CHAPTER SIXQuestion One: Did the DOE Kindred Spirit Analytical Group (KSAG) assess that Secret Restricted Data was compromised to the Chinese?
Question Two: Did KSAG eliminate indigenous development as a possible explanation for the advancements achieved by the Chinese nuclear weapons program?
Question Three: Did KSAG assess [deleted]?
Question Four: Was the KSAG assessment accurately communicated to the FBI by DOE?
Question Five: What was the scope of the compromise communicated to the FBI by DOE?
Question Six: Were there opportunities when the FBI could have recognized that the KSAG assessment had been inaccurately communicated to the FBI by DOE?
PFIAB QUESTION #9: Whether the FBI appropriately relied on technical opinions provided by the DOE?
[paragraph deleted] This group was called the Kindred Spirit Analytical Group (KSAG).
KSAG concluded their review in September 1995 and produced a two-page summary of their assessment. This concise summary, comprising a series of bullets, contained the assessment of these preeminent nuclear weapons designers and definitively answered the question they were assembled to address. [line deleted] Nor was there any dispute that this compromise had aided the Chinese nuclear weapons program by helping to establish what were attainable achievements and to
353 Modern nuclear warheads consist of a primary and secondary nuclear device, the first acting as a trigger for the second.
avoid blind alleys in their own research and development program. What KSAG concluded, however, and what the FBI would be told these DOE experts concluded, were two different matters. [remainder of paragraph deleted]
KSAG's assessment would never be provided to the FBI. In its place the FBI was told [lines deleted]. This inaccurate communication of the predicate resulted in the FBI spending years investigating the wrong crime.
The FBI received several summaries purporting to represent DOE experts' conclusions. The FBI was told [lines deleted]. Each of these representations inaccurately reflected the conclusions of KSAG.
On September 25, 1995, after the KSAG working group's assessment was completed, DOE told the FBI [lines deleted]. (AQI 2984-2985 at 84) On May 28, 1996, OEI released to the FBI a report of the Administrative Inquiry (AI) into this matter. It stated [lines deleted]
[deletion] (AI at 3; FBI 00527) Each of these representations also inaccurately reflected the conclusions of KSAG.
KSAG clearly concluded [lines deleted]. That investigation, which is underway today, should have begun in 1995, not 1999.
OEI controlled the message that was communicated to the FBI and is responsible for the inaccurate representations given to the FBI. The consequences for the investigation caused by the inaccurate representations were profound. [lines deleted]. Responsibility for this massive failure rests with both OEI, for failing to accurately communicate the KSAG assessment, and with the FBI, for failing to become thoroughly familiar with the predicate for such an important investigation. As demonstrated below, a thorough examination of the investigation's predicate would have alerted the FBI to the inaccurate assessment communicated to them by OEI.
[lines deleted] (FBI 00336) It is unclear why [deleted] does not track the analysts' language precisely. The FBI never received either the April 25, 1995 or May 25, 1995 memoranda and relied on this summary of the initial DOE assessment.
[deleted] investigative plan identifies five specific requirements for the working group to address. He characterizes it as "important" to "assist in the development of a logical investigative effort" to accomplish each of these five requirements.
- Establish a chronology of the stages of development of the US weapons design information allegedly copied by the PRC. It would assist ECI's [Energy Counterintelligence] investigative planning efforts to know for example, that US Weapons Laboratory "X" developed stage "A" of the weapons design in question during the period 19xx-19xx. In turn, US Weapons Lab "y" piggy-backed on stage "A" to develop stage "B" of the design during the period 19xx-19xx, etc.
- Identify specific documents that contain the compromised warhead data;
- Determine which program staff at each US Weapons Laboratory worked on specific portions of the design in question[;]
- Determine which laboratories and specific employees eventually had access to the completed weapons design data in question;
- Brief the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on the results of the intelligence assessment and obtain their concurrence for ECI to initiate
and discreetly conduct an Administrative Inquiry (AI) 361 This AI will follow the guidelines set forth in the following Investigative Plan. (The FBI will be continually updated on the results of the AI).(FBI 00336)
Trulock initially contemplated forming only a LANL team, with CIA [deleted] participation, to validate the initial assessment.362 "[Trulock] directed that the following actions be initiated ... establish a damage assessment team from LANL to review [deleted] (DOE 3473-3477 at 76) (McIntyre memorandum to the file dated June 23, 1995). This expanded to include LLNL, SNL and DIA. The specific composition of the KSAG was largely a product of selection by the initial members of the working group. The initial members were already assisting DOE Headquarters review intelligence reporting. Trulock personally selected [deleted] and then [deleted] to examine the [deleted] reporting.
Trulock approached and selected [deleted] to chair the KSAG during his trip to LANL in June 1995.363 [Deleted] selection represented a
361 This is the first time DOE indicated its intention to conduct an Administrative Inquiry (AI). [deleted] investigative plan also foresaw KSAG [deleted]
363 Trulock personally visited LANL to brief Director Hecker on Kindred Spirit and invite [deleted] to chair KSAG. The FBI field office in Albuquerque, New Mexico (FBI-AQ) learned of this visit from [deleted] LANL Counterintelligence (CI) Office. On July 5, 1995, the field office sent a communication to FBI Headquarters concerning Trulock's June 28, 1995, visit to LANL. [lines deleted]. No additional information is provided [continued on next page]
recognition that someone with the necessary "horsepower" was needed to manage this group of experts assembled from the national laboratories and intelligence agencies. [Deleted] of LANL's X Division (responsible for nuclear weapons design), was ideal. [Deleted] reputation was as a fair, unbiased scientist who could draw a consensus, if one could be drawn, from a group of nuclear weapons experts. [Deleted] the most forceful advocate of the Chinese espionage of United States nuclear weapons information, did not object to [deleted] selection. [Deleted] believes [deleted] suggested [deleted] to Trulock. [deleted] 11/9/99) [Deleted] assumed Director Hecker had made the suggestion when he was briefed by Trulock on June 28, 1995.364 [deleted]
KSAG included nuclear design experts in recognition of the complex scientific issues involved in assessing the Chinese nuclear weapons program and China's ability to achieve such progress [deleted]365 KSAG consisted of two very
but the implication is, since information is classified and not transferable, an unidentified employee or someone associated with LANL illegally provided the information to representatives of the PRC." (AQI 2932-2934 at 33) When interviewed [deleted] claimed [deleted] him only a cursury briefing while at LANL. It is not clear whether [deleted] was subsequently briefed by Director Hecker. ([deleted] 9/15/99) [deleted] had briefed [deleted] via STU III on Kindred Spirit on June 23, 1995. (FBI 680; DOE 1865, 2038)
364 When [deleted] first saw Trulock's name on his schedule, he assumed Trulock was coming have his detail to DOE Headquarters renewed, since Trulock was technically with [deleted] Division at LANL. [deleted]
365 Trulock broadened the small group of analysts he had previously asked to examine the intelligence within OEI. [Deleted] not nuclear weapons designers. Trulock first added [deleted] from LANL, a nuclear weapons designer whose judgment Trulock trusted. After receiving the second memorandum confirming the analysts' initial conclusion, Trulock further expanded the group to include a broader collection of nuclear weapons designers from the national laboratories. This expansion sought to definitively confirm whether advancements in the Chinese nuclear program necessarily indicated a loss of United States nuclear weapons [continued]
different groups, pure analysts366 and nuclear scientists.367. The analysts were familiar with the intelligence reporting while the scientists had designed and tested dozens of nuclear warheads. [Deleted] described the difference as "voting members and tire kickers" -- the latter group composed of OEI members who sat in chairs away from the table and never spoke. [Deleted]
information. This broad inquiry generated an assessment which has survived the test of time.
366 The assembled analysts often claimed to have a scientific background and were often incorrectly described to the FBI as scientific experts. One scientist, hearing that [deleted] was being held out as a LANL scientist by OEI, laughed, stating [deleted] was a [deleted] not a nuclear designer. KSAG's [deleted] claimed that [deleted] would not recognized a nuclear warhead's primary from his ass." [deleted]
367 [lines deleted] This crowd was enchanted by [deleted] and his conviction and chose to ignore the consensus of the assembled scientific experts. [Deleted] and [deleted] were all analysts. [Deleted] believes [deleted] did not have a hidden agenda. [Deleted] during later discussions with [deleted] clearly misrecollected KSAG's consensus. [Deleted] cited this misrecollection as an example of this "N" personality type, that they become convinced of their position to the exclusion of the conclusions of others. [Deleted] shared a similar misrecollection when interviewed by the AGRT. [Deleted] This does not accurately reflect KSAG's assessment.[Deleted]
Although the compromised W-88 information was not thought to be public, it was believed to have been widely disseminated within this country's nuclear weapons infrastructure. [Deleted] recalls thinking, [lines deleted]. While KSAG may have recognized this broad dissemination, [deleted] did not. This distinction would prove to be a major failure within OEI.
The KSAG minutes from the August 16, 1995 meeting reflect the assessment [deleted]. It also reflected KSAG's assessment [deleted]. The information could not have come from [deleted] or from unclassified sources. Therefore, [deleted]. (EAT 00370) There was also further debate within KSAG over [lines deleted]
380 The KSAG meeting notes from September 7, 1995, reflect this debate [lines deleted] (DOE 3431-3433 at 32)
[deleted] (Id.) KSAG would revise this assessment at their next meeting and in the final bullets.381
5. The September 7, 1995 final KSAG meeting and the September 8, 1995 bullets
The fourth and final meeting of KSAG (and the third meeting chaired by [deleted] occurred on September 7, 1995. Although the previous meeting's minutes articulated an intention to "draft a report," EAT 00371, no such report was ever written. Instead, a series of bullets were drafted by the assembled experts capturing their collective assessment of the Chinese nuclear weapons program and the possible compromise of United States classified information. This two-page document, dated September 8, 1995, represents the conclusions reached by the assembled nuclear weapons experts. The brief document was carefully written. The experts recalled significant debate over the use of each particular word and phrase. [Deleted] was able to draw a consensus among the nuclear experts with only [deleted] dissent to two of the nine bullets. No other document was produced by the KSAG nor blessed by the
381 The final bullets state: [lines deleted] (DOE 4636) (SC-255-0025/96)
collective experts.382 These nine bullets represent the only written conclusion produced by the group. The bullets were maintained in DOE's Headquarters inside OEI and were distributed only to the CIA. The FBI never received a copy of the document.383
KSAG's bullets, if shared with the FBI, could have prevented the misdirection of the FBI's counterintelligence investigation in this case. [lines deleted] See KSAG's second bullet, which states [lines deleted] (EAT 373-374 at 73) (emphasis added).
382 KSAG reformed on May 16 and 17, 1996, to brief Deputy Secretary Curtis on their assessment. This later meeting generated a series of slides for use in briefing the Deputy Secretary. KSAG reaffirmed their September 8, 1995 written assessment at this subsequent meeting.
383 The FBI has only recently become aware of this document as a result of the AGRT's review of KSAG. The AGRT's review of FBI-AQ's files confirm the document was not received in the field. The walk-in document was not shared with the field until 1999. [Deleted] and was present during the FBI's October 31, 1995 briefing, did not believe that KSAG's bullets were ever shared with the FBI. [Deleted]
[Deleted] the FBI has been investigating a crime which was never established to have occurred [lines deleted] DOE's own experts, the nuclear weapons designers themselves, after reviewing the available evidence, did not make this assessment. Having been inaccurately briefed, the FBI failed to identify those documents which contained the compromised information [deleted]. Similarly, they failed to identify those individuals with access to this more limited information. [Lines deleted]. The far more limited group identified to the FBI could have been the source of this compromise, but a much larger group, including contractors, Department of Defense employees and other DOE employees located at numerous sites across the United States, could have just as likely been the source of this compromise. This larger group was not identified to the FBI [lines deleted].
384 [lines deleted]
E. OEU's inaccurate portrayal of the working group's conclusions to the FBI
1. OEI's reaction to the KSAG bullets
The assembled experts returned to their respective laboratories believing their services were no longer needed. They were unaware of the FBI's interest or earlier briefing [deleted] on [deleted] conclusions. The experts were unaware that the FBI would be briefed on the assembled experts' assessment. Not one of the nuclear weapons designers were asked to participate in this briefing. The [deleted] was not aware that such a briefing had ever occurred. Instead, on October 31, 1995, [deleted] joined by [deleted] briefed the FBI on DOE's assessment of the Chinese nuclear weapons program. This briefing was billed as the working group's assessment. The FBI understood this briefing to summarize the assembled experts' assessment of the available intelligence. The briefing did not include the written bullets and no weapons designer was present.
There are indications that [deleted] KSAG's assessment of the available intelligence. First, the OEI chronology mischaracterizes the final KSAG meeting, inaccurately suggesting a split between LANL and OEI versus LLNL and the CIA. Second, [deleted] describes [deleted] dismissing the KSAG and [deleted] The AGRT assembled the most complete set of FBI records on the Kindred Spirit investigation, from multiple field offices and Headquarters. No copy of KSAG's bullets has been located among the FBI's files.386 Third, [deleted] comments to [deleted] capture his concerns with the bullets. Finally, [deleted] briefed the FBI on October 31, 1995, inviting only [deleted]
386 [Deleted] the custodian for KSAG's bullets [deleted] They were not disseminated to the national laboratories. No "bigot" list was maintained on [deleted] was not not aware of the bullets having been given to the FBI, and explained that is was not his responsibility to have provided them. [deleted]
KSAG concluded the advancement observed in the Chinese nuclear weapons program may have occurred indigenously. KSAG assessed [lines deleted] (EAT 373) [deleted] who first reviewed these portions of the AI at the request of the AGRT, conceded it was "overstated" and the working group would not have agreed with it. [Deleted] observed that [deleted]
[Deleted] and the FBI heard only [deleted] assessment, elevated by OEI to represent the unanimous assessment of KSAG. This briefing, [deleted] ensured that DOE itself would investigate the wrong crime during their own AI. The inaccurate predicate inherent in DOE's own investigation would be relied upon by the FBI during their subsequent investigation. The error would not be recognized until 1999.416 Little, if any, oversight was exercised over [deleted] the FBI. [Deleted] September 25, 1995 letter to the FBI was [deleted] Deputy Secretary Curtis, who personally briefed the CIA, [deleted] concerning the FBI. (Deputy Secretary Curtis 1/24/00) [deleted]
415 A Kindred Spirit time line, classified by [deleted] records the working group's conclusion much differently. [Deleted] (DOE 3466-3468 at 67) This simply was not KSAG's conclusion.
416 The FBI was absolutely convinced it accurately understood the experts' assessment. The FBI submitted a summary of its own Kindred Spirit investigation as an appendix to a September 1997 CIA position paper. The FBI summary stated [deleted] (FBI 12360-12390 at 71, 85, 90) As late as November 27, 1998, the First Annual DOE Threat Assessment Report repeated this inaccurate summary of KSAG's assessment. [deleted] (FBI 6503-6537 at 15)
[...] FBI agent be detailed in support of this preliminary investigation by letter dated September 25, 1995. (FBI 375) The final AI report was provided to the FBI on May 28, 1996.420 The FBI opened a full investigation on May 30, 1996.
[Deleted] developed an investigative plan for DOE AI in June 1995. This plan was shared with the FBI-HQ.421 (FBI 336-337) [lines deleted] (Id. at 36) This well conceived plan was not followed. KSAG never assessed [deleted]. The OEI briefing, however, did provide answers to the satisfaction of both [deleted] and the FBI. The OEI briefing indicated [lines deleted] Although purporting to speak for KSAG, neither conclusion was reached by the working group. Relying upon this briefing, [deleted] began tasking LANL and LLNL to assemble their records of PRC visitors and laboratory personnel travel records for future review.
420 The final and draft AIs are very poorly written. Lacking any effective structure and utilizing horribly inexact language, both are often impossible to understand or follow. Assertions are made without explanation or apparent support. While both the draft and final AIs identify [line deleted] the final AI was never reviewed nor approved by SA [deleted] The unfinished draft AI reviewed and approved by SA [deleted] was subjected to [deleted] These changes were not subsequently shown to SA [deleted] Amazingly, the FBI never shared the final AI with SA [deleted] nor was he consulted further by either FBI-HQ nor FBI-AQ. SA [deleted] assumed the draft he approved was the version provided to the FBI. The FBI assumed the version they received was the same as the one approved by SA [deleted] Neither assumption was correct.
421 A copy of [deleted] investigative plan was located in the FBI-HQ's case file at [deleted]
It is true that LANL was not the only DOE location mentioned in the AI, but LANL was clearly emphasized as the likely location of the compromise by the Chinese. In the final report, LANL is subdivided into individual groups and offices, while the other locations are not subdivided.427 The report breaks LLNL into three divisions (A, B and W), but they are all eliminated in the final report. [lines deleted]428 (AI at 39; FBI 563) Other locations were either ignored entirely (Defense Program elements) or the AI simply records that no records were located.429
[lines deleted] LANL became the focus as a direct result of how [deleted] defined the scope of the compromise. [lines deleted]
427 The language identifying various locations of the compromise comes from SA [deleted] investigative plan for the subsequent full investigation by [deleted] and placed in the final AI report. Although not taken verbatim, [deleted] portions, deleted others and attributed the source for the information to [deleted]
428 [lines deleted] (AI at 35; FBI 00559)
429 [Deleted] requested the Office of International Technology Cooperation, DOE, to assemble all DOE Headquarters and field personnel's travel records. "The Foreign Travel Management System (FTMS), which identifies DOE Federal/Contractors traveling to foreign countries did not exist during the period [deleted] Further, during the period in question there was no specific DOE requirement to document and permanently retain such information." (AI at 5; FBI 529) Thirty-one pages later, [deleted] records a similar response for Rocky Flats. (AI at 36; FBI 560) Neither location is identified in the final report as requiring further investigation.
[lines deleted] It was [deleted] impression that some of KSAG's members from LANL, including [deleted] thought LANL was the probable site of the compromise. Every time the discussion would move away from LANL, these members would bring it back to LANL. That focus didn't make sense to [lines deleted]
[lines deleted] The FBI readily accepted both this predicate and abbreviated suspect list and, until December 1998, never questioned the accuracy of the briefing or final AI report. Had the investigators been accurately briefed, they could have begun to identify the documents which were the likely source of this compromise. The current investigation, begun only recently, may be able to identify the documents which were compromised. This investigation, deferred for three years due to an inaccurate briefing, now must occur with the associated publicity and still greater passage of time. KSAG deserves recognition for rapidly evaluating the available intelligence and producing a one and one-half page assessment which has survived the test of time.
Unfortunately, because KSAG's assessment conflicted with [deleted] it was never disseminated.430 The briefing given to the investigators has not survived the test of time.
H. Missed opportunities to discover the inaccuracies in the OEI briefing
There were a number of occasions when the investigators might have realized that the OEI briefing was inaccurate.431 Five missed opportunities occurred prior to the AI's completion. The first missed opportunity occurred in August 1995, when the LANL liaison FBI agent learned of and reported to FBI-HQ the debate within KSAG. The second missed opportunity occurred when the investigators visited LLNL on December 4-7, 1995, and spoke with [deleted] briefed KSAG on the particulars of [deleted] and was aware of [deleted] in the walk-in document. The third missed opportunity was when SA [deleted] reviewed the supporting intelligence for the predicate on December 19, 1995. The fourth opportunity occurred when the FBI received the walk-in document [deleted]. The fifth opportunity occurred when [deleted] at LANL, sought access to the walk-in document in conjunction with the investigators' visit to LANL in February 1996. During this visit, at [deleted] suggestion, the investigators and future case agent were briefed by [deleted] concerning the dissemination of the W-88 information.
430 [lines deleted] KSAG's briefing to Deputy Secretary Charles Curtis on May 17, 1996, also never left DOE. Deputy Secretary Curtis could not recall why the FBI were not at the briefing. (Deputy Secretary Curtis 1/24/00)
431 This section should not be understood to shift responsibility from OEI, which ultimately is accountable for inaccurately briefing the investigators as to the compromise's scope. [lines deleted]
1. Missed opportunity
SA [deleted] the FBI's liaison to LANL, based in Santa Fe, New Mexico, became aware of the debate within KSAG during a telephone conversation with a LANL counterintelligence officer on August 10, 1995. This source repeated information obtained from Diane Soran, deceased, who was then the supervisor of many LANL employees detailed to the OEI working group, KSAG. SA [deleted] repeated this information in a communication to FBI-HQ on August 22, 1995. "Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) individuals (NFI) and CIA personnel (NFI) familiar with the information which initiated DOE efforts in Kindred Spirits believe it is not unreasonable for the PRC, on its own, to do what was claimed in the document in the possessin of the CIA. LANL individuals involved in the DOE damage assessment do not feel this way, and want to do more assessment. LLNL and the CIA believe DOE is dealing with a non-issue, and the CIA has told this to DOE HQ." (AQI 2944-2946 at 45, AGO 191-193) The cable continues: "The issue is whether the PRC could have arrived at the information, as contained within the document in CIA possession, on its own without outside help, [deleted] (Id.) The communication repeats hearsay and contains several errors. However, it does place the FBI on notice that there are conflicting opinions among the experts reviewing the intelligence. It identifies [deleted] and also identifies [deleted] although confusing his role [deleted] work.432 (Id. at 46)
432 DOE's Office of Counterintelligence has recently noted that this cable was never provided to DOE prior to late 1999. (FBI 19224-19233)
SA [deleted] followed his August 22, 1995 cable with another dated October 10, 1995. This second communication again relied upon the LANL counterintelligence officer repeating information learned from Soran.433 Written a month after KSAG had provided its written assessment [deleted] it states that:
1. The damage assessment report is complete, and somewhat of a consensus was reached. The report was provided to [deleted](AQI 2964-1965 at 65) Soran revealed that the KSAG report was provided [deleted], although no specific individual is identified and this cannot be verified.
2. The bottom line is the PRC possibly could have come up with the information in question without help, but such possibility is not probable.
3. If information were provided to the PRC, the time period is such that a leak cannot be limited to any particular laboratory or organization.
Thus, by October 10, 1995, the FBI had in its files, at both Headquarters and in the field, communications raising a number of very important leads. They identified a "damage assessment report" that was never given to the FBI; provided the names of two prominent weapons designers who participated in KSAG; identified the wide dissemination of the leaked information ("the time period is such that a leak cannot be limited to any particular laboratory or organization"); suggested the CIA and LLNL did not agree with DOE HQ or LANL and suggested that the PRC might have accomplished their achievements indigenously. Had these leads been pursued by the FBI, the problems identified in this report could have been avoided.
433 Unfortunately, because Soran is deceased, we are unable to determine the source of her information. Soran related these facts to [deleted] at LANL. It was [deleted] who repeated them to SA [deleted] to keep him appraised of the progress in DOE's evaluatin of the intelligence in Washington.
[...] represented the FBI's only access to the raw materials in this investigation. [lines deleted] The FBI never received access to KSAG's written bullets.
4. Missed opportunity #4
The fourth missed opportunity during the AI occurred [deleted] when the FBI received a copy of the walk-in document. [deleted] SSA [deleted] conceded as much from his own review of the document. [deleted] 12/15/99) Nevertheless, the FBI uncritically accepted [deleted] SSA [deleted] explained that the FBI presumed that DOE had the appropriate expertise, not readily available anywhere else in the country, to assess the implications of this intelligence. The FBI was no more prepared to go behind the predicate for this investigation [deleted]
It was a grave mistake for the FBI not to insist upon a detailed explanatin of the underlying intelligence for such an important FCI investigation. [lines deleted] Nevertheless, despite little prior experience working FCI cases with OEI, the FBI was prepared to accept the OEI evaluation of the intelligence and was not about to test that assessment. This failure to insist upon a complete understanding of the investigation's predicate at its inception cost the FBI years while they pursued an inaccurate predicate. More importantly, it cost the FBI the opportunity to investigate this crime without the publicity that is now irrevocably associated with this matter. This impact cannot be undone regardless of the resources devoted to the case today.
439 SSA [deleted] believes he saw a copy of the walk-in document before its official dissemination to the FBI, but could provide no further information. [deleted] 12/15/99)
[...] seems to suggest that this May 17, 1996 briefing was principally conducted to ensure that DOE's credibility was not damaged by [deleted] within Washington.
Whatever motivated this briefing, its lesson never left the Forrestal Building. No formal report resulted, no letter was sent to the FBI, nor were there any meetings between the Deputy Secretary and the FBI. Instead, [lines deleted] Eleven days later the final AI report was transmitted to the FBI [lines deleted]
J. The reexamination of the predicate in light of the CIA's withdrawal of the walk-in document
[deleted]453 (FBI 489) [lines deleted] 454 (FBI 485-488 at 86). [lines deleted] (Id. at 87) SSA [deleted] explained that although he was alerted to the issue by the CIA, he deferred action until the CIA and DOE completed their review of the predicate. [deleted] 12/15/99) [lines deleted] (Id. at 88).
On July 29, 1996, the CIA formally issued a communication alerting the earlier recipients of the walk-in document of the CIA's intention to [lines deleted]
453 In stark contrast with the late dissemination to the FBI of the walk-in document, the CIA is to be commended for the rapid transmission of this information to the FBI. SSA [deleted] note, dated May 16, 1996 states: [lines deleted]
454 [lines deleted]
[lines deleted]456 (Id. at 5)
After receiving the CIA's [deleted] SSA [deleted] ordered FBI-AQ to suspend the full investigation on Wen Ho Lee pending DOE's reexamination of the predicate. In a note to SSA [deleted] FBI-AQ, dated July 31, 1996, SSA [deleted] wrote: [deleted] This DOE conclusion was a major basis for above full FCI. AQ should temporarily suspend investigative activity until DOE HQ and FBI HQ can sort out this new information.(S)"457 (AQI 992) SSA [deleted] suspended the full investigation pending DOE's revalidation of the underlying predicate and a review of the matter by OIPR.
This reexamination of the walk-in document by OEI was limited to a small group including [deleted] Recently [deleted] wrote Secretary
455 See FBI 11638 to FBI 11644. The FBI, apparently accepting the CIA's warning, did not seek prior to 1999 to question this source for additional leads relevant to the Kindred Spirit investigation.
456 [lines deleted]
457 [lines deleted]
Richardson [lines deleted] (FBI5334-39) In an apparent reference to the OEI's reexamination of the predicate subsequent to CIA's alert, [lines deleted] (Id. at 36)
On August 19, 1996, OEI met with the FBI to reaffirm the predicate and provide a letter from [deleted] to Section Chief Jerry Doyle, FBI, reaffirming the OEI analysis of the Chinese nuclear weapons program despite the CIA recall/reissue cable. In attendance at this meeting were [deleted] and SSA [deleted] Unit Chief [deleted] and Section Chief Doyle. (FBI 662; see also FBI 11725) The OEI Kindred Spirit chronology identifies [deleted] as among the attendees, but omits [deleted] (FBI 675) [lines deleted] We have discussed this judgment with representatives from the respective CIA offices responsible for dissemination of this information and they do not disagree with this assessment."458 (FBI 668) [lines deleted] (Id.) The FBI acted quickly to reactive [sic] the Wen Ho Lee investigation (AQI 1008-1011) ("DOE stands by their original conclusion").
458 Although OEI restricted the number involved in reexamining the walk-in intelligence in light of the CIA's warning, no member of KSAG disagreed with the outcome when interviewed by the AGRT. [lines deleted] The compromise assessed by KSAG in September 1995 remained valid in August 1996 and remains true today. The AGRT will not add to what is already an extensive list of proferred motivations for this behavior (ranging from an inadvertent mistake to testing for a reaction from the United States in an effort to validate particular information in the document).
On September 13, 1996, the FBI interviewed [deleted] who was at DOE Headquarters.468 [lines deleted] 469 (FBI 694-95 at 95; AQI 1046-47 at 47)
[Deleted] described the wide dissemination of the compromised information.470 He specifically identified both contractors and the Department of Defense as potential locations where the compromise may have occurred. "When asked from where and when the Chinese might have acquired the information, [deleted] said it would be very difficult to say, as the W-88 is a deployed system. Deployment means that the plans would be available to various groups of people such as the US Navy (the W-88 is used by the Navy), contractor personnel and other involved personnel apart from the Department of Energy." (Id. at 95 and 46)
The FBI sought to record the predicate, not challenge it through this lead. This distinction probably explains their failure to react to the content of [deleted] interview
468 SA [deleted] could not recall how [deleted] came to be included within the lead, but thought it was because either [deleted had mentioned him during his interview or because SSA [deleted] had asked the agents to include [deleted] and only [deleted] was in Washington. ([deleted] 1/18/00)
469 This FD-302 is inaccurately classified Secret by the FBI. [lines deleted]
470 SA [deleted] specifically recalled asking [deleted] about the information's dissemination because [deleted] had told them that LANL was the likely location for the compromise. [deleted] 1/18/00)
upon receipt. Neither the case agent in the field nor the supervising agents at Headquarters recognized the clear discrepancy in this interview and the predicate communicated to the FBI. [Deleted] was not interviewed further by the FBI until recently.471
[Deleted] when interviewed by the AGRT, emphasized [lines deleted]472 Although he allowed that one never can say never, he thought it unlikely based on the intelligence he has seen. [Deleted] within the working group from this consensus position. [Deleted] added that [deleted] and as a result he lacks credibility. [Deleted]
The FBI did take a few initial steps to review the predicate for this investigation, but, significantly, it did not follow up on those steps with additional
471 [Deleted] is an affable scientist who would have been readily accessible to the FBI. He is succinct and easily understood, despite the complicated subject matter. [lines deleted] His expertise is in the area of weapons design and nuclear simulation. [lines deleted] As a scientific resource, he would have been invaluable to the FBI had they made the effort to contact him.
472 [lines deleted]
interviews to clarify important conflicts captured in the 302s. Had SA [deleted] and SSA [deleted] sought out [deleted] they would have come to understand the inaccuracies not only in the OEI briefing, but also in the AI report. SA [deleted] and SSA [deleted] failed to interview [deleted] who was at LANL and not DOE HQ like [deleted] SSA [deleted] should have insisted that SA [deleted] cover this lead personally. SA [deleted] failed to identify the composition of the OEI working group, KSAG, so that he would know who at LANL was aware of the Chinese documents and already aware of the compromise. These individuals could have been interviewed without any expansion of the number of individuals aware of the compromise. SA [deleted] was present when [deleted] name were mentioned on February 13, 1996. These members whould have become resources to guide the FBI investigation at LANL. WMFO covered this lead and interviewed two subjects beyond the one identified by the case agent. The results were recorded on FB-302s and then apparently ignored by both the field and Headquarters.
L. The CIA's independent assessment of the Chinese nuclear weapon program
After receiving the AI report on May 28, 1996 and completing the three predicate interviews in September 1996, the predicate for this investigation was left unchallenged until ASAC Lueckenhoff began to question it in December 1998, with one exception. That single exception is a 1997 review of the Chinese nuclear weapons program by the CIA. The CIA's written report was shared with the National Security Council, DOE and the FBI. This Chinese Nuclear Warhead Paper accurately characterizes the walk-in document, a document that the FBI received on [lines deleted] (FBI 12365) The CIA report was provided to the FBI on September 11, 1997. It should have led to a comprehensive reevaluation of the predicate. It did not.
1. An NSC request for a CIA assessment
In July and August 1997, [deleted] numerous senior government officials on his analysis of China's nuclear weapons program. That briefing presented an
alarming portrait of Chinese efforts to acquire United States nuclear weapons information.473
DOE and CIA records indicate that [deleted] the National Security Council ("NSC") during this time period as well. (DOE 3420; EAT 180) On August 5, 1997, Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor, asked for a CIA evaluation [deleted] concerns. (EAT 180)
That evaluation was begun in mid-August and completed by the end of the month. It was delivered to the NSC on September 5, 1997, (EAT 181) and to the FBI on September 11, 1997. (FBI 12388, 12360, 12361)
2. Background and limitations of the CIA assessment
473 In one FBI document it was referred to [deleted] "sky is falling" briefing. (AQI 5337) Another FBI document dubbed it the "nightmare presentation." (FBI 12312)
474 [lines deleted]
There were several noteworthy limitations to the CIA assessment. First, the analysts prepared it in just two weeks. [Deleted] Second, it was never intended to confront [deleted] head on.477 Third, the analysts never addressed
KSAG's findings or interviewed the KSAG experts.478 Finally, the original draft was completely rewritten to create a much shorter and less detailed product.479
3. [deleted] to the CIA
Since neither analyst was familiar with [deleted] them so they could become familiar with and assess the briefing's content. That briefing took place on August 13, 1997. [Deleted] recalled that [deleted] a series of slides.480
480 These slides, revised over time, are entitled "CHINA'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM" with the subtitle "DOE Nuclear
[lines deleted] During the briefing, [deleted] gave [deleted] names to answer any questions and provide whatever other assistance the analysts might require. The analysts
Weapons Laboratory Contributions to Chinese Strategic Breakthroughs." The set provided by DOE numbers thirty-four slides, with several repeated slides. (DOE 1870-1903) [lines deleted]
481 [lines deleted]
482 Other who received [deleted] -- Attorney General Janet Reno, FBI Director Louis Freeh, Deputy Secretary Charles Curtis and Dan Galington, Deputy Counsel, OIPR -- each of whom were interviewed by the AGRT, were unable to recall in specific detail the representations made by [deleted] The CIA analysts, unique because they understood both the topic and available intelligence, were able to recall specific representations from [deleted] The analysts were also focused on the briefing's content given their assignement.
did speak with [deleted] Neither [deleted] expressed significant disagreement with the CIA's assessment of the Chinese nuclear weapons program.483 [deleted]
4. The CIA assessment paper
483 [Deleted] increasingly moved away from his early support of and agreement with [deleted] assessment in 1995. In early 1997 [deleted] authored a paper entitled: "Chinese Modern Nuclear Warhead Development." [lines deleted] (EAT 423) Today [deleted] firmly supports [deleted] recollection of KSAG's assessment and he rapidly points to the exact language of the KSAG bullets when describing the compromise's scope.
484 See also this statement from the final paper: [lines deleted] (FBI 12366)
The final 1997 CIA position paper, as well as the draft, does adopt a position closer to that articulated [deleted] than that of KSAG. [lines deleted]485
In addition, it appears that in the pursuit of brevity, much of the qualifying language used by the CIA analysts was removed from the final position paper.486 [lines deleted]
485 [lines deleted]
486 [lines deleted] (EAT 439) This observation is deleted in the final paper provided to the FBI.
[lines deleted] (EAT 445)
5. The FBI addendum to the CIA assessment
In an amazing example of circular reasoning, the CIA's position paper attaches and incorporates a written submission by the FBI. Not only would the FBI fail to recognize [lines deleted] On September 4, 1997, CIA [deleted] received the FBI's written submission (EAT 472-276) [lines deleted] The attachment summarizes various FBI investigations, including Kindred Spirit: [lines deleted] It would also be lost on the FBI when they received the final paper.
On September 5, 1997, Section Chief Steve Dillard, Unit Chief [deleted] and SSA [deleted] provided an in-depth review of the Kindred Spirit investigation to [deleted] at the NSC (Id.) After the briefing, the NSC asked the FBI [lines deleted] (FBI 1086) This resulted in a time line, dated September 8, 1997, outlining the predicate in support of the FBI's investigation. It was forwarded to the NSC in preparation for the the NSC's briefing of NSA Berger on September 9, 1997 (Id.) This outline clearly records the inaccurate briefing given the FBI by OEI on October 31, 1995. [lines deleted] (FBI 13024-26 at 25) The outline includes important dates relevant to the walk-in document. On September 10, 1997, [deleted] requested the appendix to the CIA's position paper from the FBI. OIPR, which had previously approved the oral briefing of the NSC by the FBI (FBI 01085), also approved the dissemination of this information to the NSC on September 11, 1997. (FBI 12388) The appendix was sent to the NSC by facsimile the same day. (FBI 1088)
On August 29, 1997, Unit Chief [deleted] and SSA [deleted] attended a CIA meeting to review and contribute to the DI's paper addressing the PRC threat to the labs. (FBI 15752) Trulock was also at this meeting. During the meeting [lines deleted] At one point, [deleted] the CIA analysts [deleted]
Sometime between August 29, 1997 and September 11, 1997, Trulock wrote DCI George Tenet a letter which was described by one CIA officer as [deleted] (FBI 12388) Trulock wrote: "we would be remiss in not expressing our concerns regarding both the overall analysis and several of the key conclusions. In our judgment, the DI paper contains a number of important flaws." (EAT 384-85 at 84) Trulock also wrote: [lines deleted]
[lines deleted]487 (EAT 384)
The analysts wrote an internal response dated September 30, 1997. "We agree with Notra's assessment that the National Laboratories have a CI problem and fully support DOE's efforts to combat this problem. We were asked to conduct an independent analysis of [deleted] We tried to convey the known acquisition of US nuclear weapons design information and put it into context [deleted] (EAT 386-87 at 86)
7. The October 15, 1997 NSC briefing
On October 15, 1997, [deleted] briefed [deleted] and [deleted] of NSC. [lines deleted] had already returned to LLNL to resume [deleted] detail and was not present. The DOE contingent arrived forty minutes into the briefing which had already begun with the CIA assessment.489 Although the CIA's brief was in ninety-five percent agreement with [deleted] and focused on the five percent which [deleted] The analysts believe that
487 [lines deleted]
488 It is unclear whether NSC came to this conlusion as a result of having heard [deleted] directly, or whether it was a result of the FBI's briefing on September 5, 1997.
489 The DOE contingent was late because of their attendance at the Freeh/Tenet/Pena meeting, concerning PDD-61, also taking place that day.
[lines deleted] that he never claimed [deleted] At this point [lines deleted]492 [deleted]
8. The FBI's failure to recognize the significance of the CIA's assessment
A copy of the CIA's final paper, bearing the facsimile date of September 11, 1997, was provided to Director Freeh as part of a briefing package to assist the FBI/CIA effort to improve the counterintelligence program within DOE. [lines deleted]493
490 [lines deleted]
491 [deleted] LANL, and [deleted] also accompanied [deleted] to NSC, but did not speak.
492 The CIA analysts all emphasized that they were largely in agreement with [deleted] that DOE had serious and legitimate counterintelligence concerns in this area. [Deleted] The CIA shared [deleted] concerns over the lax security at the national laboratories.
493 It is not clear whether Director Freeh made these notations in 1997 or 1999.
Thus, Director Freeh recognized that the CIA paper was clearly taking the position [deleted] But that point -- and its implications -- needed to be understood at a far lower level within the FBI, specifically at the [deleted] level. For it was the [deleted] personnel -- specifically Unit Chief [deleted] and SSA [deleted] -- who had read the AI report and received the October 31, 1995 [deleted] It was at this level that the message needed to be received and understood that there was a fundamental contradiction between what DOE had told the FBI and what the CIA was telling the FBI. It was received, but it was not understood.
The CIA's review of China's nuclear weapons program in 1997 represented the last opportunity to correct the predicate as it was communicated to, and accepted by, the FBI. [lines deleted]
M. The impact of the inaccurate prediction upon the FBI's investigation and current developments
From May 30, 1996 until early 1999, the FBI investigated the wrong crime. [lines deleted] The inaccurate predicate caused the FBI to improperly narrow the focus of their investigation to LANL due to the associated assumption [lines deleted]. The error was compounded by the FBI's complete and uncritical acceptance of the AI report's selection of Wen Ho and Sylvia Lee as the subjects of their investigation. The AI was accepted by the FBI until December 1998 when ASAC Lueckenhoff raised serious concerns over its content. The inaccurate predicate survived for months longer. Only in March 1999 did the FBI begin to recognize the error when they first visited SNL. At
494 There is no indication that the CIA assessment was ever shared with FBI-AQ.
SNL, the FBI, by chance, spoke with [deleted] an original participant of KSAG, and began to appreciate the predicate's inaccuracy.
495 [lines deleted]
496 This fact, which may or may not be a coincidence, has only recently been discovered. KSAG did not recognize the coincidence in 1995. [deleted]
497 [lines deleted] The CIA's analysis may or may not represent the final word on this subject, but it is clear that this is precisely the type of rigorous dissection that the walk-in document required in 1995 and 1996 and requires today.
Parallel efforts, by the FBI and DOE OCI, are presently underway [lines deleted] This effort has already demonstrated a broad dissemination among various DOE components, DOD components and contractors. It has also identified documents disseminated before the 1984 window established by KSAG and utilized by the AI. [Deleted] observed that they "didn't recognize the fact that in the interface documents" this "information is shared with a larger number of organizations." "It was a blind spot" in their 1995 analysis. [lines deleted] These documents were widely disseminated within DOE, DOD and the contractors.
Similarly, [deleted] at SNL have identified documents in the early 1980s that were widely disseminated which contain the compromised information. In an effort to acquire an accurate understanding of the predicate, the FBI has assembled a task force to interview the original participants of KSAG and identify what information has been compromised and which documents contain that information. This effort, combined with the ongoing review by DOE OCI of W-88 documents to determine which contain the compromised information, should focus the FBI's future investigation on the information which was compromised to the Chinese. These efforts will better define those materials which represent the universe of documents capable of having been the source of the compromise. Whether that will also identify the individual or individuals responsible for the compromise is more difficult to predict.