

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Angola (U)

The breakdown of the Bicesse Accords and the national reconciliation process in Angola present a major policy challenge of how to terminate the renewed civil war and encourage the establishment of a democratic and representative government in Luanda. One immediate issue for the Clinton Administration is whether to recognize Angola and establish diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of Angola. (S)

This policy review should be completed by February 22. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any difference in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues: (S)

Part I: Assessment

- What are the U.S. interests in Angola? Do our political and economic interests, and historical relationship with the Angolan parties, justify a more active USG involvement in Angola? Less involvement? (S)
- What are the immediate and longer term goals of the Government and UNITA, and can they be reconciled? (S)
- What is the most likely outcome for continuing civil war? Does time favor the Government, UNITA, or neither? (S)
- What is the impact of continuing civil war on other countries in southern Africa, particularly on the prospects for implementation of the Mozambique peace accords, the transition in South Africa, and the prospects for Namibia? (S)
- What would be the effects on Angola of continued instability in Zaire?

Part II: Options for Policy

- What role should the U.S. take, if any, in promoting national reconciliation? Should the U.S. play a mediating role? How would any U.S. role relate to the UN's role, and that of the other major outside actors (Portugal, Russia)? (C)
- What are our options for recognition (or continued non-recognition) of the GRA? The options should discuss the impact on the peace process, including whether recognition can be conditioned in a fashion to maximize the incentives for both parties to reach a peaceful and durable accommodation. (C)
- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible courses of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. African policy, any applicable legislative constraints, and any budgetary implications (including foreign assistance). (U)
- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. (U)

Part III: Tasking

- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. (C)



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