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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Nonproliferation
and Export Controls ~~(S)~~

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missiles, and advanced conventional weapons poses a growing danger to the security of the United States, its forces, friends and allies. The United States has long been in the forefront of international nonproliferation efforts. President Clinton has stressed the urgency of a strengthened international effort to combat proliferation as a priority for his administration. (U)

In recent years, the resort to ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, coupled with our subsequent experience in Iraq, have underlined the gravity of this problem. The dangers of proliferation, however, are not confined to a single region. Demand for weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems persists. The availability of equipment and technology to develop them is growing. While a number of international norms -- such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, now, the Chemical Weapons Convention -- have attracted widespread support, in many areas the barriers against proliferation could be greatly strengthened. ~~(S)~~

Recent developments have affected the dangers of proliferation. Some have been helpful. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown beyond 150 parties and the

Chemical Weapons Convention has been opened for signature. Export regimes have expanded their membership and control lists. Expected reductions in superpower arsenals have raised the prospect for minimizing the threat from international stocks of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium. (S)

Other developments are worrisome. Militarily-useful technologies have become increasingly available through the relaxation of East-West export controls and increased industrialization worldwide. New suppliers of dangerous technologies are emerging, further complicating our efforts to ensure that dual-use technologies are not diverted to military purposes. Expanded export controls are not adequately harmonized or implemented. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union has raised the possibility of leakage, or even a hemorrhage, of weapons, technology, and talent to third parties. These changes are eroding U.S. leverage to accomplish nonproliferation objectives unilaterally, increasing the importance of increased multilateral collaboration. (S)

In light of these changes, the United States must develop a stronger and more integrated nonproliferation policy. This review is intended to provide the basis for such a policy. (U)

Part I: Assessment

- What is the level of threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, and advanced conventional proliferation in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean peninsula, China, and elsewhere? Where is the threat most urgent? How is that threat likely to change in the years ahead? (S)
- How effectively do existing U.S. nonproliferation efforts address that threat? (S)
- What vulnerabilities in existing international nonproliferation norms and institutions require immediate attention? (S)
- What are the most important gaps in our knowledge of proliferation-related activities worldwide? (S)
- How successful have the various export control regimes (e.g., COCOM, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, supercomputer control regime) been in stemming weapons proliferation? (S)
- How effective are existing international organizations in controlling proliferation (e.g., IAEA) and what deficiencies exist? (S)
- What proliferation risks are posed by exports from the members of these regimes, as well as from other countries, such as China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union? (S)

- What threat is posed to U.S. national security by the transfer to various countries of conventional weapons, advanced or otherwise? (C)
- How successfully does U.S. policy go beyond supply side controls to address the demand side of the proliferation equation, especially in the missile and conventional spheres? (C)
- Are U.S. laws and regulations well matched to our nonproliferation objectives? Are they being effectively implemented? (C)
- What changes to U.S. export control laws, regulations, enforcement and institutional arrangements would strengthen restrictions on suppliers of nuclear technologies? (C)
- What organizational impediments, redundancies, or other obstacles now exist within the U.S. government to more effective nonproliferation policies? (C)
- What are the effects of U.S. nonproliferation policies upon other U.S. priorities, e.g., U.S. economic growth; political and economic reform in China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union; the Middle East peace process? (C)

Part II: Options for Policy

- What policies and actions, beyond those which the United States currently is pursuing, should be undertaken to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them? What current U.S. nonproliferation policies, if any, should be abandoned? All available policy tools -- diplomatic, political, intelligence, economic, security assistance, military, and other -- should be considered. Particular focus should be given to the Middle East, South Asia, China, the Korean peninsula, and the former Soviet Union. (C)
- What additional steps should be taken to strengthen existing international nonproliferation norms and institutions, including the IAEA? What additional measures, including penalties as well as benefits, are required to inhibit the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction? (C)
- What steps should be taken to improve the linkage between nonproliferation intelligence and nonproliferation policy? What should be our highest intelligence priorities for nonproliferation? (C)
- In what ways does the possibility of the acquisition, use, or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and advanced conventional weapons against U.S. interests, forces, or allies require modification of U.S. defense policies, research and development, training, planning, and

procurement? What modifications should be considered under those conditions? (C)

- What actions can be taken to minimize the threat posed by present or future inventories of fissile materials? What actions can be taken to hasten the destruction or dismantlement of weapons and materials of proliferation concern? (S)
- What steps should be taken, if any, to integrate U.S. missile nonproliferation policy with U.S. policies toward commercial use of space and theater missile defenses? (S)
- Should the United States seek support for a binding international commitment against missile proliferation and, if so, what should that commitment include? (C)
- What modifications, if any, should be made to existing security assurances? (S)
- What actions should be taken to harmonize and strengthen domestic and multilateral approaches to export controls? (S)
- How should the United States balance its nonproliferation and other national security objectives with its need for a robust export sector? What changes, if any, should we adopt in our application of munitions and dual-use export controls (including telecommunications and computer controls)? (S)
- What institutional and organizational changes within the U.S. government would strengthen our nonproliferation efforts? (S)
- What additional steps should be taken to address the dangers of destabilizing conventional arms transfers? (S)
- What steps, if any, should be taken to modify U.S. nonproliferation laws and regulations, including sanctions provisions? What steps, if any, should be taken to improve their implementation? (C)

Part III: Tasking

- The NSC Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls should convene an Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls to conduct this review, task specific drafting responsibilities, set deadlines, and assure implementation. (S)
- The review should be conducted in a manner that will provide a basis for resolving concrete issues currently requiring decision. It should include analysis and recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with these issues. Any differences in view among agencies should be noted. (U)

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- Each option should include pros and cons (reflecting implications for broader U.S. national security and economic interests as well as budgetary impact) and an outline of an implementing strategy (including applicable legislation).
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- This review is due to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than March 12, 1993. ~~(S)~~



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