howard to Groves, 28 Jun 43, Admin Files, gen corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR. See also Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 146; MPC Min, 24 Jun 43, MDR.
- ^{210.} Ltr, Howard to Lt Col Whitney Ashbridge (Asst, Opns Br, Constr Div, OCE), 1 Apr 43, Admin Files, Gen corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, pp. 146-47.
- ^{211.} Ltr. Groves to Oppenheimer, 1 Nov 43; Ltr, Capt Peer de Silva (Santa Fe Area Intel Off) to Landsdale, sub: Censorship at Los Alamos, 8 Nov 43; Memo, Landsdale to Groves, same sub, 10 Nov 43. All in Admin Files, gen Corresp, 311.7 (Santa Fe), MDR, Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 147.
- ^{212.} Memo (source of first quotation), Groves to Secy War, sub: Publicity Concerning DSM Proj, 15 Dec 43; Memo (source of second quotation), Groves to Secy War, sub: Violation of Vital Scty Provs by Brig Gen Thomas A. Frazier, 10 Jan 44, and Incl; Rpt, Landsdale, sub: Publicity Concerning Clinton Engr Works, 3 Jan 44. All in HB Files, Fldr 62, MDR. References to atomic energy and the atomic project- some intentional, some accidental- occurred many times in the public media during the war. Examples of those investigated by Manhattan District security officials may be found in HB Files, Fldr 7, MDR, and in Admin Files, Gen Corresp, 000.73 (Censorship), MDR.

CI in the OSS

End Notes

1. The problem of X-2 operational communications was never satisfactorily resolved. X-2 communications, unlike other OSS traffic, were not read for information by other OSS officers or branch staffs in Washington or in the field. However, several incidents of using X-2 communications to by-pass normal OSS channels finally resulted in the compulsory review of all X-2 messages in Washington by the Director's office and in the field by the Strategic Services Officers.
2. Vetting is the process of checking all available CE files to ascertain whether the individual in question has ever been reported to have unfavorable or potentially dangerous associations.
3. British Military Intelligence 5 was responsible for home security, while MI-6 (V) took care of security abroad. These might roughly be compared to the FBI (responsible for the entire Western Hemisphere) and OSS/X-2.
4. Two additional sections, the Art and Insurance Units, were added.
5. See "X-2/Italy, above and "X-2/France, below.
6. These had been previously available to SO through its close integration with SOE.
7. The SCI War Room had previously maintained liaison with MI-5 and with the French through one officer from each of these services.
8. Reports on the extreme vulnerability to enemy saboteurs of Allied supply lines were unfortunately ignored by Services of Supply.
9. See "X-2/France", below.
10. See Washington section on X-2.
11. This paper is reprinted with the approval of Mr. Timothy J. Naftali, a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
12. Maj. Graham Erdwurm to X-2 London, Oct 24, 1944, Box 4, Entry 121 RG 226, NA.
13. Mark Clark's 5th Army went into hibernation in October 1944. The British 8th Army did not continue its northern push through Christmas 1944. However it was behind the 5th Army and did not reach Bologna before the spring of 1945.
14. Sicherheitsdienst, or SD, was the intelligence arm of Heinrich Himmler's Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). Although the Militarisches Amt also belonged to the RSHA, it was composed of former members of the defunct military intelligence service, the Abwehr. As of October 1944, the Germans had three radio agents reporting from Allied-occupied territory. These agents, who were not under Allied control, regularly communicated with their German case officers from Florence, Leghorn, and Rome, respectively. British SCI, "German Espionage and Sabotage Activities in Italy, 1944," Box 23, Entry 119, RG 226, NA.
15. October and November 1944 brought the peak of German line-crossing activities in Italy. The Germans attempted "at least a hundred" of these crossings with a 50 percent success rate.
16. According to Robinson O. Bellin, whom Angleton was to replace as head of the X-2 field unit (SCI Z), "a disaster" befell the unit in October 1944 because of a poorly planned operation designed to root out stay-behind agents in Rome. The scale of this disaster resists definition, yet it may very well explain the urgency with which Erdwurm sought Angleton's arrival. Responsibility for this plan is also not clear, for it was formulated in the confusing weeks during which Andrew Berding passed the leadership of the unit to Bellin. Bellin, whose career in X-2 was marked by careful investigative work and consistent preparation, denies that he planned this operation.
17. Norman H. Peason to J. R. Murphy, Oct 23, 1944, Box 57, Entry 119, RG 226, NA.
18. Favorable reviews of this book reveal widespread agreement with the thrust of Mangold's argument. For example, see Tom Bower's review, "Lost in a wilderness of mirrors," *The Sunday Times*, June 23, 1991. Among works on Angleton, an important exception in tone and perspective is the chapter, "The Theorist," in Robin

Winks's rich book on Elis in the U.S. intelligence community. See *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961*, New York, 1987, pp. 322-437.

19. November 1944: Angleton appointed head of SCI Z, X-2's Italian field unit headquartered in Rome. April 1945: Angleton appointed head of X-2 Italy. December 1945: Angleton appointed head of SSU Italy. November 1947: Angleton returns to Washington, where he become Special Assistant to Col. Donald H. Galloway, Assistant Director for Special operations at the new CIA. See Winks, *Cloak and Gown*, p. 383. Regarding Galloway's position, see Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950*, University Park, PA, 1990, pp. 11, 270-271.
20. These were the émigré information service of the former Croat government, the information service of the democratic Croat emigration, the French SDECE, the chief intelligence service of the Georgian Republic, the Italian Naval Intelligence Service, the Italian Pubblica Sicurezza, and the Yugoslav OZNA.
21. Regarding the regularity of reports from SIM and SIS, see Entry 108A, RG 226, NA; regarding the Soviet and Yugoslav ciphers, see Angleton's comments to NHP, in undated letter: James J. Angleton to NHP, Wooden File, Box 3, File: "XX," Norman Holmes Pearson Collection, the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University: Hereafter James Jesus Angleton will be referred to as JJA.
22. Although there is no concise statement available of Angleton's political philosophy in this early period, his emphasis on the role of power in international affairs and his unwillingness to rank ideologies in terms of potential threat to the United States betray a Realist point of view. See Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, 1986, pp. 7-16, for a useful discussion of political realism.
23. In his seminal work on intelligence as an instrument of foreign policy making, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Sherman Kent referred to the 1945 Gouzenko case in Canada as an example of the value of counterintelligence as a source bearing on foreign intentions. pp. 216-217.
24. For a good discussion of the distinction between counterespionage and security, see Christopher Felix (James McCargar), *A Short Course in the Secret War*, second. ed., New York, 1988, pp. 126-127.
25. Naftali, *X-2: An Appreciation*. For a succinct description of X-2's various field responsibilities, see Office of Strategic Services, Planning Group, "Counterespionage Field Manual-Strategic Services, (Provisional)," Aug. 24, 1944, Box 2, Entry 176, RG 226, NA.
26. Angleton wrote: "In practice, a certain overlapping of X-2 (counterespionage) and SI (positive intelligence) functions exists, particularly in this turbulent period before the peace conference when most secret political activities of foreign powers are conducted through intelligence services' contacts and networks." JJA to the Director, SSU, Mar 18, 1946, "Consolidated Progress Report for November, December 1945 and January 1946," Box 268, Entry 108A, RG 226. NA.
27. JJA to JRM, "Activity Report SCI/Z Units, 1-30 September 1945," Box 259, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. JJA, interview with the author, Sept. 16, 1986, Washington, DC.
31. BB068 (Maj. Graham Erdwurm) to JJ001 (James R. Murphy) and Chief, X-2 London, Oct. 10, 1944, "Pair," Box 20 Entry 119, RG 226, NA. For evidence of the use of the term ISOS, see F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 4, *Security and Counter-Intelligence*, London, 1990, p. 183.
32. Naftali, *X-2: An Appreciation*.
33. (Undated), X-2 Branch OSS," Box 80, Entry 99, RG 226, NA.
34. Naftali, *X-2: An Appreciation*. Since ULTRA was their source, the British added the proviso that they were to have veto power over the indoctrination of any American officer, most of whom would be trained in London. Interview with JRM, Nov. 16, 1983. An unfortunate side effect of X-2's exclusive access to ULTRA was the envy and suspicion of the other operational branches of the OSS, all of which were required for security purpose to share the names of agents and contacts with X-2, but none of which were told the reason for their sister branch's extreme secretiveness. The close cooperation with the British necessitated by the ULTRA link also served to widen the gulf between X-2 and the other branches.

35. James Angleton, interview, Dec. 15, 1983. Angleton argued that a successful counterespionage service required a superior source, either in the form of signals intelligence or another significant penetration.
36. Hinsley and Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, 4: 180-183.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 182. The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC and CS) issued 268,000 counterintelligence decrypts during World War II, of which 250,000 were deciphered German intelligence messages.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 183. There are a few examples of ISOS/PAIR at the National Archives. Box 1, Entry 138, RG 226 holds some paraphrases of original decrypts pertaining to stay-behind networks in Europe.
39. A complete set of Angleton's Keys and their addenda are located in Boxes 10-13, Entry 174, RG 226. NA. Angleton introduced the concept to his superiors in Jan. 1945, Box 206, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
40. In July 1945, Angleton wrote "Interrogations of captured GIS (German Intelligence Service) personalities to date have released much information which previously made it impossible to include in the KEYS." JJA to Major Erdwurm, July 3, 1945, "Appreciation of GIS KEYS," Box 255, Entry 108A, RG 226. NA.
41. An excellent example of a personality file is the one that the Rome Police (JK4, also known as the PANSY group) turned over to Angleton on the socialite Barbara Hutton. JJA to JRM, "Barbara Hutton," Apr. 2, 1946, Box 270, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
42. See the "Instrument of Surrender of Italy, September 29, 1943," *Treaties and Other International Act Series*, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. No. 1604. This document does not include any direct references to the Italian military intelligence services. It can be assumed that these services are subsumed in references to the Italian military. It may also be assumed that with the end of Allied military government in most of Italy in late 1945, the prohibitions on independent Italian military intelligence operations ceased.
43. Lt. Col. James H. Angleton to C.O., Hqs., 2677th Regt., OSS (Prov.) Aug 4, 1945, "Duty Assignment Completed as of 2400 hours, July 29, 1945," Box 120, Entry 174, RG 226, NA.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Andrew Berding and Robinson Bellin led the X-2 field unit successively from its establishment in Naples in January 1944. In making his October 1944 plea for Angleton's assignment to the field, Erdwurm's had contrasted the weak liaisons then in place with what Berding had achieved (see note 1). Despite Erdwurm's outburst, Berding's successor, Bellin, was not without his own achievements in liaison. As a consequence of the Cornacchia Abwehr case, Bellin established trust between X-2 and the Rome headquarters of the Pubblica Sicurezza, which led to a sharing of police archives and the use of police investigators by the perennially short-staffed X-2 field unit. See Bellin, "Notes for Symposium." There is reason to believe that Bellin's contacts in the Pubblica Sicurezza became the PANSY group that later undertook investigative duties for and provided police information to Angleton. Names of police officers on a PANSY document dated Dec. 28, 1944 are identical to those listed in an October 1944 document detailing a joint operation involving Bellin and the Pubblica Sicurezza (Undated), Regia Questura Di Roma, Commissariato de P.S. di Castro Pretorio, Arresto Di Fede Giovacchino, agente del servizio di informazioni nemico," Box 261, Entry 174, RG 226, NA. There is textual evidence that this document was produced in October 1944.
46. Angleton described the affair in "Memo No. 139" to X-2 London, Dec. 1, 1944. Box 205, Entry 108A, RG 226. Forty years later, Bellin said that he had not wanted to close down the Marine Unit: "I had learned that a member of the Decima Flottiglia MAS had been detected passing information to the Germans. Very soon after I read this report, I received a delegation consisting of two American naval officers from the OSS Marine Unit and an Italian naval officer. The Marine Unit wanted me to issue a security clearance, giving SCI's (X-2 field unit) benediction to use (sic) by the MU, of the Decima FM. I declined respectfully, saying that I had no objection to their use of the Italian group, but that I did not have enough information to grant a wholesale security clearance. Perhaps I was being over-cautious, but my intuition told me to be careful." Bellin, letter to the author, Jan. 10, 1987.
47. Hinsley and Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, 4: 183.
48. CB015 (Robinson O. Bellin) to X-2 Washington and London, "Borghese," Oct 19, 1944, Box 114, Entry 174, RG 226. NA.

- ^{49.} See SALTY (Carlo Resio of the Italian Naval Intelligence Service) report on Capitano di Fregata, Junio Valero Borghese, JJA to X-2 London, "Memo No. 429," Jan 27, 1945, Box 207, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{50.} Calosi is identified as head of the Italian Naval Intelligence Service, SIS, in a memorandum prepared for the State Department by SSU, "Changes in Naval Intelligence Key Personnel, Italy," June 17, 1946, CIA Research Reports: Europe, 1946-76, Microfilm, University Publications of America, 1983, Roll 3.
- ^{51.} *Ibid.* For biographical information on Resio, see "Report by Capt/Freg. Carlo Resio On His Activities From November 1939 to December 1944," Box 115, Entry 174, RG 226, NA. Before the Italian Armistice, Resio had headed Section D of the SIS, which was responsible for all naval intelligence gathering abroad. In September 1943, fearing German capture, he ordered the destruction of all of the files of Section D and set up a clandestine SIS in Rome.
- ^{52.} Angleton assigned maritime code names to all of his contacts in Italian Naval Intelligence. Aside from SALTY, Angleton received reports from BEACON, CORAL, and TAR. The code name for the Italian SIS was SAIL, Box 254, RG 226, NA. Strong evidence that Resio was SALTY comes from the cover letter, BB090 (chief, Italian desk, X-2 London) to JJA, "Carlo Resio," Mar 5, 1945, Box 115, Entry 174, RG 226, NA. Handwritten at the top of this document is "SALTY." "SALTY's identity is also strongly suggested by the statement in a May 1945 report that "ARTIFICE will enter MILAN in company with PATERNI, MACAULEY, CALDEERON, CERUTTI, and SALTY," BB090 to SAINT DH001 (chief, X-2 Washington), "SCI/Z Activities," May 2, 1945, Box 20, Entry 109, RG 226, NA. This was just after Angleton and Resio had jointly prepared operations in northern Italy.
- ^{53.} See SCI Z (X-2 Rome) memos 419-439 and 442-447, all dated Jan 27, 1945, from "SALTY," Box 207, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{54.} When X-2 Washington learned in February 1945 that one of Angleton's sources, DUSTY, was also passing information to the Soviets, it cabled Rome: "It is our understanding that present policy does not permit activities either with or against these persons, and in view of present political and diplomatic activities, it would seem particularly dangerous to under take contact with such persons at this time." Box 248, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{55.} X-2 Washington to JJA, Feb 26, 1945, Box 248, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{56.} *Ibid.*
- ^{57.} Another explanation for the absence of subsequent political intelligence reporting from Resio is that after February 1945 he confined himself to cooperation on operational matters with X-2 and left the sharing of intelligence to his subordinates. When X-2 Rome renamed its intelligence sources in the spring of 1945, Resio became JH1/1.
- ^{58.} Confidential interviews.
- ^{59.} JJA to Lt. Col. P.G.S. Mero, Signal Section, OSS, Mar. 3, 1945, "Plan IVY," Box 207, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{60.} In February 1945 Resio provided X-2 with 21 radio operators. There was a shortage of radiomen across the branches of the OSS. After screening by X-2, these men were parceled out to the other branches, with only a few staying in counterespionage. These operators took part in the intelligence assault on northern Italy. JJA to X-2 London, Mar 13, 1945, Box 252, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{61.} Box 282, Entry 174, RG 226, NA.
- ^{62.} Stato Maggiore Della R. Marina (Italian Royal Navy), "Organizzazione segreta della X M.A.S.," Aug 11, 1945, Box 128, Entry 174, Rg 226, NA.
- ^{63.} Angleton wrote in July 1945: "We are afraid that IVY was somewhat responsible for the great success in shooting spies by the CLN (partisans)," JJA to X-2 London, July 18, 1945, Box 256, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ^{64.} X-2 contacted Borghese in Milan through one of its agents and brought him to Rome. He was transferred to CSDIC (Combined Services Interrogation Centre) after the British were informed. His arrest record had been falsified to prevent the Italian government from knowing he was in custody. It seems likely that Carlo Resio and the Italian Navy knew of his capture. Resio and Angleton visited jointly visited Milan soon after its

liberation, exactly at the time that Borghese's transfer was being negotiated by X-2. JJA to AC of S, G-2, CI, AFHQ, May 19, 1945, Box 254, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA. For evidence that Resio and Angleton went to Milan together see Italian Desk, X-2 London (BB090) to X-2 Washington, May 2, 1945, Box 122, Entry 174, RG 226, NA.

65. *Ibid.* JJA to Commander Titolo, Nov. 6, 1945, Box 260, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA. Angleton attempted to prevent Borghese's execution by the Italians because of X-2's "long term interest" in him. Although Angleton had to give him up to the Italians in late 1945, Borghese survived well into the 1970s.

66. JJA to JRM, Dec 13, 1945, "Transmittal of Letter," Box 261, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

67. JJA to JRN, Jan. 19, 1946, "Publication Desired for Liaison," Box 262; JJA to JRM, Feb. 21, 1946, "Magazines," Box 266, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

68. (Undated), JJA to NHP, Wooden File, Box 3, File: "XX," Pearson Collection, Yale University. "Either with Rock (Ray Rocca) or separately I am sending the latest crypt stuff. I believe that you will appreciate the effort put into this work by JK1/14. He is doing this solely for us." From internal evidence it appears the letter was written in early 1946, after Angleton returned from his November 1945 trip to Washington and before Pearson left X-2 in May 1946.

69. *Ibid.*

70. Angleton assigned the prefix JK1 to all cryptonyms for contacts in the SIS. See Entry 108A, RG 226, NA for reports from JK1/1, JK1/2, JK1/3, JK1/4, JK1/5, JK1/6, JK1/7, JK1/8, JK1/11, JK1/14. The use of JK1/14 implies that there were 14 informants, although no reports from JK1/9, JK1/10, JK1/12 or JK1/13 have been found in this entry.

71. JJA, "Consolidated Progress Report for November, December 1945 and January 1946," Mar 18, 1946, Box 268, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

72. "Status of Liaison Relations of SSU/X-2 To the Counter-Intelligence Branches of Foreign Special Services," (1946), Wooden File, Box 1, File: "IV Thoreau OK," Pearson Collection, Yale University.

73. X-2 London to X-2 Washington, "German and Japanese Penetration of OSS in ETO (European theater of operations)," July 7, 1945. William J. Donovan

Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

74. JJA to Francis Kalnay, chief of X-2 Venice, Oct. 31, 1945. Box 260, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA. "Our present difficulty is mainly that of evaluating the various reports which have been produced by yourself, No.5 SCI Unit and the SIM/CS (Italian CE), and SCI Unit Z, Trieste. I feel that the time must come to carefully examine and control the Balkan information obtained in Italy during the past four months, and, therefore, we would appreciate your comments.

75. There are a few clues to the identity of JK1/8. The comparison of two documents regarding contacts between the Italian Navy and Albanian resistance narrows considerably the possible candidates. See documents JZX-7590, Apr. 8, 1946 (Box 270, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.), and JZX-7719, Apr. 9, 1946 (Box 271, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA), respectively. Further corroborative evidence can be found in the "CUBA" file (Box 261, Entry 174, RG 226, NA), where a note from double agent CUBA to JK1/8 appears to confirm JK1/8's identity as the former SIS Istanbul chief.

76. JJA comment on report, X-2 Italy to Washington, "Propaganda and Penetration of Left-Wing Parties vis-à-vis the Italian Royal Navy," Feb 11, 1946, Box 265, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

77. JJA, "Consolidate Progress Report for November, December 1945 and January 1946," Mar. 18, 1946, Box 268, RG 226, NA.

78. Capt. Henry R. Nigrelli, C.O., SCI Z Genoa, to JJA, Apr. 3, 1946, Box 143, Entry 174, RG 226, NA.

79. See two reports by JK1/8 pouched Oct. 7, 1946 by JJA to SSU Washington. One is entitled "SIS Contact with Monarchists," the other "SIS Activity in the Val D'Agosta." Box 248, Entry 108A. RG 226, NA.

80. As there is no postmortem on the JK1/8 case in the X-2 files at the National Archives, one must use his declassified reports as a guide to the length and substance of his career. From them, one can conclude that JK1/8 worked for X-2, at least, from August 1945 through October 1946 (an example of an early JK1/8 report is JJA to X-2 Washington, "Austro-Italian Economic Conference," Aug. 7, 1945, Box 257, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA; for October reports see below). It appears that in January 1946, JK1/8 was moved from Rome to the SIS station in Genoa (X-2 Italy, "Albanian Resistance Group in Italy," Apr. 8, 1946, Box 270, Entry

108A, RG 226, NA). After 3 months there, he may have left the SIS. (In April 1946, CUBA, a joint SIS/X-2 agent said to JK1/8 that he hoped “both Resio and I will come back into the service.” Capt. Henry R. Nigrelli, chief SCI Z Genoa to JJA, “CUBA,” Apr. 25, 1946, Box 261, Entry 174, RG 226, NA.) There is reason to believe he returned to Italian naval intelligence after the republican victory in the referendum on the monarchy in June 1946. His October 1946 reports imply access to inside SIS sources, though conceivably he may have been running SIS contacts from the outside. (JJA to SSU Washington, “SIS Contact with Monarchists,” and “SIS Activity in the Val D’Agosta,” both Oct. 7, 1946, Box 248, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.) The length of JK1/8’s career is impossible to determine because the date of his last known reports coincides with the cutoff point for most of the operational material in the X-2 files.

81. Resio must have known that SAILOR had offered X-2 his records of contacts with Mihailov because at the time of the offer, SAILOR’s files were still in Istanbul, and the only way for X-2 to obtain them was to ask the Italian naval attaché there, Comdr. Giuseppe Bestagno, to hand the documents to the X-2 chief in Istanbul, Joseph Toy Curtiss. It has to be assumed that Bestagno alerted his superiors to this request. The record clearly shows Bestagno disapproving of the order and dragging his feet for weeks on the excuse that he needed this time to “collect the necessary documents.” Presumably he stalled because he wanted higher authorization. JJA to JRM, Oct. 13, 1945, Box 260, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Apr. 8, 1946, “Albanian Resistance Group in Italy,” Box 270, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

84. JJA to X-2 Washington, Aug 19, 1945, Box 258, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

85. “Argomento: incontro con il Signor Max Pradier,” Box 262, Entry 174, RG 226, NA. This report appears to be from August 1947. It is unclear whether SAILOR wrote this particular report.

86. Box 263, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*

89. For example, see two reports by JK1/8 pouched Oct. 7, 1946, by JJA to SSU Washington. One is entitled “SIS Contact with Monarchists,” the other “SIS Activity in the Val D’Agosta.” Box 248, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

90. JJA to JRM, Nov 6, 1945, “Report of Activities of the Italian Mission from 1-31 October 1945,” Box 260, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

91. The standard account of the VESSEL case is in Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*, New York, 1982, pp. 683-705. Cave Brown was the first to write an extended study of the case based on OSS documents. However, he did not see any of X-2’s reports on the case. Unfortunately, as a result, he concluded that Scattolini was VESSEL and that DUSTY was a synonym for this source. Cave Brown also made no mention of Setaccioli. His account, therefore, leaves the counterespionage angle to the case unclear and Angleton’s actions incomprehensible. The most authoritative discussion of all aspects of the VESSEL case was a 1982 BBC radio broadcast entitled “Little Boxes,” written by Derek Robinson. (*Radio Times*, April 10-16, 1982, pp. 17, 19). Robinson’s script was based on the research of Father Robert A. Graham, S.J., an archivist at the Vatican, who had studied Scattolini for a decade. In the early 1970s Father Graham had demonstrated that falsity of the reports that Scattolini had sold to American newspapers before and during the war and linked the forger to two books on Vatican policy that appeared during the crucial Italian election of 1948: *Documenti Segreti della diplomazia vaticana, Il Vaticano e la Democrazia Italiana* (Lugano, 1948) and *Vaticano contro la pace mondiale* (Lugano, 1948). See Graham, “Virgilio Scattolini: The Prince of Vatican Misinforms, A Bibliographical Note.” *The Catholic Historical Review*, Jan, 1974, pp. 719-721. Using the Freedom of Information Act, Father Graham obtained documents regarding Scattolini’s sales to the OSS and Angleton’s role as controller of DUSTY. See Thomas O’Toole “U.S. Blessed with OSS Spy in Vatican,” *The Washington Post*, Aug 3, 1980. I am grateful to Father Graham for sharing his Scattolini file with me (hereafter Graham FOIA file).

92. X-2 Italy, “Plan Dusty-Preliminary Report,” Feb 27, 1946, Graham FOIA file.

93. Setaccioli revealed himself to X-2 when he foolishly sent some of this Vatican material by mail. As all mail in Allied-occupied Italy was subject to censorship, this package ended up on the desk of James Angleton.

Setaccioli was later picked up by Rome police officers working under X-2 supervision. X-2 Italy, "Plan DUSTY, Second Report," Mar. 23, 1946, Graham FOIA file.

⁹⁴. Angleton and CB055, "Plan Dusty, Second Report," Mar 23, 1946, Graham FOIA file.

⁹⁵. JJA, "Vessel Traffic," report sent to General Magruder, Mar. 22, 1945, Graham FOIA file. Angleton wrote: "There is good evidence that Dusty's (Setaccioli's) information passed to us daily for redistribution to our unknowing clients is culled from actual Vatican documents."

⁹⁶. *Ibid.*

⁹⁷. *Ibid.*

⁹⁸. CIA, "Memorandum For the President: Japanese Feelers," *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1963 (declassified 1990).

⁹⁹. JJA to Special Funds Officer, Sept. 5, 1945, Graham FOIA file.

¹⁰⁰. "Plan Dusty," (undated), Graham FOIA file.

¹⁰¹. X-2 Italy report, "Plan DUSTY, Second Report," Mar. 23, 1946, Graham FOIA file.

¹⁰². *Ibid.*

¹⁰³. Cave Brown, *The Last Hero*, pp. 699-701.

¹⁰⁴. OSS Washington to OSS Caserta, Feb. 17, 1945, Box 228, Entry 134, RG 226, NA. General Magruder and Whitney Shepardson, head of SI, cabled: "It is our impression that the current material is a mixture of the obvious, the unimportant if true, and plants. It has the earmarks of being concocted by a not too clever manufacturer of sales information. As a result, for the time being we are withholding the dissemination of most of this material."

¹⁰⁵. CIA, "Memorandum For the President: Japanese Feelers."

¹⁰⁶. In August 1945 Angleton wrote: Through the use of our double agent 'DUSTY' (Setaccioli), we have gained information concerning the CG-LAND (Japanese) activities as revealed in Vatican cables." JJA to JRM in Washington, CG-LANDERS Situation

Italy," Aug. 14, 1945, Box 1945, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.

¹⁰⁷. See Box 1, Entry 174, RG 226, NA. This box contains cables from September 1945 through January 1946. The last cables in this collection coincide with the timing of the assessment of this material by SSU Washington. The analysis concluded that of the material submitted by Setaccioli in fall 1945, only 35 percent was partially or wholly true, whereas 16 percent had been "definitely proven false," and 49 percent could not be properly evaluated. This survey most likely brought an end to the dissemination for intelligence purposes of the Scattolini cables. U.S. counterespionage officers maintained relations with Setaccioli and Scattolini until September 1947 at least. "Plan Dusty," (undated), Graham FOIA file. I am grateful to Max Corvo for sharing a copy of this declassified document with me.

¹⁰⁸. "Plan Dusty," (undated), Graham FOIA file. The same document added that this case "illustrated the danger of accepting at face value the product of an intelligence operation which had not been secured by adequate counterespionage investigation."

¹⁰⁹. Tom Mangold is the most recent writer on James Angleton to assume that once the Germans were defeated, Angleton immediately redirected his efforts against the Soviets. "When the wartime necessity for secrecy began to wane, only the enemy changed for Jim Angleton. Now the hammer and sickle replaced the crooked cross" (*Cold Warrior*, p. 43). Robin Winks had a more subtle view of Angleton's mindset. From interviews and the declassified X-2 records then available, Winks surmised that Angleton was "rather apolitical, mainly intent on his job, and protecting counterintelligence." (*Cloak and Gown*, p. 434n).

¹¹⁰. On the tendency of some British intelligence officers to view World War II as a diversion from the contest with the Soviets, see Naftali, "The DSM and the Politics of Allied Counterespionage," paper delivered at the Eisenhower Leadership Center, University of New Orleans, May 1990. According to the British official history of counterintelligence in World War II, as of the fall of 1939, most of the information collected by the counterespionage branch of MI6 and the domestic security branch, MI5, dealt with the Comintern. Hinsley and Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, 4: 11.

- ¹¹¹. Like many in X-2, Angleton believed the eventual collapse of the German intelligence services a foregone conclusion, and there is evidence that from early 1944 when he was still in London, he worked to build the data base necessary to monitor significant intelligence activities in Italy. BB008 (JJA) to CB001 (Andrew Berding), Feb. 28, 1944, "General," Box 145, Entry 174, RG 226, NA.
- ¹¹². JJA to JRM, Nov. 6, 1945, "Report of Activities of the Italian Mission from 1-31 October 1945," Box 260, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ¹¹³. JJA to the Director, SSU, Mar. 18, 1946, "Consolidated Progress Report for November, December 1945 and January 1946," Box 268, Entry 108A, RG 226, NA.
- ¹¹⁴. There was no serious German or Japanese penetrations of OSS. See two reports, X-2 London to X-2 Washington, "German and Japanese Penetration of OSS in ETO," July 7, 1945, and "Supplement to German and Japanese Penetrations of OSS in ETO, dated 7 July 1945," both from the Donovan Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Soviet penetration of the OSS remains a puzzle. As a good first attempt to resolve that issue, see Hayden B. Peake, *Soviet Espionage and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS): A Preliminary Assessment*, prepared for *The Conference on World War II & The Shaping of Modern America*, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, April 1986.