May 23, 1978

UNCLASSIFIED

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-36

TO: The Vice President
   The Secretary of State
   The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
      The United States Representative to
      the United Nations
      The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
      The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa (3)

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake a review of US policy concerning our objectives and interests in limiting Soviet/Cuban influence in Africa and the steps that we might take in support of our objectives. The Presidential Review Memorandum should be completed no later than May 31, 1978.

The review should address the following issues:

1. US and Others' Interests and Objectives in Limiting Soviet/Cuban Influence in Africa:

   -- What kind and level of presence and activity is unacceptable to US interests in the context of our overall priorities in Africa?

   -- What are the interests and perceptions of our European allies, Saudi Arabia and other Arabs; and African moderates?
2. Soviet and Cuban Involvement, Present and Potential:

-- What, briefly, is the current status of Cuban and Soviet involvement in areas where they have already established a significant role; how effective have been the efforts of the US and third parties in dealing with it?

-- In what areas and issues are the Soviets and Cubans likely to increase their military or political involvement over the next six to twelve months? Discuss the nature of involvement and the indigenous developments that would trigger it.

3. Policy Actions and Instruments in Dealing with Soviet and Cuban Involvement:

(a) Diplomatic Actions

-- What bilateral diplomatic actions are available to the US in dealing with the Soviets and Cubans and with countries where the Soviets and Cubans become involved?

-- What are the possibilities of working together with European, Arab and moderate African countries?

-- How can we utilize the UN and OAU?

-- What is the potential for a significant Chinese role?

(b) Economic, Military and Political Activities

-- What forms of economic, military and political activities, both inducements and sanctions, will be appropriate in countering Soviet and Cuban involvement?

-- Discuss Third Countries' potential as appropriate.

4. Congressional and Public Posture

-- What are the dominant public and Congressional perceptions of Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa?

-- What public posture is most effective in terms of dealing with US domestic concerns and with foreign opinion?
-- What level of legislative restraint are we likely to encounter in our overall programs of coping with Soviet and Cuban involvement? (Constraints on specific actions should be included in the discussion of these actions.)

5. General Guidance

-- Care should be taken to differentiate between Soviet and Cuban goals, policies, etc. in the course of the discussion.

-- Analysis should take place at two levels throughout the study. While due attention should be given to broad strategies (e.g. continent-wide aid programs as a means of offsetting Soviet activities), the prime focus should be on specific situations such as the Horn, Rhodesia and others that turn out to be most acute in the course of analysis. In these specific cases the study should provide a full range of options for furthering US interests.

-- This study should be as brief and direct as possible, assuming substantial knowledge of the issue on the part of the Policy Review Committee.

-- The implementation of ongoing policy should not be delayed by this study.

-- No course of action should be automatically excluded from consideration solely because it will present difficult political problems or would conflict with existing Administration policies. However, where such constraints would be evident, they should, of course, be noted.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
RESPONSE

Presidential Review Memorandum - 36

SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA

August 18, 1979
# Table of Contents

## Executive Summary  
Pages 1-14

## Part I  - US and Others' Interests and Objectives in Limiting Soviet/Cuban Influence in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests and Perceptions of European Allies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The View from the Middle East</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Reaction</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Perceptions of Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part II  - Soviet and Cuban Involvement, Present and Potential

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet and Cuban Involvement - Present</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet/Cuban Intentions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet motivations/intentions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban motivations/intentions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of Western Countermeasures</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for the Next Six to Twelve Months</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects Over the Longer Term</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part III  - Policy Actions and Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Instruments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Diplomatic Instruments</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control Linkages</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic Assistance to African Nations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Military Related Measures</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Assistance/Military Support for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Peacekeeping Efforts/Encouraging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Activity by Non-African Countries/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of US Military Forces in Africa/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Actions Outside Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enlisting the Support of Allies and Friends</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Pressures</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Development Assistance Support</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Measures</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Interveners</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of Conflict</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia/The Horn/Angola/Zaiza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Economic and Financial Incentives and Dis-incentives
   Cuba: Negative Bilateral Inducements
   Positive Bilateral Inducements
   Multilateral Economic Sanctions and Inducements
   The Soviet Union: Bilateral Measures
   Multilateral Efforts
   Africa: Positive Measures
   Negative Measures

6. Public Diplomacy
   Voice of America Broadcasts to Cuba

3. Specific Issues and Situations (Options)
   Option 1
   Option 2
   Option 3

PART IV - CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC POSTURE

Public Perceptions of Soviet/Cuban Activity in Africa
Congressional Perceptions of the Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa
Effective Public Posture
Legal and Statutory Dimensions

ANNEXES

I - Cuban-Soviet Presence in Africa
II - African Perceptions of Soviet and Cuban Military Intervention
III - Political and Economic Costs to the USSR of Its Involvement
IV - Political and Economic Costs to Cuba of Its Involvement
V - Potential Future Cuba/Soviet Military Intervention in Africa
VI - Latin American Reaction
VII - Public Attitudes toward "Linkage"
VIII - A: AID Contribution
   B: Memorandum to Secretary of State from AID Administrator
IX - Department of Commerce Contribution
X - Department of Defense/JCS Contribution
XI - International Communication Agency Contribution
XII - Department of the Treasury Contribution
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part I - US and Others' Interests and Objectives in Limiting Soviet/Cuban Influence in Africa

It is in the interest of the U.S. (and of other Western nations): to have a peaceful and stable Africa of independent nations where Soviet/Cuban influence is not predominant and where the level of Soviet presence and involvement does not alter the overall global balance between the U.S. and the USSR; to achieve the modernization and material improvement which Africans desire by helping them to help themselves; to help the Africans achieve their goals of human dignity, social justice and majority rule; to preserve reasonable and non-discriminatory access to Africa's mineral, agricultural, and marine resources; and to focus the inevitable US-Soviet competition into peaceful economic, trade, cultural, informational, and diplomatic channels.

Most African nations lack the expertise and resources to resolve their problems and are compelled to seek external assistance. Africans would therefore strongly resist any Western effort to brand all Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa as "unacceptable". Indeed, Soviet and Cuban efforts in economic development, health care, technical education and food production are "acceptable" to us as well as to the Africans. It is the use of large-scale military efforts coupled with Soviet/Cuban political spoiling tactics which are "unacceptable" to the U.S., particularly when they encourage African leaders to seek military solutions to problems which cannot be resolved militarily and make more difficult the negotiated resolution of disputes.

The long-term impact of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa is the subject of vigorous debate. At one end of the range of opinion is the view that the Soviets and Cubans cannot be dislodged once they have acquired a position of dominance. As a consequence, the division of position and influence in Africa between East and West could be changed to our disadvantage, and the global balance shifted in favor of the Soviets, depending on the strategic importance of the African nation taken over. Other observers, however, believe that the Soviets have demonstrated they can maintain a position of dominance only where they are able to station substantial military forces and have shown repeatedly that they are unable to maintain a close relationship with an African nation, in part because of their heavy-handed behavior, but more fundamentally because as they attempt to utilize a position of influence to pursue their own objectives, they erode and ultimately lose their position of dominance. Most observers believe that the history of Africa since 1945 clearly demonstrates the strength of African nationalism, and the skill and will of African leaders to prevent the Soviets from achieving a dominant position.

While the experience of the past two decades suggests that African nationalism has been strong enough to keep the Soviets in the role of just another foreign power, there are several significant differences between the present situation and the earlier period. First, the Soviets have shown a willingness to involve themselves militarily in problem situations in Africa. Second, Cuban combat forces represent a new element which could enable the Soviets to acquire and maintain effective control in Africa in a pattern paralleling Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Third, by providing nearly all the manpower needed,
the less heavy-handed Cubans enable the Soviets to keep in the background. In view of these differences, the balance between Soviet pressures and African nationalism which prevailed during the past two decades may have been altered, and as a consequence, the pattern evolved between 1955 and 1978 may not hold for the next two decades.

This Review Memorandum assesses the problems posed by Soviet/Cuban involvement for the present and the immediate future. A follow-on assessment should be prepared in 12 to 14 months to permit the identification of any significant changes and the need for additional or different counter-measures.

European attitudes toward Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa are ambivalent and the implications for policy uncertain. Europeans see a challenge to their own and Western interests; would like something to be done about it; and fear the consequences for global balance of an inadequate Western response. However, with the exception of France, the Europeans feel there is little they can do themselves, and see at least as much risk as benefit in deepening Western or US support for regimes like that of Zaire. Many European governments have strong reservations about an African intervention force. Others think that a Western-backed African bloc would be of doubtful effectiveness and might drive African states unwilling to line up with the West into the arms of the Soviets. On the other hand, European governments agree that every effort should be made to find peaceful solutions to the increasingly more critical problems of southern Africa.

The moderate and conservative Arab governments and Iran would like to see Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa countered by the U.S. Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have shown the greatest concern and have been the most vocal in urging us to action.

Most Latin American states are mildly concerned over and disapproving of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa. But they regard it as a distant problem not directly affecting them, and are by and large unwilling to do anything about it or able to agree even on publicly condemning it.

The Chinese can be expected to continue their sharp propaganda attacks on Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa and to intensify their challenge of Cuba's Non-Aligned credentials. But Peking will attempt to avoid over-identification with Western moves.

While Africans universally agree the Soviets are seeking influence in Africa, some see this as a normal "big power" effort to serve its interests while others believe the Soviets seek political and ideological hegemony. Governments which rely heavily on the Soviets see them as supportive and reliable. Governments which face opposition from groups which are recipients of Soviet aid ascribe a conspiratorial design to Soviet/Cuban behavior. Those in the middle find Soviet and Cuban activities peripheral to the development needs of Africa but essential to the successful resolution of southern African problems. Almost none are willing to condemn or forswear all outside military intervention. At the July OAU Summit, the Chiefs of State, while reaffirming OAU opposition to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of African states, reiterated traditional OAU approval of appeals by sovereign states for outside help. Still, Nigerian President Obasanjo, apparently articulating the evolving OAU
consensus, cautioned the Soviets and Cubans not to overstay their welcome in Africa. Africans are divided on whether the Cubans are playing an independent role or are surrogates for the Soviets. A number of countries see the Cubans as a useful catalyst to frighten the West into exerting greater pressure on the white regimes of southern Africa. Few Africans see any alternative to having the Cubans and the Soviets help equip and train the fighting forces of the Namibian and Zimbabwean nationalists. Nearly all are prepared to accept Soviet support to achieve black majority rule in southern Africa, a goal which Africans of all political persuasions are determined to achieve.

African moderate states are divided on whether Soviet/Cuban involvement constitutes a threat to their freedom. Many Africans do not think that there is a Cuban problem or a Soviet problem; they note that the Soviets left Somalia, Egypt, and Sudan when requested to do so, and seem confident that the Cubans will depart when asked. Still others believe that if Western countries object to a Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa, they must prevent the rise of situations in which the African participants believe that Soviet or Cuban help is necessary.

Part II - Soviet and Cuban Involvement, Present and Potential

The Soviets and the Cubans have nearly 60,000 civilian and military personnel scattered across the African Continent; they have mounted massive military aid programs; they have planned, launched, and sustained extensive combat operations in support of African governments which have requested their help. Although the Soviets have personnel in some 35 African countries and the Cubans in 13, the recent expansion of Soviet and Cuban activity has been focused principally in three areas: Angola, Ethiopia, and the nations neighboring Rhodesia. (The Soviet presence in Algeria and Libya dates back to an earlier period.) Cuba is the principal supplier of manpower. There are now some 42 to 47 thousand Cubans in Africa, including the 20,000 combat troops in Angola, the 17,000 in Ethiopia, and the 500 military advisors in Mozambique. In addition, there are 5,000 Cuban civilian advisors in Angola, with another 5,000 expected to arrive before the end of 1978. (See Annex I for a more detailed inventory of Soviet and Cuban activity.)

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious but not necessarily synonymous. The Soviets and the Cubans have developed a symbiotic relationship in their African adventure which furthers both their particular and mutual interests.

Soviet motivations, objectives, and intentions represent a mixture of geopolitical, strategic, and ideological/political elements which differ area by area on the Continent.

In the Horn the Soviets appear to calculate that if they can establish a strong, permanent presence in Ethiopia, they will be in a position to strengthen their strategic impact on Middle Eastern events and affect the flow of oil, to project their military power east into the Indian Ocean, and extend their influence west and south into Africa. At the same time, active involvement in Ethiopia permits the Soviets to displace the West and specifically the U.S. from a long-held position of influence, to enhance their status as a great power and expand their world role, and to support the ideologically compatible Mengistu regime.
Angola's location on the South Atlantic is strategically important and its proximity to foci of weakness (Zaire, Namibia) is attractive, but support for an ideologically compatible liberation movement-cum-government to the detriment of Western interests is equally attractive and important.

Soviet involvement in Algeria and Libya reflects a similar "mix" of motivation: a strategic presence on NATO's southern flank and the support of ideologically compatible regimes plus the attraction of hard currency earnings from massive arms sales.

Soviet involvement in the Rhodesian conflict in the short term is heavily ideological/political. Support of the black nationalist guerrillas enables the Soviets simultaneously to associate themselves with a "progressive" political grouping, to support a liberation struggle, to help the member states of the Organization of African Unity achieve one of their primary goals, and to undermine the position, influence, and interests of the West. In the longer term, their interests may be more focused on strategic influence on the events in South Africa and ultimately on the geopolitical importance and resources of southern Africa.

While the connecting thread of Soviet involvement in Africa is opportunism, there were different circumstances and different attractions in each of the areas/situations the Soviets have entered. More importantly, there are differing degrees of Soviet interest, involvement and commitment.

In the near term, the Soviets will not abandon their present role in African affairs, and are likely to seek to consolidate, if not to extend it. Nevertheless, the costs to the Soviets in terms of Soviet-US and Soviet-European relations could reach proportions which could be meaningful in Soviet decision-making, and give rise to some second thoughts about the pace and scope of Soviet involvement in Africa, if not about the long-run objective of displacing Western presence, position, and influence from Africa. (See also NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCOMPART.))

Cuba is not involved in Africa solely or even primarily because of its relationship with the USSR. It is deeply committed to the pursuit of its own ideological and pragmatic political goals there: the advancement of "The Revolution" and the support of "progressive" regimes, the expansion of its own political influence in the Third World at the expense of the West (read U.S.), and the establishment for itself of a major leadership role among developing nations.

Cuba is not likely to abandon its objectives in Africa easily or soon. There are probably only three sets of circumstances which would cause the Cubans to consider a drastic reduction in their presence or early withdrawal:

— An explicit request from the African governments directly involved for the Cubans to depart and/or an unmistakable charge of mind by other African governments which to date have found Cuba's presence and activities acceptable;

— A Soviet threat to withdraw or severely reduce its economic assistance to Cuba unless Havana withdraws from Africa. The termination or the reduction of
Soviet logistical support would force the Cubans to reduce their African presence, but they would not withdraw even if they had to go it alone in Africa: 

— Direct US military measures or the threat of US military action.

Judging from the response of Soviet officials and spokesmen to our diplomatic and public "warnings", the Soviets may have initially discounted the significance and strength of our disapproval of their African adventurism. Publicly, the Soviets have insisted that they are active in Africa only in response to the explicit invitation of the African government involved, and countered Western criticism of the Soviet/Cuban role in Shaba II with accusations of Western intervention and Western responsibility. Our concerns, however, have clearly registered with the Soviet leadership. On June 22, the Soviets issued an official statement justifying at length Soviet African policy and criticizing US and Western policies and actions there. Although the Soviet public responses have been along predictable lines, there are some indications that behind the scenes the Soviets are beginning to take seriously the opposition of the U.S., the Europeans, and some Third Worlders to their military involvement in Africa.

US efforts to deal with Cuban adventurism in Africa have not produced substantial results so far. Our diplomatic warnings that continued Cuban military presence there will make progress toward normalization impossible do not appear to have had any appreciable effect. However, Western action in Zaire, including the commitment of US military forces and our strong public statements, may have caused Castro to review one of the "givers" of his African policy — that the U.S. would not become militarily involved in Africa. It is not yet clear what, if any, shifts might occur in Cuban policy as a result. It is unlikely that Cuba will draw back from areas where it is already heavily committed, but recent Western action might result in somewhat greater caution on the part of Cuba with respect to future involvements.

Cuban losses, both killed and wounded in both Angola and Ethiopia are probably not in excess of 3 to 4 thousand. The highest estimate of the total number killed in action is 1,200. (In comparison, 606 Cubans were killed and 8,708 were injured in traffic accidents last year.) The psychological impact in Cuba has been minimal. Casualties would have to be much higher to be sharply felt among a population of nine million. Even if the numbers were larger, the effect would still be modest because of the careful management of all news. There are no casualty reports; the few references to losses are couched in terms of "fallen heroes" and are accompanied by patriotic appeals which have an undoubted effect.

Within the next six months to one year, we believe that the Soviets and Cubans will remain occupied primarily with their existing commitments to Angola, Ethiopia, and the Rhodesian nationalists, although it is possible that the scale of these commitments will be increased. In Angola, the continuing civil war will likely require the Soviets and the Cubans to make even greater commitments to protect their current position. In Ethiopia, the Cubans and the Soviets continue to resist participation in a costly and perhaps unwinnable battle for Eritrea. But should the Ethiopian military campaign continue, it is likely that the Soviets and the Cubans will eventually be drawn into a costly involvement in that conflict. Alternatively, if the Soviets promote a negotiated settlement with the
Eritrean rebels against Mengistu's wishes, they will receive little Ethiopian gratitude. If the renewed pressure of Somali liberation forces continues and expands, the Soviets and the Cubans may find it necessary to resume an active role in the Ogaden fighting. In any event, the Soviets will have to continue to deal with an unstable Ethiopian regime facing major economic and social difficulties. Should the political stalemate continue in Rhodesia, the Soviets and Cubans are expected to increase their military assistance to the Rhodesian guerrillas. Cuban military personnel may begin accompanying guerrilla units into Rhodesia, but we doubt that Cuba is presently contemplating a major offensive in Rhodesia using Cuban military units.

Over the longer term, southern Africa has the greatest potential for Soviet/Cuban involvement. Zaire probably presents the best opportunity for exploiting indigenous opposition to a corrupt and chronically unstable regime. A post-independence Namibia is another area of potential opportunity for the Soviets and the Cubans should internal stability, external pressures from South Africa, or spill-over from the NNPP-Angolan Government conflict lead Namibian leaders to seek outside military help. The Cubans and the Soviets can be expected to take advantage of opportunities which arise as the result of unpredictable events, for example, the departure from the scene or the death of or overthrow of current leaders, and of structural weaknesses endemic to post-colonial Africa. Uganda after Amin will be vulnerable to subversion. Ghana and Nigeria are both in a period of political unease as military leaders embark on reversion to civilian rule. There are obvious uncertainties in the post-Kenyatta scene in Kenya.

Part III - Policy Actions and Instruments

A. Instruments:

US actions to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa should be keyed to the following long-term goals: a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa; the orderly social and economic development of the nations of Africa; and a strengthened Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its member states to resolve the underlying causes of inter-African conflict. Flowing from these goals are shorter-term objectives: the removal of the immediate occasions for outside intervention in African affairs; the removal of Cuban combat troops from the Continent; and an increase in the costs to the Soviets and the Cubans of involvement in African trouble spots.

There are seven policy/action instruments available for use:

1. Diplomatic - Direct diplomatic approaches to the Soviets and the Cubans can be continued, but exhortation and warnings are unlikely to bring about changes in either government's opportunistic approach to Africa. Careful diplomatic work in the Organization of American States might result in a weak resolution indirectly condemning Cuban activities in Africa. There is virtually no chance of achieving even that result in either the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity, although we may be able to work through the UN and the OAU to encourage negotiated settlements of African disputes. Our Western European allies (particularly France) might be persuasive with certain countries, such as the radical Arab states who
would discount or dismiss US approaches. If pressed by us, 3 or 4 Latin American states might raise US concern over Cuba’s military involvement in Africa with Havana, but we cannot expect much in the way of direct results. We could continue our efforts directly and through our European, Arab, and African friends to convince selected members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to oppose Cuban cooperation with Soviet military activities in Africa as inconsistent with Cuba’s status in and its desire for leadership of the NAM. It is possible that too direct or frontal an effort could backfire and strengthen support within the NAM for Cuba.

US efforts to resolve disputes and to bring about peaceful change in Africa by working bilaterally with African governments and multilaterally with African, Arab, and European states can be continued. The recent agreement among the parties for the peaceful decolonization of South West Africa/Namibia after 13 months of careful, patient, and persistent diplomacy demonstrates the significant progress which can be made toward the resolution of African conflicts by working in an African context.

By maintaining a continuing dialogue with Africans of all persuasions, we can strengthen our credibility and influence in Africa. This influence can help us in turn to frustrate Soviet/Cuban aspirations by enabling us to contribute effectively to arranging negotiated settlements. Opening or expanding existing relations with some countries which have been close to the Soviets and the Cubans also provides those states with an "option" to the West; it increases their flexibility of policy and behavior, and encourages them to utilize it. While there is potentially a risk that the aid we might provide could enable the recipient government to utilize its own resources for military purposes and continue its military relationship with the Soviets and the Cubans, we should be able to avoid the types or amounts of assistance which would free resources for military equipment or operations. On the other hand, a decision to limit US interaction with African states which permit or encourage Soviet/Cuban involvement could increase the economic cost to the Soviets of their activities, sharpen African awareness of the inadequacy of Soviet assistance, and deter other governments from support of Soviet/Cuban actions. But such a US cut-off would heighten the East-West confrontation in Africa and be sharply criticized by most African states.

Ongoing arms control negotiations which have direct substantive linkages to Soviet activities in Africa, e.g. the Indian Ocean talks, and the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) restraint talks might be utilized - to call the Soviets to task for their military activities in Africa and to show them that an alternative cooperative course for protecting their interests is open to them. There is no evidence thus far, however, that the Soviets are prepared to limit their political options in Africa by forsaking their only effective resource tools: arms; or that the pace or content of the Indian Ocean talks will influence Soviet African policy measurably. On those arms control negotiations which do not have direct substantive linkage to Africa, e.g. SALT, we can continue to make clear to the Soviets that progress is made difficult when Soviet activities are raising tensions and adversely affecting public and Congressional attitudes.

2. Economic Assistance - Development assistance is one of the strong cards that we and our Western partners hold in the competition with Soviet/Cuban
military aid diplomacy in Africa. A vigorous development assistance effort permits us both to identify the US and the West with the long-term aspirations of the peoples and leaders of Africa and to counter Soviet ambitions in the short-term by strengthening our presence on the ground. If our economic aid program in Africa were substantially increased in size and scope — perhaps from $467 million proposed in FY 79 to some $950 million in FY 80 and to include infrastructure for river basin development and relieving transportation and communications bottlenecks, and to expand training, health and energy programs — it could be more effective. At the same time, the very substantial US and Western commitments to African development, together with clear assurances of major increases to address problems which the Africans consider critical, need to be made more visible. Africa's most basic problems are long term and require long term solutions. (See Annex VIII, in particular VIII-B, for a more complete and detailed exposition of the contribution development assistance can make to the achievement of US objectives in Africa.)

The West also offers African nations the most lucrative markets for their exports, access to capital, the highest quality goods and the most advanced technology available in nearly every field.

But the impact of these Western economic assets is generally long-term. We cannot counter Soviet/Cuban military assistance directly with long term contributions to African development. We need flexibility to devise, in coordination with other Western governments, an array of short- and long-term economic tools which will permit the fashioning of integrated economic packages that are responsive to urgent needs. Such packages should include not only development assistance, which addresses both immediate and longer term requirements, plus incentives for foreign investment and access to Western markets and technology, but also short-term assistance, balance of payments and budget support, and export financing. In this way, economic instruments could be used more effectively, with other policy tools to help offset Soviet and Cuban initiatives by demonstrating the economic advantages which association with the West affords Africa.

3. Military Related Measures — Military measures will not be successful in and of themselves in achieving US objectives in Africa. But combined with diplomatic and economic initiatives, security assistance — arms transfers, military training, military construction activity — could reduce the incentive of countries to seek Soviet assistance and could contribute to improved US-African relations. US policy restraints together with practical limitations (e.g. a country's ability to absorb material or training) will continue to keep US security assistance to Africa at a modest level. The U.S. might support African peacekeeping efforts. The U.S. can encourage other countries to shoulder some of the burden of checking the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa by providing funds, equipment and forces. While it is not US policy at this time to send US combat forces to Africa, we can demonstrate our capability to project our power in Africa by providing logistics support to African, European or international organization forces operating in Africa and by scheduling Navy port visits or organizing joint training exercises with the military forces of selected African nations. There are numerous military actions which could be taken against Cuba or the Soviet Union and their military forces — increasing the surveillance of Soviet FLINT ships, aerial reconnaissance flights over Cuba, increased air
and sea surveillance of Cuban aircraft and ships, etc. The U.S. could also encourage nations whose airspace is being used by Soviet/Cuban aircraft on route to Africa to deny them overflight clearance and to challenge the overflying aircraft. However, such actions would not stop Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa, and the wisdom of turning to such measures to communicate our concern over Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa is subject to rigorous debate.

4. Enlisting the Support of Allies and Friends - The political pressures which our allies and other friends can bring to bear on the Soviets and the Cubans closely parallel our own at a lower level of potential effectiveness. They could provide economic support and development assistance to vulnerable African nations who wish to resist. France, Morocco and a small number of other nations have already provided military support in the form of equipment, training, logistics help, and combat troops.

5. Economic and Financial Incentives and Disincentives - Neither US bilateral nor multilateral economic or financial measures directed at Cuba appear to offer a sufficient negative cost or positive inducement to produce a change in Cuban African policy. Bilateral US sanctions already preclude most economic contact, and the Cubans have made it clear that a normalization of US-Cuban relations does not provide sufficient incentive to change. The imposition of multilaterally agreed upon economic/financial sanctions (particularly the curtailment of official credits and export guarantees and private credits) could impose significant economic penalties on Havana, and on Moscow if it felt compelled to pick up the slack on behalf of Cuba. But the extensive international cooperation required to make such sanctions effective would be extremely difficult to achieve. A mandatory multilateral trade embargo of Cuba would require UN Security Council action which would be subject to Soviet veto. Our allies are most unlikely to agree to an informal embargo of Cuba. Such sanctions would involve serious political and important economic costs to us and to our allies. As a result, Cuba’s European and Asian trading partners are not likely to cut back their trade with Cuba or curtail the flow of credit to Havana.

The U.S. could exert limited economic pressure on the USSR (through tightening technology transfer and trade, including a reduction in grain shipments). But experience suggests that economic pressures and trade incentives do not have significant impact on Soviet behavior. In addition, there are severe domestic constraints on such pressures, not only on grain exports, but increasingly on other exports as well. A US effort to obtain multilateral agreement to limit trade with the Soviets or to restrict credit flows is unlikely to succeed in the face of Western and Japanese unwillingness to terminate government-supported credits or extend trade restrictions to non-strategic items. Allied reluctance is occasioned not only by the prospective impact on their own economies of such measures, but also by their judgment (which we share) that such measures would be largely ineffective in furthering our common political objectives.

A range of positive and negative measures which could be used to influence the policies of African governments also exists. Expanded CPIC and EXIMBANK financing, international bank lending, commodity agreements, etc. are essentially long term. The negative measures (trade embargos, the blockage of assets, the
the slow-down of lending and assistance programs) would require not only Western but Arab oil producer cooperation to be effective. They run the risk of domestic and Third World backlash, and run counter to other US economic policies.

6. Public Diplomacy — The tools of public diplomacy — the Voice of America, films, television, books and documents, exchange of persons programs, etc. — can be utilized to develop an international perception of the problems posed by continued Soviet/Cuban military involvement in Africa; gain support for constructive, i.e. economic and ideological rather than military, competition between East and West; and stress the need for long-term African growth and stability and for fostering development, peaceful change, and racial and social justice. A detailed public diplomacy program can be devised to support whichever policy option is selected.

3. Specific Issues and Situations — Issues for Decision or Discussion:

1. In the Diplomatic sphere:

— Whether to work toward normal relations with all the governments and groupings in Africa regardless of their support or acquiescence in Soviet/Cuban military involvement.

— Should we (a) undertake a major diplomatic effort in the coming months with the members of the Non-Aligned Movement to persuade them to raise objections to Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa, to challenge Cuba's credentials as an NAM state, and voice objection to continued Cuban efforts to lead the NAM, and (b) urge Latin American and other moderate states which are not NAM members to join and work against radical influence in the NAM?

2. In the Economic Assistance sphere:

— Should we attempt despite the active opposition of some Members of Congress and the public and the lack of enthusiasm of many others for foreign aid to increase substantially the size and broaden the scope of our economic development assistance program in Africa in order to obtain the resources required for the success of our African strategy?

3. In the Military sphere:

— Should we increase our military assistance programs in Africa substantially in dollar amounts, scope, and number of recipients?

— Should we increase our peacetime military visibility in Africa by increasing the number of Navy port calls, USAF overflights and visits, and joint military training exercises?

— Should we consider direct actions against the USSR and Cuba and against their military forces (e.g. increased surveillance of Soviet ELINT ships and of Cuban aircraft and ships, overflights of Cuba)?
4. In the Economic/Financial sphere:

— Should we consider additional unilateral or multilateral restraints on trade, credit flows, and the transfer of technology with Cuba and the Soviet Union in the event their military role in Africa increases?

C. Specific Issues and Situations - OPTIONS:

The options below are designed to draw together for conceptual purposes varying sets of hypothetical choices, which appear to have an internal consistency of approach, from among the issues for decision described above in III, B. It would of course be possible to construct differing options by choosing somewhat differently from among the decision issues. The following options are, in addition, designed for the coming year. Their success or failure, judged in terms of results in Africa during that period, would determine any need for further review. In Part I, it was suggested that an assessment of the situation be made after a year.

All of the policy options we have identified have a common set of assumptions:

— that the U.S. will continue to pursue its efforts to secure a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa;

— that we will continue to emphasize economic and social development in our assistance strategy for Africa;

— that our military assistance to African nations will continue to be selective and measured;

— that direct US military involvement in Africa will be limited to logistics support for the combat forces of others;

— that the U.S. will continue to stress the need for Africans to develop their own efforts to resolve local disputes and to develop their own peacekeeping capabilities;

— that the US Government in concert with other like-minded governments, will continue to stress to the Soviets and the Cubans the destabilizing effects of their unrestrained arms transfers and their pursuit of military adventurism in Africa.

It is also assumed that there will be no major shift in Soviet/Cuban policies in the next 6 to 12 months.

OPTION 1:

To continue to pursue present policies aimed at peaceful resolution of disputes, focus military assistance programs on a limited number of key, friendly African states to strengthen their defense capabilities, but with close attention to our arms transfer restraint objectives, provide limited logistics support on a
case by case basis for third country military forces requested by an African state under attack from outside its borders, increase economic assistance and other resource flows, and emphasize the need for African resolution of local disputes. Within this framework, the U.S. would encourage key African leaders to revitalize the OAU, urge OAU members to call for restraint by all African countries in seeking the assistance of foreign troops, continue to work with the UN, the OAU and sub-regional groups of African countries to promote the peaceful resolution of specific conflicts, work towards an arms transfer restraint regime in the next CAG negotiating session, and persist in our efforts to exert international pressure on the Soviets and Cubans (through the NAM and other channels) to limit their military activities in Africa and to withdraw their combat forces from the Continent. (See pp 47-48 for a detailed presentation of the specific actions to be taken in West and Central Africa, in the Horn, and in southern Africa.)

**PRO:** This course is essentially an indirect, African-focused approach to the Soviets and the Cubans. It leaves us free to concentrate our attention on our longer-term goals in Africa, places the U.S. in the role of peacemaker while casting the Soviets and the Cubans as "meddlers", provides a measure of reassurance to moderate African leaders, avoids polarization of African forces, emphasizes US advantages in the economic and technical assistance fields, and minimizes East-West confrontational aspects of our strategy.

**CCN:** This course does not meet directly the challenge of the on-going Soviet/Cuban activities or lead to short-term reduction in Soviet/Cuban presence or involvement in Africa. It may leave some moderate African and Arab states with a sense of uncertainty as to whether the U.S. is willing to counter Soviet/Cuban military activity in Africa and about their own security.

**OPTION 2:**

In addition to the steps in Option 1, to intensify efforts to support friendly governments which are concerned about Soviet/Cuban activities with substantially increased military and economic assistance, encourage efforts by the OAU to buttress African peackeeping capabilities, and use diplomatic means to mobilize European and Non-Aligned sentiment against Soviet/Cuban actions. Within this framework, the U.S. would engage in a vigorous diplomatic campaign to seek condemnation of Cuba in the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, focus NATO and other non-African government attention on the dangers posed by Soviet/Cuban actions in Africa, and move immediately, with Congressional approval, to increase significantly not only our economic development aid but also our security supporting assistance and FMS credits for African countries. If an OAU peacekeeping force were established, we would offer logistics support.

**PRO:** This course of action provides greater reassurance to France, Belgium and moderate African and Arab states of US willingness and determination to support efforts to stabilize the situation in Africa and to counter in tangible ways Soviet/Cuban involvement. It reserves the US position in the event that even more drastic action might have to be taken should Soviet/Cuban actions be markedly stepped-up. It stresses continuing US support for peackeeping by the Africans themselves.
CON: The increases projected in economic and military aid impose difficult budget choices. Congressional reaction to increased US military supply to Africa is likely to be negative. Reaction to greater development assistance transfers may be less sharp but is still likely to be adverse. Some African "progressive" states may regard this track as provocative and likely to lead to polarization unless it is balanced by intensified US diplomatic and other actions aimed at South Africa and Rhodesia. It is doubtful that the NAM will respond conclusively or effectively against Cuban military involvement. Certain elements of this course, if mishandled, could risk diplomatic rupture with Ethiopia, a failure in efforts to improve relations with Angola, and greater polarization of Africa along East-West lines.

OPTION 3:

To adopt a policy of direct and clear cut opposition to Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa, using bilateral US-Soviet and US-Cuban relations as a means of increasing pressures. Within this framework, the U.S. would, in addition to the measures described in Options 1 and 2, intensify its public denunciation of the Soviets and the Cubans particularly if there is any increase in Soviet/Cuban military activity, call explicitly for CAU or individual African government opposition to Soviet/Cuban involvement, and seek to create a consortium of European-African-Arab states to support regional or individual African state efforts to strengthen their security and resist Soviet/Cuban incursions. The U.S. would make clear through specific actions that US-Soviet and US-Cuban bilateral economic, exchange, technological, and other relationships would suffer as a result of Soviet and Cuban African policies. The U.S. would launch efforts to persuade our allies to join us in applying economic and financial sanctions against Cuba. The U.S. would also announce its intention to increase markedly its military assistance programs in Africa, including the provision of more sophisticated military equipment to countries threatened by the Soviet/Cuban presence. We would consult on an urgent basis with our European allies, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Morocco on establishing a coordinated strategy for resource transfers to sub-Saharan Africa.

PRO: This course of action establishes clearly US will and determination to deal with Soviet/Cuban "meddling" in Africa. It reinforces our general strategy for southern Africa, leaves the USSR and Cuba enmeshed in a no-win situation in Eritrea, and meets rising moderate African-Arab concerns.

CON: This course of action puts the problems of Africa into a sharply defined East-West context, and would as a consequence draw fire from Nigeria, Tanzania, and other influential African governments. It would further polarize African opinion, antagonize the Front Line states, and severely hamper our ability to work with them on southern African issues. More significantly, it risks the escalation of African conflicts, and raises the very real possibility of greater US military involvement in Africa. This course of action will convince South Africa that it has nothing to gain from further collaboration on Rhodesia and Namibia. Finally, this track would be difficult to sustain in terms of Congressional and public opinion, of allied cooperation, or of our other foreign policy objectives.
Part IV - Congressional and Public Posture

Most Americans think about Africa only when events or issues place it in an East-West framework and seem to involve the United States. In this context, two long-term opinion trends are relevant: the American public's deep distrust of the Soviet Union and its deep-seated unwillingness to commit American soldiers or large amounts of other resources or prestige to distant fronts so long as there is no clear perception that American security is directly and unquestionably endangered.

Despite the Secretary of State's recent appearance before the House International Relations Committee and his Atlantic City speech on Africa, many Members of Congress remain uneasy and uncertain about what US policy in Africa is. Members perceive the U.S. as reacting to events in Africa on a piece-meal basis rather than within a coherent policy framework, are unsure over the direction of US policy toward the Soviet Union, and are apprehensive that US involvement in Africa to counter Soviet/Cuban expansionism could ensnare us in another Viet Nam.

An effective public posture — at home and abroad — would build on the major policy statements about US-USSR and US-African relations recently made by the President and the Secretary of State in which they set forth our view of Africa, defined our long-term purpose in positive terms, and outlined the type of relationship we desire and expect to have with the Soviets and the Cubans in the African context. Abroad, our public diplomacy strategy would: reinforce our positive, forward-looking policy toward Africa; work to remove the "mantle of legitimacy" from Soviet/Cuban involvement; communicate American support for long-term development, for social justice, independence and stability in Africa; stimulate an international consensus against continued Soviet and Cuban military involvement; and encourage African efforts to develop ground rules to contain and reduce Soviet/Cuban military activities and to evolve African institutional capabilities for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

At home, an effective public posture would reiterate that our relationship with the Soviet Union is at once competitive and cooperative, that our African strategy is long-range and is directed at helping African peoples and their leaders solve the fundamental problems confronting them, and that the U.S. need have no fears about the long-range outcome of a vigorous competition with the Soviets in Africa. It would emphasize that Soviet/Cuban influence in Africa is still limited, that the West enjoys decided advantages there, and that the U.S. has greatly enhanced its position and significantly increased its influence in Africa in the last two years. It would, finally, note that our long-range strategy requires a long-term commitment of support, and appeal to the people and the Congress to have the patience and determination to stay the course.

We believe that sufficient public and Congressional support can be mustered to approve and implement a range of countermoves — short of committing US troops. However, any approach to the Congress for support and for additional resources, and in particular any effort by the Executive Branch to secure the lifting of the constraints which have been imposed by Congress over the past few years, will result in a full scale debate of the entire range of questions involved.
PART I - US AND OTHERS' INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN LIMITING SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

In the past 2-3 years, Africa has become, after a 12 year lapse, a locus of the competition between the USSR and the United States. Through numerous existing political, economic and cultural ties, most African countries are closely linked to the West. The Soviets appear determined to expand their influence and alter the present balance of East-West presence and position by exploiting the opportunities provided by local wars, regional tensions, liberation struggles, internal disputes, ideological sympathies, and tense relations between African and Western countries.

It is in the interest of the US and of other Western nations:

-- to have an Africa of independent nations where Soviet/Cuban influence is not predominant, and where the level of Soviet presence and involvement does not alter the overall global balance between the US and the USSR.

-- to achieve the modernization and material improvement which Africans desire by helping the Africans to help themselves;

-- to have a peaceful and stable Africa where change is brought about by peaceful means, where conflicts are resolved by negotiation, and where scarce resources are dedicated to development rather than large military establishments;

-- to help the Africans achieve their goals of human dignity, social justice, and majority rule;

-- to preserve reasonable and non-discriminatory access to Africa's mineral, agricultural, and marine resources;
to focus the inevitable US-Soviet competition into peaceful economic, trade, cultural, informational, and diplomatic channels.

At this stage of their political, economic and social development as nations, most African nations lack the institutions, expertise and resources to resolve their problems and are compelled to seek external assistance. Africans would strongly resist any Western effort to brand all Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa as "unacceptable". Indeed, Soviet and Cuban efforts in the areas of economic development, health care, technical education, and food production are basically "acceptable" to us as well as to the Africans. Limited Soviet/Cuban involvement in military matters--modest arms transfers, training, technicians, advisors--must also be judged "acceptable" by us even though such involvement creates an environment which permits the transition to more troublesome activities at a later stage. The right of a sovereign state to request outside military assistance to defend its territory is uniformly accepted in Africa as is the concept of military assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa.

It is the use of large-scale military efforts -- massive military aid programs, the commitment of combat forces, the establishment of a Soviet command structure in Ethiopia, and the pressure for the adoption of military "solutions"-- coupled with Soviet/Cuban political spoiling tactics which is clearly "unacceptable" to the United States. Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa are detrimental to US interests, and to the interests of African nations, when they encourage African leaders to seek military solutions to problems which cannot be resolved militarily, and make difficult or impossible the negotiated resolution of disputes. An Angola, continued Cuban troop presence and massive Soviet military assistance are making the necessary reconciliation far more difficult and sustaining Soviet/Cuban influence. (Just as continuing outside support strengthens UNITA's determination to oppose the Luanda government.) Additionally the diversion of economic resources to the purchase of arms creates balance of payments problems in the short run and undermines the economic development efforts which are the only real solution, albeit long term, to the basic problems confronting most African nations.
The magnitude of Soviet/Cuban military involvement in African disputes creates two problems. The introduction of large amounts of military equipment and foreign troops into individual African countries seriously escalates the level of tension and the possibility of conflict in the short run, constitutes a destabilizing element for the government in question, and raises longer-term prospects for regional conflict. Just as the Soviet Union's high levels of military assistance to Somalia posed threats to Ethiopia and Kenya, its current massive military aid to Ethiopia and Angola poses long-term threats to Sudan, Zaire, and possibly Zambia. Secondly, it gives the Soviets significant leverage with the recipient governments on a wide range of other questions. Moreover, despite vigorous vocal opposition by virtually all Africans to "foreign military bases" and determined resistance by most African nations to requests for facilities and operating rights, the past two decades have shown that the Soviets have obtained (temporarily) facilities and operating rights for their forces in the context of their large-scale military assistance programs.

However, there will be many situations where the fact of Soviet and Cuban military involvement will be acceptable to African states -- e.g. in southern African liberation struggles and in efforts to preserve territorial integrity -- and where our opposition to communist involvement per se would only harm our credibility in Africa. In these circumstances, the United States should concentrate on limiting the more unacceptable aspects of Soviet and Cuban involvement, e.g. its magnitude, its negative impact on negotiations, and its threat to surrounding states. At the same time, we should seek constructive ways of demonstrating US sympathy for these fundamental African concerns.

Looking at the short term, the apparent success in some countries of the Soviet/Cuban formula -- large scale Soviet military assistance and Cuban troops in support of African efforts to achieve African goals -- may produce an inclination toward political accommodation with the Soviets and the Cubans in other countries and stimulates increasing demands for Western military assistance in still others.
What the long term impact of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa will be is the subject of vigorous debate. The facts are not clear, and predictions range from total, permanent Soviet domination of several African countries and the alteration of the global balance between the US and the USSR to the reduction of Soviet/Cuban position and influence to modest levels in all countries and the complete ouster of the Soviets and the Cubans from several as African capabilities (political, economic, managerial) develop to match African determination to be independent and to manage their own affairs. At one end of the range of opinion is the view that the Soviets (and Cubans) cannot be dislodged once they have acquired a position of dominance in a particular country. As a consequence, the division of position and influence in Africa between East and West could be changed to our disadvantage and the global balance shifted in favor of the USSR depending on the strategic importance of the African nation taken over.

At the other end of the continuum is the judgment that the Soviets (a) have demonstrated they can maintain a position of dominance over time only where they are able to station substantial Soviet military forces, and (b) have repeatedly shown that they are unable to maintain a close relationship with an African country over an extended period. This in part is because of their heavy-handed behavior. More fundamentally, it is because, as the Soviets attempt to utilize a position of influence acquired by support for African goals to pursue Soviet objectives, they erode and ultimately lose their position of dominance. According to this view, the rise and decline of the Soviet position and influence in Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia in the past two decades "proves" that: (a) the Soviets are unwilling to pursue or are unable to manage a cooperative relationship between independent states, (b) African nationalism eventually contains and then reverses Soviet efforts to achieve predominance and pursue Soviet strategic goals, and (c) the Soviets are ultimately reduced to playing the part of one foreign power competing for influence with all the other foreign powers in particular African countries.

Although they may differ on detail, most observers/analysts believe that the history of Africa since 1945 clearly demonstrates the strength of African nationalism and that the leaders and the peoples of Africa have both the will and the skill to prevent the Soviets from achieving a position of dominance in Africa.
While the experience of the past two decades suggests that Arab and African nationalism has been strong enough to keep the Soviets in, or over time to push them back into, the role of just another foreign power, there are several significant differences between the present situation and the earlier period which could lead to different consequences. First, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness and capability to involve themselves militarily in problem situations in Africa. Second, Cuban combat forces represent a new instrument which could enable the Soviets and Cubans to acquire and maintain effective control in African states in a manner paralleling Soviet political and economic domination in Eastern Europe. Finally, by providing nearly all of the civilian as well as the military manpower required, the less heavy-handed Cubans enable the Soviets to limit the number of civilian and military advisors committed and to keep themselves in the background. In view of these differences, the balance between Soviet pressures and Arab/African nationalism which prevailed during the past two decades may have been altered. As a consequence, the pattern evolved in Africa between 1955 and 1978 may not hold for the next two decades.

An attempt to assess the impact of current Soviet/Cuban actions in Africa on the global balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would require the systematic examination of the interaction of a series of complex variables. At least the following elements would have to be examined in depth and evaluated: (1) Soviet and Cuban motivations and intentions (see Part II below); (2) whether the Soviets and Cubans are capable of achieving and retaining positions of total or effective dominance in one, several, or most of the fifty nations of Africa; (3) what level of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa would produce a basic shift in the balance of East-West influence in Africa, and somewhat farther afield, in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf; (4) what level and type of Soviet/Cuban influence and control over what countries would have an impact on the global balance; and (5) how specifically the global balance would be affected militarily, economically, politically with due regard to U.S./Soviet technology capabilities and resource availability worldwide.

A systematic study of this complex of interacting variables is well outside the parameters of the present PRM and would involve highly speculative considerations projected over a decade or more. At the moment, moreover,
the division of position and influence between the U.S. and the Soviets/Cubans in Africa is very much in our favor. Even in countries where the Soviets and the Cubans have achieved a position of predominant influence, they have not been able to consolidate their position and transform it into a position of effective control. Gulf is still pumping oil out of Angola; President Neto has recently communicated with us at some length and is actively seeking expanded ties with the West. Ethiopia has indicated its desire to keep the channels of communication between us open; Sekou Toure has indicated that he would like to reopen the dialogue with the West. The leaders of the Patriotic Front are clearly interested in continuing the dialogue with the West. Finally, the adverse impact that Soviet pre-eminence in Egypt and Somalia may have had on the global balance has been removed, and has not yet been replaced.

Wherever a particular observer or policy maker comes out in his analysis, the problems posed by Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa are of such magnitude and importance that they must be addressed systematically and dealt with. This Review Memorandum attempts to do that for the present and the immediate future. To insure a methodical review of the key variables in the not too distant future, a follow-on intelligence assessment should be prepared in 12 to 14 months to permit the rapid identification of any significant change and the prompt elaboration of effective countermeasures.

**Interests and Perceptions of European Allies**

European attitudes toward the Soviet/Cuban problem in Africa are ambivalent and the implications for policy are uncertain. Europeans see a challenge to their own and Western interests; would like something to be done about it; and fear the consequences for global balance of an inadequate Western response. The former colonial powers (France, the UK, and Belgium) see their special ties with former colonies threatened by Soviet/Cuban activity and consider Soviet activity as a challenge to the West at large. However debatable the specifics of each African issue, most Europeans fear the implications of a cumulative series of episodes which enhance the power and prestige of those backed by Soviet/Cuban power (if only temporarily) and weaken the position of regimes or groups more identified with the West. Africa is near enough to Europe for Europeans to see their own interests much more directly involved there than most of them ever did in Southeast Asia.
But most Europeans also have a low opinion of the capabilities of the African regimes that want Western military help. With the exception of France, they feel there is little they can do themselves; they resist linking détente policies to African issues; and they see at least as much risk as benefit in deepening Western or US military support for regimes like that of Zaire.

The UK, as Prime Minister Callaghan has publicly made clear, is at the opposite end of the spectrum, as are the Scandinavians.

The FRG, with important economic interests in Africa (and political interests in Namibia) but few independent sources of intelligence, is somewhere in between. German leaders have urged closer US-European consultations on what they see as a Soviet challenge to Western interests, but have not indicated what they think an appropriate response might be.

European governments agree that every effort should be made to resolve the situations in Zimbabwe, Namibia and eventually, South Africa which might open the door to Soviet/Cuban intervention. The British are particularly identified with this approach. There was also support for the French-Belgian action in Shaba on humanitarian grounds.
Beyond this, most Europeans are ambivalent about next steps. They believe that African disputes have roots mainly in the African past (including their own roles in drawing often arbitrary frontiers). They do not think these problems can be resolved by imposing East-West divisions on Africa. More specifically, they foresee and do not like the prospect of a series of Shaba-like rescue missions. They see the Zaire regime as corrupt and perhaps unreformable. They think it, and many other threatened African regimes, incapable of making good use of either economic or military assistance. Some fear that the image of a West determined to keep Mobutu in power would run counter to our professed commitment to human rights and to our interest in African welfare as opposed to East-West rivalry; complicate our relations with the key black African states; and generally undermine the progress we have made in improving America's standing (and so by extension that of the West) in Africa generally.

Many European governments have expressed strong reservations about the idea of an African intervention force unless it were endorsed by the OAU. In the recent Paris meeting on Shaba, the UK, Germany, and Belgium said they could not be associated with the French idea of a permanent, Western-backed force supported by a few African states, and expressed misgivings about the polarizing effect such a force could have. The French, hoping perhaps to expand their influence, are more willing than other Europeans to contemplate a Western link to an African security system, even, apparently at the risk of polarizing the continent and at some risk to detente. Yet there has been criticism in France of French military involvement in the Sahara, Chad, and Shaba. The French Government itself does not seem to believe it has the means to engage in combat at a more intensive or prolonged level than it has done in the cases mentioned. Certainly the costs of such engagement would be serious for France.

Many others in Europe think a Western-backed African bloc would, because of African weakness, be more Western than African. Besides being of doubtful effectiveness, it could drive African states unwilling to line up with the West into the arms of the Soviets or at least to a more militant anti-Western neutralism.

If most Europeans (except the French) are basically skeptical about effective action in Africa, they are also
also reluctant to put what is left of detente on the block of "linkage". They would probably not cooperate in any significant effort to restrict trade with the U.S.S.R. or Cuba. For all the concerns some of them have about SALT, most Europeans would probably be reluctant to see this keystone of detente broken off in connection with African developments. Serious as is the African situation, they are not eager to see tension spread back to Europe.

The View from the Middle East

Broadly speaking, all the moderate and conservative Arab governments, and Iran, are concerned over Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa and would like to see them countered by the United States. Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have shown the greatest concern and the most inclination to take action directly; they have also been the most vocal in urging us to action. The Egyptians and the Saudis have been concerned mainly about Soviet and Cuban activities in the Horn, although they have also followed closely events in Angola, Rhodesia and Zaire. Sadat fears that Somalia will be forced back into the orbit of Soviet influence and that from their base in Ethiopia the Soviets and Cubans will eventually turn against Sudan and overthrow Numeiri. The Saudis and Iranians share Sadat's disquiet and are concerned over the possibility that the Soviets and Cubans will extend their activities to the Arabian Peninsula and take over the small, oil-rich, but militarily weak states of the Persian Gulf. The Saudis live very literally in dread of the prospect of one day finding themselves surrounded by radical, Soviet-supported regimes. Morocco is concerned more about the situation in Zaire and in the other French-speaking states of Africa, but it is also apprehensive about the Horn.

We can expect public, and probably even material, support from the Saudis, Egypt and Morocco for US action to counter Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa. The Shah of Iran will also give us public support. Tunisia, Sudan, Jordan, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the Persian Gulf States would welcome a move by us, but might not be willing to speak out in our favor.

The radical Arab states would, in most instances, oppose action by the United States against Soviet/Cuban activities in Africa. They can be expected to back the Soviets on Angola and Zaire, and would probably welcome
welcome Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Rhodesian situation. However, some of the radicals part company with the Soviets and Cubans when it comes to Eritrea. Algeria, Iraq and Syria have long backed the Eritrean Liberation Front against the central government of Ethiopia, and their views on the Eritrean question have not changed as a result of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia. They have made known to the Soviets and Cubans their unhappiness over reports of Soviet/Cuban backing for recent Ethiopian military moves in Eritrea.

**Latin American Reaction**

The great majority of Latin American states are mildly concerned over and disapproving of Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa, but they regard it as a distant problem not directly affecting them; hence, they are by and large unwilling to do anything about it, or even to speak out strongly. Of the most important states, Brazil counsels patience, Venezuela wishes to play a moderating rather than a confrontational role, and Mexico will remain passive (see Annex VI).

**African Perceptions of Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa**

Africans universally see the Soviets as seeking influence in Africa. Some Africans see the Soviet objective as limited to influence; others believe the Soviets seek hegemony. Africans are divided on whether the Cubans are playing an independent role or are surrogates for the Soviet Union.

Governments which rely heavily on Soviet sources of supply either see the Soviets and Cubans as positively supportive or count them as reliable because of a coincidence of interest and outlook. At the opposite pole, governments that face opposition from groups which are recipients or potential recipients of Soviet aid ascribe a conspiratorial design to Soviet behavior with the Cubans (and/or African collaborators) acting as accessories. Those in the middle find Soviet and Cuban roles peripheral to the development needs of Africa but essential to the successful resolution of southern African problems. Indeed, few Africans see any alternative to having the Cubans and Soviets help equip and train the fighting forces of the Namibian and Zimbabwean nationalists, however much the conservatives would wish
otherwise. Compared to the French-speaking moderates, the English-speaking moderates are much more relaxed about the risk of relying on communist help, especially that of the Cubans, in the liberation struggle. A number of countries in fact do not consider the Cubans as Soviet surrogates, but see them as a useful catalyst to frighten the West into exerting greater pressure on the white regimes in southern Africa. Moreover, they believe that by turning to the Cubans, they can avoid the spectre of a US-Soviet confrontation.

African moderate states are similarly divided on whether the Soviet/Cuban military presence constitutes a threat to their independence and freedom. Some are alarmed or are seriously worried about Soviet/Cuban military involvement in Africa. However, many Africans do not think there is a Cuban problem or a Soviet problem; they note that the Soviets left Somalia, Egypt, and Sudan when requested to do so, and seem confident that the Cubans will depart when asked. While all agree in principle on the desirability of eliminating or preventing outside intervention in the continent, radicals and conservatives alike are led by their pervasive weakness to condone exceptions. Those who view the Soviet/Cuban military presence as a threat are chiefly concerned about their own security capacity and the broader need to promote a peaceful environment. They note that the communist states make military assistance readily available to those they favor, and observe that there is no counterbalancing assistance for those who oppose Moscow. Indeed, some believe that if Western countries object to a Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa, they must prevent the rise of situations in which the African participants believe Soviet or Cuban help is necessary. (See Annex II for a fuller exposition of the varying African perceptions of the Soviet/Cuban presence.)
Part II - SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, PRESENT AND POTENTIAL

The Soviets and the Cubans have nearly 60,000 civilian and military personnel—combat troops, military advisors and technicians, and civilian technical, administrative, medical, and education specialists—scattered across the African Continent. They have mounted massive military aid programs in several African countries—hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet military equipment plus Soviet and Cuban military technicians and training cadres. They have planned, launched, and sustained extensive combat operations nominally in cooperation with and support of the African government or liberation group which requested their help.

Although the Soviets have civilian and military personnel in some 35 African countries and the Cubans in 13, the recent expansion of Soviet and Cuban activity has been focused principally in three areas: Angola, Ethiopia, and the nations neighboring Rhodesia. The Soviets have supplied $500 million worth of military equipment to Ethiopia with another $300 million on order. About $1 billion worth of military equipment has arrived in Angola from the USSR, Cuba and several East European countries. The Soviets have 1200 military advisors and technicians in Ethiopia, 1000 in Angola, and 500 in Rhodesia's neighbors (300 in Mozambique, 200 in Tanzania). (The Soviet presence in Algeria and Libya -- massive deliveries of arms and some 1000 Soviet advisors in each -- dates back to an earlier period.)

It is Cuba, however, which is the principal supplier of manpower. There are now some 42 to 47,000 Cubans in Africa, including the 20,000 combat troops in Angola and the 17,000 troops in Ethiopia, and the 500 military advisors in Mozambique. In addition, there are 5,000 Cuban civilian advisors and technicians in Angola, with another 5000 -- mostly teachers and construction workers -- expected to arrive before the end of 1978. (See Annex I for a more detailed inventory of Soviet and Cuban activity.)

Soviet/Cuban Intentions

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious but not necessarily synonymous. The Cubans and the Soviets have developed a symbiotic relationship in their African adventure which furthers both their particular and mutual interests.
Explanations of Soviet involvement in Africa and analyses of Soviet motivations, objectives and intentions range from "the implementation of the Grand Design for the Soviet takeover of the Continent" to "a purely opportunistic exploitation of instability at the expense of the West and of the moderate states of Africa." There is no hard evidence available at this point which supports conclusively either polar explanation or any particular combination of the two. In all probability, the Soviets themselves are acting in terms of a range of motivations.

At the moment, the working hypothesis which seems to fit best the known facts is that Soviet motivations are a geographically differentiated "mix" of geopolitical/strategic and ideological/political elements. Soviet involvement in the Horn appears to be primarily geopolitical/strategic and secondarily ideological/political. If the Soviets can establish a strong, permanent presence in Ethiopia (including the development of military support facilities), they anticipate they will be in a position to strengthen their impact on Middle Eastern events and affect the flow of oil, to project their military power east into the Indian Ocean, and extend their influence west and south into Africa. At the same time, active involvement in Ethiopia permits the Soviets to displace the West and specifically the US from a long-held position of influence, and to support the ideologically compatible Mengistu regime. In Angola, the "mix" is somewhat less geopolitical/strategic and somewhat more ideological/political. Angola's coastal location is strategically important and its proximity to foci of weakness (Zaire, Namibia) is attractive. But the support of an ideologically compatible liberation movement-cum-government to the detriment of Western influence and interests is equally attractive and important. Soviet involvement in Algeria and Libya reflects a similar "mix" of motivation: a strategic presence in the Mediterranean on NATO's southern flank and the support of ideologically compatible regimes plus the attraction of hard currency earnings from massive arms sales. Soviet involvement in the Rhodesian conflict reflects yet another motivation "mix", one which is much more heavily ideological/political. Support of the black, nationalist guerrillas enables the Soviets simultaneously to associate themselves with a "progressive" political grouping, to support a liberation struggle, to help the member states of the Organization of African Unity achieve one of their primary goals, and to undermine the position, influence and interests of the West.
While the connecting thread of Soviet involvement in Africa is opportunism, there were different circumstances and different attractions in each of the areas/situations the Soviets have entered. More importantly, there are differing degrees of Soviet interest, involvement, and commitment. (See NIE 11-4-78 Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCOMTRACT) for a fuller and more detailed exposition of this subject).

Soviet involvement in the Ethiopian-Somali war was motivated by strategic geopolitical and ideological considerations which transcended the boundaries of that specific conflict. Soviet determination to support Ethiopia, particularly after their expulsion from Somalia in November 1977, was reinforced by their exclusion from the Middle East peace process, by what they perceived as an increasing threat to the credibility of their status as a great power, and by a favorable diplomatic environment which allowed them to take an active part in the defense of Ethiopian territorial integrity. The Soviets saw in the Mengistu regime an ideologically compatible government which deserved their support. Involvement also gave them an opportunity to establish Soviet power in a large, geographically strategic country with access to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the oil-rich Arab states. Soviet involvement in Eritrea has come as a natural outgrowth of their military support for the Mengistu government and their apparent intention to establish a permanent presence in Ethiopia.

Soviet involvement in Angola was of a different order entirely. It arose from Soviet (and Cuban) support for a national liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. Angola provides the Soviets with potentially advantageous proximity to Zaire and Southwest Africa (which are or may become targets of opportunity) and to Zambia. Although the Soviets (and their Cuban and East European colleagues) find themselves caught in a growing war against a revived UNITA insurgency, Cuban willingness to pay the manpower costs involved limits the Soviet contribution to material, much of which is already on the ground.

The Soviet involvement in the Rhodesian struggle has so far been relatively modest. It has been justified in terms of opposition to the Western-oriented white regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. To date Soviet involvement with the anti-Rhodesia guerrillas has been limited largely because of the unwillingness of the "Front Line" host states to allow a large Soviet (Cuban) presence in their countries. But the Soviets have assured the
Patriotic Front leaders of the means necessary to insure a military victory should peace efforts fail.

The Soviets have obtained substantial dividends in position and influence in Angola and with elements of the freedom fighters in Rhodesia and Namibia. This has not been without its costs in terms of local factional attitudes toward the Soviets. Moreover, Soviet influence rarely runs deep in the minds of their "clients". While control of the mineral resources and strategic area of southern Africa, over the long run, probably plays some role in Soviet geopolitical thinking, this is judged to be a significantly less important factor particularly in the short run than the political prospect of weakening the relations between the West and African countries in the face of increased racial tension in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Because the Soviet justification for their African activities rests on the assertion that they are only responding to African requests, they attempt to avoid actions which lay them open to condemnation for crossing forbidden African lines. They have been sensitive to and affected by radical Arab state pressures not to intervene in Eritrea, and were quick to deny any involvement in the Shaba II attack. So long as the Africans themselves tolerate and even endorse Soviet (and Cuban) assistance to Angola, the Patriotic Front, and Ethiopia, however, Western pressures will have little impact in inducing the Soviets to withdraw.

As a result, in the near term, the Soviets (and the Cubans) will not abandon their present role in African affairs, and are likely to seek to consolidate, if not to extend, it. Nevertheless, the costs to the Soviets of their African involvement are already reaching proportions likely to be meaningful in the balance of Soviet decision-making. The disruption of US-Soviet relations and the undermining of the special Franco-Soviet relationship which has been cultivated over two decades, may produce some second thoughts about the pace and scope of Soviet involvement in Africa, if not about the long run objective of displacing Western presence, position and influence from Africa.

Cuba is not involved in Africa solely or even primarily because of its relationship with the Soviet Union.
Rather, Havana's African policy reflects its activist revolutionary ethos and its determination to expand its own political influence in the Third World at the expense of the West (read U.S.).

Cuba has been involved in Africa for some 15 years and is deeply committed to the pursuit of its own ideological and pragmatic political goals there. Ideologically, the Cuban leadership is committed to the advancement of "the Revolution" and to the support of revolutionary movements and "progressive" regimes in developing areas. On a more practical level, Cuba aims, through its support for other governments, to establish for itself a major leadership role among developing countries.

Castro's African policy has enabled him to realize both objectives. He has discovered in Africa a region uniquely open to Cuban influence and relatively free of countervailing Western pressures. He has effectively exploited residual anti-colonial feelings, intra-African quarrels, the failure of the Western powers (unwillingness or inability) to respond to the perceived needs of African political institutions, and the racial issue in an effort to orient indigenous revolutionary movements and governments along lines followed by the Cuban Revolution.

Within these broad guidelines, Cuba's policy is above all opportunistic. Castro is willing to take risks, but he has avoided major military commitments where chances of success were doubtful. The Cubans have yet to experience a major military setback; except for a few engagements during the brief South African intervention in Angola in 1975, they have been fighting against poorly trained and ill-equipped forces which can inflict frequent casualties but are unable to mount an offensive that would seriously threaten the viability of Cuba's military presence.

Cuba is not likely to abandon its objectives in Africa easily or soon. It clearly intends to play some role in Africa for an indefinite period; the magnitude of that role will be a function of continued Soviet logistic support.

Given the seriousness of Cuban purpose in Africa, there are probably only three sets of circumstances which would cause the Cubans to consider a drastic reduction in their presence or early withdrawal. Two of these
involve the vital interests (or even survival) of the Cuban state. They are:

a) An explicit request from the African governments directly involved for the Cubans to depart and/or an unmistakable change of mind by a substantial number of other African governments and groupings which to date have found Cuba's presence and activities acceptable. In the absence of a general shift in African attitudes, few Non-Aligned nations will openly criticize Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa, and the Soviets and Cubans can safely ignore those who are interested enough or brave enough to do so. However, given an unmistakable a shift in African opinion, the addition of general Non-Aligned criticism to African opposition would so intensify the hostile political environment that the Soviets and the Cubans could no longer ignore it.

b) A Soviet threat to withdraw or severely reduce its economic assistance to Cuba unless Cuba withdraws from Africa. Only the threat of the termination of the $2 billion a year Soviet subsidy is likely to result in total Cuban withdrawal from Africa. The termination or reduction of Soviet logistical support would force the Cubans to reduce their African presence, but they would not withdraw even if they had to go it alone in Africa. However, the Soviets would not be likely to threaten to cut off economic assistance to Cuba or to stop logistic support for Cuban operations in Africa. They might be willing to show some moderation at the margin, but they would not wish to risk an open break with Cuba over Africa.

c) Direct U.S. military measures or their threat. This course of action is not one the U.S. is likely to take or even consider seriously. Moreover, the use of US troops in Africa has already been explicitly ruled out by the President.

Effectiveness of Western Countermeasures

The U.S. has made it unmistakably clear to the Soviets and the Cubans that we view their willingness to exacerbate armed conflict in Africa as a matter of serious concern. We have pointed out to the Soviets the dangers their activities in Africa pose for our overall relations. Senior
U.S. Government officials have publicly and repeatedly underscored the adverse impact of Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa on US-Soviet and US-Cuban relations. We have communicated our concern over Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa to selected members of the Non-Aligned Movement directly and through a number of European, Arab, and African governments who share our concern and our view of Soviet/Cuban activity. We are continuing to press vigorously for the solution of the problems and the resolution of the disputes which invite Soviet/Cuban intervention. In response to the legitimate security needs of the African nations threatened by Soviet/Cuban action, we have provided modest amounts of military assistance and have provided logistic support for the efforts of France, Belgium, Morocco and others to counter the Cuban-approved invasion of Shaba and to calm the post-invasion instability.

Judging from the response of Soviet officials and spokesmen -- private reactions, public declarations, and actions -- to our "warnings", the Soviet government may initially have discounted the significance and strength of our disapproval of their African adventurism. Publicly, the Soviets insisted that they are active in Africa only in response to the explicit invitation of the African government involved, and countered Western criticisms of the Soviet/Cuban role in Shaba II with accusations of Western intervention and Western responsibility. The June 17 PRAVDA commentary now indicates clearly that our concern, which was expressed during the Gromyko visit and in the President's Annapolis speech, has registered with the Soviet leadership.

The PRAVDA article was followed by an official Soviet government statement on June 22 which amounted to a lengthy Soviet justification of its own African policy and standard criticisms of US and Western policies and actions in Africa. Although the Soviet public responses were along predictable lines, there are nevertheless some indications that behind the scenes the Soviets are beginning to take seriously the opposition of the U.S., the Europeans, and some Third Worlders to their involvement in Africa. While the strong opposition
of several Arab and Third World radicals to Soviet/Cuban participation in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict may have been more persuasive than US and Western remonstrances, the Soviets and the Cubans have so far carefully avoided any direct combat role in the Ethiopian offensive against the Eritrean forces.

US efforts to deal with Cuban military adventurism in Africa have not produced significant results so far. We have frozen the normalization process, but while the Cubans attach some value to improved relations with us, they attach even more to their political goals in Africa. Hence, our diplomatic warnings that their continued military presence there will make progress toward normalization impossible do not appear to have had any appreciable effect. There are few if any measures we can take against Cuba on a bilateral basis, short of military action, which would have any real impact. The steps we have taken toward normalization are so marginal that they give us virtually no leverage. Indeed, closing the interests sections, abrogating the fishing agreement, etc., are steps which would damage our interests as much if not more than theirs. If Cuban military adventurism in Africa is to be countered in the near term, it must be addressed more directly, i.e. in Africa itself. Western action in Zaire, including the commitment of U.S. military forces and our strong public statements, may have caused Castro to review one of the "givens" of his African policy -- that the U.S. would not become militarily involved in Africa. It is not yet clear what, if any, shifts might occur in Cuban policy as a result. It is unlikely that Cuba will draw back from areas where it is already heavily committed, but recent Western action might result in somewhat greater caution on the part of Cuba with respect to future involvement.

Cuban casualties in Africa have not been high. While our estimates are not based on hard intelligence and are imprecise at best, we believe that Cuban losses, both killed and wounded, in both Angola and Ethiopia are probably not in excess of 3 to 4 thousand. (One estimate -- DIA's -- is 5-6 thousand.) The highest estimate of the total number killed in action is 1200. (In comparison, 606 Cubans were killed and 8,708 were injured in traffic accidents last year.) The psychological impact in Cuba has been minimal. Casualties would have to be much higher to be sharply felt among a population of nine million. Moreover, even if the
numbers were larger, news is carefully managed. There are no casualty reports or lists. The few references to losses are couched in terms of "fallen heroes" and are accompanied by patriotic slogans and appeals which have an effect. The average Cuban may not care much about advancing Marxism-Leninism, but the role Cuba is playing in Africa appeals to his sense of nationalist pride.

Prospects for the Next Six to Twelve Months

Within the next six months to one year, we believe that the Soviets and the Cubans will remain occupied primarily with their existing commitments to Angola, Ethiopia, and the Rhodesian nationalists, although it is possible that the scale of these commitments will be increased.

-- In Angola, the continuing civil war will likely require the Soviets and the Cubans to make even greater commitments to protect their current position. Cuban willingness to pay the cost in manpower and Soviet willingness to provide arms and financial assistance will determine the future of their involvement in Angola. There is some evidence that Cuban forces are already being augmented again.

-- In Ethiopia, the Cubans and the Soviets continue to resist participation in a costly and perhaps unwinnable battle for Eritrea. But should the current Ethiopian offensive go badly, it is likely that the Soviets and the Cubans will eventually be drawn into a costly involvement in that conflict. Alternatively, if the Soviets promote a negotiated settlement with the Eritrean rebels against Mengistu's wishes, they will receive little Ethiopian gratitude. (There already are signs of Soviet-Ethiopian friction over this and other issues.) Regardless of which path they choose, the Soviets will have to continue to deal with an unstable Ethiopian regime facing major economic and social difficulties. Finally, if the renewed pressure of Somali liberation forces against the Ethiopians in the Ogaden continues and expands, the Soviets and the Cubans may find it necessary to resume an active role in the Ogaden fighting.

-- The Soviets and Cubans are expected to increase their military assistance to the Rhodesian guerrillas in the next 6 to 12 months, and Cuban military personnel may
well begin accompanying guerrilla units into Rhodesia. We doubt that Cuba is presently contemplating a major military offensive in Rhodesia using Cuban units (Cuba has said that it will not), but Havana would probably be willing to provide troops to strengthen the defenses of Zambia and Mozambique if requested to do so (Cuba has indicated privately that if Kuanda or Machel should ask for Cuban troops they will get them).

Over the Longer Term

None of the three major conflicts in which the Cubans and Soviets are now involved is likely to be fully resolved within a year, and there is no reason to believe that Cuba -- with full Soviet cooperation -- cannot sustain or even increase its level of involvement (barring a serious military setback and a much higher casualty rate).

Castro probably regards southern Africa as having the greatest long term potential for Cuban involvement. The ideological lines there are clear cut, the white-minority regimes are on the defensive, the situation places the Western powers in an acutely uncomfortable position and there is virtually universal acceptance among other African and Third World states of Cuban support for the black nationalist movements. The future of Cuban opportunities in this area probably will be determined in large measure by the success or failure of the western settlement initiatives for Rhodesia and Namibia. Subsequently, a post-independence Namibia could be a potential opportunity for the Soviets and the Cubans should internal stability, external pressures from South Africa, or spill-over from the UNITA-Angolan Government conflict lead Namibian leaders to seek outside military assistance.

Outside of these immediate areas of Cuban/Soviet interest, Zaire probably presents the best opportunity for exploiting indigenous opposition to a corrupt and chronically unstable regime. Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola, the Congo, and potentially in Burundi permits clandestine assistance to dissident political organizations and could provide an entree if Mobutu were replaced by a left-leaning regime or if Zaire disintegrated into regional entities as a result of civil war or severe political strife.
The Cubans and Soviets can be expected to take advantage of opportunities which arise as a result of unpredictable events (e.g., the departure from the scene or the death of or overthrow of current leaders) and structural weaknesses endemic to post-colonial Africa. Uganda, after Amin, will be vulnerable to subversion owing to the weakness of existing institutions. Ghana and Nigeria are both in a period of political unease as military leaders embark on reversion to civilian rule. There are obvious uncertainties in the post-Kenyatta scene in Kenya. In such circumstances, the USSR and Cuba will continue to seek opportunities to promote the establishment of ideologically compatible regimes and to enhance their own positions in Africa. (See Annex V for a more detailed exposition of this forecast.)
Part III - Policy Actions and Instruments

A. Instruments

Our program of action vis-à-vis the Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa should be keyed to the following goals:

-- A peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa.

-- The peaceful and orderly social and economic development of the nations of that continent.

-- Strengthened ability of the Organization of African Unity and its member states to resolve the underlying causes of inter-African conflict.

-- The reduction of the scale and scope of Soviet and Cuban arms aid and military activity on the Continent.

Flowing from these long-range goals are shorter-term objectives which, in the context of current Cuban and Soviet involvement translate to:

-- Removal of the immediate occasions for outside intervention in African affairs.

-- Removal of Cuban combat troops from the continent.

-- Or, at least making apparent the likely costs to the USSR and Cuba of their meddling in African trouble spots.

1. Diplomatic Instruments

Obviously, we can continue with direct demarches to the Soviets, and the Cubans, as well. Merely hortatory approaches are, however, unlikely to bring about a change in either government's current approach to Africa. We will have to carefully address linkages to
determine the manner and level at which we wish to push our efforts to bring about a pull back from military involvement by both countries in Africa. There is no purely bilateral diplomatic action we can take with respect to the Soviets or the Cubans which is likely to change their recent decisions: a broader and orchestrated approach is needed—one which is centered on the regions directly affected, but which also draws into its orbit all other pertinent actors and forces.

Careful diplomatic work through the OAS might result in some kind of diluted resolution condemning Cuban activities in Africa. We have virtually no chance of achieving this result in either the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity (OAU). On the other hand, we can work through both organizations in an attempt to encourage negotiated settlements of various intra-African squabbles and the civil wars in Angola, Ethiopia and Chad.

There are a number of third parties external to Africa through whom we might work. Some of the Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe, like Romania or Poland, may see their interest threatened by the cooling of détente and thus be a channel for urging the Soviets to reconsider their current strategy in Africa for the sake of better East-West accord. A country like Romania or even Yugoslavia might serve as honest broker in trying to achieve a settlement in Ethiopia, or other trouble spots.

Our Western European allies, particularly France, the UK and the FRG, have a role not only bilaterally with the Soviet and Cubans, but in enlisting additional support in Africa. In particular, the French might be in a position to urge a more active role on radical Arab states, like Iraq or Syria which have expressed concern about Soviet/Cuban aid to Ethiopia which is fighting their Moslem brothers in Eritrea.

In Latin America, at our behest Mexico and Venezuela have raised with Cuba the question of the latter's action in Africa. So far, the impact of these demarches is not apparent. We could continue such efforts through Mexico, Venezuela and perhaps one or two other Latin American governments, but we should not expect much in the way of direct results.
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) presents yet another channel for diplomatic approaches to Cuba, though there is no evidence of a consensus against Cuban activities. The points we have been making and would reiterate are that Cuba's activities in Africa, in conjunction with the Soviet Union, are inconsistent with its desire for a leadership role in the NAM, and with the long-term interest of Africa. This approach might be made through states like Kuwait, India, Peru or Yugoslavia, as well as by selected African leaders, some of whom have already embarked on this course. One again, as in the case of the OAS, the impact on Cuban policy is likely to be marginal. In addition, we will have to bear in mind the great sensitivity of these governments to any implication that they are being manipulated by an outside power, particularly the United States. When faced with a choice, they may prefer NAM solidarity to criticism of the Cuban role in Africa and Cuba's position in the NAM."

We do not foresee China playing a substantially more significant diplomatic role in limiting Cuban and Soviet activities in Africa. The Chinese can be expected to continue sharp propaganda attacks along the lines taken by their Foreign Minister during his recent visit to Zaire, and to intensify their challenge to Cuba's credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. But, Peking will attempt to avoid over-identification with Western moves, preferring to pursue an independent course.

By maintaining an open dialogue with Africans of all persuasions, it may be possible to bolster the determination of African leaders to preserve their independence of action, to provide them with alternative sources of development aid and political encouragement, and to frustrate Soviet-Cuban aspirations by using our influence to encourage negotiated settlements. For example, continued diplomatic dialogue and judicious use of modest amounts of economic and technical aid might help persuade Guinea to further restrict Soviet military access, Zambia to keep Cuban troops out of its territory and Congo-Brazzaville to resume its efforts to mediate between Mobutu and Neto.
An alternative option would be to limit sharply or even terminate political, economic and other relations with African states which allow the Soviets and Cubans to play a preeminent political or military role. Such a policy (specific actions are outlined below) could increase the economic burden on the Soviets, sharpen African awareness of the severe limitations of Soviet economic and technical assistance, and act as a potential deterrent for other African governments. This option, if observed strictly, would likely produce sharp criticism from most African states. It would, at least in the short run, limit our ability to communicate with and influence a number of leaders. Moreover, it would require parallel action by other OECD governments to be effective, and would sharpen East-West competition in Africa. The economic costs to the Soviets, though heavy in the long-term, might be acceptable for a considerable period and could result in wider African dependence on Moscow. Finally, even selective cut-offs of US aid, including emergency food shipments, would be a sharp break with our policy of meeting basic human needs regardless of the political orientation of the governments concerned.

Arms Control Linkages

As an important area of US-Soviet interaction, the arms control field must be examined for the relationship it may bear to Soviet activities in Africa. In so doing, we must consider two distinct types of negotiations:

-- those with direct substantive linkages to Soviet activities in Africa, e.g., the Indian Ocean talks and the conventional arms transfer restraint talks;

-- those without direct substantive linkage, which nevertheless are potentially affected by the political tensions generated by Soviet activities, such as SALT.

On the former type, the possibilities for linkage are not limited to manipulating the pace of negotiations. A more effective linkage might be to use the CAT and Indian Ocean talks to show the Soviets that an alternative (cooperative) course for protecting their interests is open to them, and also, as appropriate, to call the Soviets to task for their activities. There is no evidence thus far, however, that the Soviets are prepared to limit their political options in Africa by forsaking their only effective resource transfer
tool: arms; or that the pace or content of the Indian Ocean talks will influence Soviet African policy measurably.

The ongoing conventional arms transfer (CAT) talks with the Soviets offer a forum for bilateral diplomacy to restrain directly Soviet military involvement in Africa. Since the Soviets have agreed to include Africa in an agenda item in the talks, CAT provides a convenient vehicle for negotiating mutual arms transfer restraint to the area. We have already proposed to discuss the following in the December session:

-- agree on the substance of a demarche to member states of the OAU encouraging self-restraint;

-- agree on a public statement of support for the principle of arms transfer restraint in Africa;

-- establish the basis for an interim supplier restraint regime, including a consultative mechanism for its implementation.

While the Soviets may agree to interim supplier restraint measures, e.g., prohibition of certain types of systems, their willingness to allow CAT to restrict their Africa policy is questionable.

In the case of the discussions which do not have direct substantive linkages to Africa, we need to make clear to the Soviets that progress in or completion of major negotiations is impeded when Soviet activities raise tensions and public and Congressional doubts about the value of US-Soviet cooperation. Making such a point would not establish a substantive linkage between specific points of SALT or other arms control negotiations and the African situation, but would simply express the political reality of the relationship. We ourselves should be careful not to allow this political connection to obscure the policy interests we have in these negotiations or to distort the way we pursue those objectives.

2. Economic Assistance to African Nations

One of our strongest cards in countering Soviet and Cuban military aid diplomacy in Africa is substantially to increase our commitment to what we and our Western partners do best--providing long-term development assistance.
A vigorous development assistance effort permits us both to identify the US and the West with the long-term aspirations of the peoples and leaders of Africa and to counter Soviet ambitions in the short term by strengthening our presence on the ground. An increase in total economic aid from the $467 million proposed in FY 79 to some $950 million in FY 80 and to over $1 billion by FY 1983 can be justified on economic grounds and would be a strong signal to the African states of US interest and support.

A program able to meet demonstrated African needs would involve an increase in development assistance (DA) from the requested $294 million in FY 79 to about $560 million in FY 80 and rising to over $800 million by FY 1982. These additional funds would be channelled mainly into addressing critical transport and communications needs, including infrastructure for river basin development, and expanding technical training, health and energy programs.

Security Supporting Assistance (Economic Support Fund) is provided to help secure peace or to deal with major economic or political crises, and requires a clear justification in terms of political/security interests. SSA can be used for balance of payments, or budget support; for major infrastructure projects; or for regular development projects. Through FY 79 SSA for Africa will be limited to southern Africa, but in FY 80 and subsequent years the Administration could seek Congressional authority to use SSA in other parts of the continent basically to meet short-term economic support needs. The willingness of Congress to agree to use of SSA outside of southern Africa remains to be tested, however.

For FY 80 an appropriate SSA program level would be about $265 million, possibly rising to $305 million by FY 82 depending on events in Africa, to be divided approximately equally between southern Africa and the rest of the continent. Major recipients outside southern Africa would include Zaire, countries in the Horn region, and possibly others. Because of the volatility of Africa today we should seek flexibility in programming SSA to ensure that we can meet critical short-term needs emerging in FY 80 which we can not forecast today. The Southern African Development Assistance Study now underway will identify priority assistance needs for that region.
A level of $117 million in Title I and III food aid is a reasonable target for FY 80. Title III could become an important resource for Africa if proposed legislation to fund freight costs for the relatively least developed countries as enacted. The Title II strategic grain reserve scheme in Tanzania provides a model for the expansion of the regular Title II program in Africa. Under these assumptions total PL-480 flows to Africa could reach $240 million in FY 80, depending on overall budget constraints.

For planning purposes, we could also consider creation of a special two-year refugee program of $40 million per year, with authorization for replenishment as required. Creation of an Africa-wide Ambassador's emergency fund would meet the growing number of immediate refugee problem situations arising from violence on the continent.

Besides development assistance, the West offers African nations and the rest of the developing world the most lucrative markets for their exports, access to private capital markets, official non-concessional financing (Exim, CCC, and their counterparts in other Western countries), direct foreign investment, and the highest quality goods and most advanced technology available in almost every field. In trade not only are Western markets the largest consumers of African exports, generally they also have fewer barriers than the markets of either the LDCs or the Eastern bloc. Moreover, Western markets afford preferential access to qualifying African goods.

The impact of these economic assets generally is long term in nature. In the long term our contribution to African development will be a central factor in our influence with African states. In the short-term however, our operative assistance mechanisms have limitations as a counter to rapid deliveries of Soviet/Cuban military assistance. Economic aid, PL-480, EXIM loans, OPIC guarantees and changes in GSP are difficult to deploy rapidly and are entangled in legislative and other restrictions. In some cases country and commodity prohibitions cripple any capability to address the short-term problems of the very countries we want to influence.
The US needs an array of short and long term economic tools on which to be able to draw in devising economic responses to the critical needs of African countries, in coordination with other Western governments. Comprehensive responses for regions and countries must incorporate a variety of instruments ranging from short term financial assistance and export financing when genuinely needed to longer range economic assistance and other measures which address the problems of both inadequate infrastructure and meet basic human needs, and which improve incentives for foreign investment and access to Western markets and technology. We must be able to offer integrated economic packages which are realistically responsive to legitimate and pressing needs. In addition, greater visibility of existing major assistance flows along with commitments to increases directly associated with African aspirations can have important short as well as long-term political advantages. In this way economic instruments can be used, with other policy tools, to help offset Soviet and Cuban initiatives by demonstrating the breadth and depth of economic advantages which association with the West affords Africa.

3. Military Related Measures

Military measures carry strong diplomatic (and domestic political) signals. From a military point of view, however, they are tools for enhancing the security of governments or groups which we support against military challenges, and, conversely, for limiting the effectiveness and raising the cost to others of attempts to gain power and influence through the use of force. For the most part, military measures will not be successful in and of themselves to achieve US objectives in Africa. Combined with diplomatic and economic initiatives, military measures could in certain instances advance US policy, but, in other circumstances, military measures may be of only marginal value. Military alternatives include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: security assistance including arms transfers, training, and nation-building; military operations, aid to insurgent groups; encouraging military activity by non-African countries; and use of US forces for operations both in and outside Africa to limit Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa.
No single military measure could sensibly be utilized across-the-board to all African nations. Potential actions specifically directed at Ethiopia, Angola, Zaire, Zambia, and Mozambique are considered in Annex X. The following measures, if tailored to fit the circumstances of a particular country, might also prove useful to US policy.

Security Assistance

The sale of arms does not in and of itself achieve US policy goals. Whether it will help do so in a particular situation depends on individual circumstances. US military assistance to Africa is minimal, constituting somewhat less than 2% of US arms transfers worldwide. An increase in US aid could reduce the incentive of countries to seek Soviet assistance. Transfers could also contribute to US policy goals by causing countries to believe they can rely on the United States to protect their security and by increasing the opportunities for contacts between the United States and the recipient country. Military training particularly could provide opportunities for fruitful contacts between the United States and African states. Military construction activities which create infrastructure needed by African countries might also contribute to improved US-African relations.

In analyzing the provision of security assistance to African countries, at least five constraints must be kept in mind. First, an indiscriminate provision of such assistance would not be consistent with the Administration's policy of arms transfer restraint. Second, security assistance can be expensive, but the African countries are generally poor. Although arms transfers on a grant basis are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (MAP), Congress has expressed a determination to phase out grant programs. The Administration could work with Congress to reverse this decision. Third, security assistance can only effectively be provided within a country's ability to absorb the materiel or training. To the extent that African countries have reached those limits no additional assistance will enhance their military capability. Fourth, security assistance generally cannot be provided as an immediate palliative to fast-moving contingencies. No contingency fund or separate stocks now exist from which the President could quickly provide arms to an African nation. Moreover, even were arms available in
the United States, constraints such as lack of training or absence of required support often might make their provision availing. To deal with the training problem the USG could increase its training efforts in Africa and could encourage African countries, such as Morocco and Egypt, and our European allies to become involved in an overall training program. The USG may have to increase the use of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to facilitate arms transfer agreements. The use of MTTs is another means of projecting an interest and concern for the host country. Finally, as the situation in Zaire, for example, demonstrates, security assistance alone cannot overcome a country's significant internal problems.

Military Support for African Peacekeeping Efforts

The President indicated in his recent news conference that the United States did not support the development of a Pan African force, in the sense of a "strike force . . . that could be used whenever called upon to go to anywhere in Africa to try to intercede militarily to bring about peace." The President apparently has not ruled out ad hoc operations such as the African force being developed for Zaire. Should other such forces be created, the United States could also provide support. Given, Morocco's record, the US could consider tailoring, FMS and IMET programs with the object of up-grading that nation's ability to participate in emergency operations.

Encouraging Military Activity by Non-African Countries

Non-African countries other than the United States could shoulder some of the burden of checking the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa. To some extent, they have already done so. UNITA in Angola and the Eritreans in Ethiopia receive support from countries other than the United States. Moreover, while the purpose of the activities is not directly to offset Soviet or Cuban activities, France has a substantial military presence on the continent. Belgium reacted quickly to the Zaire contingency, and several other European and Arab countries provide economic assistance to various African nations. Such actions enhance Western influence in Africa and, in that sense, are counters to Soviet and Cuban activity.
Use of US Military Forces in Africa

The President has declared that the United States has no plans to send US combat forces to Africa. The United States can, however, demonstrate its capability to project power to Africa without committing combat forces. The Navy could schedule increased visits to ports in East and West Africa. Joint exercises could be arranged with receptive African countries including Liberia, Morocco, or Senegal, among others.

The Shaba airlift exposed weaknesses in our ability to support operations in Africa. Roberts Airport in Liberia, an airport which is taken for granted in many American contingency plans, ran out of fuel even though American logistical support consisted of a limited number of sorties. Moreover, the US does not have access to any port between Mombasa, Kenya and Matadi, Zaire - a distance of 4500 miles. The United States could lay the foundation for active involvement by acquiring base rights and by assisting African nations in improving port and airfield facilities which could be used for operations in Africa.

Finally, the United States might enter into mutual defense pacts with key African nations. Such agreements involve risks to United States policy, and would meet heavy public and congressional opposition. Their effect on Soviet-Cuban activities would be long-range inasmuch as they would not directly counter any specific on-going Soviet or Cuban activity.

Military Actions Outside Africa

There are numerous military actions which can be taken by the United States against the Soviet Union or Cuba, but only one has a direct relationship to Soviet or Cuban African activities. The United States could encourage the countries whose air space is being overflown by Soviet planes on the way to Africa to challenge those aircraft.

Other, indirect activities include increasing surveillance of Soviet ELINT ships, being non-cooperative with routine Soviet military requests and announcing the establishment of a force directed towards Africa. Similarly, with respect to Cuba, the United States could conduct aerial reconnaissance flights over Cuba, increase
air and sea surveillance of Cuban aircraft and ships, or increase US military presence in Florida. The net effect of such actions would not be to stop Soviet-Cuban African activities. The value of demonstrating our displeasure against Soviet or Cubans in this fashion would be subject to debate.

4. Enlisting the Support of Allies and Friends

As Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa mounts we find ourselves with a growing list of concerned nations ranging from the Western Europeans, some Latin Americans, both moderate and radical Arabs, India, to the Chinese. The extent of concern and willingness to take an active role varies almost as widely as the states mentioned, and their motives for doing so.

Political Pressure

**Soviets** - The political pressures which can be brought to bear on the Soviets by our Western allies closely parallel our own at a lower level of potential effectiveness. However, French pressure, in light of the Franco-Soviet special relation built over two decades, might be particularly useful. There are additional pressure points on specific areas of Soviet activity. Arabs, including the Arab left, oppose Soviet-Cuban actions in Eritrea. The amount of political pressure Arab radicals like Syria or Iraq can or are willing to place on the Soviets, their principal arms supplier, is not decisive but has been greater than expected e.g. Iraq's refusal to permit Soviet airlifts through its territory. Any attempt to enlist their cooperation might, however, undercut any resolve they otherwise might muster to caution the Soviet (and Cubans) quietly.

As noted elsewhere in this paper political pressure could come from selected East Europeans (Poland and Romania) if they felt their interests threatened by Soviet adventures in Africa.

Our strongest allies, if their support can be mustered, would be key African leaders like the Nigerians, Tanzanians and Zambians. If they could be brought to consider Soviet activities as inimical to Africa's longer range interest, they would be the most
effective advocates of a shift in Soviet policy in Africa. Should substantial progress be made toward settlements in southern Africa, a case might be made that increased Soviet/Cuban activities would risk derailing these efforts. If not, Tanzania, Nigeria and other key Africans will continue to view Cuban-Soviet involvement as a necessary goad to Western action against the white minority regimes.

Cubans - While the Soviets and Cubans are both pursuing opportunistic policies in Africa, Cuba has more of an ideological underpinning. Cuba sees itself in a revolutionary leadership role. Therefore, it is unlikely to abandon its current policy in Africa easily or soon.

Economic and Development Assistance Support

The principal support available comes from the traditional Western donors (US, France, European Economic Community, UK and Canada, though the latter has tried to keep its aid untied from political considerations).

These same countries could use their influence in the international financial institutions to direct economic assistance toward those parts of Africa considered fertile ground for Soviet/Cuban intervention. Japanese support, though limited, might be targeted to a few key areas. Some of the richer Arab oil states (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) are a source of additional economic backing in those African states with significant Moslem populations.

At some more distant point in time, we might consider looking to a country like Brazil, with its language and historic ties in parts of West and southern Africa, as another channel of economic and technical development aid. Other possible avenues for economic and financial sanctions and incentives are outlined elsewhere in this paper.

Military Measures

This analysis of third-party military involvement in Africa will focus first on those countries most likely to intervene and then on the different regions where the Soviets or Cubans are or may become active.
Potential Intervenors

France has mutual defense arrangements with virtually all its former colonies. It has recently demonstrated willingness to intervene militarily in Chad, Mauritania, Djibouti and Zaire. The active French military role in Africa has, however, touched off domestic criticism from both the left and the right, and has exposed France to African charges of neo-colonialism. Thus, the ability of France to sustain costly, prolonged military operations in Africa is questionable.

Morocco has twice over the past 15 months intervened in Zaire, but the bulk of its forces are tied down in the Western Sahara guerrilla war, making it less likely to undertake new military ventures. In any event, Morocco needs outside logistical support to transfer its forces within Africa and may continue to expect the US to replace equipment it uses in such operations.

Saudi Arabia does not have the manpower to intervene directly in Africa, but it is a principal source of financial assistance for Egypt, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, the Eritrean insurgents, and perhaps UNITA, as well. The Saudis view Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa as part of a larger East-West confrontation, are particularly concerned about Soviet inroads in the Horn, and are willing to provide financial aid in situations where they believe there is a good chance to counter Soviet-Cuban influence. The Saudis are most willing to support conservative Muslim governments, but have refused to become involved in situations like Chad where a non-Muslim government faces Muslim insurgents.

Iran, like Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Soviet successes in the Horn, but does not have the financial surplus needed to make massive grants to governments threatened by Soviet-Cuban actions. Thus, Iranian financial support to moderate Africans has been modest despite its activist rhetoric. It is unlikely that the Shah is prepared to deploy more than a token force to Africa, except for UN peacekeeping purposes.
China. One of the major factors shaping PRC attitudes toward Africa is the desire to counter Soviet influence. Accordingly, China provides military equipment to UNITA, Zaire and Somalia, which face Soviet-backed foes. The PRC also provides military aid to Zambia, Mozambique, Madagascar and to SWAPO. The PRC wants us to take a more active role in resisting Soviet-Cuban initiatives in Africa. It is unlikely to cooperate openly with us along these lines. US and PRC interests are not, however, synonymous and, in the long run, excessive PRC influence in Africa could be undesirable from our standpoint.

Britain, has not been overly concerned by Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa. It might conceivably contribute troops to a UN peacekeeping force for Rhodesia, to rescue British subjects caught in Shaba-type situations, or provide forces to help keep order if requested by countries like Kenya, where it has strong ties.

Areas of Conflict

Rhodesia. If the US-UK effort to mediate a peaceful solution fails, and the proposals for internal settlement appear to be taking hold, some African states may call for Cuban military help up to and including combat troops. South Africa would probably send in troops if Cuban combat units entered or seemed about to enter Rhodesia. Up to now, both Kaunda and Machel have worked to limit Cuban presence in their countries and might -- even under the above conditions -- be willing to accept increased Western and Arab financial assistance in return for continuing to limit Cuban intervention. There is, however, the risk that such assistance will reach the Patriotic Front in the form of arms. We see little prospect for significant African, Arab or European involvement over the short run except as part of a UN peacekeeping force. Some African governments may threaten to send troops to fight with the Patriotic Front, but they lack the resources and logistics to carry through without significant outside support.

The Horn. If the Ethiopians were to suffer serious reverses in Eritrea, the Cubans could conceivably be drawn directly into the conflict on a large scale thereby limiting their capacity for intervention elsewhere.
This would trigger increased Arab covert assistance to the Eritrean liberation fronts and arouse vocal opposition from among Arabs and Africans alike. The Cubans recognize the clear dangers of direct intervention in Eritrea and will likely resist Ethiopian demands for some time to come. They will, however, continue to train Ethiopian troops, fly air support missions and maintain active units in the Ogaden to protect against continued insurgency or renewed Somali attacks.

Angola. UNITA and other insurgent forces are tying down some 20,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola. The continuation of the insurgencies further limits Castro's ability to intervene elsewhere in Africa.

Zaire. The current pan-African peacekeeping effort in Shaba may serve as a model for future actions by some African leaders to protect against insurgency or invasion. This exercise, however, points up the fact that African forces need extensive outside support to mount and maintain such operations. Moreover, the strong opposition of Nyerere and others to the Shaba force indicates the difficulty of launching similar efforts under OAU auspices. On balance, our stated position of opposing the French-inspired concept of a standing Pan-African intervention force (unless such a force were created by the OAU) is welcomed by a wide range of opinion in Africa and leaves us free to selectively back ad hoc peacekeeping actions while working quietly to encourage African consensus on the need to create stronger mechanisms for continental crisis management.

5. Economic and Financial Incentives and Disincentives

Cuba

Neither US nor multilateral economic measures directed at Cuba would appear to present, in and of themselves, a sufficient cost or inducement to evoke a positive Cuban foreign policy change. Sanctions currently in force already preclude most economic contacts and a normalization of these relations probably would not provide enough incentives. A multinational set of sanctions could result in serious costs to Havana, but such international cooperation would not be easy to achieve and could pose serious political and economic costs to us and our allies.
Negative bilateral inducements include reapplying, tightening, or denying further easing of economic sanctions, a cut-off of US-Cuban telecommunications; and, abrogation of the US-Cuban fisheries agreement. Specific actions could include restoring the restrictions on trade between US foreign subsidiaries and Cuba, restoring restrictions on US tourism, denial of bunkering privileges to third-country vessels enroute to or from Cuba, denial of official US cargoes to vessels trading with Cuba, and suspension of remittances from US residents to close relatives in Cuba.

While it is impossible to estimate accurately, the cost of these sanctions to Cuba would be small. The $110 million of annual sales of non-US grain to Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of US companies since 1975 would simply be diverted to non-US brokerage houses. Substitutes are readily available for most of the $50 million in manufactured goods exported annually by US subsidiaries. Other costs would include $6.5 million in gross hard currency tourist receipts (not profits) and as much as $15 million in remittances. Denial of bunkering privileges or reimposition of the denial of official US cargoes to vessels trading with Cuba would result in increased costs and significant logistical dislocations. Abrogation of the fisheries agreement would have little commercial impact. Cutting off communications would remove a resource of considerable indirect commercial value, but would mean the loss of essential diplomatic and weather communications, as well as hardship for Cubans in the US.

There could also be strong protests from the rest of the non-communist world. Western Europe, Canada, Japan and Latin America all use those same telecommunication links to Cuba. They would see such a measure as reflecting hysteria on our part, particularly since even during the missile crisis it was our policy to keep telecommunications links between Cuba and the Western world open.

As for reimposing prohibitions on American citizens traveling to Cuba, it should be borne in mind that our courts earlier determined that we cannot enforce restrictions on the travel of American citizens. We can tell them
they should not travel to a given country, but we can take no action against them if they choose to go anyway.

Cutting off charter flights to Cuba would not substantially affect Cuba. It would, however, be a symbolic gesture to which we could point in asking the Europeans to take steps of their own, and it might be pleasing to American public opinion. However, to take this or any of the other steps listed immediately above would contradict the President's public declaration June 14 that the U.S. does not contemplate any retaliatory steps against the Cubans in the fields of trade or travel.

Positive bilateral inducements for a modification in Cuba's Africa policy logically include complete, phased or incremental normalization of economic relations under standard commercial terms, or coupled with "carrots" such as MFN status, GSP, EXIM finance, OPIC guarantees, and CCC credits, all of which would require congressional action.

Acting alone the Executive Branch could allow commercial credit and trade, and encourage the involvement of US firms in developing Cuba's tourism and nickel industries and in off-shore petroleum exploration. If normalization of relations took place prior to settlement of the $2 billion in US expropriation claims, we would obviously lose one of our few bargaining chips. Following a resumption of US trade, on normal commercial terms total Cuban exports to the US could reach $350 million by 1981, while Cuban imports from the US could reach $390 million, an amount equal to about 30% of Cuban imports from non-communist countries.

Multilateral Economic Sanctions and Inducements for use with Cuba include the negative actions of a Western trade embargo, partial or total elimination of Western European, Latin American and Japanese credit flows, and action by Western and other states to suspend official credit and export guarantee programs. A mandatory multilateral trade embargo against Cuba (as in the case of Rhodesia) would require UN Security Council action and is virtually beyond reach. Neither do our Western allies, Latin American governments nor the Japanese seem likely to accept the proposition of a trade cut-off independent of the UN mechanism. The most fruitful line of approach, therefore, would appear to be a diplomatic
effort aimed at persuading selected governments to suspend official export credit and guarantee relationships. Of lesser effect would be a publicly announced reexamination of Cuba's credit worthiness in light of the increased political risks caused by its African involvements. The object of these latter initiatives would be to eliminate governmental credits and drive up the cost and reduce the availability of the relatively short-term private bank credits Cuba is currently relying on to finance its hard currency trade deficits. This would force Cuba to default on its substantial hard currency debts or oblige the Soviet Union to use valued hard currency resources to make up the short fall either directly or through the COMECOM multilateral banks.

Positive inducements include further integration of Cuba into the Western financial and trading system, including entry into the World Bank system, the Caribbean Development Bank and the IMF. Any such effort must overcome Cuban ideological biases and would be complicated by President Carter's promise to oppose MDB lending to Cuba, as well as by human rights concerns and current human rights legislation. Matching Soviet economic assistance ($2.3 billion in 1978) through a combination of bilateral and multilateral arrangements would require a substantial effort including massive sugar purchases, substantial development loans and probably special trade preferences. Increased Western technological aid might more easily compete with generally low quality Soviet inputs.

The Soviet Union

The US could exert limited economic pressure on the Soviet Union—most notably through curtailed grain shipments—but this would be vehemently opposed by US agricultural interests and experience shows that neither economic pressure nor trade incentives are likely to have a significant influence on Soviet behavior. Economic sanctions are likely to be counter productive and could evoke retaliatory action against US economic and political interests rather than promote constructive policy changes in Africa.

Bilateral measures which could be used against the Soviet Union include persuading private US lenders to cut back on credits, reducing US grain exports and reducing or cutting off other trade, particularly that
involving high-technology items. Reductions in grain shipments would obviously run counter to the US-USSR grain agreement, except in case of short supply. Even a broader trade cut off or reduction, or a tightening-up on the transfer of technology would have a relatively minor impact.

Potential bilateral inducements to the USSR—government-supported credits and MFN status—are now linked to emigration by the Jackson-Vanik amendment. As noted above and in the annexes, US government agencies such as OPIC, EXIM and the CCC are effectively barred from extending credits to the Soviet Union by this and other legislation.

Multilateral efforts to limit Soviet trade or restrict credit flows would likely not succeed in the face of European and Japanese unwillingness to prohibit government-supported credits or extend trade restrictions to non-strategic items.

Africa

This section and the annex examine a range of positive and negative economic actions and instruments that might be employed by the United States—alone, or in concert with others—to influence the foreign politics of African governments that may be subject to Soviet and Cuban pressure. The measures are considered in the context of two sets of countries: those in which the Soviets and Cubans are already influential (Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia and Mozambique); and, those in which they may become influential (Botswana, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia). The same sets of actions could be used to influence the behavior of other African or Arab players.

Positive Measures designed to contribute to economic growth and development or to stabilize the economy include additional concessional economic assistance with particular reliance on SSA, allocation of larger PL-480 and FMS credits to selected governments, provision of salary subsidies for badly needed but expensive technical personnel, expanded OPIC and EXIM activities in support of private bankers and businesses, greater multilateral bank lending and a shift in US commodity policy to embrace a wider range of international commodity agreements. Where basic economic and political
reforms are desired; we should consider IMF involvement, but recognize this could mean delaying some of the above measures. We should also consider attempting to remove during the FY 80 legislative cycle congressional restrictions on assistance programs to Angola and Mozambique.

The speed and flexibility offered by SSA is most effective when used in concert with other donor programs and could most suitably be considered for Zaire, Zambia and Sudan, as well as other countries able to absorb additional development assistance or experiencing balance of payment difficulties. Angola, Mozambique, Sudan and Zambia, among others, could absorb additional PL-480 commodities. New FMS credits could be considered for Kenya, Sudan, and Zambia. Other suggested measures are less useful for immediate impact purposes. A shift in US commodity policy, for example, would meet heavy opposition from domestic interests and from Congress, as well. Human rights issues can also impact negatively on all the above options.

Negative measures designed to increase the economic cost of undesirable policies logically involve trade embargo and blockage of assets, oil embargo, withdrawal of GSP status and a slow-down in multilateral and bilateral lending and economic assistance programs. Most of the above actions would require Western and Arab oil state cooperation to become effective. All carry the risk of domestic and the certainty of Third World backlash, and they run counter to other Administration policies.

6. Public Diplomacy

Based on the authoritative recent statements by the President and Secretary Vance, and drawing on emphases and alternatives outlined in the economic and financial instruments section above, a public diplomacy strategy should be shaped to support US policy interests in an international consensus along two dimensions:

--the political-military problems posed by continuing Soviet and Cuban military presence in Africa;

--and the need to foster long-term African growth and stability.

In the first instance, it is important for US public diplomacy approaches to:
--stimulate sustained discussion of the principles of behavior which should govern great power relations with the Third World;

--gain support for constructive, i.e., economic and ideological rather than military, competition;

--stress the need for aid to development, racial and social justice, and stability in Africa.

In the second instance, public diplomacy approaches would elicit an ongoing dialogue with African societies on their own aspirations, the costs of violent resolution of problems, the importance of attention to long-range development, and American affiliation with African goals.

In support of the statements by the President and Secretary Vance, additional statements by prominent US officials, members of Congress and public figures would help convince publics abroad that policy consensus exists in this country, that continuity exists in US policy toward Africa; that our perspectives on relations with the USSR are essentially balanced and that US policy regarding Africa and Soviet/Cuban actions has support from a broad spectrum of influential sources in this country and abroad.

To emphasize US views and support for African development, as soon as policy options are clarified and decided, it would be useful to publicly enunciate US foreign assistance intentions.

ICA actions to support a program of public diplomacy would include using VOA, media distribution, cross-filing supportive statements from here and abroad, background briefings for international media representatives, international visitor grants and American specialist speakers on tour to convey US views to opinion leaders and audiences abroad.

Voice of America Broadcasts to Cuba

The VOA could initiate programming specifically for Cuban audiences and/or increase broadcasts to Latin America. Either course of action would involve some additional costs ($100,000 per year for daily one-hour program to Cuba, and $250,000 per year for a one-hour daily increase in air time to Latin America), but given the emphases of the President and Secretary, and the
analysis of Cuban capacities and intent elsewhere in this Response, these VOA initiatives risk being unproductive and stimulating a backlash effect of any "propaganda war." They would be more appropriate if Option 3 were selected.

VOA news broadcasts of course reflect events and public statements. In other coverages and commentaries especially for Eastern Europe and the USSR and for Africa, the VOA can convey much of the information and views supportive of US policy thrusts outlined in the economic and financial instruments section of this paper.

B. Specific Issues and Situations (Options)

All of the policy options presented below have a common set of assumptions. These assumptions are as follows:

-- that the United States will continue to pursue its efforts to secure a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa;

-- that Africans will not renounce force as a means of achieving majority rule in southern Africa until peaceful efforts have succeeded;

-- that until majority rule is achieved, Africans will not eschew Soviet Cuban military assistance unless other reliable sources are found;

-- that we will continue to emphasize the economic and social development aspects of our assistance strategy for Africa;

-- that, pending the outcome of our conventional arms transfer (CAT) restraint negotiations with the Soviet Union—particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa area—our provision of military assistance to African nations will continue to be selective and measured;

-- that direct US military involvement in Africa will be limited to logistics support for the combat forces of others;

-- that US policy will continue to stress the need for Africans to bolster their own efforts to resolve local disputes through bilateral and multilateral channels, including the OAU;
-- that African governments, either on a sub-regional or a broader OAU basis, should be encouraged to develop their own peacekeeping capabilities;

-- that the US Government, in concert with like-minded governments—Western European, Arab and others—will continue to stress to the Soviet Union and Cuba the destabilizing consequences that result from their pursuit of a strategy of unrestrained arms transfers and military adventurism in Africa.

We also assume that there will be no major shift in Soviet-Cuban policies over the next six to 12 months, that the threat of Soviet-Cuban military involvement will have heightened, that the situation in the Horn region will continue to be unstable (as will the situation in Zaire), and that the level of hostilities in Chad and the Western Sahara will not have declined.

The following options are designed for the coming year. Their success or failure, judged in terms of results in Africa during that period, would determine the need for further review. In Part II, it was suggested that an assessment of the situation be made after one year.

OPTION 1

To continue to pursue present policies in terms of a peaceful resolution of disputes, exercise arms transfer restraint (using inter alia the CAT forum), increase economic assistance and other resource flows, and continue emphasis on the need for African resolution of local disputes.

General

-- Within this framework the US Government would work with key African leaders to revitalize the OAU;

-- Mount a concerted effort to encourage the OAU to adopt a resolution calling for elimination or reduction of foreign troop presence, except in the case of OAU-sanctioned defense arrangements.

-- Continue to work through the OAU to promote peaceful resolution of specific conflicts and seek passage at the United Nations of a non-intervention resolution.
-- Undertake low-key, but systematic consultations with selected Third World leaders, stress our respect for non-intervention and our interest in a genuinely Non-Aligned Movement with the object of undercutting Cuba's pretensions to NAM leadership;

-- Intensify efforts to define and obtain US public support for our African policies.

West and Central Africa

-- Support and seek ways to strengthen efforts to secure negotiated settlement of Western Sahara and Chadian disputes;

-- Continue contacts with Angola, encourage Neto to control Katangan exile forces, offering trade-offs including possible US opposition to Zairian and other support for insurgents, and eventual economic aid.

-- Consider seeking to involve the USSR and Cuba in Angola-Zaire mediation efforts being undertaken by Congo (3) or others;

-- Continue to make a significant contribution to the Sahelian development program and otherwise assure moderate leaders of US support;

-- Seek opportunities to strengthen economic aid and other ties with Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and other governments considered to be in the Soviet "orbit" as proof that we offer viable alternatives;

-- Include modest FMS and IMET programs for selected West and Central African states (e.g., Senegal, Liberia, Mali,) in FY 1980 budget requests;

-- However, continue to look to France and Belgium to assume the principal security role for the region.

-- Continue to seek closer bilateral relations with Nigeria and work closely with it to help resolve regional disputes.

-- Respond using economic instruments to overtures from Guinea and coup-Brazzaville, thereby lessening their departure on the USSR and other socialist support.
The Horn

-- Continue to be responsive to pressing security concerns of Sudan and Kenya;

-- Delay fulfilling our promise of defensive military equipment for Somalia;

-- Work behind the scenes at the UN, in Africa and with involved Arabs to arrange a Summit meeting of all Heads of State involved in the current Horn crisis;

-- Dispatch a special mission to discuss this proposal with OAU chairman Numayri of Sudan.

-- Alternatively, privately offer to support Soviet and Cuban efforts to arrange Eritrean negotiations.

Southern Africa

-- Seek to preclude expansion of Soviet and Cuban military involvement by offering modest amounts of military and other additional aid to Zambia and Botswana, and economic aid to Mozambique if current restrictions can be repealed.

-- Maintain current efforts to negotiate peaceful transfers of power in Rhodesia and Namibia;

-- Hold out to Neto the possibility of closer ties, possibly diplomatic relations, economic and technical assistance as part of a larger "southern Africa II" package designed to reduce tensions along the Namibian and Zairian frontiers and lead to withdrawal of Cuban combat troops;

-- Involve the OAU closely in the above effort, which would include an attempt to negotiate a settlement an otherwise protracted civil war with Savimbi's UNITA, which Neto cannot win in the field.

Public Diplomacy

-- Reduce the frequency and level of public pronouncements on Cuban-Soviet involvement in Africa;

-- Focus on Africa's long-term social and economic development needs and our efforts -- in partnership with other donors -- to meet these needs;
-- Stress the need for Africans to work toward peaceful negotiated solutions of their problems and play-up their successes in this area.

**Pros**

-- Leaves us free to concentrate our attentions on our longer-term goals in Africa, our immediate objectives in the southern Africa, and in the Middle East, and in regard to SALT and other bilateral US-USSR issues.

-- Places the US in the role of peacemaker while casting the Soviets and Cubans as "meddlers;"

-- Provides a measure of reassurance to moderate African leaders;

-- Avoids polarization of African forces and assures that we do not become isolated from key Front Line states.

-- Emphasizes US advantages in the economic and technical assistance fields, and demonstrates that we peacefully and effectively compete with the USSR and Cuba.

**Cons**

-- Does not respond to domestic political pressures for direct challenges to Soviet and Cuban intervention or lead to short-term reduction of Soviet-Cuban involvement;

-- Does not fully meet the concerns of some of our European allies, friendly states in the Middle East and South Asia, or of many moderate African leaders;

-- Gives the impression that the US is unwilling to counter directly Soviet and Cuban meddling in Africa.

-- Is unlikely to result in African or international condemnation of foreign troop presence in the absence of Rhodesian and Namibian settlements.

**OPTION 2**

In addition to the steps in option 1, to intensify efforts to support friendly governments with substantially increased military and economic assistance,
encourage efforts by OAU to buttress African peacekeeping capabilities, and use public and private diplomatic means to mobilize European and non-aligned sentiment against Soviet-Cuban actions.

**General**

-- Within this framework, the US Government would engage in a vigorous diplomatic and public affairs campaign to seek condemnation of Cuba in the Non-Aligned Movement;

-- Encourage the OAU to create stronger peacekeeping mechanisms.

-- Increase the awareness of NATO and of other non-African nations of the dangers presented by Soviet-Cuban policies;

-- Consult with our allies with the object of putting technology flows to Cuba under COMCOM supervision, reducing or cutting-off officially-supported credits and private capital flows;

-- Make it clear to Cuba that the above actions are directly related to its military adventures;

-- Significantly increase economic development, security supporting assistance and FMS credits, working in concert with other donor nations for greatest impact.

-- Offer logistics support for an OAU peacekeeping force, should such a force be created.

**North, West and Central Africa**

-- Publicly endorse French and Belgian security initiatives and attempt to obtain the financial support of Saudi Arabia, other moderate Arab states, and possibly Iran;

-- Improve existing host government logistical support capabilities (for US air supply missions) based on Agadir, Dakar and Monrovia;

-- Support moderate efforts to establish sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms;
-- Follow similar course with respect to OAU;

-- Increase FMS and IMET to selected African governments.

The Horn

-- Work closely with Egypt, Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to secure Somali adherence to the principle of territorial integrity;

-- Based on such adherence, re-examine re-establishment of a military supply relationship based on provision of "defensive" arms;

-- Intensify efforts to secure negotiated settlement of Eritrean problem;

-- Attempt to maintain at least a minimum US presence in Ethiopia;

-- In collaboration with other Western European nations, continue to meet security concerns of Sudan and Kenya.

Southern Africa

-- Continue our quiet dialogue with Neto, but decline to take concrete steps toward further normalization until he accepts mediation of his squabble with Zaire and begins to phase-down Cuban troop presence;

-- Provide FMS and increased economic assistance to Zambia and Botswana, but hold the line on economic assistance to Mozambique;

-- Should southern African negotiations fail, lend political support to the liberation movements.

Public Diplomacy

-- Maintain frequency and tone of US official expressions of concern about Soviet and Cuban military involvement;

-- Indicate that our increased activity is a direct result of their actions, noting that we have not lost sight of our long-range policy goals;
-- Work with our NATO allies, friendly African and Arab governments and selected NAM members to seek condemnation of Cuba in the Non-Aligned Movement, focus world attention on African problems, and convey Western viewpoints.

Pros

-- Reassures France, Belgium and moderate African and Arab leaders of US willingness and determination to support efforts to stabilize the situation in Africa and counter Soviet-Cuban involvement.

-- Reserves US position in the event that even more drastic action might have to be taken should Soviet-Cuban intervention continue or even increase;

-- Stresses continuing US interest in peacekeeping by Africans themselves.

Cons

-- Congressional opinion on increased US military supply involvement and resource transfers is likely to be largely negative;

-- Reactions to increased development aid will be less sharp, but are still likely to be adverse.

-- African progressives would regard this track as provocative unless it were balanced by intensified diplomatic and other actions in southern Africa.

-- The NAM is not likely to respond conclusively or effectively condemning Cuban meddling, and our campaign to attain condemnation of Cuba could well backfire.

-- Risks a diplomatic rupture with Ethiopia, and failure of efforts to improve relations with Angola;

-- Risks polarizing Africa into competing power blocks, and derailing current southern Africa initiatives.

OPTION 3

To adopt a policy which essentially commits the US to direct and clear cut opposition to Soviet-Cuban policies, including termination of CAT talks, support
for French approach on peacekeeping and marked increases in security and other forms of assistance to moderate African leaders.

General

-- Within this Framework, the US Government would intensify its public denunciation of the Soviets and Cubans, call for African action against the latter, and seek to create a consortium of European-African-Arab states to support regional peacekeeping efforts;

-- The US Government would also make clear through specific actions the likely consequences of Soviet activities in other areas (e.g., economic relations, SALT, Indian Ocean talks, CAT, etc.);

-- The US Government would announce its intention to substantially increase its economic and military assistance programs in Africa, including requests for supplemental appropriations in FY 1979, and provision of more sophisticated weapons to countries threatened by Soviet-Cuban presence;

-- The US Government would launch efforts to persuade our allies to join us in applying economic and financial pressures against Cuba.

-- Consult on an urgent basis with Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Iran and perhaps Morocco with a view to establishing a coordinated strategy for resource transfers to sub-Saharan Africa.

North, West and Central Africa

-- Lend support to the creation of a sub-regional non-aggression pact and mutual defense force;

-- Work with the French, the EEC and Arab donors to channel significant new resource flows toward the weakest economies of the region.

The Horn Region

-- Devote significant additional resources to bolster the defense capabilities of Kenya, Sudan and Somalia;

-- Seek to increase Arab assistance to the Eritrean liberation fronts;
--- Move to weaken Soviet influence in PDRY.

**Southern Africa**

--- Encourage other interested parties to expand covert assistance to UNITA;

--- Establish significant FMS and IMET programs for Zambia and Botswana;

--- Attempt to secure congressional and public support for closer ties with Mozambique;

--- Intensify unilateral and attempt to create additional multilateral economic pressures against South Africa.

**Public Diplomacy**

--- Adopt a confrontational posture, using all US communications assets;

--- Enlist similar stands by our allies, moderates and other states, and from sources of public influence abroad;

--- Work to create an international atmosphere of urgency which would induce cooperative efforts for regional peacekeeping in Africa;

--- Make public statements supportive of additional economic pressures on South Africa and greater efforts on the part of the Front Line to negotiate a settlement.

**Pros**

--- Establishes clearly US will and determination in dealing with Soviet-Cuban "meddling" in Africa.

--- Reinforces our general strategy for southern Africa;

--- Leaves the USSR and Cuba enmeshed in a non-win situation in the Eritrean war.

--- Meets rising moderate African-Arab concerns.

**Cons**

--- Puts Africa's problems in a sharply-defined East-West context.
-- Would draw fire from Nigeria, Tanzania, and other influential African governments.

-- Further polarizes African opinion, antagonizes and divides the Front Line states, severely hampers our ability to work with them on southern Africa issues.

-- Risks greater US military involvement in Africa, and the escalation of conflicts.

-- Probably would not be sustainable in terms of congressional and public opinion, or our other foreign policy objectives.

-- Will convince South Africa it has nothing to gain from further collaboration on Rhodesia and Namibia.
Most of the American public is relatively unconcerned about Africa—in its African context—and focuses on Africa only when its attention is drawn to issues that place Africa in an East-West framework and seem to involve the U.S. In the context of Africa as a place where the Soviet Union and the United States are in danger of colliding, two long-term opinion trends become relevant: (1) the American public's deep, abiding, and recently exacerbated distrust of the Soviet Union; (2) the American public's deep-seated unwillingness to commit American soldiers or large amounts of other resources or prestige to distant fronts so long as there is no clear perception that American security is indubitably endangered. In addition, a more recent and less recognized attitude, which demonstrated its significance during the debate over the Panama treaties, also comes into play: a growing concern that American power and influence are waning and that the United States must flex its muscles if challenged. These three attitudes generate the ambivalent blend of suspicion, wariness, and muted anger with which a growing portion of the American public views the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa.

Given that Africa, even in an East-West context, is a rather novel concern for the American public, it is not surprising that a recent poll on the subject turns up contradictory responses on how the public prefers to respond to Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa. A Harris poll taken on June 5th-6th—just before the President's Annapolis speech on the 7th—produced majority responses favoring and opposing U.S. support for intervention against the military operations supported by Russians and Cubans. (See Annex VII for the specific questions posed.) Sharply variant responses also turned up in responses probing the public's affinity for linkage. And, in a still later question, 59 percent thought the President was "not being tough enough" and only 25 percent thought he was "being as tough as he should be."

But, if American soldiers are not to fight and rhetorical toughness does not suffice, the public is likely to become restive and critical. Its disapproving attention would likely (if not inevitably) focus on a seeming "bargaining chip" such as SALT and seemingly contradictory aims would become increasingly difficult for the public to reconcile and accept.
During the past year, the public's perception that the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa is a threat has increased. During the same year, support for SALT—even in principle, where the level of approval is highest—has slipped a small but noticeable degree. Lately, this slippage has accelerated. There was a larger increase in opposition to SALT between May and June, 1978, than there had been from May 1977 to May 1978.

A majority of Americans appears to accept that the Russians and Cubans in Africa are bent on mischief. Some counter-moves designed to penalize the Soviet Union and Cuba for their presumed adventurism would probably be approved—so long as they did not constitute substantial commitments to questionable regimes or causes and so long as the direct involvement of American troops were not a foreseeable risk.

If the Soviet presence in Africa becomes more visible and its disruptive influence more unmistakable, it is likely that public sentiment for responding vigorously—but not in kind—would intensify markedly. In this event, there would be growing support for "linkage" in two senses: (1) sentiment would grow for making progress on some major issue, notably SALT, contingent upon Soviet disengagement in Africa; (2) dubiousness about Soviet compliance with SALT's provisions would grow and with it there would be increased opposition to the actual treaty, on the grounds that the Soviet Union has by its activities in Africa shown itself duplicitous on detente and therefore untrustworthy on so vital an issue as controlling nuclear arms.

Congressional Perceptions of the Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa

Aside from a handful of Members, the Congress has had, until very recently, little knowledge of or interest in Africa. But in response to Administration statements and to recent press play about Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa, Congressional awareness of Africa has been heightened. There is as yet, however, no consensus on the Hill on the nature of the Soviet/Cuban presence or, more importantly, on what if anything the U.S. should do about it. The lack of consensus can be attributed to several factors:

-- Despite the Secretary of State's recent appearance before the House International Relations Committee and his Atlantic City speech on Africa, many Members of Congress remain uneasy and uncertain about what U.S. policy in Africa really is.
-- Members perceive the U.S. as reacting to events in Africa on a piece-meal basis and not responding to them in a unified way within a coherent policy framework.

-- The Congress is similarly unsure over the direction of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

-- The recent public discussion of constraints on the President's ability to act in certain foreign policy situations together with the apparent conflict between some of our requirements in Africa and our human rights and our arms transfer restraint policies has exacerbated the existing confusion on the Hill.

-- In the background, coloring Congressional perceptions of the Soviet/Cuban African adventurism is the apprehension that U.S. involvement in Africa could ensnare us in another Viet Nam.

Gauging Congressional sentiment and predicting Congressional responses on such a complex issue is always difficult; it is especially difficult in an election year.

Effective Public Posture

The President and the Secretary of State in major policy statements have set forth our view of Africa, defined our long-term purposes in positive terms, and outlined the type of relationship we desire and expect to have with the Soviets and the Cubans in the African context. The statements should be used as the basis for a well-orchestrated public diplomacy endeavor over the next year, and should be reiterated by Executive Branch officials using identical or closely similar language in order to avoid any confusion of public understanding here or abroad, and, if possible, by Congressional leaders enunciating a similar perspective.

An effective public diplomacy strategy would:

-- reinforce the emphasis by the President and the Secretary of State on a fundamentally positive, forward-looking U.S. policy toward Africa;

-- remove, to the extent possible, the "mantle of legitimacy" from Soviet/Cuban involvement;

-- communicate American support for long-term development, social justice, independence and stability in Africa;
-- stimulate an international consensus against continued Soviet and Cuban military involvement;

-- encourage African efforts to develop ground rules which contain and possibly reduce Soviet and Cuban military involvement, and evolve African institutional capabilities for peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The approaches at home and abroad would reflect and reiterate several concepts already expressed by the President and the Secretary of State, as well as more supportive ideas:

-- A reiteration of the observation that our relationship with the Soviet Union is at once competitive and cooperative and will be for a long time to come;

-- A reiteration of the challenge to the Soviet Union to join with the U.S. in a cooperative effort aimed at bringing about the changes the Africans are determined to make in their societies and toward achieving the goals of economic and social development the African nations have set for themselves;

-- A quiet restatement of the fact that the U.S is prepared at the same time to use its resources to counter Soviet fishing in troubled waters if that is the direction the leaders of the Soviet Union choose to go;

-- A declaration that the African strategy of the U.S. is long-range and is directed at helping African peoples and their leaders address and solve the fundamental political, economic, and social problems confronting them, emphasizing that we believe that this course is at once the best way to enhance our relationship with our friends in Africa and to counter opportunistic Soviet/Cuban meddling;

-- A reiteration of our view that the U.S. need have no fears about the long-range outcome of a vigorous competition with the Soviets in Africa; that the political and social system we have evolved in the U.S. has more to offer the Africans and that we and our Western colleagues have the economic resources and expertise and the willingness to share them which will enable African governments to raise the standards of life of their peoples;

-- A cautionary comment that our long-run strategy must be accompanied by a long-term commitment of support if it is to be effective, and an appeal to the people and the
Congress to have the patience and determination to stay the course;

-- Finally, an assertion that Soviet/Cuban influence in Africa is still limited, that the U.S. and its Western colleagues are not in full retreat, that the West enjoys decided advantages in Africa and that the U.S. has greatly enhanced its position and significantly increased its influence in Africa in the last two years.

We believe that sufficient Congressional support could be mustered to approve and implement a range of countermeasures -- short of the commitment of U.S. troops. It should be noted that any effort by the Executive Branch to lift the constraints which have been imposed by the Congress over the past few years or to obtain additional support for activities in Africa will probably result in a full-blown Congressional debate of the range of questions involved. Finally, we do not believe that Congressional support for increased economic and military assistance to Africa will persist over the long term--once public and Congressional attention has been diverted from the present focus on Africa--unless the Executive Branch and interested Americans mount a systematic effort to sustain a long-term commitment. The necessary underlying appreciation for our interests in Africa needed to sustain a longer term and higher level of commitment simply does not exist among Members of Congress and the American public at this point.

Within the parameters of public restraint established by the President and the Secretary of State, it should be possible to chip away at the "mantle of legitimacy" of the Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa, and to rally Third World support for our view that their presence in Africa is menacing. An effort should be made, using information already in the public domain or which can be released, to call the attention of the world to the problems which the Soviets and the Cubans are already causing and experiencing in both Ethiopia and Angola--where their presence appears to be in conflict with the basic nationalistic sentiments of host governments and peoples.

In the international arena, to give our friends and the fence-sitting moderates a rallying point, we should:

-- provide positive grist for the mill of those Africans and others who are openly disturbed by Soviet/Cuban militarism, and encourage those who are disturbed about the long-term
implications of military intervention by any foreign power;

-- stimulate expressions of African and Arab concern about Soviet influence in Africa (possibly even among the more radical Arab countries worried about developments in Eritrea);

-- lead to amplified Indian concern about the reintroduction of the Cold War in the Indian Ocean area;

-- feed the anxiety beginning to be expressed by unofficial Eastern Europeans that the Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa presents a potential threat to detente;

-- help dispel Western European and African fears about our perceived inability and/or lack of political will to act decisively and constructively;

-- help discredit the Cubans as a nonaligned power by emphasizing their dependent relationship to the Soviet Union;

-- stimulate outspoken concern in the Caribbean basin about the implications of Cuban militarism.

Legal and Statutory Dimensions

Many of the actions contemplated by the options described in this paper would be affected by legal considerations that would have to be evaluated specifically in the context of an individual case. For example, as the recent airlift to Zaire has demonstrated, any deployment of U.S. forces to Africa, even in a supportive, non-combatant role, will inevitably raise considerations under the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). Similarly, material assistance and training programs for African nations would have to be undertaken within the context of the complex body of foreign assistance legislation and financed within the limits of appropriations made available under that legislation. The foreign assistance law contains an array of conditions, prohibitions, and mandatory procedures whose applications would have to be examined on a case by case basis. Arms transfer options including the transfer of U.S. furnished articles or their use in previously unauthorized activities are also governed by extremely detailed legislative requirements. Many of the principal legal considerations are mentioned in the discussions of the issues and the possible alternative courses of action. It should be emphasized, however, that more detailed analysis of the legal implications, as well as the foreseeable
Congressional reactions which could lead to changes in the existing law will be essential in the specific implementation of the general policy choices resulting from this study.

It will be important, in the context of determining and implementing a course of action with regard to Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa, to be certain of our legal authority to act and to be able to satisfy Congressional, press, public and bureaucratic demands to know what that authority is. Nearly all possible courses of action discussed in this memorandum present questions as to the statutory or other legal bases for effectuating and funding them.
ANNEX I: The Cuban-Soviet Presence in Africa*

1. The current Cuban-Soviet involvement in Africa is a divisive issue on the continent. Several countries such as Chad, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast strongly oppose any African appeal for Soviet military assistance and view the Cubans as a tool of Moscow without their own separate goals and objectives. Ethiopia and Angola, on the other hand, will continue to be militarily dependent on Soviet assistance and Cuban troops, and in return are prepared to offer access, to air and naval facilities, as well as diplomatic and political backing for Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa which do not adversely affect their national interests. The majority of African nations probably subscribe to the Nigerian view that Moscow's presence in Africa introduces the risk of Soviet-American confrontation on the continent, but that the risk is acceptable as long as the Soviet presence is not too large and is perceived to be on the side of the "progressive" forces in Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia, and South Africa.

2. There are 15,000 to 17,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia. The vast majority of these are combat troops; the remainder are support personnel, advisers, and medical personnel. A Cuban economic delegation has recently arrived in Ethiopia and is probably laying the groundwork for a large-scale economic assistance program similar to the one being carried out in Angola.

3. The Soviets now have 1,200 military advisers and technicians in Ethiopia who are responsible for directing logistics, communications, and the maintenance of most Soviet-supplied equipment. This equipment includes more than $500 million in modern heavy weapons such as T-54 and T-55 tanks, MIG-21s, MIG-23s, SA-2s, and SA-3s. Outstanding orders are valued at $300 million, which assures a moderate to heavy volume of deliveries for the next year or so even if no new agreements are signed. The Soviets are also expanding and modernizing Ethiopian facilities and are developing a naval

* This paper was produced in CIA and coordinated at the working level with State/INR, DIA, and NSA.
facility of their own north of Assab. A floating dry dock that was previously located at Berbera and Aden is now in Ethiopian waters for Moscow's use.

4. Ethiopia's military dependence on the USSR and Cuba gives the Soviets and the Cubans considerable leverage in Addis Ababa, but their influence falls short of political control. Chairman Mengistu and most of his governing colleagues are nationalists and unwilling to compromise Ethiopia's sovereignty. They have shown a willingness to reject Soviet or Cuban policy that runs counter to Ethiopia's national interest and are particularly determined to maintain control of Ethiopia's domestic affairs. The Cuban ambassador reportedly was ousted recently largely because of a Cuban effort to rehabilitate a Marxist-Leninist group at odds with the government. A Soviet effort to get Mengistu to move faster in the creation of a "vanguard" communist party has not succeeded.

5. CIA estimates that there are now about 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola; recent reporting suggests that this number may soon increase somewhat. In addition, there are 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers in Angola with another 5,000--mostly teachers and construction workers--expected to arrive by the end of the year.

6. At least 600 Cubans serve as advisers in the various government ministries. They are most numerous in the Ministries of Construction and Housing, followed by Defense, Education, Health, Finance, Transport, and Foreign Trade. About 600 are said to work as mechanics and drivers and another 600 as technicians in the construction industry. There are at least 500 medical personnel, 100 agricultural specialists, and over 1,000 teachers. Cubans also have been involved in training ZAPU, SWAPO, and Katangan forces inside Angola.

7. The Cubans are said virtually to run some government ministries. They have filled much of the vacuum left by the departure of Portuguese managerial and technical personnel.
8. The Cubans have also played a critical role in countering the guerrilla threat to the Neto regime. They provide important armor, air, and artillery support for Angolan troops. Sometimes they launch independent operations against the guerrillas. Neto is almost totally dependent on Cuban military assistance to remain in power.

9. There are about 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Angola, which has become Moscow’s second largest arms client in sub-Saharan Africa. More than $500 million in Soviet weapons and related equipment has arrived from the USSR, Cuba, and several East European countries, particularly the GDR, to create an arsenal that includes MIG-21 fighters, MI-8 combat helicopters, and several naval craft. No major new arms agreements have been recorded thus far in 1973, but support and resupply requirements for Angolan and Cuban engagements with UNITA forces should push delivery levels higher. An increased flow of equipment into Luanda is also expected for SWAPO units in Southern Angola and ZAPU forces in Zambia.

10. The Soviets now have access to naval and air facilities in Luanda and may be developing port facilities elsewhere. Several hundred economic personnel hold key positions in most government ministries. Soviets are moving into important financial and commercial positions, and are replacing Cubans in the ministries of transport, fisheries, and trade.

11. A Cuban fishing fleet operates out of Angola, providing Cuba with at least a modest economic return on its Angolan investment.

12. The substantial Cuban—as well as Soviet—involve ment in Angola, however, has provoked much popular resentment. While we have seen no signs of major strains in relations among the three governments, popular antipathy toward both Soviets and Cubans is likely to pose an increasingly serious problem.

13. Neto continues to push cautiously for greater Western involvement in Angola, perhaps to balance increased Cuban and Soviet influence in the government and party. Neto wants
to attract much-needed Western technical expertise and economic assistance, in part to gain a measure of flexibility vis-a-vis Moscow. He has told Westerners on several occasions that the Soviets were involved in last year's coup attempt; presumably he continues to harbor suspicions that Moscow may want to depose him. Nevertheless, Neto currently has no alternative to seeking additional Soviet advisers and Cuban forces given the enormity and immediacy of his problems.

14. Elsewhere in Africa the Cuban presence is as follows:

Algeria: 50 to 55 (about 35 medical personnel, 10 VIP security personnel, and 8 sports instructors)

Benin: 75 to 100 (15 security advisers, about 40 military advisers, 20 medical personnel, and 15 technicians)

Cape Verde: There are possibly 10 to 15 medical personnel.

Congo: About 500 (about 300 are military advisers)

Equitorial Guinea: Total Cuban presence 100 to 400 (approximately half are military advisers and security personnel)

Guinea: Total Cuban presence 400 to 600 (200 are military personnel)

Guinea-Bissau: About 250 (140 are military)

Libya: Possibly 100 to 125 (all military)

Mozambique: 800 to 950 (300 to 350 civilians; about 500 military)

Sao Tome & Principe: 100 to 250 (almost all civilian, most are medical)

Sierra Leone: 15 (security advisers)

Tanzania: 120 to 275 (most are civilian technicians; possibly 30 are military)

Zambia: 75 to 90 (military advisers; 65 to 70 are training ZAPU guerrillas; possibly 10 are training SWAPO forces)
15. The estimated Soviet presence in Africa, including Angola and Ethiopia, is shown in the table.

16. Over the past year, the Soviets have also greatly increased their arms deliveries and technical services to three of the front-line states—Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—and through them to liberation groups targeted against Rhodesia and Namibia. The Soviets delivered more than $35 million in military equipment to these governments and insurgent forces in 1977 with approximately one-third of this amount destined for the Patriotic Front. The USSR has assisted in expanding training facilities in the area and contributed to strengthened border defenses in Mozambique; inventories have been significantly upgraded with heavier, more advanced weapons. Sufficient equipment is now in place for an expanded Cuban presence.

17. Mozambique has become important to the Soviets who are helping President Machel transform the Mozambique Army from a guerrilla to a conventional force. Soviet-built facilities to accommodate these trainees now include a tank-driving course as well as SA-7 missile, heavy artillery, and small arms ranges. More than 150 Soviet advisers support these camps and perform other military maintenance operations. Deliveries have included medium tanks, helicopters, plus large quantities of small arms and ammunition that are destined for the guerrillas. Some 500 Cuban military advisers are believed to be training the FRELIMO forces and may, in consequence, also be working with Rhodesian guerrilla forces which are in certain locations with the Mozambique Army.

18. President Machel shares Kaunda, Khama, and Nyerere's suspicion of Soviet and Cuban motives in southern Africa, but views his acceptance of equipment and advisers as a practical necessity. Machel's recent trip to China and his role in promoting the US-UK proposals for Rhodesia are designed in part to balance relations with Moscow and Havana. A breakdown in the Rhodesian settlement effort and an escalation of Rhodesian attacks is likely to lead, however, to a greater Soviet and Cuban presence in Mozambique.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Militarily: Equipment Instruction, Maintenance and Construction, Doctors and Teachers</th>
<th>Miilitarily: Equipment Instruction, Maintenance and Construction, Teachers, Doctors and Teachers, Engineering, Geologists, Technicians, Medical, 20 Geologists, 20 Technicians, 80 Teachers, 80 teachers, 1,000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>Central African Empire</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa (Total)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>North Africa (Total)</td>
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Estimated Soviet Presence in Africa
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Personnel (thousands)</th>
<th>Education, Training, &amp; Research Personnel (thousands)</th>
<th>Total Personnel (thousands)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
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Remarks:

- Estimated Soviet Presence in Africa

(contd.)
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Doctors, Technicians, etc. for M.D.</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>Teachers, Doctors, Technicians, etc. for B.S.</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers, Teachers, Technicians, etc. for A.B.</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Remarks:**

- Civilian: All personnel not detailed to specific categories.
- Military: All personnel detailed to specific categories.

**Total:**

- Civilian: 1763
- Military: 1330
- Grand Total: 3093

**Counties:**

- Kaduna
- Katsina
- Kano
- Kebbi
- Sokoto
- Zamfara
- Jigawa
- Keffa
- Niger
- Kogi
- Niger
- Katsina
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19. Soviet military deliveries to Tanzania will jump this year if recent arms agreements for $200 million in ground arms, missile air defense, and communications equipment remain unchanged. The arrival last month of mobile SA-6 missile launchers marked the first such delivery to a sub-Saharan country and will probably require an increase in the Soviet advisory presence that now numbers 200. A large share of Soviet deliveries is channeled to Rhodesian and SWAPO insurgents, including for the first time artillery. To date, Cubans have not been involved in military matters, but a small group may soon begin training Rhodesian guerrillas at a Tanzanian camp.

20. Zambia accepted $10 million in new Soviet arms assistance last fall because of mounting concern over the defense of its borders against Rhodesian incursions. Under growing pressure due to domestic problems and the lack of a resolution of the Rhodesian situation, President Kaunda has warned repeatedly that he may be forced to agree to a greater Soviet and Cuban role. He has thus far kept his distance from both Moscow and Havana and resisted, for example, Soviet pressure to cancel his trip to the US and UK. In part because of the Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war, Kaunda believes that the Soviets are primarily interested in expanding their own power and influence in southern Africa and has thus far limited Moscow's role in the Rhodesian conflict to providing arms and training for the Patriotic Front. There are 65 to 70 Cubans and 5 to 10 Soviet military advisers with Rhodesian guerrillas in Zambia. Moscow, however, believes that Kaunda's present attachment to Nkomo will work in its favor and will ensure Kaunda's continual support for ZAPU.
ANNEX II: African Perceptions of Soviet and Cuban
Military Intervention*

In the independent countries of the African continent and offshore islands (49 OAU members plus South Africa), there are probably as many as 21 (22 with South Africa) that are either alarmed or seriously worried about the Soviet and/or Cuban military presence. Another 12 or so are, with qualifications, supportive of it, and the remaining 16 might be called resigned or inattentive. However, the hard core in each of these three categories is smaller since many shifts occur, depending on how closely affected a given country may be by the presence of the Cubans or Soviets or their military in its vicinity. As examples, Kenya must currently be counted "resigned" because the Soviets and Cubans are now arrayed against the Somalis; Somalia, in turn, is worried about a threat. While those that are concerned are the largest bloc, they are outweighed if the other two are counted together. A good number are in fact stragglers like Zambia which is fearful of the Soviets, and yet resigned to having Cuban military forces on the continent (preferably not in Zambia) because of a coincidence of interest in opposing minority rule in southern Africa.

African opinion is divided as to whether the Cubans are playing an independent and progressive role on the continent or are basically surrogates for the Soviet Union. Cuba's smallness, like its Third World status, is seen by some as reassuring, but for others it only underlines Cuba's dependence on the Soviets for its ambitious undertakings in Africa. Thus:

--A number of countries, like Nigeria and Tanzania, do not consider the Cubans as Soviet surrogates but as a useful catalyst to cause the West to exert greater pressure on the white regimes in southern Africa, and one that can be used without producing the spectre of a direct US-Soviet confrontation.

--Others, notably among the francophones, consider the Cubans nothing more than puppets. As Niger's Foreign Minister put it, to talk about a separate Cuban role is naïve: "All they produce is cigars and sugar;"

* Coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR.
there is no Cuban ability to project power in Africa apart from the Soviet connection."

The Soviets are seen universally as seeking influence in Africa; some Africans call it no more than that; others speak of hegemony. In the latter category are countries that have been burned by past close association with Moscow, like Egypt and Sudan, and a number of governments that have long been fearful of communist subversion. In general:

Governments that face opposition from groups that are recipients or potential recipients of Soviet aid ascribe a conspiratorial design to Soviet behavior, with the Cubans and/or African collaborators acting as accessories. The centerpiece of the design is often perceived as close to home, though there is a tendency, too, to look for "domino." In addition to Egypt and Sudan:

--President Malloum of Chad sees Qaddafi as being led from Moscow, and Libyan support of the Chadian rebels as the first step in Soviet-backed Libyan interventions against Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, CAE, and Sudan.

--Morocco's Hassan is a strong proponent of the theory that the Soviets, aided and abetted by radical clients and subclients, entertain grand designs in Africa and are relentlessly on the move to realize them.

--Senegal and Ivory Coast decry the Soviets' partisan involvement in African politics (especially in Angola) and the communist states' willingness to help escalate conflicts. (For Senegal it is Algeria rather than Libya that is seen as the proximate threat, stirring up trouble in the Sahara.)

--Mobutu's Zaïre sees itself surrounded by hostile communist proxies and specifically under attack in Shaba.

--Cameroon's mistrust of the Soviets harks back to the days when Moscow aided the UPC in opposition to Ahidjo's "neocolonial" government at independence. (This concern has apparently been revived by the upsurge of Cuban activity since Cuba has often expressed sympathy for UPC exiles.)

Governments that rely heavily on Soviet sources of supply, especially for military assistance and Cuban manpower, either see the Soviets and Cubans as positively sup-
portive, as in the case of Angola and Ethiopia, or, as in the case of Algeria, Libya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Guinea, and perhaps Mali, count them as reliable because of a coincidence of interest and outlook or, at a minimum, because there is no major conflict of interest in foreign affairs. These consumers view the USSR as a superpower with global interests beyond Africa. While they consider the quest for influence normal, most of them are to some degree wary of the disparity between Soviet might and African weakness. But on balance most of these countries see the Cubans and Soviets as helpful supporters of socialist-oriented governments and useful allies in the struggle against "imperialism."

The middle-ground, held by many of the English-speaking countries, finds Soviet and Cuban roles peripheral to the development needs of Africa but essential to the successful resolution of southern African problems. Compared to the francophone moderates, the anglophones are much more relaxed about the risk of relying on communist help, especially that of the Cubans, for the liberation struggle. (Liberia, however, identifies more closely with the views of its francophone neighbors and with the US. Malawi is fearful of Soviet designs to the point of paranoia.)

Perception of Threats

Africans are influenced in their perceptions by events in Angola and the Horn, but not all of them agree on the significance of Soviet and Cuban activity in the two areas.

In Angola, where the Cubans intervened in large numbers on behalf of one of the liberation groups, South Africa's involvement and the MPLA's successes convinced most Africans that there was no point in refusing recognition to Neto and, consequently, in criticizing Cuba and the USSR. But some have never been reconciled to this outcome. These "irreconcilables"—Zaire, many of the francophones and Morocco—disagree with Nigeria, and other anglophones who, although they originally had qualms, now argue that Cuba was invited in legitimately. Those who read broad and threatening implications into the two Shaba invasions by the Angola-based Katanga gendarmes are precisely those irreconcilables who are alarmed by Cuba's presence in force in Angola.

In the case of the Horn, the Soviet-Cuban military intervention alarmed Egypt, Sudan, and other moderate Arabs in the region. But no one questioned that the aid was requested by the Addis Ababa government or that it was,
initially at least, directed at an external aggressor. A different dimension is added by the prospect of Soviet and Cuban involvement in a campaign in Eritrea. For one thing, this would clearly not be an intervention in response to an external threat. For another, the Eritreans enjoy considerable sympathy in the Arab world. Thus, Algeria, which has traditionally been supportive of the Cubans, seems uneasy about their future role in Ethiopia. Eritrea is also a complicating factor for Libya, which had originally supported the Eritreans, then had become an enthusiastic supporter of the Mengistu regime and by implication, had endorsed Soviet and Cuban efforts on its behalf.

Few Africans see any alternative to having the Cubans and Soviets help to equip and train the fighting forces of the Namibian and Rhodesian nationalists, however much the conservatives would wish otherwise. But the front-line states, which are themselves the most ardent proponents of such assistance, see some risk in introducing a large Cuban presence (let alone a large Soviet one) in the countries bordering Rhodesia. They want Smith to believe that the nationalists have a credible option of calling on Havana for support, but they are not eager to have that option explored. Apart from the complications that any expeditionary force creates for the host government, the front-line presidents probably do not want the Cubans to develop a stake in a particular Rhodesian solution that would limit the flexibility of the Africans. The front-line states seem to perceive a possibility, too, that direct Cuban involvement in Rhodesia—and even more likely, in Namibia—could trigger a strong South African riposte.

Many Africans seem convinced that direct US or Soviet military involvement always carries a high risk of provoking a superpower confrontation. They see advantages, therefore, to having southern African liberation movements work with the Cubans primarily. They also seem confident that the Cubans will leave when asked.

Perhaps because there have been so few Communist Parties in Africa (only in the North African countries, Sudan, and South Africa), Africans do not seem to anticipate that "genuine communism" will result from Soviet or Cuban activities. Moreover, they have taken note that the Soviets left Somalia, Egypt, and Sudan when asked to do so.

Currently Africans seem less nervous about communist "fifth columns" than about what some see as a menacing
spoilers game that the USSR and its allies are playing. The Ivorians, for example, believe the Soviets are not even interested in exploiting Africa's resources themselves and are only concerned with denying the West access to raw materials and with destroying the productive relationships that exist between Western countries and Africa. Some reason that this means the Soviets will try specifically to bring down their regimes. As a case in point, the Malawians are persuaded that the Soviets, if successful in Rhodesia, will search for other easy targets in the area--of which Malawi would be one of the most conspicuous. The fact that communist countries provide a ready source of arms, albeit sometimes indirectly, to contentious elements like the Chadian rebels is troubling in itself but also because such a threat makes it necessary for poor governments to siphon off needed budgetary resources for defense expenditures, thus further weakening them.

Definition of the Problem and Prescriptions

Africans agree in principle on the virtue of eliminating outside interventions in the continent but their pervasive weakness leads radicals and conservatives alike to condone exceptions. One point of view is that if Western countries object to a Soviet and Cuban presence, they must prevent situations arising in which Soviet or Cuban help is necessary. This has been the Kenyan reaction to developments in Ethiopia and is a much reiterated theme of frontline diplomacy concerning Rhodesia.

The Africans' own attempts at crisis management have led to a proliferation of mediation efforts, chiefly under OAU auspices, but have produced relatively few results in recent years. The broad acceptance of certain rules of the game such as respect for the inviolability of borders has reduced (but not eliminated) the danger of conflict over territorial disputes. Separatist activity is also somewhat inhibited by the broad African consensus against secession. But there is as yet no agreement on the proper response to internal disputes that become internationalized. Legitimacy is often in the eye of the beholder in judging the leader who calls on foreigners to shore up his regime or to hold his state together.

While many Africans do not think there is a Cuban problem or a Soviet problem, those that do are chiefly concerned about their own security capacity and the broader need to promote a peaceful environment. They argue that the communist states make military assistance readily available to
those whom they favor but that there is no matching assurance for those who do not cooperate with Moscow. So long as communist military assistance took the form of relatively unsophisticated weapons, the offsetting assistance could be found. The quantum jump in the number of Cuban troops in Africa produced for Angola and the Horn presents a challenge of a different magnitude as does the introduction of more sophisticated military equipment. The impulse among those who do not want to turn to the communists is to press for greater US assistance as well as what is sometimes referred to as "stopgap" aid from France or other Europeans.
ANNEX III: Political and Economic Costs to the USSR of its Involvement in Africa*

1. When the Soviets weigh the advantages against the political and economic costs in becoming more heavily involved in Africa, they conclude that the risks are worth the gamble. African countries have presented many opportunities to Moscow in recent years because of their political instability, economic backwardness, and lingering resentment toward Western colonial powers. African adventures have brought the Soviets and Cubans closer together over the past three years and Moscow is hopeful that its successes on the continent—particularly in Ethiopia—will reinforce its claim as the champion of progressive forces in Africa and the leader in the world communist movement. The Soviets also hope to translate their activity into predominant influence on the continent. Triumphs in Africa moreover, help to balance setbacks in Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan as well as the deterioration of Moscow's position in the Middle East over the past several years.

2. There is no firm indication, moreover, that the Soviets' assertiveness in Africa is being tempered either by the current level of Western opposition, or by their own awareness that expansion of influence in southern Africa will be more difficult than it has been in the Horn. There are political costs, but Moscow's major concern—how the US reacts—is eased by its assessment that such major issues as SALT are not likely to be affected and that penalties in other areas would be bearable.

3. Soviet expectations in southern Africa are fueled by their perception of the difficulties confronting the US and UK in attempting to broker a nonviolent political settlement in Rhodesia and, further on, in prodding South Africa toward a similar solution. They fear political settlements that would render them irrelevant, although they do not assign them a high probability at this stage. Their own (and Cuban) support for black nationalists reduces the probability that the West can exclude them from the area, and the Kremlin is determined to use its influence and resources to obstruct such an outcome. Should Western political efforts fail,

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* This paper was produced in CIA and coordinated at the working level with State/INR, DIA, and NSA.
Moscow would expect the US to be unable and unwilling to take sides decisively in racial conflicts, either in support of embattled white regimes or of black movements dedicated to overthrowing them. In any event, while the US plays out what Moscow calculates will be a problematic mediating effort, the Soviets will make every effort to assure themselves a voice in the future of Rhodesia and Namibia by establishing themselves as the main external patron of the black nationalists.

4. Nevertheless, Moscow presumably realizes that there are certain uncontrollable factors in the area—which cannot be assessed or even anticipated in advance—that could lead to political costs for the USSR. The moderate Africans' perception of a Soviet grand design in Africa could lead to a more favorable environment for the creation of African regional unity—as in West Africa—as well as reinforcing Western influence. A more pervasive Soviet presence could provoke African popular resentment: there are already indications in Angola that the Russians are beginning to be perceived as neocolonialists interested only in exploiting the country's resources. Soviets and Ethiopians are now sparring over Moscow's attempts to influence internal political developments in Addis Ababa. The recent Katangan invasion of Shaba province not only enhances the moderate African perception of Soviet perfidy, but threatens to complicate Soviet relations with the West. The strong reaction of the French to the Katangan invasion within NATO councils, and the subsequent Franco-US consultations, could lead to some weakening of Franco-Soviet ties.

5. Soviet assertiveness in the Horn has not yet seriously damaged Moscow's interests in the Middle East, because of USSR's Arab friends—even those who back Somalia—have given their need for Soviet support against Israel a much higher priority than events in the Horn. Soviet support for a protracted war in Eritrea, however, has drawn an adverse reaction from many Arab quarters, including such Soviet clients as Iraq, Syria, and possibly Algeria and Libya. Moscow's need for Iraqi facilities for its airlift to Addis Ababa, as well as Soviet interest in Iraqi oil, places severe limitations on the pressure it can apply against Baghdad. Syria, bowing to Soviet pressure, stopped aiding Somalia, but refuses to halt its aid to the Eritreans, despite Soviet entreaties.
6. In addition to opposition from both conservative and radical Arabs, the Soviets may anticipate some difficulties over Eritrea at the summer session of the Organization of African Unity. African opinion generally tolerant of Moscow's behavior in the Ogaden, where the Soviets were seen to be helping one African state fend off attack from another; but most African states regard the Eritrean problem as an internal Ethiopian matter. Moscow's direct involvement in Eritrea could lead to a split in OAU ranks.

7. The Soviets are facing difficulties in the Rhodesian situation because of President Kaunda's resistance to introducing additional Cubans to Zambia, ZAPU strongman Nkomo's unwillingness to close the door to the Anglo-American plan, and Mozambique President Machel's inability to convince ZAPU and ZANU to coordinate their military actions. The Soviets will also confront political problems in Angola over the longer run because of the pathetic situation of the Angolan economy, the increase in popular discontent, and the cabinet split between a pro-Soviet faction and those advocating a more nonaligned foreign policy and a less radical domestic program. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA poses a growing political and military threat to the Neto regime which may eventually require additional Cuban troops.

8. Over the longer term, moreover, the Soviets may face more complex military and political problems in Africa, and more Cubans may eventually be needed to stabilize the situations in Ethiopia and Angola, and to achieve a military victory for black nationalists in Rhodesia. The political costs for the Soviets would then begin to rise. The increasing "Cubanization" of the continent could have an increasing negative effect not only upon those forces already opposed to Soviet policy—conservative Arabs, Iran, and the West—but also upon moderate Africans. Castro may eventually place some limits on Cuba's presence and involvement.

9. There is no real evidence that the tangible costs of Moscow's increased involvement in Africa are a substantial burden on Soviet resources. It is, in fact, probable that one of the attractions of pursuing African opportunities may be the relatively low cost of exploiting them compared, say, to the price tag of further Soviet efforts to purchase a stable foothold with the Arabs. On the military side, neither the economic costs nor the drain on military resources
appear to represent a significant constraint on Soviet activities. From 1975 through 1977 the value of Soviet military assistance commitments to sub-Saharan African states totaled about $1,600 million and deliveries about $1,150 million. The bulk of these agreements provide for payment within 10 to 12 years, and therefore represent a recoverable expenditure. Indeed, Moscow has in some cases been able to recoup some of the investment in arms that might otherwise be junked. Soviet arms transfers to Africa—where even old technology is frequently advanced—has not limited Soviet ability to meet domestic and Warsaw Pact requirements. Nor has the commitment of 2,500 - 3,000 Soviet military personnel in Africa had any noticeable impact of Soviet manpower availability. Even such high-visibility efforts as the Angolan and Ethiopian airlifts, moreover, were accomplished without noticeable disruption of routine military preparedness and have provided a significant bonus in crew and unit training for distant operations.

10. In the area of economic assistance the Soviets have also limited the costs of their involvement. Soviet extensions of economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa, in fact, have declined in the last three years, and totaled only $21.3 million in 1977. (East European extensions of credit, meanwhile, have risen significantly to $108.7 million last year, suggesting that the Soviets may have tasked their Warsaw Pact allies with more of the economic burden in Africa.) Nor is there evidence that the provision of technical experts to Africa or the training of Africans in the USSR has had any significant impact on Soviet resources.

Drafter: Mel Goodman, CIA
351-7931
ANNEX IV: Political and Economic Costs to Cuba of its Involvement in Africa*

1. The political and economic costs to Cuba of its expanding role in Africa have thus far been within manageable limits and have not constituted a significant constraint on Cuban policymakers. The presence of 42,000 to 46,000 Cubans in Africa represents about 1.6 percent of the Cuban labor force and an estimated loss in national output of about $130 million annually if these people were productively employed at home. Although the loss of skilled and unskilled workers has caused disruptions in several sectors of the economy, the impact has been minimized by a rapidly expanding labor force, increased mechanization of the labor intensive sugar harvest and the widespread use of student labor in other areas of agriculture. The diversion of ships and planes to and from Africa has cost $15 million annually at most and has not seriously disrupted Cuban trade patterns or commercial airline schedules.

2. Virtually all of the material costs of the Cuban presence are borne by the USSR. The Soviet-made equipment is either transshipped from Cuba or shipped directly from the USSR. By the end of 1977 about three-quarters of the equipment shipped from Cuba to Angola had been replaced by new and in some cases more modern weapons and the remainder, plus additional equipment, is likely to be covered by future Soviet deliveries. The USSR has also provided planes and pilots to facilitate Cuban logistics between Havana and Luanda, and has transported Cuban combat personnel to Ethiopia on at least three Soviet passenger ships. Further, it supplied Soviet fighter pilots to bolster Cuba's defenses and free Cuban pilots for combat in Africa.

*This paper was produced in CIA and coordinated at the working level with State/INR, DIA, and NSA.
3. In addition, Soviet economic support has increased sharply in the past two years and will amount to the equivalent of $2.3 billion in the form of sugar and petroleum subsidies in 1978. Moreover, Moscow will purchase some 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar for hard currency to help Cuba meet its export quota under the International Sugar Agreement and will supply an additional $200 million in Soviet capital goods to help offset lagging Cuban imports from the West. The increased Soviet assistance reflects the closeness of Soviet-Cuban relations.

4. Although there appears to be a growing concern on behalf of some lenders in international financial markets, Cuba's military involvement in Africa has had only a minor impact on its commercial relations with industrialized countries. Most continue to base their financial decisions on economic factors, believing Cuba is a good credit risk because of its impeccable repayment record with the West, and that the USSR would stand behind Cuba's debt obligations. In recent months, Havana has been able to secure additional financial credits in industrialized countries, including Japan, Italy and West Germany, totaling $145 million.

5. Cuban adventurism in Africa has adversely affected Western development aid programs in Cuba. This assistance is much smaller, however, than its hard currency borrowings. West Germany in early 1978 canceled its projected aid to Cuba because of Havana's growing involvement in Angola at the time. More recently, the Netherlands and Canada have indicated that they will terminate their annual aid programs of $6.7 million and $1.3 million respectively by the end of this year because of Cuban interference in African affairs. The Swedish Government is considering ending this $7.5 million aid after 1979-80. Belgium and the UK have also expressed their concern over Cuba's actions.

6. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of Cuba's overall commitment in Africa, but the public is aware that the Cuban buildup in Africa has coincided with cutbacks in rations and major downward revisions of Cuba's first Five Year Plan. No organized opposition exists in Cuba, however, and protests so far have apparently been limited to private grumbling. Havana, nevertheless, is becoming increasingly concerned that the Cuban populace will learn the extent of Cuban involvement, and that dissent will increase.
7. As is his custom during periods of flagging popular sentiment, President Castro has spent considerable time since mid-1977 trying to bolster morale by touting the economic achievements of the Revolution. A master of media manipulation, Castro has little trouble refocusing public antipathy and generating renewed revolutionary momentum. He is probably not yet overly concerned about public disaffection—particularly since Cuban casualties have not been publicized and apparently have not been high enough to generate spontaneous protests. The numerous speeches and heavy media treatment over the past year are, in effect, preemptive maneuvers to head off disenchantment.

8. Internationally, Havana is aware of nonaligned criticism of Cuban military involvement in Africa and of quiet efforts—apparently spearheaded by conservative African and Middle Eastern States and supported by Yugoslavia—to change the venue of the nonaligned summit scheduled to be held next year in Havana. In response, Havana has orchestrated a diplomatic offensive to reassure its allies and assuage the concerns of others. For the present at least, this diplomatic offensive has succeeded in holding public criticism to a minimum. As the recent nonaligned coordinating bureau meeting in Havana demonstrated, few of Havana's critics are prepared to confront Cuba openly in nonaligned forums.

9. Widening Cuban military involvement abroad would run a bigger risk of alienating nonaligned states, however. A Cuban decision to shift a large portion of its troops from the Ogaden to Eritrea would, for example, hurt Cuba's relations with some of its closest Arab allies. Cuba's success in limiting diplomatic damage also depends on its ability to overcome a growing nonaligned perception that Havana is acting as Moscow's stooge.

10. If the USSR continues to sponsor the Cuban effort, Cuba can continue to carry out and probably increase moderately its commitment in Africa without seriously damaging its economy or defense capabilities. Cuba has a relatively large and rapidly expanding young population—53 percent of its 9.7 million population is under 25 years of age—reflecting the result of a Cuban baby boom in the 1960s. As a result, the Cuban labor force will grow at an annual average of at least 93,000 between 1977-82. The number of Cuban males
between 13 and 24 years will increase from 614,000 to 732,000 over the same period. Unless Cuban economic growth accelerates over this period, the Castro government may have difficulty providing productive employment for these personnel. Consequently, the rapid expansion of the Cuban labor force and military manpower pool will provide Havana the capability to increase the size of Cuban military and civilian forces overseas if it so chooses.

11. Nevertheless, Cuban public awareness of any sharp escalation in the number of Cuban casualties coupled with a potentially deepening popular disaffection stemming from a perception of the economic costs of Cuban involvement in Africa could eventually pose a constraint on Cuban policymakers. Under such circumstances, the Cuban populace might resort to passive protests, for example, worker slowdown and absenteeism as occurred in the early 1970s, when consumer goods supplies failed to improve in the aftermath of the record 1970 sugar harvest. The bottom line, however, will depend on the political will of the Cuban leaders and thus far they have been prepared to pay the price.

Drafter: Russ Swanson, CI
Coordinator: Bob Hopkins
351-3972
ANNEX V: Potential Future Cuban-Soviet
Military Intervention in Africa*

Cuba and the Soviet Union have developed a symbiotic relationship in Africa which furthers both their particular and mutual interests. Cuban activities in Africa fall into two categories:

-- those which Cuba can carry out on its own; and

-- those which require cooperation, planning, and substantial material and logistical support from the Soviets.

The former are small in scale, involving at most a few hundred civilian or military advisors, and in most cases conform to accepted norms of international behavior. They do not in themselves substantially change power relationships in Africa. They do, however, establish relationships which can provide the basis for much larger joint Cuban/Soviet operations.

Of the latter, there have been three so far: Angola, Ethiopia, and the still-embryonic effort in Rhodesia. In contrast, there are now Cuban civilian or military advisors in virtually every African country whose political alignment would permit their acceptance (See table in Annex I). In addition, Cuba provides training and material support to black nationalist movements in white-dominated southern Africa. With the exception of aid to the ex-Katanga gen-darmes and indications of Cuban involvement in training dissidents for use against Somalia and Djibouti, there is very little evidence that Cuba is attempting to destabilize other established African governments.

Cuba is not involved in Africa solely or even primarily because of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Rather, Havana's African policy has grown out of an activist revolutionary ethos and -- probably more importantly -- Fidel Castro's almost messianic zeal to diminish U.S. and other Western "imperialistic" economic and political influence in the Third World. Nevertheless Cuba is so dependent upon Soviet economic and military support that it cannot afford to get

* Coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, NSA and State/INR.
too far ahead of Moscow's African policy.*

Castro's African policy has enabled him to play a major international role as a supporter of revolutionary movements and "progressive" governments, thus fulfilling a long-standing and, until recently, frustrated ambition. He has discovered in Africa a region uniquely open to Cuban influence and relatively free of countervailing Western pressures. He has effectively exploited residual anti-colonial feelings, the failure or inability of the Western powers to respond to the perceived needs of African governments and revolutionary movements, the weakness of African political institutions, and the racial issue in an effort to orient indigenous revolutionary movements and governments along lines similar to those followed by the Cuban Revolution.

Within these broad guidelines, Cuba's policy is above all opportunistic. Castro is willing to take risks, but he has avoided major military commitments where chances of success were doubtful. The Cubans have yet to experience a major military setback; except for a few engagements during the brief South African intervention in Angola in 1975, they have been fighting against poorly trained and ill-equipped forces which can inflict frequent casualties but are unable to mount an offensive that would seriously threaten Cuba's military presence.

Castro remains sensitive to African views of Cuban activities, but is aware of a general propensity on the part of African leaders to support or acquiesce in Cuban policy as long as it can be justified as supporting certain principles: e.g., sanctity of existing borders, black majority rule, opposition to white minority regimes. At least until recently, there is no indication that Castro has regarded U.S. military involvement as a real possibility.

Soviet activities have extended over a number of years. Prior to 1975 Moscow provided training, arms, and attempted to build up "progressive" forces in a number of countries. Since 1975, when the conflict in Angola escalated, the Soviets have stepped up their activities by deploying naval

* DIA disagrees with the overall characterization of Cuban activities implied in this paragraph. "While Cuban activities and presence may superficially conform to accepted norms of international behavior, ultimately they are aimed at fostering radical regimes at the expense of Western influence. Also it is misleading to give the impression that Cuba acts independently of the USSR; Cuba is dependent on Soviet support for projecting its policies in Africa and thus must generally subordinate its activities to the USSR."
forces (to give visible backing to Angola, Ethiopia and others and to deter any possible Western intervention), major airlifts and sealifts of military equipment and full support to Cuban forces and to consolidate the Soviet position in the area. The Soviets carry out many activities in Africa without Cuba, but in conflict situations the Soviets welcome the introduction of Cuban combat soldiers as a means of making Soviet military aid decisive.

Prospects for the Next Six to Twelve Months

Within the next six months to one year, we believe that the Soviets and Cubans will remain occupied primarily with their existing commitments to Angola, Ethiopia, and the Rhodesian nationalists, although it is possible that the scale of these commitments will be increased.

-- In Angola the Cubans achieved a quick conventional military victory only to become mired in an intractable counterinsurgency situation. Despite massive Cuban military assistance, the MPLA is apparently no closer to achieving effective control over Angola than it was two years ago and may well be in a worse position. UNITA has resisted repeated Cuban/MPLA attempts to destroy it and indeed appears to have gained strength. Efforts to eradicate the FNLA in the north and FLEC in Cabinda have been similarly unsuccessful. The Cubans are clearly concerned about a repetition of South African raids into Angola and are reinforcing their defenses in the south. There is some evidence that Cuban forces in Angola are again being augmented.

-- In Ethiopia, the Cuban forces that produced the swift defeat of the Somali regular army in the Ogaden are being challenged by a revived Somali ethnic insurgency. Although the scale of such activity does not seriously threaten the Cuban forces in the Ogaden, it may well make it necessary to keep Cuban forces there for an indefinite period in order to maintain Ethiopian control. The Cubans continue to resist participating in a costly and perhaps unwinnable battle for Eritrea, but we believe it likely that they will eventually be drawn into the conflict. If so, the number of Cuban troops in Ethiopia will probably increase also.

-- We expect to see an increase in Cuban military assistance to ZAPU during this period, and Cuban military personnel may well begin accompanying guerrilla units into Rhodesia. We doubt, however,
that Cuba is presently contemplating a major military offensive against Rhodesia using Cuban units, but Havana probably would be willing to provide troops to strengthen the defenses of Zambia and Mozambique if those countries were to request it.

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There is no evidence that Cuba is planning a direct combat role in Namibia, which probably ranks much lower on the scale of priorities than Rhodesia. The Cubans will continue and perhaps increase the level of training and material assistance they are providing to SWAPO, however. If SWAPO were able to establish a secure base of operations inside Namibia, Cuban cadres might be placed there as well, but this is unlikely to occur within the next year.

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Cuban participation in other current conflicts (Western Sahara and Chad) has not been confirmed and would create problems for Cuba in the non-aligned movement and in relations with individual African states. Any Cuban support for Polisario and/or Frolinat is likely to remain small scale and inconspicuous and would be intended primarily to enhance Cuba's relations with Algeria and Libya.

Over the Longer Term

None of the three major conflicts in which the Cubans and Soviets are now involved is likely to be fully resolved within a year, and there is no reason to believe that Cuba -- with full Soviet backing -- cannot sustain or even increase its level of involvement unless its forces suffer a serious military setback and a much higher casualty rate.

The Soviet Union and Castro probably regard southern Africa as having the greatest long term potential for Cuban involvement. The ideological lines there are clear cut, the white-minority regimes are on the defensive, the situation places the Western powers in an acutely uncomfortable position, and there is virtually universal acceptance among other African and Third World states of Cuban support for the black nationalist movements. The future of Soviet and Cuban opportunities in this area probably will be determined in large measure by the success or failure of the western settlement initiatives for Rhodesia and Namibia.

Outside of these immediate areas of Cuban/Soviet interest, Zaire probably presents the best opportunity for exploiting indigenous opposition to a corrupt and chronically
unstable regime. Cubah and Soviet presence in Angola, the Congo, and potentially in Burundi permits clandestine assistance to dissident political organizations and could provide an entree if Mobutu were replaced by a left-leaning regime or if Zaire disintegrated into regional entities as a result of civil war or severe political strife.

The Cubans and Soviets can be expected to take advantage of opportunities which arise as a result of unpredictable events (e.g., the death or overthrow of current leaders) and structural weaknesses endemic to post-colonial Africa. Uganda, after Amin's departure from the scene, is vulnerable to subversion owing to the weakness of existing institutions. Ghana and Nigeria are both in a period of political unseas as military leaders embark on reversion to civilian rule. There are obvious uncertainties in the post-Kenyatta scene in Kenya. In such circumstances, the USSR and Cuba will continue to seek opportunities to promote the establishment of ideologically compatible regimes.

There are, however, constraints on such activity. Even ideologically "correct" African leaders will prove balky or demanding (e.g., Mengistu and Siad), or may dilute ideology with economic pragmatism (e.g., Sekou Toure and Machel). The diversity of OAU opinion renders that organization unreliable in the pursuit of political aims. The OAU has in effect ratified Soviet/Cuban activity in Angola and the Horn, but the principle of territorial integrity is itself a constraint. Further, African leaders such as Kaunda and Nyerere, while devoted to southern African "liberation," are reserved in their attitudes toward direct Soviet/Cuban involvement (although this could change).

While the attitude of some non-aligned nations has been a factor in Cuba's reluctance to assume a combat role in Eritrea, it is unlikely that the attitudes of the OAU or the non-aligned movement by themselves will prove a decisive restraining influence on Cuban/Soviet activities in Africa. The leading non-aligned moderates have increasingly pressed the Cubans to stay out of Eritrea, but they are primarily concerned with maintaining unity within the movement and do not yet appear inclined to organize a serious challenge based on Cuba's African activities or its relationship with the Soviet Union. Cuba has attempted, so far fairly successfully, to overcome "progressive" Arab apprehensions over Eritrea by supporting causes in which Arab interests are more directly engaged. Some African leaders may mutter privately about their concerns over the Cuban and Soviet presence in the continent, but few are willing to make an issue of it. Nor is
it clear that the condemnation of pro-Western or conservative African leaders would have any appreciable effect on the willingness of other states to request and accept Cuban or Soviet assistance as long as it contributed to their immediate needs.

Drafter: INR/RAR: David Smith, x22251
Latin American Reaction to Soviet-Cuban Actions in Africa

Judging from the comments of our posts in Latin America, the host governments, almost without exception, rank Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa relatively far down on their scale of priorities. None can be expected to take any strong initiatives or adopt an out-front position, and very few would even support energetic initiatives on our part, such as a strongly condemnatory OAS resolution or one calling for the reimposition of a trade embargo against Cuba. Indeed, Jamaica and Guyana, who tend to sympathize with many aspects of the Cuban position, would sharply oppose any measures.

We could expect support only from Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Argentina might sign a resolution condemning Soviet-Cuban actions, but probably would not support a trade embargo or other concrete measures. These governments would attempt to link actions to counter the Soviet-Cuban thrust in Africa to their own campaigns to wipe out "communists" at home. This could lead to serious misinterpretations or even dilution of our own human rights policies in those countries, or possibly even throughout the hemisphere.

On the other hand, while seeing it as a distant problem not directly affecting them, the great majority of hemispheric governments at least mildly disapprove of Soviet-Cuban activities and have some concerns as to what Cuban successes in Africa may imply for the future. Colombia, for example, is concerned that Cuban successes in Africa will encourage it to engage in troublemaking among the black nations of the Caribbean. Venezuela is also apprehensive over Cuban actions in Africa but hopes to play a moderating rather than a confrontational role. Mexico will remain passive. Brazil counsels patience and suggests the Africans should work the problem out for themselves. Bolivia would to some degree support U.S. initiatives but would not take any of its own.
While not willing to join in or support strong measures or resolutions, and while believing that the matter should really be handled in the UN or the OAU, many of the governments, perhaps even a majority, might back a milder joint-statement or resolution, which, in emphasizing the peacekeeping role of the OAS in this hemisphere and the principle of non-intervention, would gently or indirectly chide the Soviets and Cubans for violation of that principle. Such a statement would, however, have to be most carefully worded and orchestrated. Indeed, it might have to be so anodyne as to have little practical significance, and given that many of the governments would have to be overridden in their preference not to handle the issue at all in the OAS, it is questionable whether our gains would outweigh our losses.

Clearly, none of the Latin American states which are members of the Non-Aligned Movement can be expected to take the lead in criticizing or challenging Cuba within that organization.
Public Attitudes Toward Linkage and U.S. Intervention in Africa

A Harris poll taken on June 5th-6th—just before the President's Annapolis speech on the 7th—produced majority responses favoring and opposing U.S. support for intervention against the military operations supported by Russians and Cubans.

When respondents were asked how they felt about "letting U.S. cargo planes be used to fly in troops from France to fight Cuban and Russian-led troops in Africa," the response was only 37 percent in favor and a majority of 52 percent opposed. Yet, when asked how they felt about "persuading NATO countries to organize a military force to defend African countries threatened militarily by Russian- and Cuban-led troops, with U.S. cargo planes used to carry NATO troops and U.S. military supplies into Africa," a majority of 51 percent favored this proposal and 37 percent opposed it.

Sharply variant responses also turned up in responses probing the public's affinity for linkage. Thus, 63 percent favored a SALT agreement "and at the same time being tough with the Cubans and Russians about their expanding military activities in Africa." In response to a subsequent question that asked respondents to choose between SALT and getting "tough with the Russians and Cubans about their expanding military activity in Africa," 48 percent opted for SALT and 42 percent for toughness. And, in a still later question, 59 percent thought the President was "not being tough enough" and only 25 percent thought he was "being as tough as he should be." The nature of the desired toughness was undefined.

During the past year, the public's perception that the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa is a threat has increased. During the same year, support for SALT—even in principle, where the level of approval is highest—has slipped a small but noticeable degree. Lately, this slippage has
accelerated. There was a larger increase in opposition to SALT between May and June, 1978, than there had been from May, 1977, to May, 1978. This is shown in responses to a Harris poll question repeated four times since March, 1977: "Do you favor or oppose the U.S. and Russia coming to a new SALT arms control agreement?"

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Clearly, there is relatively small, but growing, opposition to even the idea of SALT. Furthermore, the level of support for SALT shown by this data should not be accepted at face value. Other poll data shows there is a good deal less support for a SALT treaty that provides for nuclear parity than for a SALT treaty in principle.
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM - 36
SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA--
A.I.D. CONTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

Opportunities for Soviet/Cuban intrusion into African affairs are greatly increased by economic and political instability in key countries. In the long term, stability and security will be most effectively achieved by meeting the economic and social development aspirations of the African people rather than by military means. Fostering the development process is critical to our continued good relations with African states and must be a basic consideration in our evolving policy towards Africa.

Therefore, in addition to diplomatic, military and political actions to meet Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa, an economic response is essential. It would consist of a reinvigorated development assistance effort including:

-- more substantial resource flows,

-- more flexibility in assisting with major infrastructure development as part of broad economic support,

-- better assistance coordination among the donor countries.

The U.S. response must be both short term to meet immediate threats, and longer term to establish more substantial conditions of stable economic and political development.

Short-term measures should include balance of payments support through supporting assistance and PL 480 Title I, debt relief for the poorest countries, as much relatively rapid-dispersing development assistance as can be supported by sound programs, and a well-coordinated international drive to obtain comparable efforts from other donor nations and institutions.

Longer-term assistance should include a greater amount and broader range of development assistance—multilateral and bilateral, focusing both on basic human needs and infrastructure requirements—to ensure social stability and economic progress in the continent's developing countries. It must also include improved economic relationships across the spectrum of international economic policy comprehended within what are termed North/South, or Global Community, issues.
Commitment to a major program of expanded and carefully coordinated economic development cooperation with Africa would provide immediate evidence of our determination to deal meaningfully with the principal concerns of African states, would firm relations between Africa and this country, and would promote U.S. and Western influence in Africa. It would thereby have a profound effect in deflecting Soviet/Cuban attempts to exploit instability.

Presidential decisions have already set a framework within which the United States can undertake a bilateral program which will reach $1 billion a year by FY 83. Other donor commitments may well result in a total assistance flow of $6-7 billion a year.

RECOMMENDATION

A.I.D. proposes announcement by the President, after consultation with other donors, of a major commitment by the U.S. and other nations and institutions to a Partnership with Africa in the current African Development Decade. The upcoming OECD meetings provide an ideal occasion to discuss such a proposal; it could then be announced at the Bonn Summit. Consultations should begin immediately.

The attachment provides additional detail.
A PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRICA

A.I.D. proposes a major commitment to a U.S. and Western Partnership with Africa in an African Development Decade. The elements of this proposal are:

1. A comprehensive economic development partnership to respond to African development needs within the broader context of expanding economic relationships, including private investment and trade.

2. A spelling-out by the President of our substantially increasing resource commitment to Africa, with annual U.S. aid to Africa rising to $1 billion by FY 83 and a total assistance flow of $6-7 billion a year from the West; the impact and effectiveness of this assistance will be sharpened through a coordinated approach (through OECD/DAC) with our European allies.

3. A comprehensive array of U.S. aid, including:
   -- A broad basic needs approach to the problems of African urban and rural poverty, expanded health services and African manpower development.
   -- Expanded institutional building to increase African government and private capacity to carry forward development themselves.
   -- Major infrastructure projects, including African transportation, communication and river basic development.
   -- Economic support to address African short-term economic problems such as balance-of-payments difficulties, and to augment the resource transfers required for growth.
   -- Transfer of technology, with particular attention to programs of technological cooperation and exchange in the more developed countries.

4. A U.S. commitment to economic cooperation with all African countries committed to development, regardless of ideology or income level, opening consideration of states such as Mozambique and Nigeria.
Development is the most basic problem of Africa, yet it has received less U.S. assistance attention than any other region. This has deprived the region of more than U.S. aid, however, since U.S. attention acts as a catalyst for other donor activities (such as in the Sanei). The U.S. lead would have an effect far beyond the resources we would commit.

Africa's development problems are exacerbated by the lack of human, institutional and physical infrastructure. A major gap in the basic needs approach is that it has not permitted us to address the particular need of Africa for major physical infrastructure. Unless we assist with such infrastructure we are not able to help African states satisfy the basic needs of their people or to respond to what they see as a priority development need.

African governments and people have two basic interests. The first is for completion of the historic movement for African self-determination and majority rule. The second is for economic advancement, including major improvements in the social and economic well-being and equitable treatment in the world's economic system. U.S. and Western economic response on a scale and in a form that is sensitive to these interests will override any short-term opportunistic external initiatives. Only the West has the resources and technology that can bring about the development to which Africans aspire, and African governments know this. Soviet/Cuban contributions have proved to be minimal and ineffective in addressing these basic development concerns.

Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa is related both to weak governments and unstable situations within regions and to the liberation movement syndrome in southern Africa where, for a variety of reasons, it will not be the United States which responds to African demands for military assistance. But U.S. economic cooperation can advance self-determination goals by minimizing economic and social disruption.

A development orientation to the U.S.-African relationship is essential. No amount of aid can make a meaningful difference where the commitment and the policies of the government are not directed toward development, the workability of the recommended program is dependent upon the use of development performance as the primary basis for the transfer of resources.

Countries where this commitment is strongest should receive more positive responses. This approach reinforces the rational and committed, regardless of ideology, to show that our concerns are not just a flurry of short-term concerns to counter Soviet/Cuban activities.

Announcement of this program could be couched in terms of the President's commitment, in his inaugural Message to the World to work with other nations towards the right of everyone to be free from hunger, disease, poverty, and repression.
Presidential and Administration statements and expressions of commitment early in 1977 created an atmosphere of enthusiasm and expectation among African leaders. Specific results are not yet apparent, however, and this optimism has in many cases given way to cynical resignation to "more of the same." Visible concrete actions with the prospect of tangible results, announced pursuant to a carefully orchestrated strategy, would help regain this lost momentum.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa - The Role of Assistance

A.I.D. has responded to State's request for a contribution to PRM 36. I would also like, however, to share my own views with you.

Opportunities for Soviet/Cuban intrusion into African affairs are greatly increased by economic and political instability in key countries of the region. In the long term, stability and security will be most effectively achieved by meeting the aspirations for self-determination and economic development of the African people, rather than by any military measures we may take. Thus, fostering the development process in Africa is critical to resolution of the problems—both long and short term—of the African states, and must be a basic consideration in our evolving policy towards the region.

Therefore, in addition to whatever diplomatic, military and political actions we may take to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa, a comprehensive and tangible economic response is essential. This must include:

-- Use of all our assistance channels. It must include not only our security-related and developmental bilateral aid, but also PL 480. It should include channeling investment capital through OPIC and vital capital exports through EXIM Bank. It should also include encouraging the multilateral development banks to step up their involvement and the pace of their disbursements in the area. Finally, the IMF can play a valuable role in managing short-term stabilization programs and providing interim resources to countries in financial crises.

-- Substantial resources flows. Presidential decisions have already set a framework within which the United States can undertake a bilateral program which will reach $1 billion a year by FY 83.
Commitments of other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions could result in a total assistance flow of $7-8 billion a year. These are impressive levels, but we are not now taking public credit for even the current projections.

-- **Coordination among donors.** By working with other donor nations and institutions, we could perhaps increase the concessional resources flow to $10 billion, or as much as $35 billion over the five-year period. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the ideal vehicle for achieving this coordination—it is designed for just such a purpose, and it is searching for pertinent issues. A joint approach by major bilateral donors to the multilateral institutions would be extremely effective in encouraging them to respond to the African requirement.

-- **Flexible program content.** Our bilateral program should continue to emphasize basic human needs. It should also allow, however, for the support of investment in infrastructure which the Africans see as a priority need, and for financing recurring local budget costs, if necessary. Multilateral programs which we support similarly must be able to respond to special requirements beyond ordinary programming.

-- **Responses to long-term needs as well as economic crises.** In the short term we must meet immediate threats to economic and political stability. We can use balance-of-payments support through supporting assistance and PL 480 Title I, debt relief for the poorest countries, as much rapidly disbursing development assistance as can be supported by sound programs, and a well-coordinated international drive to obtain comparable efforts from other donor nations and institutions. In the longer term, to create more substantial conditions of stable economic development, we must have a greater amount and a broader range of development assistance, multilateral and bilateral, to ensure economic progress in the continent's developing countries, and we must also improve economic relationships across the spectrum of international economic policy comprehended within North-South, or Global Community, issues.

-- **Announcement as a national commitment.** International agreement on a major program of expanded and coordinated economic development cooperation with Africa would provide evidence of our determination to join in addressing this key concern of African states. Public commitment to an enduring development program in Africa by the Administration would greatly strengthen the impact, and
be politically more popular than a deepening security relationship. It would also provide firm and ongoing linkages between Africa and this country and thus promote U.S. and Western influence.

I emphasize that our economic efforts must be both carefully coordinated with other donors, and ultimately focused on the long term, to demonstrate that we are doing more than throwing together a superficial short-term package to counter Soviet/Cuban activity.

RECOMMENDATION

I propose announcement by the President, after consultation with other donors, of a major commitment by the U.S. and other nations and institutions to a Partnership with Africa. The upcoming OECD meetings provide an ideal occasion to discuss this proposal, which could be announced at the Bonn Summit.

My staff is prepared to discuss more specifically the content and strategy for such a proposal with whomever you designate, and to join in international consultations.

[Signature]

John J. Gilligan
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Pastor  
National Security Council

FROM: Lawrence Theriot  
Department of Commerce, ITA/BEWT

SUBJECT: Potential Economic Leverage on Cuba and the U.S.S.R.

Positive Inducements: Cuba

Having aggressively chosen the option of military involvement in Africa, the Cuban leadership has clearly given priority to political interests over any economic interest in normalizing commercial relations with the United States. Consequently, any effort to "buy off" Cuba from its African adventures will necessitate substantially greater economic benefit "carrots" than simply resuming trade on normal commercial terms. The following options could be used:

- Beyond resuming trade the 20% tariff preference on goods imported from Cuba could be reactivated.
- Cuba could be made eligible for Eximbank and Commodity Credit Corporation credits.
- Cuba could be made eligible for U.S. bilateral economic development assistance.
- The USG could offer to jointly coordinate economic development assistance programs in those countries where Cuba has an existing economic aid program underway, especially Angola and other African countries.

All of the above options would entail Congressional approval, would be controversial, and are therefore cumbersome as leverage tools to be exercised by the Executive branch in bargaining with Cuba.

Acting alone, the Executive Branch could do the following:

- Lift the embargo, to allow trade with Cuba based on normal commercial terms, including loans by U.S. commercial banks.
- The USG could encourage (through OPIC insurance, for example) the involvement of American companies in developing Cuba's tourism and nickel industries and in exploration for offshore
oil deposits in Cuban waters. There is some evidence that Cuba is uncomfortable with its current dependence on the U.S.S.R. for 95% of its petroleum needs and would welcome U.S. assistance in searching for the oil deposits that the Cubans have always maintained existed offshore. An alternative to U.S. company involvement, could be to encourage the Norwegians or British to begin exploration in Cuba.

**Negative Inducements**

Under existing legislative authorities, the Administration could take general steps which could indirectly raise the real economic cost of African involvement for both Cuba and the Soviet Union. However, in no event are these costs likely to prohibit further African adventures where political gains are likely to accrue to the Cuban/Soviet interests.

**Actions on Cuba**

The Executive Branch could revoke the relaxations which have been made in the embargo since 1975.

- Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury could reimpose the prohibition on trade with Cuba by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies located in third countries. However, the economic impact of this move on Cuba would be extremely small. Since 1975, Cuba has purchased only $126 million of manufactured goods from American affiliates and comparable substitutes are readily available from a variety of sources. The $290 million of grain sales consisted of transactions in foreign grown grain which were handled by foreign affiliates of U.S. grain brokerage companies. Most sales were made directly to the Soviet Union, for reexport to Cuba. Future sales to Cuba would continue, handled by foreign brokers. The effectiveness of this kind of action depends crucially on third country support. Canada and Mexico were instrumental in forcing the lifting of the ban on U.S. foreign affiliates trading with Cuba in 1975, and may resist this regression in economic embargo.

While Congressional approval is not specifically required for tightening the embargo on Cuba it might be politically wise to insure broad Congressional support by complying with the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. As called for in the Act, a Presidential National Emergency Declaration would clearly be in tune with the Congressional concerns embodied in the Act that the Executive not act arbitrarily to impose economic embargoes for foreign policy reasons.
Reimpose the ban on tourism: Cutting off U.S. tourism would entail only a small economic cost at this time. More importantly, because retaliation would be expected the United States would sacrifice the humanitarian objective of Cuban-American family visits which have recently increased in number. The ban on tourism could have a stronger economic effect if it were combined with pressure on the Canadian government to restrict the current flow of 50,000 annual visitors to Cuba (equal to 90% of the Cuban hard currency earnings from tourism).

Seek to impose a full multilateral embargo on Cuba. It is unlikely that this could be done in the U.N., where Cuba has substantial support among third world countries. Consequently, it would probably have to be done through bilateral discussions with Cuba's major noncommunist trade partners. Conceivably, the West Europeans are now sufficiently concerned about Africa to participate in an embargo of the type they resisted in the 1960s. Japanese cooperation is questionable. However, to be effective, an embargo would have to prohibit Soviet reexports of Western products (mainly grain) to Cuba. Western countries are not likely to agree to such restrictions on commerce with the U.S.S.R.

Leverage Through Cuba's External Debt

Cuban hard currency indebtedness may have reached $1.9 billion by end 1977--this is a heavy burden for such a small economy. Debt service liabilities may consume 40 percent of hard currency export earnings. Cuba has been financing its trade deficits in 1977 and 1978 largely through relatively short term private bank-to-bank credits because the negative political atmosphere created by its African policies has made European banks reluctant to participate in longer term publicized Euro-currency loans to Cuba. Cuba is also using governmental trade credit lines wherever these are available. Individual governments in Argentina, Spain, Austria, Belgium, FRG, Norway, U.K., Italy and Mexico should be urged to cancel credit lines for Cuba and/or suspend Cuban eligibility for governmental export credit guarantee and insurance programs where these exist. This should be accomplished as part of a publically announced reexamination of Cuba’s credit worthiness in light of the heightened political risk caused by its participation in military conflicts in Africa. Public governmental actions of this type would also sharply limit the willingness of bankers to undertake new private loans to Cuba.
Substantially dependent on short-term loans, Cuba would be hard pressed to find the estimated $350 million needed to service debts this year. If rescheduling became necessary, that would further damage Cuba's credit standing in noncommunist countries. Fearing that Cuban credit problems might raise the risk and cost of borrowing for all CMEA member countries, the U.S.S.R. would probably pay Cuba's hard currency obligations. However, with the Soviet's own substantial needs for limited hard currency resources, this would entail the most expensive type of cost for supporting Cuba. Outright default by Cuba on its debt obligations is very unlikely unless Soviet hard currency support is not forthcoming. However, should default occur, the damage to solvency of major Western banks would probably be small since Cuban net obligations were $1,018 million at the end of 1977.

Multilateral Institutions—Havana's recently expressed interest in joining the Caribbean Development Bank would be rejected on the basis of its African policies. Cuba is a member and draws hard currency loans from the COMECON banks, IBEC and IIB. U.S. banks lend to both these institutions, but are prohibited from lending to Cuba. The USG could challenge the legality of U.S. bank lending to an entity partly owned by Cuba. Simply raising this legal uncertainty could make it more difficult for both COMECON banks to arrange loans on the Eurocurrency markets, since U.S. banks would be reluctant to participate. This would be an added cost to all COMECON countries of Soviet support for Cuba in Africa.

Bilateral governmental cooperation agreements—Cuba maintains government-to-government economic and technical cooperation agreements with many noncommunist countries. Usually, these agreements call for annual meetings to discuss cooperation. Western countries could be encouraged to either postpone or cancel meetings scheduled under such agreements because of Cuban involvement in Africa.

- Technology Transfer—Cuba is not considered one of the targeted communist countries where exports of high technology items are prohibited under the COCOM mechanism. The USG could raise the issue at the fall meeting of COCOM in order to increase the awareness of the Western Alliance of the need to monitor carefully the export of sophisticated technology items to Cuba. A public declaration that Cuba is to be included under COCOM controls would identify Cuba as a Soviet bloc country and damage Cuba's claims to nonaligned nation status.

- Cuban Hard Currency Exports

Sugar: The United States could disapprove the ISA. However, such action would raise multilateral problems since the ISA benefits also many of our allied nations as well as problems with domestic sugar legislation. Multilaterally, even while approving the ISA, the USG could pressure Western countries to limit purchases of Cuban sugar for reasons of its African origin.
Using a multilateral institutions focus, the United States could begin to oppose Cuban petitions at the ISA. Unfortunately, however, Cuban and U.S. sugar interests are often parallel.

Nickel: The United States could harass the U.S.S.R. through its nickel sales to the U.S. based on a suspicion that part of the exports are in fact Cuban origin nickel. We could harass the Soviets by requiring certificates of origin and assurances that the nickel is not coming from Cuba. This would be another small complication for the U.S.S.R. from its involvement with Cuba in Africa. We could also restate U.S. opposition to noncommunist countries purchasing Cuban nickel. This could be effective since worldwide nickel markets are depressed and Cuba is trying to expand its hard currency sales network in Europe and Japan.

Shipping: Bilateral actions—the USG could revive the blacklist of third country ships trading with Cuba and make them ineligible for U.S.G. financed cargoes. According to a conversation with the Cuban Minister of Transportation the blacklist created many headaches for Cuban transportation.

Direct Pressure Points on the U.S.S.R.

- Oil: Though bilateral contacts, the USG could attempt to foster dissent in Eastern Europe over the fact that Cuba is supplied Soviet oil at prices that are cheaper than Soviet exports to Eastern Europe. EE countries are very sensitive to oil question at a time when the U.S.S.R. has served notice that oil export supplies will not be expanded.

- Rice: The United States should increase surveillance of U.S. rice exports to the U.S.S.R., which probably have been diverted to Cuba in the past.

- Wheat: USG could pressure the Canadians to end any preferential purchase arrangements it may have for exports to the U.S.S.R., some of which are destined for Cuba.
I. INTRODUCTION. This memorandum examines military measures which might be employed to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa. Military measures available to the United States in Africa range from encouraging or assisting the military efforts of other non-African states, to providing military assistance, training and infrastructure, to increasing US military presence (including introducing US personnel and obtaining US operating rights), to use of military force. The alternatives include, but are not necessarily limited to the following which are discussed in greater detail in the body of this paper: security assistance including arms transfers, training, and nation-building; military support for peacekeeping efforts; intelligence and covert operations; aid to insurgent groups; encouraging military activity by non-African countries; and use of US forces for operations both in and outside Africa to limit Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa.

Military measures carry strong diplomatic (and domestic political) signals. From a military point of view, however, they are tools for enhancing the security of governments or groups which we support against military challenges, and, conversely, for limiting the effectiveness and raising the cost to others of attempts to gain power and influence through the use of force. For the most part, military measures will not be successful in and of themselves to achieve United States objectives in Africa. Combined with diplomatic and economic initiatives, military measures could in certain instances advance US policy, but, in other circumstances, military measures may be of only marginal value.

Military measures which affect Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa need not themselves be limited to United States actions taken in Africa. There are, however, only limited feasible military actions outside Africa which might either enhance the United States position or reduce Soviet/Cuban influence on the continent.
II. BACKGROUND. United States military involvement in Africa currently is largely limited to the provision of security assistance, with the list of recipients (at very different levels of assistance) including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Gabon, Nigeria, Liberia, and Senegal. The United States military presence in Africa is small. Including the DAOs (63), there are approximately 114 United States military personnel stationed on the continent. The other major western presence in Africa is France which has some 10,000 military personnel in Africa, including forces in Djibouti (5,000), Senegal (2,000), Chad (1,310), Gabon (600), Ivory Coast (500), Mauritania (110), and the Comoros (50). France also provides security assistance to numerous African countries. (See MAP 1.)

The Soviet and Cuban military presence in Africa (and particularly Black Africa) is substantially greater than that of the United States and France. There are approximately 4,000 Soviets in 20 countries and 35,000-38,000 Cubans in 12 different countries. The Soviet Union has agreed to provide more than $800 million in military aid to Ethiopia within the last year, and aid delivered to other countries in Africa in 1977 had a value of some $300 million. (Table A provides a comparison of US and Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa.)

III. MILITARY ACTIONS IN AFRICA. Analysis of potential military actions in Africa to counter Soviet and Cuban presence suffers if undertaken at too great a level of generality. Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa is greatest in Ethiopia, Angola, and the Rhodesia-Zambia-Mozambique cluster. Zaire also recently has been affected by Cuban-trained insurgents. Each of these "hot spot" areas presents special circumstances and each is separately discussed below, followed by an analysis of military means, which could have relevance to many of the countries on the continent.

A. Ethiopia

There are substantial reasons to believe that the Soviets and Cubans will retain significant influence with the current regime in Ethiopia. Not only did the Soviets and the Cubans successfully aid Ethiopia in the face of the Somali invasion, but the Ethiopians continue to need Soviet and Cuban help to keep Western Somali Liberation Front activity to a manageable level and to operate a successful offensive against the Eritrean guerrillas. In return for their involvement, the Soviets stand to gain port facilities in Ethiopia; the Cuban rewards thus far are less tangible, including such things as enhancing their standing in the Third World, deriving ideological satisfaction from aiding "progressive" forces, and ensuring continued Soviet support.
The United States can pursue two potential courses of military action in Ethiopia. It could try to gain credence with the current Ethiopian regime by providing military assistance. However, such assistance would almost certainly be limited compared to Soviet/Cuban aid. Moreover, providing such aid would appear inconsistent with the thrust of our military assistance programs to Sudan and possible future aid to Somalia.

Alternatively, the United States could seek to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement by providing aid to the insurgent groups in Ethiopia. Providing aid directly to the WSLF, however, is so contrary to recent United States' policy that it is not further discussed.

Aid to the Eritreans, on the other hand, could serve United States objectives. The Cubans have shown a marked reluctance to commit combat forces in Eritrea. Stiffening the Eritrean resistance to an Ethiopian offensive would increase the Ethiopian desire for the Cubans to commit their forces in Eritrea and would force the Cubans to choose between offending the Ethiopians or fighting against a genuine liberation movement. Should the Cubans choose the latter course, that would reduce their standing with the Third World non-aligned countries, particularly if those countries felt that the Cubans had acted largely at the behest of the Soviets. Aid to the Eritreans also could serve the objectives of tying down the Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia, increasing their casualties if the Cubans were committed to the Eritrean conflict, denying the Soviets use of the Eritrean ports and, generally, denying the Soviets and Cubans "victory" in Ethiopia. Finally, aid would be seen by some countries as an appropriate expression of American commitment to stop Soviet and Cuban activity.

On the other hand, there are risks in such an involvement. Certain African countries would view United States military action in Africa with disfavor, feeling that we were using Africa solely as a convenient battleground with the Soviets rather than being motivated by a conviction that the Eritrean cause is just (a reasonable point since we so long supported Ethiopia). Moreover, aid to any secessionist movement would violate the OAU principle of territorial integrity of African states. United States involvement might not allow the Eritreans to succeed and, in that case, we could look ineffectual as compared to the Soviets. Aid to the Eritreans and/or the WSLF would almost certainly lead to a break in US-Ethiopian diplomatic relations. Furthermore, any attempt by USG to actively assist Eritrean insurgents could provide the Soviet Cuban coalition with a pretext and African public support to intervene on a massive scale in Eritrea. Finally, our overall relations with the Soviets might grow worse because of active US involvement in opposition to them.
To some degree, the risk of US involvement can be avoided and the benefits obtained by having other countries supply the Eritreans with weapons. Now Eritrean weapons are supplied by Iraq and Syria, bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and Iran. Other countries could be encouraged to provide additional financial and material support to the insurgents.

If the policy decision were made to aid or encourage aid to the Eritreans, a major commitment in terms of both assistance and training would be required to give the Eritreans a significantly enhanced conventional capability. The Eritreans’ most pressing needs are for light portable air defense systems to counter the Ethiopian monopoly over the air, and a more effective anti-tank system. There is also some need for artillery, although this would be susceptible to Ethiopian air attack. However, the greater number of Ethiopian personnel, equipped with modern Soviet weapons, combined with the Cuban presence, more than likely would cause the Ethiopians to prevail in a conventional conflict. The Eritreans are already adequately supplied with small arms and additional such arms would not significantly increase Eritrean effectiveness against the Ethiopian/Cuban/Soviet forces. By contrast, the Eritrean capability for guerrilla war can be improved at far less cost.

B. Angola

As in Ethiopia, there are substantial reasons to believe that the Soviets and Cubans for some time will retain significant influence in Angola, through their support of the Neto government and the presence of 20,000 Cuban troops. However, the Neto government, itself unstable, has not been able to consolidate its authority within Angola. UNITA, which operates in, and exercises a considerable degree of control over, large areas in the south and east of Angola, is well-led, well-organized, and (because of its tribal base) enjoys the general support of the population in its area. Other insurgent groups, which operate in the north (FNLA) and in Cabinda province (FLEC), are far less effective. The fact that UNITA is black gives it an advantage (outside of the metropolis) over the Neto government, which is Mulatto based; however, tribal considerations would militate against UNITA’s gaining effective control over the entire country. FLEC is physically separated from the rest of the country; FNLA is somewhat stigmatized as a consequence of Zairian (Mobutu) support, and the power base is relatively small, compared with UNITA. It is highly improbable, therefore, that either, by itself, could gain effective control over the country.
The United States could elect to support militarily one or more of the insurgent groups. Doing so would put the US on the side of at least one viable liberation movement (UNITA), and increased opposition might lead the Neto government to seek an accommodation with one or more of the opposition groups (notably UNITA), or it could result in increased support from the Soviet Union and Cuba to Neto to maintain its dominant position. However, for any aid to be provided, the Congress would have to repeal the Clark amendment. A number of African countries might react negatively to US military assistance to the insurgents, as an example of superpower opportunism and meddling in the internal affairs of an African country. Finally, UNITA might not prevail and the United States would have received a second Angolan "defeat." US support might also make the US appear to be on the same side as South Africa, with attendant political liabilities.

Again, as in the case of Ethiopia, encouragement of third party assistance to Angolan insurgent movements might avoid some of these risks. UNITA already receives its arms through the cooperation of five countries: Iran and Saudi Arabia pay for Morocco to purchase French and other arms, which are then transported by the French to Zaire for shipment to UNITA.

Assuming, for analytic purposes, that the Congress approved US aid to the insurgents, UNITA probably would not have sufficient means to overthrow the Neto government in the next several years. Such aid would, however, tie down the Cubans, increase Cuban casualties and Soviet costs, and, perhaps, make it less likely that the Soviets and Cubans would have the stomach for further military activities in Africa although they may retaliate by stepping up aid to MPLA.

Effective aid to UNITA could be provided on a relatively small scale. UNITA needs small arms, clothing, mortars, and food. Air defense is a major weakness, particularly since the Cubans have begun to mount combined air/ground operations against the guerrillas. Communications is another area where UNITA is weak. Finally, UNITA could use assistance in expanding and improving its intelligence capabilities.

The FNLA and FLEC are less effective than UNITA, but shipments of light arms and mobile air defense systems also could add to their effectiveness.
C. Zambia

Soviet and Cuban influence in Zambia is thus far limited. President Kaunda accepted $10 million in new Soviet arms assistance last fall, but he also agreed recently to a $100 million economic package with the United States. In addition, there were discussions concerning USG arms sales to Zambia.

Should Zambia request arms from the United States, the provision of such aid would not, of course, necessarily end Zambian involvement with the Soviets or the Cubans. It would, however, add an American dimension to the military assistance Zambia now receives from others.

Zambia has at least two legitimate reasons for obtaining American military assistance. First, Zambia has relatively few, not highly trained forces to patrol a large country which has within it guerrilla movements directed against other countries -- ZAPU along the Rhodesian border, and the Katangese and others in the west. To reduce the internal instability created by the presence of the guerrillas, training might be provided the Zambian forces. Basic arms could be provided to allow force expansion of some few thousand to allow better coverage of the country's problem areas. (The possibility of such arms finding their way to ZAPU or even being used by Zambian forces against Rhodesia should not be overlooked.) Mobility equipment, perhaps helicopters, would enhance the value of existing and/or expanded Zambian forces.

Second, Zambia has enormous needs for infrastructure to aid its economic development. Military construction activities could provide increased infrastructure, for example, by providing export-import routes to replace those no longer available through Angola or Rhodesia.

D. Mozambique

Mozambique has relatively substantial Soviet and Cuban contingents which are largely involved in making the "FRELIMO" guerrillas over into a modern army. The Soviets have also provided Mozambique with almost $60 million in military assistance. Additionally, there are numerous East Germans in the country who are providing significant administrative aid. There is relatively little by way of military assistance or activities which seems appropriate for the United States to undertake in Mozambique. Mozambique might purchase some US arms if they were made available (as in the case of Zambia, the possibility that some such arms would be directed to the ZAPU/ZANU or used by the Mozambique armed
forces against Rhodesia and/or South Africa should not be over-
looked), but it seems doubtful that Mozambique would halt their
purchases from the Soviets or utilize US training in lieu of the
already in-place Soviet and Cuban advisors. One possible US
military action would be military construction considered on a
case-by-case basis. On another tack, the United States could
seek port visitation rights such as the Soviets have. For the
most part, however, economic and diplomatic activity in Mozambique
seem the most appropriate avenues of approach for the United States.

E. Zaire

The principal threat to Zaire's security is in the mineral
rich Shaba province, bordering Angola and Zambia. The Katangans
trained and supported by the Cubans and Soviets, and operating
from base areas in Angola, are within easy striking distance of
the mining areas of Shaba. The combination of tribal ties and
opposition to Mobutu give the Katangans much in common with the
Lunda people in Shaba, and facilitates their movement and support
within the province. The Zaire Army, poorly trained, poorly led,
and little motivated are inadequate to the security task. In
these circumstances, the Zaire Government remains on the defensive
and the military initiative lies with the Katangans.

The French and Belgian intervention in May accomplished
the rescue of civilians, and prevented Katanga occupation of
Shaba; it did not prevent a serious setback to the economy. The
French and Belgian paratroopers are not being replaced by an
African force, organized by the French and comprised mainly of
Moroccans with contingents from other Francophone African states.

The United States provided airlift support to the French
and Belgians during the initial rescue phase and additional airlift
support during the information and movement of the African force
and its equipment to Zaire. US support has been conditioned upon
France taking the lead in organizing the security arrangements
for Shaba.

The US expects additional French requests for assistance
to the African force; indeed, the French have already alluded to
equipment shortages and the need for continuing support.

The African force is the best near-term means to provide
a reasonable level of security and stability and to permit the
functioning of the mining community.
However, the African force is only a temporary device. It cannot prevent Katangan raids, and it is uncertain how the force will perform in combat. If the existing Zaire regime and the current national boundaries are to be maintained, the Zaire Army must be made into a professional force, which will require military reforms. The United States could contribute to such a goal but the best means are primarily diplomatic and not military.

IV. ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. The United States can undertake four broad categories of military activity in Africa: 1) US security assistance; 2) support for an African peacekeeping force; 3) encouraging security assistance or the use of military forces by our European allies and other capable countries in Africa; and 4) use of United States military forces in Africa.

1. US Security Assistance. As noted above, the United States provides security assistance to a significant number of countries on the African continent. Sales (LOAs) totaled nearly 200 million in FY 77 and will run around $1 billion in FY 78 (half this amount is for the Egyptian F-5 program).

The sale of arms does not in and of itself achieve US policy goals. Whether it will help do so in a particular situation depends on individual circumstances. Provision of United States aid can, for example, reduce the incentive of countries to seek Soviet assistance. Transfer can also contribute to US policy goals by causing countries to believe they can rely on the United States to protect their security and by increasing the opportunities for contacts between the United States and the recipient country. Military training both in the US and in the host country could provide opportunities for fruitful contacts between the United States and African states. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union far exceeds the United States in the amount of training provided to African countries. Roughly 6-7,000 Africans were trained in the Soviet Union from 1977 to 78. Approximately 3,000 were trained in the United States during the comparable period. Military construction activities which create infrastructure needed by African countries might also contribute to improved US-African relations.

In analyzing the provision of security assistance to African countries, at least five constraints must be kept in mind. First, indiscriminate provision of such assistance would not be consistent with the President's policy of arms transfer restraint. Second, security assistance can be expensive, but the African countries are generally poor and Congress has shown
propensity for expanding either grants or credits for arms purchase. If further security assistance to Africa were desirable, expansion of grant or credit programs might also be considered. Third, security assistance can only effectively be provided within a country’s ability to absorb the materiel or training. To the extent that African countries have reached those limits, no additional assistance will enhance military capability. Fourth, security assistance generally cannot be provided as an immediate palliative to fast-moving contingencies. No contingency fund or separate stocks now exist from which the President could quickly provide arms to an African nation. Moreover, even were arms available in the United States, constraints such as lack of training or absence of required support often might make their provision unavailing. Finally, as the situation in Zaire, for example, demonstrates, security assistance alone cannot overcome a country’s significant internal problems.

2. Military Support for African Peacemaking Efforts. The President indicated in his recent news conference that the United States did not support the development of a Pan African force, in the sense of a "strike force . . . that could be used whenever called upon to go to anywhere in Africa to try to intercede militarily to bring about peace." The President apparently has not ruled out ad hoc operations such as the African force being developed for Zaire. Should other such forces be created, the United States could also provide support.

3. Encouraging Military Activity by Non-African Countries. Non-African countries other than the United States could shoulder some of the burden of checking the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa. To some extent, they have already done so. UNITA in Angola and the Eritreans in Ethiopia receive support from countries other than the United States. Moreover, while the purpose of the activities is not directly to offset Soviet or Cuban activities, France has a substantial military presence on the continent. Belgium and France reacted quickly to the Zaire contingency, and several countries provide economic assistance to various African nations. Such actions enhance Western influence in Africa and, in that sense, are counters to Soviet and Cuban activity.

Apart from the activities non-African countries are already pursuing (which might be increased in scope), it is less than clear what such countries can do by way of military measures in Africa that would be an effective counter to the Soviets and Cubans. One potential course of action might be encouragement of the PRC to act in tandem with some Western country in providing aid to one or more African nations. The PRC has provided modest
military aid to certain African countries in the past and, as Foreign Minister Huang's visit to Zaire demonstrates, the PRC has a substantial interest in events on the continent. Even if the PRC would discuss, and then announce publicly that it had done so, the problems of Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa with Western nations, the Soviets could not overlook the fact that its actions in Africa had brought its two major antagonists together.

4. Use of US Military Forces in Africa. The President has declared that the United States has no plans to send US combat forces to Africa. Major constraints also exist on the use of US combat forces in Africa in any event: Intervention would generate intense opposition in Congress; the deployment of US forces in Africa is inhibited by the lack of a reliable base for logistical support; and forces would have to be diverted from other military missions, notably NATO commitments.

The United States can, however, demonstrate its capability to project power to Africa without committing combat forces. The Navy could schedule visits by carrier task forces to ports in East and West Africa. (A recent three-ship visit to eight African ports in January-February made a positive impression on the host countries.) Joint exercises could be arranged with receptive African countries, possibly Liberia, Morocco, or Senegal. Shows of force into areas of concern could be arranged. The United States could lay the foundation for active involvement by acquiring base rights and assisting African nations in improving port and airfield facilities which could be used for operations in Africa. Finally, the United States might enter into mutual defense pacts with key African nations. For the most part, such activities could be undertaken without significant risk to United States policy. Their effect on Soviet/Cuban activities would, however, be long-range inasmuch as they would not directly counter any specific ongoing Soviet or Cuban activity.

Finally, if the circumstances warrant, the United States has the option of introducing combat forces to block a Cuban/Soviet inspired action.
V. MILITARY ACTIONS OUTSIDE AFRICA

There are numerous military actions which can be taken by the United States against the Soviet Union or Cuba, but only one has a direct relationship to Soviet or Cuban African activities. The United States could aid the countries whose airspace is being overflown by Soviet planes on the way to Africa to challenge those aircraft. A direct US-Soviet confrontation would probably be in no one's interest, but the Soviets have themselves recently demonstrated the principle of sovereign air space by their downing of the ROK commercial airliner. A confrontation with the Soviet Union over airspace carriers with it the risk of provoking a Soviet military response.

Other, indirect activities include harassing Soviet ELINT flights, increasing surveillance of Soviet ELINT ships, being non-cooperative with routine Soviet military requests and announcing the establishment of a force directed toward Africa. Similarly, with respect to Cuba, the United States could conduct aerial reconnaissance flights over Cuba, increase air and sea surveillance of Cuban aircraft and ships, or increase US military presence in Florida. The net effect of such actions would not be to stop Soviet/Cuban African activities and would invite Soviet retaliation in kind. Thus, the value of demonstrating our displeasure against Soviets or Cubans in this fashion would be subject to debate.
Preface

(S) Any examination of militarily related measures which might be employed to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa must begin with an assessment, in broad terms, of the Soviet/Cuban military presence within the continent.* Soviet/Cuban military presence is defined as personnel and equipment located in and around Africa and as access to port and airfield facilities that can be used for the conduct of combat related operations. The assessment of Soviet/Cuban military presence can then be compared to an assessment of US military presence. This comparison can serve as a basis for the examination of the militarily related measures which might be employed to counter Soviet/Cuban involvement. Principle focus will be on Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa South of the Sahara.

Military Assistance

(S) Soviet military involvement in Africa South of the Sahara has accelerated considerably in the last 10 years. A major surge of both arms agreements and deliveries began after 1973 and the upward trend is continuing. More than $2 billion worth of military assistance agreements have been concluded during the 1973-77 period, representing over 85 percent of the value of all agreements since 1960. The rate of deliveries has increased correspondingly; more than $1.5 billion worth of materiel, or over 85 percent of the total since 1960, has arrived during the past five years. Figure 1 compares the Soviet Union/United States military assistance agreements.

(S) The major recipients of Soviet military assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa are almost all regimes whose ideological learnings are well left of center (Figure 2).

(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Accompanying the increase of Soviet military involvement is a trend toward the provision of more heavy and sophisticated equipment. Seventy-two percent of the tanks, 63 percent of the armored personnel carriers, 68 percent of the jet fighters, and 92 percent of the surface-to-air missile battalions (excluding SA-7s) delivered since 1960 arrived during the past five years alone. Many late-model, items have recently been supplied or promised. These include SA-6/GAINFUL

* This Tab concentrates on a comparison between the Soviet/Cuban presence and that of the US and European allies. Annex I, The Cuban-Soviet Presence in Africa provides additional details.
US* VS Soviet Union Military Agreements to Sub-Saharan Africa (1968-1977)

Estimated Value in Millions of US Dollars

* Includes FMS, Commerical Exports, MAP, IMET

Soviet Union

US

Figure 1

UNCLASSIFIED
SOVIET MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES

MAJOR RECIPIENTS, 1960-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Deliveries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>306</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>.61</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Estimated value in millions of US dollars

SECRET/NOFORN

Figure 2
antiaircraft missile systems to Tanzania; OSA II-class missile-attack boats to Somalia and Ethiopia; BM-21 rocket launchers to Angola; and MIG-21/FISHBED and MIG-23/FLOGGER jet fighters to Ethiopia, the first such weapons to be provided to a Sub-Saharan nation.

(U) Major US delivered items include 12 F-5 aircraft to Kenya, 6 C-130 aircraft to Zaire, and 6 C-130 aircraft to the Sudan.

Personnel

(S) Equipment deliveries are often accompanied by advisory personnel programs. Despite the departure of 1,500 advisors from Somalia last year, there are presently more than 4,000 Soviet military personnel in 20 countries. In comparison the US as of 31 Mar has approximately 723 military personnel on the continent. This figure includes DAOs, embassy security personnel, security assistance teams, communications personnel, and clerks.

(S) Cuba’s African presence has risen considerably. Between 35,000 and 38,000 Cuban military personnel, about 65 percent of whom are combat forces in Ethiopia and Angola, are located in 10 Sub-Saharan countries (Figure 3).

(S/WINTEL/NOPORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) The Cuban presence in Ethiopia is currently estimated at 16,000-17,000 military personnel. An estimated 12,000 combat troops are organized into a division-sized organization, three mechanized brigades of which were largely responsible for overcoming Somali forces in the Ogaden. Furthermore, about 40 Cuban MIG-17/FRESCO and FISHBED fighter pilots flew combat missions alongside their Ethiopian counterparts, effectively exploiting the advantages of air superiority. The remainder of the Cuban presence has been involved in logistic, air defense, military construction, advisory, and medical activities. The degree of Havana’s commitment to Ethiopia is embodied in the presence of at least five general officers, three of them veterans of the Angolan campaign.

(C) The Soviet/Cuban effort in the Horn has not detracted from their military commitment in southern Africa (Figure 4). Although in not so dramatic a fashion as in Ethiopia, Moscow, and Havana are increasing their involvement with the Front-line states and insurgent movements targeted against Rhodesia and Southwest Africa, exerting in combination the dominant outside influence upon the region.
## Estimated Number of Advisers/Technicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>19,000-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Central African Empire</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>75-100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>65-80</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1/ Includes one general officer.
2/ Includes combat forces.
3/ Cuban forces operating into Cabinda from Congo are included in the Angolan total.
4/ Includes at least five general officers.
5/ Includes about 12,000 combat forces.
(S) It is estimated that there are 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. Approximately 1,000 Soviet advisors manage an Angola arsenal that includes MiG-21 fighters, Mi-8 helicopters and several naval craft.

(S/NOINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Cubans (and perhaps Soviets) based in Angola are engaged in training guerrillas preparing to fight in Southwest Africa and Rhodesia. Some of Havana's advisers in Angola are working with the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). In addition to instructors already stationed at two training camps in Angola, as many as 800 Cuban military personnel are reportedly being prepared at a third camp to serve as advisers to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), one of two principal Patriotic Front organizations engaged against Rhodesia. Some of them may soon be transferred to Zambia. Both Nkomo and Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's leader, have visited Havana in recent months. Some 400 SWAPO and a few hundred ZAPU trainees have received guerrilla instruction within Cuba, supplementing the assistance both organizations have received within the USSR and Eastern Europe. To date, this amounts to a handful of insurgents trained for SWAPO and up to 1,000 for ZAPU.

(S) The Soviets are continuing to build their military relationship with other southern African nations, specifically: Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia. The intentions in these states are discussed in other portions of the PRM report.

(S) The results of the comparisons to this point are illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$865 Million</th>
<th>$2.2 Billion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<td>CUBA</td>
<td>35,000 - 38,000</td>
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Total Military Assistance Agreements for Sub-Saharan Africa (1968-1977)

Total Military Personnel in Africa
Military Access

(U) Reliable access to naval ports and airfields is extremely important to the examination of the wide spectrum of military measures that can be used to counter Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa.

General Statement

(S) With the exception of Liberia US military aircraft have no reliable access to airfields throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Diplomatic clearances must first be obtained. The US during the Shaba II operation was able to obtain access to airfields into and out of Zaire. Such access is situation dependent. The Soviets would require similar clearances. Their presence on the east and west coast facilitates air operations.

East Africa

(S) US Naval presence consists of the three ships of the Middle East Force which deploy for approximately 30% of their total time in East African waters. This is supplemented by the deployment of a CINCPAC naval task group to the Indian Ocean three times a year, during which at least one month is spent in East African waters. USN ships routinely visit Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya. USN ships and aircraft have visited all three in 1978. It is anticipated that requests to visit Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Mozambique would be denied.

(S) The Soviet Union maintains a naval squadron in East Africa. At present there are 17 units deployed to the Indian Ocean: two combatants, three amphibious units, one minesweeper, one submarine and ten naval auxiliaries.

(S) The Soviets apparently intend to build up Assab in Ethiopia as a key Red Sea port. Naval vessels are also located off the port of Massawa where a floating drydock has been positioned. This suggests that the Soviets will request -- or have already requested -- special military access privileges in the Massawa and Assab areas.

(S) The Soviets set back in Somalia cost them the loss of facilities to stage naval reconnaissance TU-95/BEAR D flights over the Indian Ocean. Currently, no Ethiopian airfield is suitable for TU-95 flights.
Southern Africa

(S) The US Navy does not have access to any port or airfields between Mombasa, Kenya, and Matadi, Zaire, a distance of 4,500 miles. The Republic of South Africa has offered in the past the use of maritime support facilities, which are the best in Africa; however, for political reasons, the USG has declined such offers.

(S) The Soviet Navy periodically visits Mozambique ports.

Central and West Africa

(S) The US Navy does not regularly deploy ships to the area. During 1977 or 1978 the USN visited a number of countries along the West Coast.

(S) At present the composition of Soviet naval units in West Africa waters, i.e., 14 units, consists of two destroyers, two minesweepers, one amphibious unit, two submarines, six auxiliaries and one intelligence collector. DIA reports that the Soviets may soon upgrade the West Africa naval patrol into a "squadron."

(S) Angola has allowed the Soviet regular access to Lunada's port facility. This has provided greater flexibility to Soviet West African naval patrols. Coupled with the patrol efforts from Conakry, Guinea, the Soviets can now cover much of the African Atlantic Coast.

(S) Since early 1977, Soviet BEAR D long-range reconnaissance aircraft have deployed to Luanda Airfield in Angola. These aircraft conduct reconnaissance missions against US and Allied naval forces as well as major shipping lanes. In wartime they can perform tactical reconnaissance, cruise missile targeting and strategic command and control missions.

(S) The Soviets have supplied Guinea with military assistance in return for access to the naval and air facilities. In June 1977, TU-95 BEAR D aircraft flights were discontinued by the Guinean Government, presumably in order to encourage economic aid from the West. The Soviets are attempting to reverse that decision but have not been successful to date.

(S) Mali has previously provided Soviet access to their airfields in the port and can be expected to do so again. The Soviet Union has agreed to upgrading all the Malian airfield facilities.
These are likely to see increasing use as a supplement or replacement for the airfield in Guinea. Figure 5 illustrates the facilities available to the Soviet Union.

**French Forces**

(S) This examination of military measures will include the role currently absorbed by other Western allies. France has assumed a role that counters the Soviet/Cuban effort. Second only to the USSR as an arms supplier to Africa, France has long-maintained troops in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Djibouti. Its permanent Indian Ocean naval force matches its Soviet counterpart. Figure 6 illustrates the French forces in Africa.

**Facility to Conduct Combat Operations**

(S) Soviet and Cuban military presence throughout Sub-Saharan Africa is considerable. The combined Soviet/Cuban effort in Angola and Ethiopia facilitate the planning for and the conduct of military operations. What has been developed in the countries is a position from which combat operations could be conducted. Conceivably the Soviets can stage, equip, train and deploy a surrogate force that could destabilize neighbors. This situation is evident in the growing Soviet/Cuban support for guerilla forces engaged against Rhodesia and South Africa.

(S) Further military incursions into Zaire could extend Soviet/Cuban influence. The extension of Soviet/Cuban influence that conceivably could include Angola, Shaba Province in Zaire and Ethiopia could effect future events in Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan.

(S) The potential capability for the Soviets to conduct operations from their client states, coupled with access to naval and air facilities, will be a growing problem.

(S) A combination of port and airfield access, overflight permission and diplomatic leverage provides the Soviet Union and Cuba, in combination the possibility of being able to introduce Cuban combat forces and supplies into Africa through Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Thus, established bases of operations could be maintained for future operations.

(S) The US in response to a crisis situation in Africa does not enjoy the luxury of an established base of operations. Recent decisions by the President in PD/NSC-18 have directed that the US maintain a deployment force of light divisions with strategic
Figure 6 (continued)

French Presence in Africa

Naval Forces

Ground Forces

Air Forces

2 Breguet Atlantic
4 C-160 Transall
4 KC-135
300 men at Ndjamena

Remainder at Mogo

1750 in Chad as follows: current naval presence

100 at Nowakchott
16 at Atar
4 tractors
1 destroyer

Two at Nowakchott

4 amphibious
2 patrol
4 C-160 Transall

1 boxcopters
10 Jaguar

300 men at Ndjamena

200 at Port Bouet

600 at Libreville, Gabon

1 Ivory Coast

500 at Port Bouet

100 at Mauritania as follows:

110 Comoro Islands

Except in Mogadiscio, Somalila, East African countries are generally

French Presence in Africa

UNCLASSIFIED
June 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
David D. Newsom
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

FROM: John E. Reinhardt, Director

SUBJECT: PRM-36: Public Diplomacy Aspects
of Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa

This memorandum addresses the following: (1) attitudinal considerations; (2) recommended courses of action; including (3) VOA and other radio assets.

I. ATTITUINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The prerequisite to an effective public diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa is a policy -- authoritatively articulated -- which defines our long-term purposes in positive terms, gives our friends and fence-sitting moderates a rallying point, and begins to call into question the mantle of "legitimacy" in which the Soviets and Cubans have successfully enveloped their presence.
At the very least, the USG must force important foreign publics to reckon with a strong, consistent set of U.S. principles and objectives.

Given a comprehensive statement of U.S. policy, public diplomacy could help to: (1) develop a greater supporting consensus among important foreign publics and their governments; (2) reduce the perceptions of U.S. policy as fragmented and reflexive; (3) feed the concern of those already disturbed, for whatever reasons, by the actions of the USSR and Cuba; and (4) give further pause to those who are concerned about the consequences of Cuban/USSR intervention for their own national interests.

Our public posture should:

-- provide positive grist for the mill of those Africans and others who are openly disturbed by Soviet/Cuban militarism, and encourage those who are disturbed about the long-term implications of military intervention by any foreign power;

-- stimulate expressions of African and Arab concern about Soviet influence in Africa (possibly even among the more radical Arab countries worried about developments in Eritrea);

-- lead to amplified Indian and Iranian concern about the reintroduction of the Cold War in the Indian Ocean area;

-- feed the anxiety beginning to be expressed by unofficial Eastern Europeans that the Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa presents a potential threat to detente;

-- help dispel Western European and African fears about our perceived inability and/or lack of political will to act decisively and constructively;

-- help discredit the Cubans as a nonaligned power, by emphasizing their dependent relationship to the Soviet Union;
stimulate outspoken concern in the Caribbean basin about the implications of Cuban militarism.

II. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

We recommend two major efforts which, taken together, might help to chip away at the "legitimacy" of the Soviet/Cuban presence, could establish a more positive perception of U.S. intent -- and would lay the groundwork for public diplomacy programs.

"Code of Conduct"

We have separately suggested to the White House and the Secretary of State that the President should outline, in his June 7 speech, a "code of conduct" for superpower behavior in the Third World. While any such code would inhibit the U.S. as well as the USSR, it would on balance disadvantage the Soviets over at least the medium term and could raise the question of the legitimacy of the Soviet/Cuban role for international discussion.

In this same broad context, the Administration's public statements should touch repetitively and authoritatively on the following potentially resonant points:

-- there is concern in a number of African countries, including the anglophones, that there is a "grand design" behind the Soviet interest in influence in Africa. We need to raise the question of the USSR's hegemonial intentions;

-- external forces invited into a conflict situation for one purpose have been known to remain for other purposes. Most African nations have splinter groups, ethnic or political, and we can usefully raise the question whether any of the world's countries wish to have "mercenary" forces operating nearby;
Soviet sponsorship of Cuban presence in Africa calls into question Cuba's "nonaligned" status. Cuba attaches considerable importance to hosting the Nonaligned Conference in 1979. This point can be made in low key publicly, but in parallel with private discussion, particularly with the Indians.

U.S. Policy Toward Africa

The minimum prerequisite to effective public diplomacy is a comprehensive, positive reiteration of U.S. African policy, perhaps by Ambassador Young who has unique credentials and credibility with Africans. It would be important, immediately following his speech, to have it "authenticated" by statements by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Key points in the message:

-- The Carter Administration initiated, from the outset, a significant change in U.S. policies toward Africa, characterized by the principles of self-determination, majority rule, territorial integrity and development on African terms.

-- We agree with Africans that attention must be focussed on African problems, not on power rivalry on African soil; but we will assist, in whatever ways possible, the ability of African nations to resist aggression.

-- The basic and urgent necessity for most of Africa is increased development.

-- President Carter is prepared to join with other developed nations to respond cooperatively to Africa's economic priorities.
The U.S. remains fully committed to majority rule in Southern Africa and to active support of peaceful solutions of African problems by Africans.

Public Diplomacy Actions

Assuming something like the public posture recommended above, ICA could assist by:

- live broadcasting and TV satelliting (or, at a minimum, videotaping) of speeches and statements by the Administration;

- full-text distribution to media and influential individuals in important countries;

- background briefings by Administration officials for those in the foreign press corps who are read or heard by significant audiences in the Third World;

- convening seminars and conferences involving foreign and American specialists on economic and security subjects;

- bringing to the U.S., over the next few months, appropriate foreign media and government officials, especially Africans, for discussions of Third World developments with their American counterparts in and out of the USG;

- cross-filing supportive statements by Africans and others via ICA media in an effort to enhance their resonance.

More specifically, and without overstating ICA's capability -- and assuming an effective, constructive and authoritative exposition of the American position -- we can help to precipitate both a more pointed discussion of the Soviet/Cuban presence and (hopefully) a more articulate consensus opposed to it among important publics.
Additional Initiatives

There are two psychological factors which deserve special consideration and action through both traditional and public diplomacy.

The Nonaligned Conference: Cuba places great importance on hosting a conference of nonaligned nations in June, 1979. We should take advantage of the fact that the host country has clearly aligned itself with the USSR.

Diplomatic and public diplomacy channels should be utilized to raise the prospect that the site of the conference ought to be changed. At a minimum, we should attempt to raise the level of discomfiture among those who will attend -- hopefully having some of the nonaligned countries publicly surface questions about the suitability of Cuba as host.

The scheduled visit this month of the Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, may afford us a special opportunity.

His Foreign Minister made the following statement on May 13 in the context of a warning against the danger of the great powers "dashing in" when "developing countries fight amongst themselves for a piece of territory or something else":

"We think it is essential for this purpose for all members of the movement to adhere strictly and genuinely to the concept of non-alignment. The presence of foreign armed personnel in large numbers on the territory of a non-aligned country for long periods, particularly when these are no longer needed for defense against external aggression, is likely to cause anxiety in the minds of other non-aligned nations."

Questions:

1. Would it be possible through diplomatic channels to induce a similar statement by the Prime Minister while he is in Washington?
2. Would it be possible to include a statement in the communique concerning the appropriate role for nonaligned nations?

The Threat of Rebel Groups: We should be able to capitalize on the fact that there are a significant number of nations in the Third World which are threatened by rebel forces -- whether tribal or political. What is now happening in Zaire and other African countries can happen elsewhere; indeed, rebel forces elsewhere will be heartened to the extent that any sovereign power is successfully toppled by such forces.

We should undertake a series of statements to point out that to the extent that tribal and/or political forces, armed from the outside, succeed anywhere, there is a danger of infection and contagion elsewhere.

III. VOA AND OTHER RADIO ASSETS

As the single medium which can be mobilized immediately to communicate directly with large numbers of people around the world, the Voice of America has a significant role to play.

While its news broadcasts must remain independent of policy control, VOA commentaries, analyses, editorial roundups, and backgrounders can be used to explain American policies in Africa, place them in the larger East/West and North/South contexts, and feature statements by foreign media and foreign leaders which support and reinforce these policies.

Africa

VOA currently broadcasts via shortwave to Africa in English, French, Swahili, and Portuguese. However, the VOA signal to southern and southeastern Africa is neither reliable nor qualitatively satisfactory. We are discussing with OMB and the Congress the...
installation of a mediumwave transmitter in Botswana to cover southern Africa. The transmitter could be on the air within six months of the date of OMB/Congressional approval.

In our commentary, analysis, and public affairs programming to Africa, we stress the active role that the United States is now playing in the peaceful resolution of conflicts in this area, our support for African self-determination and development, and the potential threat to the political stability of any state of foreign military intervention. We will continue our cross-broadcasting of helpful statements by Africans and others.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

VOA broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will, in commentary and editorial programming, stress the costs of Cuban/Soviet adventurism in Africa -- particularly in terms of the potential dangers it presents to detente.

Latin America

VOA currently broadcasts via shortwave to Latin America live and by satellite feed in Spanish, English and Portuguese. The same Spanish programs are also broadcast to Cuba via mediumwave; we do not now originate programs specifically tailored to Cuban audiences. Additionally, much of Latin America (and importantly the Caribbean) can pick up VOA English broadcasts to Africa. Within the limits of its current air time, VOA will increase the proportion of time devoted to the issues at hand.

OPTION I: VOA can program specifically for Cuban audiences at a cost of $100,000 per year for a daily one-hour program.

There are advantages to this course of action and there are possible disadvantages as well. The latter include the fact that the differences between
a special Cuban broadcast and our broadcasts to the rest of Latin America would not be lost upon the Cubans, who monitor our broadcasts to the hemisphere. The GOC could make considerable psychological capital -- both domestically and internationally -- out of the perception that the United States would have launched a "propaganda war" reminiscent of the days of the cold war. We could also contribute, perversely, to the impression that Cuba is more important than it is.

**OPTION II:** VOA could increase the total amount of air time broadcast to Latin America via shortwave, with a corresponding increase in commentary, analysis, and public affairs programming. This would cost approximately $250,000 a year per one-hour daily increase in air time.

**Other Radios**

Other national radios can be encouraged to step up supportive broadcasting. The Administration may wish to enlist -- through diplomatic channels -- cooperation from the British, French, Dutch, German, Portuguese, and Egyptian national radios. They have large audiences and good credibility in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and can be of significant help.
The following section analyses both the bilateral and multilateral economic policy options that the U.S. could pursue in an effort to encourage Cuba to follow a responsible foreign policy in Africa. Consideration has been given to both economic sanctions and economic inducements. A foreign policy towards Cuba consisting of economic sanctions would act to further limit Cuba's access to western technology and financing. A foreign policy consisting of positive inducements would reverse the current US policy of isolating Cuba to one of bringing Cuba as quickly as possible into the western financial system. Neither of these options would probably create sufficient economic leverage to induce moderation of Cuba's foreign policy and both would require considerable political capital.

I. U.S. Bilateral Economic Sanctions and Inducements

A. Negative Inducements

1. Reverse Relaxation of Economic Sanctions: Since 1975, relaxation of sanctions has taken place in four general commercial areas. Reapplying, tightening, or denying further easing of restrictions in these areas would impose a cost on Cuba.

   (a) US Foreign Subsidiary Trade: Because of difficulties in US relations with third countries over US "extraterritorial jurisdiction" over US foreign subsidiaries, restrictions or trade between US foreign subsidiaries and Cuba were eased in 1975 with the effect that subsidiary exports were allowed for non-strategic goods with insubstantial US-origin components and not involving US dollar accounts. Since October 1975, licenses for such subsidiary exports have amounted to $452 million: $326 million in non-US food grains and $126 million in a variety of non-strategic manufactured goods. Restoring the restrictions would probably not deny Cuba most of the goods (with the possible exception of spare parts) which could generally be purchased from other countries. Reimposing the restrictions would, however, also pose a political cost to the US in our relations with third countries.

   (b) Tourism: In March 1977, restrictions on travel by US citizens to Cuba were removed. Cuba is hoping to benefit from expanded US tourism. Cuban estimates indicate that annually about 14,000 US tourists and businessmen will visit Cuba between 1978 and 1980. In 1978, a total of about 300,000 foreigners are expected to visit Cuba. Gross hard currency revenues (not profits) from US tourists are projected
to be at most $6.5 million in 1978. Although reimposing US travel restrictions alone would not exert significant economic pressure on Cuba, travel restrictions in concert with Canada could apply considerably more pressure since Canada's flow of 50,000 visitors provides an estimated 90 percent of Cuba's hard currency tourist earnings. Such tourist earnings, however, account for only about five percent of Cuba's total hard currency earnings. US travel restrictions might raise a humanitarian problem if the Cuban Government retaliated by preventing Cubans from visiting their relatives in the US.

(c) Ship and Aircraft Bunkering: Ships of third countries enroute to or from Cuba were prohibited from bunkering at US ports until August 1975, when this restriction was lifted. Bunkering by Cuban vessels is still prohibited. Denial of third country bunkering privilege would result in a small increase in cost to Cuba in terms of the availability and cost of merchant transport. The US could also reimpose the sanctions which prohibit third country ships engaged in Cuban trade from carrying U.S. aid shipments. This measure could result in significant logistical dislocations for Cuba and a marginal increase in cost.

(d) Remittances: As of January 1978, US residents were permitted to remit to close relatives in Cuba a maximum of $2,000 annually. There are believed to be about 750,000 Cubans in the US. The precise number of those legally eligible and economically capable of making remittances is unknown, but if only as few as 10 percent remit the yearly maximum, the hard currency earnings for Cuba would be $.15 million. Although providing potentially substantial hard currency earnings, the remittances are not sufficiently great to offer usable leverage on Cuba.

2. Cut Off US-Cuban Telecommunications: Throughout the embargo period, telecommunication links between Cuba and the US, and through the US to the rest of the world, have remained uninterrupted for a number of political, humanitarian, and intelligence reasons. Two links exist: a submarine cable and an over the horizon system. Cuba's only alternative link to the rest of the world consists of a nonstationary Soviet satellite which is accessible only during certain periods of the day. Cuba accrues no direct financial benefit from the US links because out-going calls are placed collect and revenue from incoming calls is placed in a blocked-US account. The indirect commercial value, however, is considerable in that it significantly facilitates commercial relations with third countries. Although doubtlessly of great utility to Cuba, the telecommunication links are not
so important as to motivate it to change its foreign policy. The U.S. would also face a political cost in cutting the link in terms of the reaction of third countries with which Cuba trades.

3. Abrogation of the U.S.-Cuban Fisheries Agreement: In September 1977, the U.S.-Cuba Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) entered into force providing the basis for Cuba to apply for permission to fish in the U.S. 200 mile fisheries conservation zone. To date Cuba has only been granted a quota for certain types of fish in the North Atlantic. Hard currency earnings from this quota in 1978 will not exceed $7 million. Cuba's fisheries earnings from U.S. waters under the GIFA will be substantially below earnings prior to the March 1977 U.S. extension of its fishing zone from 12 miles to 200 miles. Abrogation of the GIFA would have little commercial impact on Cuba.

The U.S. has, additionally, completed all procedural measures approving a small shark quota for Cuba except for the physical transfer of the official quota documents. Although the quota is of insignificant commercial importance, the transfer of the documents and activation of the quota could have an undesirable symbolic impact. The imminent transfer of the documents by State to Cuba could be postponed.

B. Positive Inducements

1. Normalization of Economic Relations: The most readily available positive inducement for Cuba is the removal of US restrictions on commercial and financial relations. The removal of restrictions could be executed totally, partially or incrementally.

   a) **Total Normalization:** This would involve removal of both the trade embargo per se, as well as restrictions on Cuban access to commercial bank credit and benefits such as MFN status, GSP, and Exim finance, which could require Congressional action. Such unencumbered access to US markets could lead by 1981 to total Cuban exports to the US of a maximum of $350 million. Cuban imports from the US by 1981 could reach a maximum of $390 million (30% of Cuban imports) and would include food and industrial products, including spare parts, and US technology. If normalization of relations took place prior to settlement of the $2 billion in US claims on Cuba resulting from the expropriation of US property, the US would lose one of the few bargaining chips available to press Cuba for a claims settlement. Following a resolution of US claims, however, US private investment and commercial
bank lending could become a substantial source of financing for Cuba if Cuban policy permitted.

b) Partial Normalization of Relations: Some parts of the sanctions could be removed while other were left in force. Generally, however, such partial measures would provide little inducement and be difficult for the U.S. to administer.

c) Incremental Normalization of Relations: As a variation of partial relaxations, the US could ease sanctions incrementally with each additional easing conditioned on matching positive changes in Cuban policy. The marginal growth of benefits to Cuba would, however, have very little impact on Cuban policy.

II. Multilateral Economic Sanctions and Inducements

A. Negative Sanctions

1. Expansion of Trade Embargo: A mandatory multilateral trade embargo of Cuba would require a UN Security Council action (i.e., Rhodesia). This would at most limit Cuba's access to western markets which currently compose 30 percent of Cuba's trade and would not affect trade with Cuba's major trading partners, the socialist countries. (See background paper defining Cuba's trade relationships.) In addition, this action may not be feasible within the current UN framework and would immediately open up the U.S. to charges of economic aggression.

Alternatively the U.S. could ask the western countries to cut off trade with Cuba independent of the UN mechanism. Cuba's major western trading partners include: Canada, Japan, Spain and Argentina. Cuba relies on these countries for import of high technology that cannot be obtained in the eastern bloc and for major foodstuffs. Although the data is not available to quantify Cuba's dependence on western spare parts, Cuba would bear economic cost if access to all western spare parts was curtailed. The capacity of the eastern bloc to supply the spare parts is unknown. Canadian grain alone made up 25 percent of Cuba's total imports from western countries in 1976. (However, it is not realistic to assume that Canada would be willing to curtail export of wheat to Cuba since the Soviet Union, a major importer of Canadian grain, buys the grain for Cuba.) To the extent that the imports of technological goods from these western governments can be curtailed, some reduction in growth might occur over time resulting in internal discontent against involvement in Africa. However, it is unlikely that Cuba's western trading partners will be convinced that expansion of the U.S. trade embargo will be effective and they, therefore, are not likely to curtail their trade, with Cuba.
2. **Eliminate private financial flows**: Presently Cuba is dependent upon commercial banks for private financial flows to pay for imports from western countries and to service the hard currency external debt of the GOC which totalled $1.9 billion at the end of 1977. Cuba has received substantial private financial flows from Japanese and Western European banks. If Cuba lost its access to private financing, imports from western nations would have to be curtailed. This would result in some reduction in growth over time as Cuba primarily borrows to import capital goods. Cuba would not be able to meet the targets under its five-year plan and some internal discontent against African involvement might result. Commercial banks in all likelihood would discontinue loans to Cuba if governments publicly reviewed Cuba's creditworthiness, and found that due to the political uncertainty surrounding Cuba's political status in Africa, Cuba no longer had access to official credits for creditworthiness reasons.

If Cuba's access to both private and official credits dried up, the Soviet Union or an Eastern European country might choose to loan or grant hard currency to Cuba in place of these flows. In that event the cost would be imposed on the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc countries; these flows may not be a perfect substitute for the flows from western countries.

**B. Positive Inducements**

1. **Bring Cuba into Western International Financial and Trading System**: The U.S. could offer to support Cuba's entry into the various institutions such as the IDB, IBRD, Caribbean Development Bank and the IMF in an effort to reorient Cuba's economic dependence towards the Western countries and away from the Soviet Union. These institutions could provide a fair amount of technical assistance and resource transfers over the next several years. The Cuban Government has not to date expressed an interest in participating in these institutions. Although Cuba is not banned from joining these institutions, the U.S. would have to work hard to overcome the ideological biases which now exist in order to pave the way for Cuba's entry into this system. Any such effort would be complicated by President Carter's promise to Congress early this year to oppose any lending to Cuba through MDBs.
In addition, the U.S. could ask other western countries
to provide primary Cuban exports with tariff preferences in
an effort to increase trade relations with these countries.

2. Match Soviet Offer: The western countries could
offer to match Soviet economic assistance to Cuba through
a combination of bilateral and multilateral arrangements.
The amount of assistance required for such an effort would
be substantial since Soviet economic assistance will reach
a record level of $2.3 billion in 1978. (see background)
Even an offer of matched economic assistance might not attract
Cuba given the ideological harmony between the Soviet Union
and Cuba and the ideological disharmony between Cuba and western
countries. In addition, the political costs to this administrati
would be high; congressional opposition would be very difficult
to overcome. Another disadvantage to this option is that we
would be rewarding Cuba for actions which we do not agree with.
This effort would be complicated by the fact that many western
countries including Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden are
contemplating the elimination of their past bilateral assistance
programs to Cuba (approximately $30 million) in protest of
Cuba's African involvement. (Official trade credits and
guarantees have not however, been affected by their African
policy.)
CUBA: FINANCIAL SITUATION

The following analysis is intended to provide a brief overview of Cuba's external financial relations both with socialist and western countries. This overview will help provide the background necessary to evaluate the policy options open to the U.S. to help counter Cuba's involvement in the African states.

Trade Relations

As a one-crop economy, Cuba is highly dependent on foreign trade to provide the materials necessary for economic development. The Soviet Union replaced the United States as Cuba's major trading partner following the break in economic relations between the U.S. and Cuba in the early 1960s. Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet Union has increased since that time.

In 1978 approximately 50 percent of Cuba's total trade is expected to be with the Soviet Union. As a member of CMEA, a socialist common market type of operation, Cuba conducts an additional 20 percent of its trade with socialist countries (see Table I). The Intra-CMEA trade is conducted with "soft" or nonconvertible currency which means that export proceeds from trade with one CMEA country can only be used to finance imports from that country.

Although the Cuban economy is primarily oriented towards trade with socialist countries, Cuba has traded substantially with western countries over the last few years. The GOC relies on the western countries for import of high technology which cannot be purchased from the eastern bloc and for imports of foodstuffs (see Table II). The value of Cuba's trade with western countries increased marginally in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (see Table III) Trade with the west increased substantially in 1974 when the GOC believed that the world price of sugar would average 20 cents per pound throughout the 1975-80 planning period. However, with the fall in sugar prices the "western" share of Cuba's foreign trade declined from an average of 40 percent in 1974 and 1975 to 30 percent in the 1976. The shortage of foreign exchange in 1976 meant that the areas of Cuba's five-year plan that relied on western capital had to be abandoned. As a result the Cuban Government began to replace goods "formerly purchased in free markets" with goods from Eastern bloc countries.
Western countries which have had significant trade relations with Cuba since 1974 include: Japan, Canada, Spain, Argentina, and France. (See Table IV) In 1974 and 1975, Japan was Cuba's major western trade partner for several reasons. Private commercial banks in Japan were willing to loan to Cuba to finance Japanese imports and Japan's official export promotion agency provided Cuba with approximately $400 million in trade credits from 1974 to 1976. In addition, Japan can supply the high technology which Cuba demands. Furthermore, since Japan relies on large quantitatives of imported sugar, Cuba could benefit by replacing Australia as Japan's major supplier of sugar when their current trade contract expires in 1980. In 1976 Canada replaced Japan as Cuba's major western trading partner.

Cuba has had ready access to official trade credits from the other western nations with which it has traded in the past few years. (See table V) However, since the retrenchment in trade with western countries in 1976, these credits have only been utilized to 40 percent of capacity. Some credit lines including the line from the United Kingdom have not been used at all.

**Foreign Assistance:** The Soviet Union has been the major source of foreign assistance to Cuba since the early 1960s. Soviet economic assistance to Cuba from 1961 to 1976 totalled $8.2 billion (see Table VI) and it is expected to reach $2.3 billion in 1978 alone. The economic assistance that Cuba receives from the Soviet Union takes many forms. The Soviets have subsidized petroleum exports to Cuba by providing 95 percent of Cuba's petroleum needs at half the world price. They have continually made soft currency purchases of Cuban sugar and nickel above world prices and have made hard currency purchases of sugar when Cuba was in need of foreign exchange. As an expression of continued support of the Cuban Government, the Soviet Union indicated that it would increase its assistance to Cuba in 1978 by:

--- increasing the price it pays for Cuban sugar from about 31 percent per pound to about 40 percent per pound;

--- purchasing an additional 360,000 tons of sugar above the 2.7 million tons originally programmed in the 1978 trade protocol;

--- purchasing with hard currency an additional 500,000 tons of sugar outside the protocol; and by
providing an additional $200 million in Soviet goods to help offset lagging Cuban imports from the West.

Other Eastern bloc countries including Czechoslovakia, East Germany, etc., also provide aid to Cuba by purchasing sugar and nickel at subsidized prices. In addition, these countries provide more traditional forms of development assistance through export of "whole factories" with relatively good repayment schedules. (12 years repayment period, two percent interest, usually one year grace). Most of these governments appear to be dedicated to Cuba's development efforts and it is not likely that the aid levels will be reduced because of Cuba's African involvement.

Western governments have provided limited amounts of foreign assistance to Cuba over the past several years. While this bilateral assistance is insignificant in amount, its importance lies in the fact that it is a display of western support for the Cuban Government. However, at least three countries including Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands are contemplating suspension of their bilateral aid programs in response to the growing involvement of Cuba in African affairs.

Access to Hard Currency: Cuba is dependent upon access to hard currency both to service its external debt which reached $1.9 billion at the end of 1977 and finance imports from western countries. Cuba's major source of hard currency foreign exchange is through export of sugar. (see Table VII) In 1976, proceeds from the export of sugar comprised 80 percent of Cuba's hard currency earnings. When finalized, Cuba will derive substantial benefits from the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) which guarantees access to the free market for 2.5 million tons of Cuban sugar at prices above the current world market level.

A second source of hard currency is commercial lending. The Cuban government has borrowed substantially from Japanese and Western European commercial banks over the past several years to finance imports. (see Table VIII) Japanese commercial banks have continued to make commercial loans available to Cuba even though the GOJ has expressed concern over Cuba's involvement in Africa. The Japanese government has indicated that decisions of the banking community are outside government control and, therefore, Cuba's access to these lines will not likely be hampered by political concerns.

However, Cuba has been forced to increasingly rely on short-term bank-to-bank credits because the negative political
atmosphere created by its African policies has made European banks reluctant to participate in longer term publicized Eurocurrency loans to Cuba.

Because private financing has been less accessible, when possible, the GOC has been using official trade credit lines to finance imports from western nations. Access to these official credit lines could be influenced by political concerns although Cuba's Africa policy has not yet affected the availability of these lines. A government public review of Cuba's creditworthiness could provide the opportunity to reduce the official credit lines and would probably be followed by a reassessment by commercial banks of their lending policy toward Cuba.

At present, Cuba has three sources of hard currency derived directly from the United States: U.S. tourism; fisheries; and family remittances. The total gross revenue (not profit) associated with American travel to Cuba in 1978 will at the outside not amount to more than $6.5 million, approximately 1.5 percent of total Cuban hard currency earnings. Potential hard currency gain from U.S. zone fisheries at a maximum will reach 10 million in 1978, about 2.5 percent of total currency convertible currency earnings. Early this year Treasury regulations were amended to allow a maximum transfer of $500 every three months by U.S. resident or spouse to close relatives in Cuba. This could provide $15 million in foreign exchange to Cuba in 1978. Therefore, the total amount of foreign exchange that can be influenced directly by U.S. activity is $31.5 million in 1978, less than 8 percent of Cuba's total projected hard currency earnings for the year.
This paper examines a range of positive and negative economic actions and instruments that might be employed by the United States—alone or, preferably, in concert with others—to influence the foreign policies of African countries that may be subject to Soviet and Cuban pressure. The measures are considered in the context of two groups of key African countries—those in which the Soviets and Cubans are already influential (Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique—Tabs 1, 3 and 5, respectively) and those countries in which the Soviets and Cubans are not now particularly influential (Botswana, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia—Tabs 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, respectively).

I. Positive Measures. Designed to contribute to economic development or to stabilize the economy.

A. Concessional Economic Assistance. Additional economic assistance through Security Supporting Assistance or development assistance is the most direct and flexible policy instrument. It is most effective if used in concert with other donors, including the multilateral development banks. Currently, balance of payments difficulties in Zaire, Zambia and Sudan would suggest large balance of payments support programs—in each country, on the order of several hundred million dollars annually from all sources. Kenya, Angola, Somalia and, perhaps, Mozambique could probably absorb additional development assistance in the tens of millions of dollars annually from all donors. Aside from technical assistance, the Soviet Union and Cuba provide little economic assistance to Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

B. Allocate more PL 480 and FMS credits to the region. While possessing some of the flexibility of Security Supporting Assistance, these programs are limited by our pursuit of other policy objectives, e.g., availability of appropriate commodities and arms transfer policies, respectively. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire could absorb additional PL 480 commodities. New or additional FMS credits would be appropriate for Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia. The magnitudes of the PL 480 and FMS programs would probably not exceed $20 million annually from the United States, except in Zaire and, perhaps, Sudan.
C. Expatriate Subsidy Program. All the countries examined are dependent on expatriates, to some extent, to perform technical or professional services. The cost of expatriates is a substantial drain on their balance of payments. The Cubans and Soviets maintain very large technical assistance programs in Angola and Mozambique, while the other countries in the Horn and Southern and Central Africa hire contract labor directly in the West. An expatriate subsidy program would have the effect of providing a foreign exchange guarantee to the expatriate and reducing the direct hire cost to the African Government, while strengthening a key economic link between the African countries and the West. It could offer Mozambique and Angola an alternative to Soviet/Cuban technical aid.

D. Private Bank Lending. OPIC presently offers relatively high cost loan insurance to projects with an American sponsor and substantial American management input. There is also a small direct loan program for this purpose. The Administration might wish to consider permitting OPIC to guarantee loans made directly to selected African governments.

E. Expand Ex-IM financing in Africa. Currently, the main barriers are lack of creditworthiness among some African countries (e.g., Sudan, Zaire, and Zambia) and the unfamiliarity of U.S. exporters with the area. Barring a change in creditworthiness criteria, significant expansion is not likely.

F. Expanded Multilateral Development Bank Lending. Project formulation and complementary local government policy changes are sometimes constraints on MDB lending. However, in most of the African countries the MDBs are very active. Quiet discussions with Bank officials might relax insistence on economic policy changes and might reduce the perception in some countries of "Bank arrogance." Given the long gestation period for projects, the increase in flows would probably be minor.

G. Shift in Commodity Policy. Most of the African countries are dependent on exports of one or a few commodities to the West: copper (Zaire and Zambia), beef (Botswana), cotton (Sudan), hard fibers (Tanzania) and coffee (Angola, Ethiopia and Kenya). The Carter Administration has adopted a positive posture toward the negotiation of price stabilizing commodity agreements (ICAs) where they appear feasible and in the
U.S. interest. We are now members of the Coffee and Tin Agreements and we are about to culminate ICAs for sugar and wheat; also we have expressed a willingness to participate in negotiations for agreements on rubber and cocoa and a producer-consumer discussion body for coconuts. Beyond these commodities we either seriously doubt the feasibility of a viable agreement or we expect heavy opposition from U.S. domestic interests and perhaps Congress. Moreover, while more active support for the ICAs would strengthen bonds between some African countries and the West and would generate some political goodwill, we could not expect significant improvement in political ties.

IMF Conditionality/Stabilization Program. In the past, such activities as private bank and Ex-Im lending and, at times, concessional assistance have been contingent on an IMF-supported stabilization program. This policy has the advantage of reducing the need for aid and strengthening longer-term economic and political stability. The policy may inhibit the implementation of some of the above measures in, for example, Sudan, Zaire or Zambia, where the countries for one reason or another cannot undertake reforms in the short run.

II. Negative Measures. Designed to increase the economic cost of undesirable policies.


B. Oil Embargo. Several of the African countries (Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan) are dependent on the conservative oil producers (Saudi Arabia, Iran or Kuwait). While radical oil producers, such as Iraq, Algeria and Libya, might step in, in the event of an embargo, the foreign exchange cost and disruption would be substantial.

C. GSP Eligibility. All the countries are GSP beneficiaries, and the benefits could be withdrawn. The effect would be minor, except in Mozambique, where $20 million of sugar exports to the U.S. received GSP benefits.
D. Reduce Positive Measures. The measures in Section I could be reduced or eliminated, including a slowdown in multilateral development bank lending. Such steps would be more effective, if in concert with other Western countries. The IBRD should be particularly included in a concerted, since it is the main coordinating institution for assistance to all the countries, except non-members Angola and Mozambique.
Soviet Union

Economic and financial measures which might be employed to encourage responsible Soviet actions as well as to inhibit meddling in African affairs.

(A) Roles which might be played by financial institutions.

(1) U.S. Government agencies (Eximbank, CCC, OPIC):
No significant role is possible for these agencies at present. They are effectively barred by U.S. legislation from extending credits to the Soviet Union. Prospects for change are not such as might induce the Soviets to modify their behavior at present.

(2) Private financial institutions:
Private U.S. banks and other financial institutions might be persuaded to cut back on credits for the Soviet Union, including financing of U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and participation in consortiums to extend credits. This would, however, not be likely to be effective in influencing Soviet behavior unless coordinated with similar actions by other major Western governments -- an unlikely prospect.

(3) International financial and economic development assistance institutions (IBRD, IMF, and other Western organizations):
No significant role is possible for these agencies at present. The Soviet Union is not a member of these institutions and does not receive credits from them. Prospects for change are remote and not likely to influence Soviet behavior.

(B) Impact of financial and economic measures.

(1) Debt rescheduling.
The Soviet Union is not expected to have difficulty in meeting its financial obligations. A positive current-account balance was achieved in 1977 and is a distinct possibility in 1978. Debt rescheduling is not a realistic prospect soon.
(2) Credit availability.

Sufficient credit on attractive terms is expected to be available to the Soviet Union in 1978. Unilateral attempts by the United States to restrict credit to the Soviet Union would be unlikely to have significant impact. Prospects for effective multilateral action are distinctly limited.

(3) Commodity markets.

The Soviet Union is dependent on the United States for certain high-technology machinery and equipment (e.g., high-capacity oil well pumps; large computers) and for roughly half of its grain imports. The machinery and equipment are in some cases important for improving the productivity of Soviet industries. The grain is important for developing the production of livestock. Efforts to use export controls to influence Soviet behavior would probably meet strong resistance from the Soviets, who would probably do without or accept less satisfactory substitutes rather than yield to economic pressure. Cutting off such U.S. exports would presumably be resisted by U.S. farmers and exporters. Cutting U.S. grain exports below 6 million metric tons a year would run counter to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement, except in case of short supply.

(4) Trade.

A cutoff of U.S.-Soviet trade would have relatively minor impact on the Soviet Union, except for certain items not obtainable elsewhere, unless coordinated with similar actions by other major Western nations -- an unlikely prospect. U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. totaled $1.6 billion in 1977, and imports totaled $234 million, a minor part of Soviet trade, which totaled over $75 billion in 1976, with gross national product over $897 billion.